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TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS


Positive Performance

7.3 Fix

* Repair of combat vehicles prior to Line of Departure (LD): Units are ensuring that combat vehicles get repaired prior to LD. They are properly managing Prescribed Load List (PLL) parts and working with the Forward Support Battalion (FSB).

7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities

* Comprehensive religious support to units: Chaplains and chaplain assistants are much better prepared to provide comprehensive religious support to their units than they were two years ago.

Techniques:

1. Select aggressive brigade chaplains and NCOs who want to be prepared to perform their wartime mission. Put the best NCOs in brigade level spots and make it reflect in their NCOERs that they are in the position because they are the best.

2. Train-ups are intentional and incorporate lessons learned from previous rotations.

3. Brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMT) are including their slice element UMTs in the training. This facilitates comprehensive support throughout the brigade's area of responsibility.

4. Battalion level chaplains are motivated to learn and willing to be a part of the team. This is a major step forward and should be an area the branch aggressively strives to attain.

5. Continue to place emphasis on training "go to war" skills.

7.5.2.1 Request Supplies

* Logistical reporting to support battalion: Platoons are doing a standard job with turning in logistical reports to the support battalion. Generally, platoons have a defined relationship with their support assets and almost never lacked a Class I, III or V item.

7.5.2.4 Procure Supplies

* Emergency Class V in combat trains: Emergency Class V is usually available for all missions with adequate mix.

7.7 Provide Military Police Support

* Brigade-level use of military police: Generally, brigades doctrinally employ direct support military police platoons. The platoons are primarily attached to the brigade main for circulation control and area security missions. This greatly enhances the platoons' effectiveness as a combat multiplier on the battlefield. They are integrated for the important missions to complement their brigades.

* Military police integration with brigade staff: The majority of the platoon leaders are fully integrated into and regularly interfacing with the brigade staffs during mission planning and coordination. This active involvement results in the best employment of the platoons. (Platoon leaders who do not interact with their brigade staff are usually given limited missions which result in minimal employment of the MP asset.)

7.7.2 Conduct Law and Order Operations

* Area security and circulation control operations:

1. The brigade staff factors in good intelligence evaluation of the rear area threat before tasking the MP platoon with a mission. This directly enhances their effectiveness as a combat multiplier, properly employing them in the most critical areas.

2. Team leaders are not only escorting large convoys, but perform duties as the convoy commander, a great responsibility for a young sergeant.

Where to improve:

1. Support battalions occassionally attempt to integrate MP platoons into their base security plans. This frequently causes confusion (usually during critical hours of darkness) when MP teams are requested to supplement with little or no prior coordination.

2. Generally, the platoons need improvement in planning, OPORD dissemination, and actions on contact with the enemy.

3. Circulation control in the areas of breach security and contaminated areas should be trained at Home Station.

Needs Emphasis

7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment

* Proper completion of DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988: Units, leaders and individuals fail to properly complete and submit DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988.

PROBLEM: Many unit technical SOPs do not address the basics of DA Forms 2404 and 5988 completion to include format, submittal and collection process/method, maintenance section form flow and actions and return of form/parts to equipment operator.

RESULTS:

1. Reduced preventive maintenance.
2. Reduced parts ordering.
3. Lower Operations Readiness (OR) rates.

Techniques:

1. Many Home Station daily operations for motor pool operations can be applied to field maintenance operations. Those that are not may be refocused to equate administrative operations to tactical/field requirements to eliminate a dual-system of operations.

2. Technical SOPs can be updated/revised/written to include maintenance operations.

3. Unit LOGPACs are often the collection point for DA Forms 2404 and 5988s and delivery of non-dead lining parts to platoon sergeants.

4. Maintenance contact teams can accompany the LOGPAC supplies with the platoon sergeant and work on vehicle faults during LOGPAC operations or at a consolidated site.

7.3.2.2 Recover

* Recovery operations planning: The recovery plan for not mission capable (NMC) vehicles (specifically during task force missions) lack essential detail.

