* Firing battery defense: Firing battery defense is generally not understood or executed to standard.
PROBLEMS:
1. Battery commanders frequently fail to ask the proper questions of the S2 during the field artillery support plan brief regarding expected enemy threat and the effects of terrain on operations in their proposed position areas.
2. Firing batteries are often not to standard in basic battery defense skills. Many range cards are inaccurate, reflecting a lack of key leader understanding of how to derive howitzer left and right limits IAW FM 6-50.
3. Lack of PCIs result in numerous range card errors going unnoticed.
4. Target reference points and range markers are not used or understood.
5. Procedures for "Killer Junior" are often misunderstood.
6. Seldom do units conduct a battery battle drill for controlling direct fires.
7. Most defense diagrams do not consider all the fire power available to the platoons.
8. Platoon defense diagrams completion time ranged from 1 hour up to 12 hours; some platoons never completed them. RESULT: incomplete battery defense plans.
9. Poor weapons maintenance in headquarters platoons and FDCs.
10. Rehearsals of tank killer teams and reaction forces are often planned, but generally not executed due to problems with prioritizing preparations for the battle and time management by battery commanders and platoon leaders.
11. Direct fire plans are almost never rehearsed.
12. Positions are usually not hardened; wire not buried IAW battery SOP; collimators not lowered or sandbagged; OPs without protection.
13. Alternate positions are always mentioned, but rarely prepared. RESULT: batteries learn first hand the difficulties of an unprepared hasty displacement to an alternate position.
14. Supplementary positions are rarely planned or are indicated on the defense diagram with little understanding on the gun line of how they will be executed.
15. Seldom are there plans for executing small arms for air defense (SAFAD), although the enemy air threat is generally high.
PALADIN Specific PROBLEMS:
1. Firing batteries rely solely on survivability moves when planning battery defense.
2. There is little or no platoon or battery control of survivability moves; sections execute. RESULT: pairs in adjacent PAs, moving IAW battalion survivability criteria, frequently occupy positions extremely close to each other, as they move within their PAs.
3. Paladin battery commanders rely on a technique of battery fallback positions as their primary means of defense.
4. Platoon leaders and PSGs usually do not drive the fallback routes during preparation in order to time specific triggers for falling back. RESULT: batteries get overrun.
5. Units do not properly position howitzer pairs and then establish sectors of fire. RESULT: reduced ability to mass direct fires and defend.
6. Paladin leaders do not use FAASVs in overwatch positions during deliberate defense.
7. Batteries do not usually employ LP/OPs. RESULT: platoons deprived of early warning.
Techniques:
1. Battery commanders must work with S2s and study proposed PAs for defensibility and survivability.
2. Battery commanders must make every effort to occupy the terrain that provides the battery the best passive defense, while still meeting the battery's critical fire support tasks.
3. Battery commanders and platoon leaders should plan, then rehearse, battery direct fire defense; survivability moves to alternate positions; triggers for these moves.
4. Defense preparation should be a battle drill designed to establish a basic defense capability as rapidly as possible.
- assign sectors of fire already determined by an advance party gunnery sergeant
- establish a couple of hasty target reference points for the battery
- complete range cards and defense diagrams approximately 1 hour after the platoon is ready to fire
- include a quick rehearsal if time permits
5. Once hasty defense preparations are established, continue improvements based on METT-T.
* Preparation for TAA defense: Unit defensive plans fail to adequately integrate defensive measures, such as indirect fires, mines and obstacles. Sector sketches and range cards are not to standard. Battalions do not develop R&S plans for the TAAs incorporating all unit assets (aircraft) to adequately protect the TAA.
Technique: The battalion staff should plan the defense and R&S of the TAA rather than just assembling company plans. The CSM should check unit compliance with the plan; sector coverage; range cards; weapons knowledge; weapons serviceability.
* Engineer battalion HHC commanders' role as rear area engineer: HHC commanders have not been well integrated into their role as rear area engineers.
RESPONSIBILITIES:
1. Plan, coordinate, and execute the mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability battlefield operating system in the brigade rear area.
