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THE BRIGADE AND BATTALION TASK FORCE PLANNING PROCESS

as of 25 Jan 95, by LTC Robert Hobbs, Senior Brigade Trainer, NTC, and CPT Phil Kaiser, Combat Maneuver Analyst, CALL

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The Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP) is a very difficult and complex task that staffs often have problems with at the National Training Center (NTC). This article will identify some of the common problems staffs experience at the NTC throughout each step of the MDMP. The following discussion presents techniques and procedures that can assist in solving some of the problems.

Developing a fully integrated and synchronized plan is difficult under the best of circumstances. The task is even more difficult under combat conditions when time is limited and staff members lack adequate sleep. There are no easy solutions to this complex problem. Only training, familiarization with the planning process, and development and use of unit SOPs will increase the efficiency of the staff.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Mission analysis is sometimes the easiest step of the process, but it is also where staffs commit some of the most critical errors. Any mistakes the staff or commander commit here will only complicate the process as time passes.

The most serious problem in this step occurs when staff members are either not present, do not actively participate, or fail to coordinate in detail with other staff agencies. The mission analysis offers staff members the opportunity to identify to the commander and other staff officers constraints or limitations in his area of responsibility. This opportunity is where the staff integration process begins. For example, as the S1 provides his update, he should provide current personnel status updates. If the S1 identifies Alpha Company at less than 50-percent strength, the S1 should ensure that the S3 is aware of this so, as he develops COAs and war-games them, he does not designate Alpha company as the task force main effort unless the unit is reconstituted in a timely manner. Another good example involves the S2. As the S2 briefs the enemy situational templates (SITTEMPs), he may identify a likely location for an enemy artillery target. If the S1 or S4 is not present to capture this information, the S1 may place his casualty collection point in less-than-a desirable location.

LESSON:

The mission analysis brief is not just a brief to the commander; it is also a brief from the staff, to the staff, to ensure all time and effort are effectively focused. All primary staff officers must be present and actively involved in the planning process.

Another serious problem involves the S2. Often the S2 is not prepared to brief a detailed enemy SITTEMP during the mission analysis brief. This often results in the planning process continuing, with little regard for the enemy situation. The S2 must have the enemy SITTEMP near completion prior to the mission analysis brief. This SITTEMP must be a complete analysis, not just a copy of higher headquarters templates. This is no easy task. The IPB process is very time-consuming and must be constantly updated as information becomes available. To avoid this problem, the TF S2 must get an early start developing his enemy SITTEMP. The TF LO can be of great assistance by providing the brigade S2 products to the task force as the products are developed. If the LO fails to do this, the S2 cannot produce an effective product without delaying the entire MDMP.

LESSON:

The LO must provide all intelligence products to the S2 as they become available. The TF S2 shop must be trained and capable of conducting current operations and planning for future operations simultaneously for a limited time. This requires the BICC and the S2 NCOIC to play an active role in the planning process.

Staff officers also fail to identify and state critical facts and assumptions that are pertinent to their area of responsibility. Some examples are: current/projected maintenance and personnel status, CL IV/V status, number of available transportation assets, and number of available helicopters and their lift capacity or limitations. These are simple examples, but each can play a devastating role if not identified. The facts and assumptions do nothing more than establish the parameters for COA development. If these are not clearly identified and stated, the plan will be developed based on facts and assumptions that are not known to the commander and staff.

LESSON:

Each staff officer should develop a list of potential issues for consideration during each type of mission. This list should be included in the unit TACSOP. It will be of great assistance when time is limited, and the staff officer is weary from lack of rest.

Another serious mistake that occurs involves time management. Staff officers often fail to conduct a detailed analysis of time available. Key events are often not recorded and added to the timeline as they are identified. The timeline should be as detailed as possible, serving as a record of all key events and significant activities that should occur. The timeline should also include how much time is to be allocated to each step of the planning process. The TF XO serves as the timekeeper. He manages the timeline, and ensures it is followed.

