DOCTRINE
Strategic deceptions may influence the enemy's total capability to wage war in-theater. Operational deceptions set the terms of battle for tactical formations, taking the enemy's induced war-waging capability into account. The following figure shows the relationship between strategic and operational deception.
OPERATIONAL DECEPTION
Theater, Army, Army Group, and sometimes Corps Commanders have within their purview operational-level deceptions. The objective of deception operations at the operational level of war is to influence the decisions of enemy commanders BEFORE BATTLE OCCURS SO THE TACTICAL OUTCOME OF BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS ARE FAVORABLE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLOITABLE OPERATIONALLY. Thus, operational deceptions have a greater "pay off" than deceptions conducted at the tactical level. The essence of the operational art is to recognize the enemy's center of gravity and then design campaigns which expose it to attack and destruction.
Center of Gravity
A "center of gravity" is a fundamental source of enemy power and strength, and in most cases will have to be attacked in phases over time. Campaign plans must have as their ultimate objective the destruction of the enemy's center of gravity.
The Campaign (Initial Phases)
Employing deception during the first phases of a campaign affords operational commanders several opportunities:
- To influence enemy perception of friendly operational intent (objectives), and by extension, strategic ends.
- To induce incorrect enemy conclusions and decisions about friendly forces allocated to fight battles.
- To induce incorrect enemy conclusions about force dispositions.
- To induce incorrect enemy conclusions about the nature and extent of air and naval support to the ground maneuver.
ALL FOR THE PURPOSE OF CAUSING THE ENEMY TO ADOPT A POSTURE THAT IS OPERATIONALLY EXPLOITABLE IN THE FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT BATTLES.
OPERATIONAL TACTICAL LINKANGE
Operational deception plans set the terms of battle in which tactical commanders fight: the size of the enemy forces, enemy force composition and disposition, friendly mission, where and when the battle will be fought, tactical objectives, etc., in other words -- the factors of METT-T. OPERATIONALLY-INDUCED FACTORS OF METT-T DIRECTLY INFLUENCE THE NATURE OF THE ENEMY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, DECISION CYCLE, AND TROOP CONTROL PROCEDURES WHICH TACTICAL COMMANDERS MANIPULATE TO WIN (Figure 2). (Although tactical organizations are not precluded from developing tactical-level deceptions independent of the operational context, they normally will execute derivative slices of operational deception plans.) Operational deception plans SHOULD contain deception event taskings for one or more tactical commands subordinate to the operational commander.
Tactical deception plans are designed to exploit the tactical situation immediately confronted by the tactical commander. Tactical deception plans should be developed within the context of an operational deception plan.
TACTICAL DECEPTION
Tactical deceptions manipulate the decision cycle of enemy commanders in contact. As stated earlier, deception planning must support accomplishment of the commander's mission and be closely linked with the operations of all the force's elements. Operation plans and associated deception plans must be flexible enough to allow for change when unanticipated events occur.
Vietnam 1966
One of the biggest problems for U.S. forces in Vietnam was enticing the main force Viet-Cong units out of their jungle hiding places so they could be fixed and destroyed. The 1st Infantry Division under then Major General William DePuy used tactical deception to trap the 272d Regiment of the 9th VC Division in early July 1966.
The 1st ID had recently engaged in a series of small battles and ambushes around the provincial capital of An Loc near the Cambodian border. In one particular incident, A Troop, 1/4 Cavalry, of the divisional cavalry squadron, had been ambushed on the road to Loc Ninh by a VC regiment. Apparently there was a serious security leak on the staff of the Province Chief since he had been informed of the movement of that unit only a few days before. Capitalizing upon this, General DePuy and his staff ensured that the Province Chief and his staff were informed in advance of a move of what was described as a similar-sized force on the road to Minh Thanh a few days later. However, this force was beefed up with an additional cavalry troop and additional infantry. Also, since it was known that the 272d VC Regiment was nearby, 1/28th Inf, 2/2nd Inf, 1/18th Inf, and the rest of the 1/4th Cav with additional artillery were positioned nearby and ready for action.
The trap was sprung on 6 July. The "bait" force had a few uncertain moments, but the reaction forces closed with the VC Regiment killing at least 239 VC. General DePuy stated afterwards, "It wasn't perfect, but it wasn't bad." The use of deception as an integral part of a plan to trap an unwary enemy was a key element in this tactical success. The enemy's decision process would never be quite as smooth or as certain again.
Offense
Deception is key to offense. Supporting attacks are made, in part, to mislead the enemy on the attacking force's scheme of maneuver, thus giving the main attack a better chance of success. Deceptions are conducted during the offense to increase uncertainty or inject "false truths" in enemy target acquisition and situation development capabilities.
Defense
All forces on the defensive seek to deceive the enemy on the location of their forward line of own troops (FLOT). Deceptions are also conducted to conceal the location of those forces not on the FLOT and to hide our intentions. Deceptions can be used to force the enemy to waste artillery ammunition and to misuse reconnaissance assets. An objective of the covering force might be to deceive the enemy on the location of the main defensive area. Small elements may use dummy positions, equipment, and notional activities to cause the enemy to waste time by deploying and attacking a false position or preparing for unnecesaary offensive action, thereby rendering his force vulnerable to counterattacks.
Retrogade
Deception is required to reduce the vulnerability of a unit during movement to the rear. Deception assists in two major areas during retrograde operations: maintaining secrecy of movement and hiding unit disposition. Commanders should also take advantage of darkness and other conditions of limited visibility. Visual and sonic (sound or sound related) deception measures are critical. Planning retrograde operations includes coordination of electronic warfare activities to assist in the deception. Some deception measures include:
- Requiring radio silence for displacing units.