PROBLEM: Units do not plan collection points, and when they do the collection points do not support the task force mission.

RESULTS:

1. Company/teams are often confused or lack any knowledge of the recovery plan.

2. Units lose valuable time in generating combat power during the task force mission and often only begin collecting vehicles after the change of the mission.

Techniques:

1. The Battation Maintenance Officer (BMO) must have an understanding of the task force mission in order to develop a recovery plan, and must plan for collection points that will support the task force during the entire mission.

2. The BMO must integrate his recovery plan with S-4 CSS plan.

3. The recovery plan must be briefed during the CSS rehearsal to ensure that the company teams have a thorough understanding.

7.4.3.1.2 Provide Career Management Support

* S-2 Section: lack of experienced 96B Intelligence Analyst: Field Artillery (FA) battalions lack experienced 96B Intelligence Analysts to provide technical expertise to the S-2 section.

PROBLEMS:

1. FA battalions either have no 96B or have a 96B that is directly from Advanced Individual Training (AIT), and has no experience.

2. With the deletion of the military intelligence officer from the direct support (DS) artillery battalions, the need for an experienced 96B is critical, since the 96B is normally the continuity of the FA S-2 section.

  • Responsible for training the S-2 officer who will normally be assigned to the position for less than a year
  • Acts as the S-2 in his absence.

Technique: Division G-2s and G-2 SGMs should fill 96B slots in DS battalions with 96Bs in the grade of E4 or E5, and have worked at least one assignment in a maneuver brigade or battalion S-2 section.

7.4.3.4 Perform Chaplaincy Activities

* Synchronization of religious support assets on the battlefield: Brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMT) struggle with synchronization of religious support assets on the battlefield.

PROBLEM: FM 16-1 gives a cursory discussion of the religious support duties of brigade chaplains and ministry team NCOICs, but does not provide a how-to on synchronization of religious support assets.

Techniques:

1. Supervisory chaplains need to be involved in the training of subordinate Unit Ministry Teams.
2. Use the information given in the previous version of FM 16-1 (prior to the 1995 rewrite).

Procedure: FM 16-1 should be expanded into three FMs:

  • FM 16-1-1, dealing with religious support at the battalion level
  • FM 16-1-2, dealing with religious support and brigade and regimental level
  • FM 16-1-3, religious support at the division, installation and above level.

* Composition of unit ministry teams: Units tend to omit the chaplain assistant on their Unit Ministry Teams (UMT).

PROBLEMS:

1. The commander does not understand the importance of what the chaplain assistant does on the battlefield.
2. Chaplain assistant NCO supervisors do not aggressively strive to get chaplain assistants to training.

RESULTS:

1. No proper division of labor to allow the chaplain to adequately address the needs of the soldiers.
2. The chaplain assistant does not understand his/her job, or is improperly utilized, and the team becomes less effective.

Technique: Provide training for the chaplian assistant consistent with FM 16-1, which states "..The chaplain assistant is a combatant, carries a weapon, and is essential for the survival of the team on the battlefield."

* Chaplain support to rear elements: Units tend to have inadequate religious support for rear elements, i.e., the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) and the hospital.

PROBLEM: Units deploying to combat training centers do not configure their Unit Ministry Teams IAW FM 16-1, and therfore, are not able to support all elements of the battlefield.

RESULT: UMTs are not trained the way they intend to fight.

Technique: Units deploying to the combat training centers must deploy their complete UMT with the unit.

* Ministry team understanding of reception, staging, onward movement, integration (RSOI):

PROBLEMS: Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) often do not understand their role

  • In reception, staging, onward movement, integration (RSOI) operations
  • During Other than Military Operations (OMO)
  • When relating to civilians on the battlefield
  • When advising the commander
  • When dealing with the media

RESULT: UMTs are too often technically unprepared for deployment for combat

Technique: Supervisory chaplains and NCOs must take seriously their responsibilty to ensure "battlefocused" training is conducted to standard.