LESSON:

Develop a detailed timeline identifying all key events up to, and including, the execution of the mission. Modify the timeline as required. Enforce the timeline.

The last issue involves understanding the intent of the higher headquarters commander. If the staff fails to properly understand or interpret the commander's intent, valuable resources (time, soldiers, and equipment) may be committed in a fashion that do not facilitate the intent. If the intent is not clear, any and all attempts must be made to clarify the intent. Staffs spend hours developing and war-gaming COAs only to start over because they failed to understand the intent of the commander. This results in having even less time to develop a plan that supports the commander's intent.

LESSON:

Understanding the intent of the higher headquarters commander is crucial. If the intent is unclear, seek clarification immediately.

The mission analysis is perhaps the most critical step of the process. Mission analysis does not have to be a lengthy process. The staff should anticipate this requirement and start preparation early. In addition, visual aids (charts) will reduce briefing time and allow the commander to quickly get the snapshot of the unit he needs. If done properly, each staff officer should possess a clear understanding of the mission and issues from other staff officers that may affect his area, and the enemy situation.

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

At this point in the process, the staff has conducted a mission analysis brief to the commander. The commander either approves or modifies the restated mission. The staff is now ready to receive the commander's initial guidance.

The commander must take the time to prepare well-developed guidance for his staff. The guidance must be clear, concise, and detailed. Areas the commander should include are listed in FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff, final draft, Aug 93. The areas are as follows:

Enemy COAs to consider

Commander's intent

Concept of operation

Deception objective

Priorities

Time plan

Type of order

Type of rehearsal

Each of these areas plays a critical role in the process. These areas identify the parameters the staff must operate within as the planning process continues. This guidance saves the staff time and effort and will assist them in developing COAs that contain the characteristics the commander feels are important to the mission.

Normally commanders who give incomplete or inadequate guidance respond by saying, "I like to provide my staff maximum latitude in the planning process." This concept is fine in an environment where time is not a limited resource, and the commander accepts the staff's work. Some staffs spend hours developing and war-gaming COAs they developed based on inadequate guidance. In one example, the commander responded to his staff as it conducted the decision brief by saying, "I do not like either COA; here is what we are going to do." This resulted in the staff developing another COA that was not fully analyzed or war-gamed due to time constraints. The staff cannot develop a COA suitable to the commander without detailed guidance.

LESSON:

The most valuable resource the staff possesses is time. Once lost, time can never be recovered. Therefore, detailed and specific guidance from the commander leads to efficient use of time by the staff. The commander must take time to mentally form a picture in his mind of what he expects and, just as importantly, what he does not expect. This mental picture must then be clearly communicated to the staff. As the situation develops, the commander must rapidly update his guidance to the staff.

COA DEVELOPMENT

The commander has now provided his staff the required guidance necessary to continue the planning process (COA development).

Often the enemy SITTEMP is not used to developing COAs. This results in planning that is not being driven by the IPB process. Without using the enemy SITTEMP, the analysis of relative combat power and the arraying of initial forces cannot be conducted to standard. Ideally, the S2 has developed a large, detailed, and accurate sketch with the enemy SITTEMP applied. This large sketch allows the entire staff to easily see and provide input.

LESSON:

The S2's SITTEMP must be used during the COA development. Also the S2 must be an active participant, providing assistance in analyzing force ratios, threat weapon capabilities and as much intelligence and information about the enemy as possible.

Often the COAs developed only include maneuver and fire support considerations, completely omitting the other battlefield operating systems (BOSs). Each staff officer (subject matter expert) must participate to ensure his respective BOS is thoroughly integrated into the COA. To facilitate this, staff members can break down into teams to develop multiple COAs simultaneously. If this technique is used, the staff must be careful to ensure each COA receives the same level of development based on the capabilities of the staff. Staff NCOs should be used to ensure this occurs.

LESSON:

Each BOS must be integrated into each COA as it is developed.

