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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
RC DEPLOYMENT TO KOREA

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The United States has consistently maintained only a small regular Army while relying on its reserve component in event of national emergency. Key to successful use of these reserves is their ability to mobilize and deploy quickly when needed. Even with ample warning time, the US Army has seldom been able to do this. An example from the Korean War illustrates some deployment pitfalls.

The 40th Infantry Division, California National Guard, was mobilized in September 1950, shortly after the start of the Korean War. The division, some 6000 men understrength initially, trained as best it could at Camp Cooke, California until November 1950. By then, it was still 3000 men short. It was finally brought up to war strength (plus ten percent) in February 1951 and ordered to Japan in March. The entire preparation for overseas movement (POM) was affected by its low strength during training, shortage of some critical skills, and the trickle of untrained replacements.

The division had a number of deployment difficulties, mostly in logistics. The first problem involved estimating and obtaining the right number and size of packing crates for division equipment. Division combat engineers had to fabricate almost 3500 special boxes for shipping spare parts, typewriters and other items which did not fit the standard box. Ordnance equipment processing was also a problem. No one in the division had ever processed weapons, vehicles and other major items for an overseas move. Technicians from Benicia Arsenal were brought in to assist. The division also had a hard time dividing responsibility for documentation, rail loading and other duties between post and division personnel. After much discussion, the division retained responsibility for moving all ordnance equipment to the post assembly area. Post personnel then assumed responsibility for loading equipment on flatcars, blocking the equipment and lashing it all down.

Once the 40th made it to the port, the deployment bogged down because the Army port inspection team arrived almost two weeks late. A special port liaison team was set up by the division to coordinate inspectors, post staff and division units. This ad hoc group was invaluable in speeding the division's load-out. In March 1951, a ten-man advance team was sent to Japan (ten days ahead of the main body) to coordinate reception activities. After additional training and another load-out, the division reached Korea in February 1952.

[Taken from: HQ, Fifth US Army, "Problems of Overseas Movemen of 40th Infantry Division," 21 August 1951, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.]

Table of Contents
Preface
Deployment Planning