Military

• Level I: Personnel - Command group, special platoon leaders, primary staff. Technique - sand table. Where - Bn TOC. When - Time.
• Level II: Personnel - Bn Cdr, Bn XO, S-3,S-2, Co/Tm Cdrs, FSO, TF Engr, ADA officer. Technique - rock/stick drill. Where - Bn TOC. When - Time.
• Level III: Personnel - Bn Cdr, Bn XO, S-3,S-2, Co/Tm Cdrs, FSO, TF Engr, ADA officer. Technique - Map. Where - Bn TOC. When - Time.
• Level IV: Personnel - Command group, special platoon leaders, primary staff. Technique - communications. Where - respective CPs.

Regardless of the procedure used to designate rehearsal types, participants, etc., that procedure should be the result of a home-station trial and error refinement. Every time the task force conducts combat maneuver training at any level, the elements participating in that training should also be training in rehearsal techniques. A standard for measuring the effectiveness must be established by the chain of command, and rehearsals should be evaluated and critiqued. Unless an ongoing system of evaluation and feedback exists, training will occur that is not to standard, including rehearsal training.

Mission orders are orders that give subordinates tasks to accomplish without telling them how the tasks should be done; but more importantly, it gives them a reason/purpose why they are doing it. These type orders focus on:

• Task and purpose
• Results
• Absolute essentials

Mission orders are a product of understanding the commander's intent. If the soldiers of a unit have worked together and know each other, this process is fairly abbreviated. When units/ personnel have not worked closely together, game plays/drills, SOPs, and other techniques are used to help reduce the amount of confusion.

"An understanding of the intent of the higher commander is a prerequisite to mission tactics."

"The commander's intent is designed not to restrain, but to unleash a subordinate by giving him greater freedom of action to accomplish the mission."
General John W. Foss, Commander, TRADOC

The Egyptian forces in October 1973 (Operation BADR) faced a powerful Israeli force in substantial fortress outposts on the east bank of the Suez canal. The Egyptians rehearsed their assault combat teams extensively; a best-case scenario called for the 5-mile crossing to take at least 2 hours. Soldiers rehearsed their applicable section of the plan without knowing when or even where the assault would be launched. A system of colored flags was devised to guide each assault team to its correct sector. Each soldier was briefed on the timing and routing system of his unit and other units crossing with him. A special crossing command was established to manage the entire system. This crossing command had the final authority on all changes of routes or times. Units rehearsed their crossing plans, both day and night. Bridging units practiced erecting bridges until they could meet or exceed the standards established by the crossing plans.

One of the major points to the Egyptian rehearsals, especially critical to the special assault units, was rehearsing in excess of the minimum standard. A special amphibious brigade was formed in January 1972 and given special training. The brigade trained with its amphibious tanks beginning in August 1972. By late October 1972, the brigade held a full-scale exercise and in July 1973, a full capabilities test was conducted. The brigade completed a 20-mile practice night amphibious assault, landed at the designated site and moved inland to accomplish its mission. During the actual assault in October 1973, the brigade was required to cross only 5 miles of water.

A problem discovered during the rehearsals was a sand barrier which faced the assault troops on the east bank of the canal. Explosives experts practiced and practiced but, even with powerfull charges and bulldozers, opening a large enough gap took 5 or 6 hours under fire. As a result, the Egyptian engineers turned to using water cannons pumping water under high pressure to wash away the barrier. After training the teams constantly against similar barriers, the engineers were able to create a massive breach within 2 hours. This innovation was a great surprise to the Israelis. Rehearsals helped identify the problem and helped validate the solution to the problem.

The brigade rehearsed to a higher standard so, when the time for the real assault came, it accomplished its assault mission on October 1973 in a mere 30 minutes.

If problems are found during a rehearsal, plans must be developed at all levels that allow incorporation of these changes into mission planning.

Table of Contents
Section I: Rehearsal Sequence
Section III: Types of Rehearsals