Once the COAs are developed, the end products should include a COA sketch and statement, task and purpose of each available asset, and a generic task organization. If the staff takes the time to develop these products, the COAs are probably mature enough to be war-gamed. A technique that works well during the COA development involves the commander. If the commander is present as the staff develops the COAs, two positive actions occur. First, the commander can provide immediate feedback to the staff as needed. This ensures that the COAs are suitable and feasible. Second, this eliminates the need for a COA brief prior to the wargame session. Both of these result in time being saved.

COA ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON

Ideally, the staff has now developed multiple COAs based on the commander's guidance. The staff is now ready to conduct a detailed analysis of each COA. The COA analysis is the most difficult process of the MDMP. This step is also the most critical to ensure a fully integrated and synchronized plan. Before discussing common problems during the wargame process, a brief review of the steps in the process is in order.

1. Gather the tools.

2. List all friendly forces.

3. List assumptions.

4. List known critical events and decision points.

5. List significant factors.

6. Select the wargame method.

7. Select a recording technique.

8. War-game the battle, and assess the results.

These steps must be carefully followed as the staff conducts the wargame session. If any of the steps are omitted, the outcome becomes less effective.

LESSON:

It is imperative that each staff section be represented with an active participant in the process. The enemy situation must be depicted and accurately portrayed by the S2 throughout the process. The S2 does a disservice to the unit if he does not represent an active enemy that wants to win and fight accordingly. The wargame session must be IPB driven.

The first problem involves gathering the tools. The tools include the COA sketch and statement, the staff, enemy SITTEMP, and any charts or tools the staff may use. Frequently, various tools, such as staff members or the SITTEMP, are not used or present during the wargame process. This limits the effectiveness of the wargame effort.

The second problem occurs when the staff fails to identify assumptions that are critical to the COA. These assumptions must be identified initially during the COA development phase. During the wargame, the staff reviews, refines, and updates the assumptions. The staff must validate each assumption by asking the following question, "Is the assumption likely to occur?" If the answer is no, the assumption is invalid and is not considered. Frequently, critical assumptions are informally identified or stated by a staff officer, but are not recorded, discussed, or validated. As a result, a COA may be developed on a critical assumption that is either not identified or validated by the staff.

LESSON:

Critical assumption must be recorded, discussed, and validated.

The third common problem involves listing critical events and decisions points (both friendly and enemy). This step is important because it assists the staff in determining where and how to conduct the actual wargame session. These critical events may include the following: breach of an obstacle, actions on the objective, movement through a defile, or actions in an engagement area. By identifying the critical events, the staff has an idea of where to focus the majority of its time and effort during the wargame session.

At this point, the staff is ready to select a wargame technique. The staff can select either the belt, box, or avenues-in-depth technique. Often, staffs do not understand the difference in the techniques, or the advantages or disadvantages of each. When selecting a technique, the staff must ask two important questions: "How much time can we allocate to the actual action-reaction drill?" and second, "What is the priority of critical events to be war-gamed?" Answers to these two questions assist the commander and staff in focusing and prioritizing their effort, and also in determining the wargame technique. Frequently, staffs spend up to four hours war-gaming one COA using the avenue-in-depth technique from the LD to consolidation on the objective. This technique may be acceptable if ample time is available, but when time is limited, avenue in depth is not the preferred technique. If the staff identified and prioritized the critical events, they may have determined that focusing on the objective area, and other areas where contact is expected could have resulted in a more effective use of their time (box technique).

LESSON:

When time is limited, the staff should focus its time and effort on the most critical events (box technique). When time is available, more resources (time and effort) can be spent analyzing a larger portion of the mission (belt or avenue-in-depth technique).

At this time, the staff has selected a wargame technique, and determined what critical events need to be war-gamed. The staff is now ready to conduct the action, reaction, and counteraction drill. This is the most difficult step in the COA analysis process. The S2 should aggressively and accurately fight the enemy. The staff then describes the activities as they occur. This action and reaction drill must be detailed and recorded to ensure all events are properly synchronized and coordinated. Often, the discussion lacks adequate detail. The S2 fails to identify NAIs, or fails to determine who is responsible for observing NAIs (R& Plan). Frequently, the FSO also fails to determine specific target grids, or fails to determine who will observe and conduct the call for fire (target and observer plan). While discussing actions in an engagement area, the S3 at times fails to analyze engagement ranges, probability of kill, friendly, and enemy BDA of various engagements. The staff must record these key details to ensure the order captures critical information brought out during wargaming. The three methods of recording are the synchronization matrix, narrative technique, and the wargame worksheet.