2. Selection and upgrade plans for MSRs.
3. Providing sighting expertise for hasty protective minefields.
4. Supervising hasty protective minefield emplacement.
5. Ensuring brigade CSS elements understand lane/bypass marking systems.
6. Planning and then tracking the survivability effort in the brigade rear.
Techniques: The Engineeer battalion HHC commander should participate in the FSB orders process and publish an engineer annex, including a survivability matrix.
* EW mission planning to support force protection during recon or counter-recon missions: While the eyes of the brigade (scouts/STAR/COLTs) are conducting their mission, the ears of the brigade (EW intercept/collection teams) are the only assets within the brigade that are able to provide early warning and protection. Too many units fail to plan for employing EW teams do this by listening to and locating (through radio direction finding) enemy recon commo nets. Once intercepted, these nets are exploited to see if any STAR/COLTs have been compromised during their insertion, or if any scout/STAR/COLT elements have been spotted and/or targeted for destruction.
Techniques:
1. EW platoon leaders must plan for detailed force protection missions during execution of brigade recon and counterrecon missions; EW intercept operators must understand the purpose and importance of these missions, and their vital supporting role.
2. The intel electronic warfare support element in the brigade TOC must work closely with the FSO to coordinate force protection during the insertion of STAR/COLTs. The FSO provides the where and when of team insertion, and the electronic warfare support element then ensures this information is passed to the EW teams. The EW teams monitor enemy recon nets to see if any insertion is compromised, etc. If so, this information is immediately passed back to brigade to warn the STAR/COLT teams.
* NBC warning and reporting system: Units are slow to identify artillery strikes that may contain chemical munitions, even though chemical NAIs and observers are specified in the OPORD. Also, once contaminations are found, units send initial SPOTREPS higher, but fail to follow up with required NBC reports.
Technique: Brigade chemical staff officers must actively monitor NAIs and instruct observers how to identify potential chemical artillery strikes.
* Base planning/execution: CSS units consistently have difficulty planning and providing for their own defense.
PROBLEMS:
1. Initial quartering party actions lack thoroughness.
2. Base cluster defenses often are based on poor quality fighting positions, an absence of sector sketches, and weak coordination between supporting elements.
3. Fire support planning and execution is not coordinated or complete.
4. The IPB process is poorly understood and is not integrated and synchronized during the orders process.
5. Alternate TOC operations are either not conducted, or are not fully prepared to function as the primary TOC.
6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment
* Units fail to properly use the M8A1 chemical agent alarm:
PROBLEMS:
1. Units fail to perform PCCs of M8A1 alarms prior to deployment, and therefore arrive with some unserviceable equipment.
2. Units fail to properly employ the alarms:
- not connected to the battery
- not positioned upwind
- not connected to the M42
3. Many units fail to use the chemical agent alarm.
4. Many units are not complying with the annual wipe tests requirement.
Technique: Units must make the effort during Home Station training to properly employ chemical agent alarms during their field training, and to maintain the equipment in serviceable condition.
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security
* Task force and company/team counter-recon plans: Commanders rarely develop a complete counter-recon plan that integrates all available TF assets.
PROBLEMS:
1. The commander responsible for counter-recon rarely establishes a solid command relationship with the combat multipliers OPCON or attached.
2. Too often a lack of urgency and visibility given to the counter-recon mission has a direct negative impact on the counter-recon force.
3. Engagement area development is the exception, rather than the rule.
4. Commanders fail to identify who, what, where and when to kill the enemy.
Technique: The TF commander, S3 and S2 should be able to articulate the conduct of the counter-recon effort, and how it will be synchronized and fought by the counter-recon commander. The key is for the counter-recon commander to meet sector secure times with enough combat power to meet his task and purpose.
* EW platoon site selection: The platoon operations centers too often do poor jobs of selecting proper collection/jamming sites for EW assets.
Techniques:
1. Advanced planning can simplify site recon and the selection of primary and alternate collection/jamming sites.
2. A detailed map study of the entire AO with line of sight (LOS) analysis should be done by the EW platoon leader as an aid in helping select initial, supplemental, forward and fallback sites for EW teams.
3. An excellent aid in site selection and LOS determination is a modified area map with the contour lines color coded by elevation. Intervisibility lines become readily apparent. Use of this aid will cut down on assignment to non-productive sites.
Back
to NTC BOS LIST
Back
to TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC), STATEMENTS
Go
to TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS, STATEMENTS
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
