TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS (cont)
* Air Defense platoon use of Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment: Most air defense platoons do not train with or utilize their Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment, including:
- IFF interrogators
- Computers
- Codes
- Programmers
- Support and power sources
RESULT: Units are not able to conduct training or properly use, program, support, or coordinate their IFF equipment.
* Preparation and submission of DA Form 1156: Units are challenged with preparing and submiting DA Form 1156 to standard.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units are expected to quickly prepare and submit DA Form 1156 when they receive casualties.
2. DA Forms 1156 are frequently not completed with all pertinent information.
3. DA Forms 1156 for soldiers who are lightly wounded, treated, and immediately returned to duty (RTD), are not submitted to the TF S-1 or S-1 representative at the Forward Aid Station or Main Aid Station (FAS/MAS).
RESULT: Personnel & Administration Centers (PACs) located in the field trains are unable to properly execute their mission; i.e., awards, letters of condolence/sympathy, and personnel transactions are not timely or accurate.
Techniques:
1. Conduct training at Home Station on what a properly filled-out form should look like.
2. Task force should develop an SOP for submission of DA Form 1156 for RTDs.
- Have the company team consolidate its RTD 1156s with the First Sergeant prior to his departure to the LRP meeting.
- The First Sergeant submits the RTD 1156s to the S-1 or designated S-1 representative who checks them for correctness and accountability.
- Verified RTD 1156s are sent back to the field trains with all other 1156s collected that day at the FAS/MAS.
RESULT: The PAC in the field trains would receive all 1156s within 10 to 12 hours after the injury occurs, giving them at least 12 hours to process required paperwork and conduct necessary personnel transactions.
* Soldier knowledge of equipment, i.e., battle sight zeros, NBC and PMCS: A majority of military police platoons need to improve basic soldier knowledge of their battle sight zeros, NBC, and PMCS equipment.
Technique: Leaders must take time on a daily basis during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) to concentrate on improving these skills. These skills must be trained to standard at Home Station prior to deployment.
7.5.2 Supply the Force
* Task Force S-4 missile requests: Task force S-4s often do not understand the different types of STINGER missiles and make inadequate missile requests.
PROBLEM: Air defense platoons and S-4s often place requests for "Stinger Missiles. Missile rounds and weapon rounds are not differentiated to ensure an adequate availability of gripstocks.
Techniques:
1.
Air defense platoon sergeants must coordinate with the task force to ensure
they have DODACS for both types of missiles.
2.
Ensure a requesting system exists which differentiates between the two missiles.
* Task Force ownership of Class IV/ V (mines) supply point: In general, task forces give the responsibility of planning, organizing, operating and removing their Class IV/V (mines) supply point to engineers that are involved in the Countermobility (CM) effort.
RESULT: Takes engineer soldiers away from the CM effort and shifts a percentage of these specially trained soldiers to perform tasks that could be performed by dismounts who are not as involved with the CM effort.
Technique: Task forces should assume responsibility of the task force Class IV/V (mines) supply point IAW FM 2-32.
* Materiel readiness tracking from garrison to field environment: Units have difficulty maintaining an accurate picture of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions upon arrival into Theater.
PROBLEM: CSS units have difficulty transitioning their Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) (i.e., ULLS, SAMS 2 and SARSS) from garrison to a field environment because of a lack of manual tracking system while the STAMIS are off-line.
RESULT: Units quickly lose an accurate picture of what equipment is inoperable, what parts are required, the associated requisitions status and DA Form 2404 preparation and tracking.
Techniques:
1. Unit leadership should require the use of automated CSS systems in both Home Station garrison and field use.
2. Future CSS automated management software must be more user friendly and provide real-time information management products.
3. Units should request or keep track of historical usage of supplies in the theater to which they are deploying. It is possible to develop a "factor" to use automated forecasting tools e.g., OPLOG planner, at battalion or brigade S-4 sections.
4. Units should develop a manual system (DA Form 2404 daily turn-ins and daily maintenance meetings) to track readiness before STAMIS are fully operational after arrival into Theater.
* Tracking of high priority Class IX requisitions: Manual transportation manifests were used inconsistently by Main Support Battalions (MSB) to maintain visibility of in-transit high priority parts.
PROBLEM: Transportation manifests do not get to Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Support Operations prior to each shipment's arrival in the brigade support area (BSA).
RESULT: The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) has insufficient time to put into motion actions to accept and install high priority deadlining parts prior to line of departure (LD).
NOTE: The use of Class IX electronic data transfer (using the "BLAST" software program) has improved to a 68.3% success rate; an increase in effectiveness of 17.3%. The increase can be attributed to improved Home Station training and better coordination between the FSB and their signal support.
Techniques:
1. CSS Units should develop tracking systems for high priority parts. This system should be used on a daily basis at Home Station.
2. The BLAST system must continue to be trained and utilized at Home Station in order to build familiarity with MSE interface by all components of the system: Signal Company, Brigade Signal Officer, and Battalion Commo/SARRS operator.
* Synchronization of Class III (B) supply operations:
PROBLEMS:
1. There is a lack of synchronization in Class III(B) resupply operations between the Main Support Battalion (MSB), the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) and maneuver task forces.
2. Resupply windows within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) tend to be rigid time periods versus event-driven and do not consistently support maneuver operations by maintaining full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.
3. The forecasting of Class III(B) by the BCT through the use of LOGSTATS is poor and contributes to the lack of Class III(B) resupply synchronization.
RESULT: The FSB and task forces have difficulty reaching capacity from resupply operations
Techniques:
1. The BCT must train to become more flexible in the development of Class III(B) resupply windows. These windows should be flexible enough to support operations and at the same time maintain the maximum capacity possible within storage/transportation assets.
2. Fuel forecasting should be incorporated into Home Station training.
* Task Force tracking of Class III/III(P) and Class V on-hand status: The task force is not able to manage or track Class III/III(P) or Class V on-hand status.
PROBLEM: Orange reports submitted to the S-4 are not completely filled out.
RESULT: The S-4 is forced to guess what ClassIII/III(P) and Class V supplies are on-hand.
Technique: Train to ensure Orange reports submitted to the S-4 have complete information.
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative, Part 1|
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