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TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL (cont)

* Co/TM conduct of Pre-combat inspections and checks on unit equipment:

PROBLEM: Commanders and Co/TM leaders are not issuing specific guidance during warning orders and OPORDS that establish a standard for PCI/PCC, and a time of inspection by the chain of command.

RESULTS:

1. Poor gunnery execution because of no PCC and inaccurate boresighting.
2. Breaching kits not functional at breach sites.
3. Vehicle breakdown due to poor operator-level maintenance.
4. M-8 Chemical alarms in non-mission capable status.
5. M26 boresight device in non-mission capable status.

* TF FSO planning and tracking defensive preparation:

PROBLEMS:

1. Ineffective time management

2. Lack of defensive planning checklist

3. BOS synchronization and integration not tracked on maneuver TF timeline

• use of SEEs to dig survivability positions for OPs and mortar pre-stock
• target refinement to ensure planned v. actual obstacles are covered by indirect fires
• emplacement of indirect triggers

Techniques:

1. Delegate more planning responsibilities to the FSNCO

2. Develop a checklist detailing what fire support tasks must be accomplished for defensive operations and which tasks are "critical" to the maneuver TF. (FMs 71-123, 6-20-20, 6-20-40, STP 6-13F14-SM-TG provide examples)

3. Ensure "critical" tasks are on the maneuver TF timeline so they are visible to the entire staff.

4. The FSO should split tasks with the FSNCO, and establish priorities of work and effort.

* 12B/12F/62E individual tasks and enforcement of tactical discipline:

PROBLEMS:

1. Most engineers cannot properly arm/disarm a M15 or M21 mine.

2. Engineer platoons are taking three to four times the doctrinal standard to install a (live) fixing minefield.

3. Engineer platoons are taking two to three times the doctrinal standard to install an (inert) fixing/turning minefield.

4. Poor MICLIC drill execution.

5. Poor employment of the AVLB/CEV/DOZER.

6. SOPs that outline the necessary battle drills but a failure to practice the battle drills.

7. Tactical assembly areas:

• Personnel, ammo, fuel status reporting
• Use of M8 alarms
• Range cards/sector sketches
• Platoon/company fire plans
• PCC/PCIs
• Weapon zeroing
• Graphic control measure dissemination
• Load plans

Technique: These problems can all be solved with disciplined adherence to existing SOPs and standards.

4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders

* TF staff timeline detail: TF timelines normally contain basic items and are noteffectively disseminated; frequently they are not even posted.

Procedure: Timelines must be included in WARNOs and FRAGOs, and must be updated continuously.

Technique: Prepared shells that include expected events are useful; events scheduled by higher headquarters (backbriefs, rehearsals, etc.) must be included. Post timelines in CPs and annotate them as events occur or change.

* Execution matrices and Decision-support products: quality and integration with higher:

PROBLEM: TF staffs wargaming either gets too detailed and never finished, or is extremely superficial.

RESULTS: Products derived from wargaming are rarely useable, doing little to synchronize the plan or to key the commander to critical tactical decisions during mission execution.

Techniques: Use two types of wargaming; integrate products with higher HQs

1. Initial wargaming: use after commander's planning guidance, and if he has directed development of more than one course of action (COA).

• Done to the level of detail necessary to produce a sound COA recommendation

2. Second wargaming: after COA selection, and commander's refinement of guidance and intent. Worked to the level of detail time allows, this wargaming session should be the most time consuming step in the planning process. Products from this second wargaming:

• Fully integrated, very detailed execution or synchronization matrix
• Decision support tool (template or matrix) useable by the commander and staff

NOTE: If the commander directs that only one COA be developed, there is no need for two wargaming sessions. HOWEVER, wargame the directed COA against both the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COA, if they are not the same.

3. The products from TF level planning must be integrated with the plans from higher headquarters.

* Problems specifying desired fire support effects: Units rarely correctly address the desired effects of fire support. Methods used by brigades to determine effects seldom translate into Critical Fire Support Tasks (CFSTs) that would ensure successful mission execution for the brigade.

PROBLEM: Brigade commanders give fire support guidance that is too specific, ie. "Destroy one MRB of the regimental body deep."

RESULT: This overly specific guidance on fire support effects before any courses of action are developed drives the staff to develop different courses of action, but with each course required to achieve the same fire support effects (deep) for each COA.

PROBLEM: Other commanders give guidance that is too vague, ie., "Provide decisive fires against the enemy." This is too general and undefinable.

RESULT: Without definable guidance, staffs produce unspecific, ineffective fire support plans.

Techniques: Disrupt-Delay-Limit Below are definitions with an EXAMPLE: interdict, with the specified effect, ie. either Disrupt, or Delay, or Limit, a function or action that the enemy will attempt to accomplish.

1. Disrupt: Prevent the enemy from carrying out this action in the method he intends. EXAMPLE: "Disrupt the enemy's ability to fix our main effort's main body."

2. Delay: To cause that function or action to happen later than the enemy desires. EXAMPLE: "Delay the repositioning of the enemy's opposite flank MRC until our reserve commits thorough the breach."

3. Limit: Prevent that action or function from happening where the enemy wants it to happen. EXAMPLE: "Limit the advance guard's use of the ridge line to flank the brigade combat team."