7.4.4 Provide Health Services

* Incorporation of professional filler system (PROFIS) physicians into medical platoon training: The professional Filler System (PROFIS) physicians are not incorporated into medical platoon training and are not prepared to conduct tactical operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. The majority of PROFIS doctors deploying to the combat training center have never trained with the unit they are supporting, and have been with the unit an average of about one week.

2. PROFIS physicians are too often not trained on common soldier skills.

Technique: PROFIS physicians must be identified at lease six months prior to deployment, and train up with the unit at Home Station prior to deployment. This will allow him to become familiar with unit equipment and SOPs.

7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties

* Medical evacuation of chemical casualties and KIAs:

PROBLEMS:

1. Many units do not know what to do with their chemical casualties and KIAs.
2. During evacuation numerous field litter ambulances (FLA) are needlessly contaminated.
3. Casualties are brought to the decon site or to the clean main aid station/forward aid station (MAS/FAS).

Techniques:

1. Train medics and company personnel to minimize the spread of contamination of FLAs and clean medical facilities.
2. Train patient decon procedures IAW FM 3-5.
3. Identify clean and dirty FAS/MAS in OPORD and reiterate at rehearsals.

* Use of air casualty evacuation assets: Units, specifically the logistics planners, do not sufficiently plan for air casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) assets when they have them available.

RESULT: A unit's died of wounds (DOW) rate is elevated relative to the elapsed time they are left on the battlefield.

Techniques:

1. Full utilization of available air assets in CASEVAC would significantly reduce a unit's DOW rates. Air evacuation needs to be planned in detail. Areas that need to be addressed are:

  • A clear task and purpose
  • Enemy ADA threat
  • Priority to specific unit and type of casualty
  • Pickup zone (PZ) location and set-up responsibilities
  • Where the casualties should be evacuated

2. To help ensure their proper utilization, the aviation LNO or the Pilot-In-Charge should be available during the planning process.

7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel

* Electronic Support (ES) Team training: use of PRD-12, Portable Radio Direction Finding System: ES teams continue to demonstrate a lack of proficiency in the use of PRD-12 Portable Radio Direction Finding System.

PROBLEM: The PRD-12 is an integral component of, and system back-up capability for the TRQ-32(V)2. Given the opportunity to employ the PRD-12 when their TRQ-32A is down for maintenance or during limited dismounted operations, most teams demonstrate a lack of training with the PRD-12 and an inability to operate it to standard.

RESULT: The commander does not receive all of the intelligence information that might be available.

Technique: ES teams should conduct training in the use of the PRD-12 (if so equipped), striving to attain the same standard of operations with the PRD-12 as they do with the TRQ-32A. This should include training in night operations and DF netting procedures.

* Leader training: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) equipment: IEW leaders do not fully understand the capabilities and employment of tactical IEW equipment. Particular weaknesses include:

  • Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR)
  • PRD-12 (Portable Radio Direction Finding System)
  • Direction finding (DF) theory and accuracy
  • Electronic attack (EA) capabilities

Techniques:

1. IEW leaders must get hands-on time with EW systems while the crew is performing their mission.
2. IEW leaders should read the FM-34 series
3. Senior leaders should conduct OPDs to discuss the doctrinal employment, capabilities, and limitations of EW systems.

* Direct Support (DS) MI Company training: support of HHCs and FSBs: DS MI companies are now organized under a new MTOE designed to use a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) area support concept. This system frequently fails to provide adequate support.

RESULT: DS MI companies continue to deploy a maintenance slice. This slice typically includes a TPU, wrecker, motor maintenance, and C-E maintenance teams.

Techniques:

1. MI companies must form a habitual relationship at Home Station with the HHCs and FSBs of the Brigade Combat Team they support. This relationship must then be exercised in a field environment.

2. SOPs and IEW-specific prescribed load lists (PLL) (like PRD-12 batteries and 200/400 amp generators) should be developed from lessons learned during these exercises.

3. Rigorous Home Station training will test the system and instill confidence.



TA.6 Mobility/Survivability BOS & Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Narrative
TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS Narrative, Part 2



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