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TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE BOS


Positive Performance

5.1.1.2 Collect Physical Environment Information

* Effective use of TERRA BASE program: this program allows S2s to fully template the effects of terrain on communications and direct fire. Technique: use the program at Home Station to develop and sustain proficiency.

Need Emphasis

5.1 Collect Information

* Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan development: the majority of S2s develop R & S plans without integrating other staff elements. RESULT: R & S plans partially cover Named Areas of Interest (NAI), but more importantly, the R & S plan is not synchronized with other elements to ensure complete BOS integration.

Techniques:

1. The XO or S3 should drive the R & S plan development, in conjunction with the S2
2. Develop the plan similarly to an OPORD; this will help foster staff integration.

* Reconnaissance: planning, synchronization, supervision: PROBLEM - TF commanders and S3s "delegate" the responsibility for planning, integrating and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S2.

RESULT: failed reconnaissance effort, which hampers the staff's ability to determine threat weakness/strength and then exploit threat weakness.

Technique: TF commanders and particularly S3s must assume an active role in R & S planning in order to synchronize the effort and to allow the S2 time to analyze reconnaissance results. This then allows the S2 to subsequently redirect, as necessary, collection assets.

5.2.1 Evaluate Threat Information

* Threat evaluation: Brigade S2s rarely deploy to the NTC with complete threat models, particularly missing the description of tactics and options, as well as the identification of High Value Targets (HVT).

Technique: S2s should develop valid threat models, using Steps 1 - 3 of the IPB process prior to deployment. If the threat is well-known, then a doctrinal template and historical data will initially suffice. If the threat is new or less well-known, the S2 may have to develop and update the threat model as information becomes available.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* Artillery battalion S2s do not practice the IPB process enough at Home Station: Field Artillery battalion S2s routinely spend the first several days of a rotation trying to put together IPB templates to support the Tactical Decision Making Process because this type of training and preparation was not done at Home Station prior to deployment.

RESULT: FA battalion S2s are generally unable to synchronize their conduct of IPB with the FA order timeline. This causes S2 products either to be omitted during the orders process, or not integrated at the proper time in the process.

Procedures:

1. The procedures specified in FM 34-130 must be followed, and incorporated into unit standing operating procedures (SOP).

2. Incorporate in the SOP specific timelines for the orders process, including products and time limits associated with their completion.

Technique: The S2, S3 and FDO should develop and practice the products and timelines during Home Station garrison and field exercises. This cooperative effort will refine the process early and facilitate staff crosstalk.

* TF/Squadron S2s: the IPB process and application: S2s possess an acceptable conceptual understanding of the IPB process. The breakdown appears to be rooted in the application of IPB, including what products must be produced, by whom, when and to what standard. Staff integration of IPB products at TF/squadron level is poor.

Technique: FM 34-130 appendices give an adequate illustration of IPB concepts. The application of the process and the concurrent integration with the staff planning process must be practiced routinely during Home Station training, in order to be successfully employed during subsequent deployments.

* Situation Template development:

PROBLEMS:

1. S2s are not routinely depicting the enemy's most dangerous course of action (COA). Very few S2s develop multiple enemy COAs or threat models that would assist the staff in visualizing how the enemy will fight and what he will look like as he enters our potential engagement areas.

2. S2s SITEMPS do not graphically portray all the enemy's combat multipliers.

3. During wargaming, the staff does not conduct a thorough action-reaction-counterreaction drill of the fight based on a good SITEMP or threat model.

RESULTS:

1. Without an accurate depiction of the threat in an engagement area, commanders have a more difficult time calculating the necessary number and type of weapon systems to employ to achieve the commander's intent in that engagement area.

2. TFs develop COAs and wargame them without a clear understanding of how the enemy will fight.

3. Maneuver plans do not get synchronized with fire support or engineers, etc. to take advantage of enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities; we hamper our ability to gain and maintain the initiative.

Procedure: The S2 must, at a minimum, prepare enemy SITEMPS and threat models depicting the enemy's most probable and most dangerous COAs.

5.3.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions

* Determine Threat Courses of Action: SITEMPs produced by brigade S2s are rarely complete; seldom will they produce an event template with a matrix. Event templates portray all enemy options, and concentrate on the differences. This helps to identify which COA the enemy will adopt. With no enemy event template, or one that is incomplete, the wargaming process is severely hampered.

Techniques:

1. For enemy COA analysis, be able to answer the following questions:

  • Who? - what element
  • What? - type of operation
  • When?- time the action will begin
  • Where?- the sectors; zones; axis of advance; avenues of approach; objectives
  • How? - the method the enemy will use to employ his assets, ie. main effort, supporting effort, scheme of maneuver, fires, and support
  • Why?- the objective or end state the enemy expects to achieve
2. Develop an enemy event template, on a separate overlay, that depicts the following:
  • Time Phase Lines (TPL)
  • Named Areas of Interest (NAI)
  • Avenues of Approach (AA)
  • Decision points

This enemy event template will greatly assist in determining when the enemy will be entering our battle space.

5.3.3 Prepare Reports on the Battlefield Area

* Terrain analysis:

PROBLEMS:

1. Enemy avenues of approach depicted into friendly sectors do not identify potential engagement areas, fire sacks, defensible terrain and specific system or equipment positions.

2. Terrain analysis fails to identify where maneuver forces are most vulnerable to enemy observation and fires.

3. Terrain analysis is not considered by the S2 or the S3 when developing threat and friendly COAs.

4. S3s develop friendly COAs without considering terrain's impact on weapon system effects and/or enemy COAs.

5. There is little staff integration between the S2 and the supporting engineer.

RESULTS:

1. Vital information derived from terrain analysis is not incorporated into the decision making process.

2. Staff develop COAs and wargame them without an adequate knowledge of how the enemy will use terrain to his advantage and a terrain based concept of the employment of mobility and counter-mobility assets.

Technique: S2s should work closely with engineers and using TERRA BASE, if available, conduct detailed terrain analysis that meets the commander's needs. In addition to enemy avenues of approach, the terrain analysis should identify the following, as a minimum:

  • Intervisibility lines
  • Potential engagement areas
  • Enemy fire sacks
  • Weapon system firing lines
  • Lines of communication

* Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) integration in Task Force IPB: EBA products and analysis, specifically enemy engineer capabilities and terrain analysis are not integrated with the S2 products. TF commanders are not receiving the complete enemy picture.

Techniques:

1. Integrating engineer companies into the TF's training plan will increase engineer participation in TF battle staff training.
2. The engineer company XO should be integrated into the maneuver TF battle staff.


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