- Maintaining a normal radio pattern along the old FLOT.
- Conducting limited objective attacks in areas away from the retrograde unit to divert the enemy's attention.
Relief
Security and deception are keys to relief operations. During relief operations, the deception story will portray the occupying unit as remaining in place. To provide continuity, the incoming unit will have to assume the normal patterns and signatures of the outgoing unit.
- New radio communications should be avoided.
- If necessary, radio frequencies and call signs of the outgoing unit should be used initially by the incoming unit to reduce the effectiveness of enemy signals intelligence.
- Decoys and dummies may also be employed initially for any equipment that is moved to the rear and not replaced in kind.
The following are deception considerations for certain types of units and functions at the tactical level.
Aviation
Aviation forces provide an aerial dimension for tactical and operational battlefield deception plans by participating in demonstrations and feints. Aviation can quickly concentrate aerial combat power to conduct demonstrations or feints in areas throughout the battlefield. All types of aviation assets are ideally suited to execute demonstrations. This may include false insertions of ground forces or deceptive aerial movements to distract the enemy focus. Attack and air reconnaissance assets also have the mobility and firepower to conduct feints to draw the enemy's attention away from the force commander's main efforts.
Repetitive flights into or out of a specific area (i.e., command posts, CSS facilities, landing zones, airfields, etc.) sets easily identifiable patterns and may indicate the relative importance of the site. Because aviation operations are difficult to conceal short of elimination, effective deception techniques and OPSEC must be employed to ensure survivability of all aviation forces.
Deception operations to construct dummy airfields and landing sites (including runways, taxiways, parking areas, refueling sites, and ground support equipment) should be considered during tactical and operational planning to enhance aviation survivability. These were used extensively by both the Egyptians and the Israelies during the 1973 war. A variation was used by the Argentinians in the Falklands. The British attacked the Port Stanley airfield and made it unusable. Reconnaissance repeatedly confirmed that it was not operational. Only when British ground forces closed on Port Stanley and heard C-130s landing and taking off at night did they realize the airfield was being used. The Argentinians had repaired the damage, but used dirt, rubble, and salvage materiel to portray that the damage went unrepaired. The British believed and did not attack the airfield again. Combat heavy engineer equipment may be required to facilitate these types of deception operations. Dummy aviation operating sites should be in close proximity to actual operating locations, and should be used periodically for aircraft operations to further conceal the identity of the actual operational sites. Road and highway networks also make very effective, expedient and easily concealed aircraft landing sites. When the roads are not in use for aviation operations, they can be used for ground traffic.
Fire Support
All fire support assets (artillery, mortars, CAS and EW) can employ deceptive tactics and techniques. Deceptive movement and careful concealment of artillery weapons can add to surprise in combat operations. Moving artillery into supporting positions while purposely revealing other signs of preparation for an operation can lead the enemy to believe that we are in position. The friendly commander may take advantage of darkness or reduced visibility to reposition most of his artillery pieces. The deception site, however, must remain as previously displayed. A good source of effective artillery decoys is damaged/salvaged material made to look like artillery pieces. By the skillful use of flash simulators, explosive charges (the Soviets rely heavily on sound ranging), smoke, and some real artillery weapons left in position, the enemy can be induced to continue believing the deception story. Major Gerald R. Akhust, Royal Artillery, a battery commander in the Falklands, wrote in the Field Artillery Journal, "I fired lots of rounds at suspected gun positions only to find out later it was two old tires and a drain pipe draped with a camouflage net. At deception, the enemy was very good."
Engineer
Engineers can construct decoys from battlefield junk and simulate the building of airstrips, bridges, minefields, and field fortifications. Engineers can also provide technical and mechanical assistance in camouflage. Use of combat engineer battalions for deliberate construction of decoy positions should be avoided since they are not structured or equipped to do so.
NBC
The destructiveness of nuclear and chemical weapons makes the commanders of major combat forces very sensitive to the threat of the use of such weapons. Indications of the presence of, or preparations for the use of, chemical or nuclear weapons (e.g., particular delivery means, storage points, and launching sites) will be sought. This will present opportunities for deceptions based on the presence or use of nuclear or chemical weapons.
Before the initiation of chemical warfare by the enemy, the threat of NBC warfare may cause him to adopt an unfavorable course of action. If friendly forces can create the impression that chemical attacks are likely, the enemy may go into full protection prematurely, thereby reducing his combat effectiveness. Care must be taken not to trigger an enemy pre-emptive strike. A technique to achieve this impression is to mix riot control agents (RCAs) with smoke on enemy positions. Soviet doctrine calls for specificactions after chemical attacks which are not necessary for RCAs. After chemical warfare has been initiated, deliberate decontamination of units can deceive the threat as to which units we are planning on using for offensive operations. (Hasty decon is normally sufficient to allow units to resume operations, but our doctrine calls for deliberate decon if available.)
Another important concern is the movement of nuclear weapons. Convoys moving actual weapons should be made to look as routine as possible. Due to political sensitivities, these deceptive measures should only be used upon approval/direction of the operational commander.
Logistic Considerations
The movement of personnel, equipment, and the placement of logistic support installations are normally indicators of a forces intent. The movement of empty boxes/pallets of ammunition and the establishment of fuel storage areas with real or dummy assets can mislead the enemy as to projected offensive actions. You should use minimal actual transportation assets making numerous, visible trips to simulate a larger effort.
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