This gives clear guidance to the staff addressing enemy actions the commander finds unacceptable. The staff uses that guidance and formulates COAs accordingly. Wargaming further refines the COA and helps synchronize the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). This results in a concept of operation (scheme of maneuver) and concept of fire support (scheme of fire support) to accomplish the mission.

With the commander's guidance and the wargaming products, the targeting team must determine the necessary systems (each with a time, place, and purpose) to use on the enemy formation. The cumulative result of this employment will be the achievement of the commander's intent.

During wargaming, the targeting team determines which and how many enemy systems must be attacked with maneuver, lethal and nonlethal fires to achieve the desired target effect.

* Field artillery staff supervision of subordinate elements: Brigade staffs do not closely supervise the development of the fire support plans among subordinate elements. Such supervision is necessary to ensure subordinate elements develop fire support plans that will result in the success of the brigade fire support plan.

PROBLEMS:

1. Subordinate elements are not required by TACSOP to submit the reports to brigade FSEs necessary to monitor subordinate element planning and preparation.

2. Few brigade FSEs are proactive enough to get the information from subordinate elements. For example, the only reports routinely required to be sent to the brigade FSE are TF target lists and artillery firing unit locations. Therefore, the brigade FSE does not routinely receive TF fire support annexes, execution matrices, or observer plans.

3. During the preparation phase, the brigade FSE does not routinely monitor the progress of subordinate preparations, ie. emplacement of triggers, establishment of OPs, reconstitution of observers, maintenance of fire support assets, sub-assignment of target execution responsibilities, target refinement, etc.

4. No standard "required report" from subordinates about fire support assets exists.

RESULT: Without this close staff supervision from brigade, the brigade FSE has no assurance that subordinate elements are developing a fire support plan that will meet the brigade commander's requirements, or that the assets necessary to accomplish the mission are available.

Procedures:

1. Develop a required fire support asset status report from subordinates, with associated reporting times. This must be a "push" system from lower to higher since this information cannot be easily obtained through TACFIRE.

2. Require subordinate elements to submit to the brigade FSE the execution details of all assigned fire support events, ie. exact trigger description and grid; time the trigger was emplaced; observer location; batteries that will fire the target; volume of fire; munitions; etc.

Techniques:

1. Use either the fire support execution matrix or scheme of fire support worksheet as the basic tool for staff supervision. Look at the fire support events assigned to each subordinate. Subordinates should submit detailed execution plans for each event. Therefore, a blank box means the subordinate has not submitted its plan. The brigade FSE then asks the subordinate element for a status of planning/preparation.

2. As subordinate execution plans are received, the brigade FSE can immediately check the plan to see if it will accomplish the assigned mission. If so, fine. If not, then adjustments can be made with the subordinate.

3. Have the subordinate elements backbrief the brigade fire support plan immediately following the issuance of the brigade OPORD.

4. Require periodic radio/MSRT backbriefs from subordinates when their plans are complete, but before they are published.

* CSS units use of the Tactical Decision Making Process: FSBs are required to produce numerous OPORDs in support of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) operations.

PROBLEM: FSBs rarely conduct a full and complete orders process because of a failure to manage time and a lack of familiarity with the doctrinal orders process.

RESULT: FSB OPORDs lack sufficient detail, which then leads to rehearsals that lack detail and are not well coordinated. In turn, these deficiencies lead to avoidable mission execution failures.

4.4.2 Issue Orders

* Co/TM operations orders, preparation and dissemination:

PROBLEMS:

1. OPORDS frequently violate the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule.
2. OPORDS tend to be vague and often do not follow the five paragraph format.
3. Company commanders frequently do not conduct IPB, METT-T analysis, or follow standard troop leading procedures.

RESULTS:

1. Late and inadequate mission rehearsals.
2. Subordinates with a poor understanding of the operation.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Central control by brigade of field artillery counterfire:

PROBLEMS:

1. Too many brigade commanders fail to establish priorities for force protection.
2. Radar zone management is not controlled by the brigade FSE.

Techniques: The brigade commander, with recommendations from the staff, must establish which portions of the force have priority for protection. The priorities should be phased because different portions of the BCT will have priority during different phases of the operation.

• The brigade FSE must act as centralized control for the management of radar zones during the preparation phase of the operation.

• The brigade FSE must exercise the same technique in the planning of the counterfire fight.

• The brigade OPORD must contain the top down radar zone plan. Implied to the TFs and the artillery battalion is they execute bottom up refinement as their scheme of maneuver is developed.

• The artillery battalion refines call for fire zones as the SITEMP is confirmed/denied.

• The task forces and artillery battalion may nominate additional radar zones to the brigade FSE.

• The brigade FSE consolidates the nominations, resolves duplication, checks the nominations against the commander's guidance, and develops and disseminates the brigade consolidated plan.

• Development of the Radar Deployment Order (RDO) is done by the artillery battalion, but it is done after detailed guidance is received from the brigade HQ.

• Refinement of the RDO is a continuous process.

• TF FSOs must continually update the critical friendly and censor zones as the maneuver forces and mortars move about the battlefield.

• The FA S2 must update the call for fire and ATI zones as the enemy situation develops.

* Attack helicopter battalion use of ground maneuver plans to develop aviation plans: Aviation units can optimize their air routes and engagement area planning by using obstacles and fire plans developed by the ground task force. Most of the time these plans are not obtained from the ground brigade.

TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part I

TA.5 Intelligence BOS Narrative