TA.6 Mobility/Survivability & NBC BOS (cont)
6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems
* Decontamination operations by contaminated units:
PROBLEMS:
1. Deliberate decontamination sites and link-up points are usually identified in plans; however, the plan sites are rarely used, creating link-up problems between the contaminated unit and the decon platoon.
2. Augmentation and support for decon operations is still a problem.
- Most brigade NBC staffs fail to realize their staff coordination and supervisory responsibilities for decon operations
- Units rarely task specific elements (such as military police, engineer, and medical personnel and equipment) to reinforce decon operations
- Units do not adequately stock equipment for Detailed Troop Decon (DTD) or plan for resupply after the operation
- Task forces are limited in conducting decontamination operations due to lack of water hauling capabilities
Techniques: Successful decon operations depend on proper augmentation of the decon platoon.
1.
The brigade assumes responsibility for augmentees and CSS coordination, to
include water transport.
2.
The unit should train a decon team in each one of its units to be prepared
to augment the decon platoon at the decon site.
3.
The brigade ensures the augmentees & CSS assets link-up with the decon platoon
prior to decon operations.
4.
At link-up, the augmentees & CSS assets are under the control of the decon
platoon leader.
RESULT: The decon platoon leader is properly augmented and supported by the brigade staff and the contaminated unit. This enables the decon platoon to have all the necessary equipment and personnel in place to conduct thorough decon operations.
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security
* Security of combat formations during periods of preparation for combat: Units fail to secure themselves during periods of preparation for combat.
PROBLEMS:
1. If units do secure themselves, security efforts are usually too late.
2. Security efforts lack an adequate plan or SOP.
3. The parent unit does not track the status of security of their C2 nodes.
4. Leaders often fail to task units to perform security functions. When they do, the task is often vague, not specified in terms of time or space, or lack a definable purpose.
5. Units are tracking the status of their security posture, and protective measures do not get done.
RESULT: Units are routinely penetrated by enemy reconnaissance.
Technique: Every organization, unit, or leader has the fundamental obligation to secure itself. The subordinate chain of command can fix this issue within their area of operations, even when not specifically tasked to do so. It is an inherent task to all combat operations. Leaders simply must ensure and provide for the security of their combat formations and ensure appropriate tasks are conveyed and understood.
6.3.2.1 Employ Signals Security
* Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoon anti-jamming measures:
PROBLEM: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle platoon SOPs for anti-jamming measures often state that the platoon switches to the "next time period's frequency".
RESULT: The next time period's frequency has not been authorized for use in the current time period and is often authorized and utilized by another element.
Procedure: SOPs should state that platoon leaders must coordinate with their supported task force to obtain use-allocated spare frequencies or use of other nets such as the battery net.
6.3.2.2.3 Employ Smoke/Obscurants
* Integration of smoke missions: Smoke platoon leaders/sergeants, when integrated early into the planning process, develop more than one course of action to accomplish their offensive or defensive smoke mission(s). Too often, however, smoke missions are not "wargamed", and smoke assets are wasted on poor missions or a lack of valid missions.
PROBLEMS:
1. Nearly all smoke missions fail to integrate projected and generated smoke.
2. Generated smoke is not integrated into the maneuver plan.
3. Typically, a smoke platoon mission is "just move along the task force and blow smoke".
4. When a valid smoke mission is planned and synchronized with the maneuver plan, forces are unable to maneuver in the smoke effectively due to their lack of training in limited visibility.
Techniques:
1. Refer to FM 71-2, which clearly states over a dozen uses for smoke in the offense and defense.
2. References for coordinating smoke missions are FM 3-50, FM 3-101-2, and FM 71-2.
3. Environmental issues do not allow most units to train with smoke at Home Station. However, computer simulation programs exist to assist units in at least gaining the knowledge on how to plan and use generated smoke.
4. Division chemical staffs must develop a training program for brigade and task force chemical staffs (officers and NCOs) in the planning requirements for NBC assets, particularly smoke platoons.
6.3.4 Provide Counterreconnaissance, Security and Readiness
* Security operations at brigade level: Security operations at the brigade level leave the brigade vulnerable to enemy reconnaissance.
PROBLEMS:
1. There is seldom a system to actively seek out, identify, track and destroy the enemy's reconnaissance forces throughout the depth and breadth of the sector/zone.
2. The brigade security effort is often limited to identifying one or two "counter-reconnaissance companies" that line up along some phase line with no specified mission.
3. Brigade commanders are reluctant to allocate any real combat power to security operations.
- Units tasked to perform counter-reconnassiance are often given other missions such as brigade reserve or occupation of a battle position, and do not have the time, stamina or planning ability to do both.
- Security operations are normally concurrent with the height of planning and preparation of the brigade's next mission, and receive little attention from the brigade's "heavy hitters".
Techniques:
1. Commit a force capable of finding and destroying the enemy's reconnaissance effort throughout the sector/zone. Do not give this force any other mission.
2. Plan security operations early and with the same amount of attention and support given to any other combat operation.
Procedure: Design a command and control system for security operations that can make and execute movements of brigade combat power and supporting elements without the need for executive-level decisions.
* Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) team skills:
PROBLEM: GSR teams tend to have a low level of proficiency in several areas:
- Ability to call for fire
- NBC skills (unmasking procedures and M256 kit use)
- Battlefield survival (security and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM))
- Range cards for the radar and crew-served weapons
Techniques: Train above skills at Home Station.
* Combat Service Support (CSS) units development and execution of base cluster defense plans: CSS units consistently have difficulty planning and providing for their own defense. Development and execution of coherent base cluster defense plans, to include fire support and ADA planning/ coordination and executing alternate Tactical Operations Center (TOC) operations continues to be difficult for CSS units.
PROBLEMS:
1. Base cluster defenses often are founded on poor quality fighting positions, an absence of sector sketches, and weak coordination between supporting elements.
2. Reconnaissance and surveillance planning is improving but the execution of these plans remains a problem.
3. Fire support, mobility/survivability and air defense planning and execution is not coordinated or complete.
4. Alternate TOC operations are either not conducted or are not fully prepared to function as the primary TOC.
5. Hasty displacement planning and execution needs improvement.
6. Other areas needing improvement are:
- Planning of preparation and execution triggers
- Site selection based on current Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
- Development of lists of priority equipment to be saved
- Development of routes, reporting posts and priority of movement
Technique: Home Station training must fully integrate and exercise all aspects of base defense operations.
* Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) security: Security in the UMCP is not to standard and tends to be neglected due to the maintenance workload.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Security is not considered a priority in the UMCP, and therefore, the units
usually have no security SOP.
2.
Units that do possess an SOP usually do not execute them.
3.
Units seldom integrate vehicles and crews into the security mission of the
UMCP.
Procedures:
1. Units must ensure that security is a priority, and must establish an SOP that profiles 360 degree security and proper placement and crew served weapons around the perimeter.
2. The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) should personally integrate into the security SOP all vehicles and crews that are in the UMCP for maintenance.
3. UMCP site selection should enhance the survivability and security of the UMCP.
4. Other passive measures such as noise and light discipline must be strictly enforced.
5. Every soldier in the UMCP should be given a hasty fighting position with assigned sectors of fire.
TA.6
Mobility/Survivability BOS & Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Narrative, Part
1
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
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