LESSON:

The staff members must analyze and record each critical event in sufficient detail to result in a well-synchronized plan.

After the staff has conducted the wargame session, it is now ready to compare the COAs. This comparison leads to the staff's recommendation to the commander. The staff uses the significant factors it developed prior to conducting the action and reaction drill. These significant factors may include the principles of war and tenets of Army operations doctrine. These significant factors are determined by analyzing the commander's intent, the next higher commander's intent, and the restated mission. Each COA is analyzed with respect to each significant factor and leads to a recommendation.

A technique that helps during the wargame process again involves the commander. If possible, the commander should attend the wargame session. The commander should not drive the process or hinder the staff. Rather, the commander should listen and provide additional guidance as needed, and assist in keeping the staff focused. This activity assists the staff in maintaining a focus. By having the commander present during the process, the commander observes the staff's work, and listens as the staff develops a recommendation. By doing this the commander is prepared to make an on-the-spot decision, once again preventing the need for a decision brief (saving time).

As the commander makes his decision, the staff is now ready to receive the commander's final guidance before the staff refines and develops the plan. The commander must ensure his refined guidance is clearly understood by the staff.

CONCLUSION

As previously stated, the MDMP is an extremely difficult process. There are no shortcuts to the process if a detailed and synchronized plan is the goal. Any staff can develop a sound plan in an environment where sufficient time is available. However, a well-trained staff can develop a sound plan in 6 - 8 hours. The following is an attempt to outline some recommendations on how the staff should train on the MDMP process.

The first recommendation is to conduct a detailed class on the MDMP process. The audience for the class should not just include officers and senior NCOs. Include all soldiers who work in the TOC. The younger soldiers can play a significant role if they understand the planning process, and what role they are to play. They do not have to be experts with the process, but they should possess a fundamental understanding. Young soldiers can do a great job preparing mission analysis charts, wargame charts, terrain sketches, and serving as recorders during the process. These type tasks are significant "time savers," or "time wasters," if not properly conducted. Young soldiers will do a great job if they understand the overall process and the role they play.

Next, practice the process. As you conduct the training sessions, do not make the mistake of conducting your staff training in the office. There is a significant difference in conducting the process in the sterile environment of the office versus in a tactical setting. Take the time to set up the TOC, and force the staff to operate in a field setting. This will also assist in developing TOC setup drills and SOPs. The training should be conducted late at night to ensure all participants are less than fresh. Once again, try to simulate a realistic environment.

Additional recommendations:

• Attempt to have an outsider observe the process to provide constructive feedback.
• Conduct AARs.
• Attempt to identify what planning charts and other tools are necessary to conduct an efficient planning process.
• Develop SOPs that will help streamline the system.
• Every soldier should play a role. However, the soldier must know what his role is.
• Staff drills should incorporate all available staff officers from combat support and service support elements.

Finally, the commander must personally train his staff. The commander who turns this task over to his executive officer will probably not achieve success. When staffs are introduced to the pressures of a CTC rotation, units often develop shortcuts, or eliminate steps. This causes the process to be fatally flawed, often resulting in poor execution. The correct answer is to train frequently under realistic time constraints, achieving efficiency and thoroughness through repetition. Increased proficiency will produce a more detailed and synchronized plan, and also result in more time available for subordinate units to plan and prepare for combat.

This article identified some of the common problems units experience in the planning process as well as recommended some solutions to the problems. This is an attempt to assist units in learning from previous experience. The process can be very difficult. The only solution is continual realistic training. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 93-3, The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff, Jul 93, for additional assistance.
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