TA.4 Command and Control (cont)
* Engineer Company operations orders (OPORDs): Engineer company operation orders (OPORDs) are often missing complete paragraphs of the 5-paragraph format and paragraphs presented are often lacking in detail.
PROBLEMS:
1. Paragraph 1, Situation, often lacks specifics of the current situation and the enemy engineer capabilities.
2. Paragraph 3, Execution, often lacks detail in the Scheme of Engineer Operations (SOEO) that integrates the engineer unit into the overall Scheme of Maneuver.
3. Units rarely use maneuver graphics and/or terrain models or sketches during the OPORD brief to subordinate and attached units.
4. During the task force/brigade OPORD briefings the staff engineer rarely articulates the mobility/survivability concept of support.
Techniques:
1. Engineer Company commanders and staff engineers utilize the complete 5 paragraph format for developing and briefing the engineer OPORD and concept of support.
2. Many units have made use of printed "fill in the blank" formats to eliminate redundant parts of the OPORD process and as reminders of data and information required.
* Integration of CSS into the combined arms rehearsal: The integration of CSS into the tactical plan continues to be a problem area. Although brigades routinely conduct lengthy combined arms rehearsals, little or no emphasis is placed on integrating CSS into the process. On those occassions when CSS is addressed it is done at the end of the rehearsal process without any attempts to integrate it into the overall plan by brigade leaders.
Technique: The brigade leadership must ensure that the CSS plan is integrated in the brigade overall tactical scheme of maneuver. Incorporation of the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) commander and brigade primary CSS staff member into the combined arms rehearsal process will lead to better integration and synchronization of CSS in the brigade's operation.
* Medical platoon rehearsals: Medical platoon rehearsals have not generally contributed to a better understanding of the medical support plan.
Technique: Refer to CALL Newsletter 91-1, Rehearsals, for discussions on rehearsal sequence, types of rehearsals, and rehearsal techniques.
* CSS Rehearsals: CSS rehearsal effectiveness is being hindered by a lack of preparedness, inadequate presentation tools, and disorganized formats.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Recent experience shows CSS rehearsals tend to be service support briefs rather
than participatory events.
2.
Presentation tools are inadequate, often consisting of nothing more than a
1:50,000 scale map with the CSS overlay.
3.
Participants frequently are unfamiliar with the CSS plan at both task force
level and within their subordinate unit.
4.
Formats for CSS rehearsals lack organization and will change from one mission
to the next.
Techniques:
1. The S-4 must present the service support plan and provide the CSS annex with graphics at the task force orders brief.
2. The S-4 must police the various CSS representatives to ensure they received this information so that they arrive at the CSS rehearsal prepared to participate.
3. Participants need to come to the CSS rehearsal with a map, graphics, and knowledge of both the task force CSS plan and their role within the plan.
4. The S-4 should strive to use the terrain model or appropriate rehearsal kit that will provide a large enough stage to allow participation.
5. The CSS rehearsal should proceed by phases that correspond to the task force scheme of maneuver.
- The rehearsal leader (typically the S-4) should introduce the expected enemy and friendly situation the each phase in the battle
- Each CSS representative should act out the tasks he will be performing during that phase
4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support
* Establishment of Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) procedures:
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigades do not establish Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) procedures.
2. Brigades make use of a great amount of rotary and fixed wing aircraft for air assaults, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R& asset insertion, re-supply, CAS, and command and control (C2), but their effort to execute A2C2 is sometimes minimal to non-existent.
3. The brigade staff does not normally have a formal A2C2 cell, and is not versed in A2C2 procedures.
4. The control procedures developed often limit field artillery fires on the battlefield at critical times.
5. Brigades fail to turn control measures on and off at the appropriate time.
Procedures:
1. Brigades must establish standard operating procedures (SOP) for A2C2. Each member of the staff must understand their responsibilities in A2C2 planning.
2. Do not place the entire burden for A2C2 on the Air Liaison Officer (ALO).
4.4.3 Provide Command Presence
* Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Command and Control (C2): Company commanders and platoon leaders make decisions from their command post with little understanding of the environment in which Electronic Warfare (EW) teams are operating.
Technique: Leaders must go forward on the battlefield on a regular basis to see the terrain, conduct pre-combat inspections, and to gauge the morale and performance of their soldiers.
* Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) personnel battle tracking skills: The CTCP personnel are not cross-trained to duties such as battle tracking, map posting, combat strength analysis and situation updates.
Technique: CTCP personnel need to be trained and competent in battle tracking skills in the event they must serve as an alternate tactical operations center (TOC).
4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline
* Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCI): Company/ team leaders are not regularly conducting PCCs, and platoon sergeants and leaders are not conducting PCIs.
PROBLEM: Most units have SOPs on the conduct of PCCs and PCIs, but they are not often followed.
RESULT: Units are often unable to perform their missions to standard because they do not have the right equipment or enough of the right batteries, etc. These are small mistakes that cause major problems when the team cannot accomplish its mission.
Techniques:
1. Units should review their PCC/PCI SOPs to ensure they are adequate, and leaders should ensure these SOPs are used.
2. Company/team leaders should perform thorough PCCs with a checklist before every mission. Platoon sergeants or leaders should then follow-up by conducting PCI spot-checks.
4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations
* Command and control of reconnaissance operations: Reconnaissance operations fail when there is no single command and control headquarters.
PROBLEMS:
1. When reconnaissance operations are joint or committee efforts, and each element (i.e., aviation, COLTs, chemical recon, scouts, etc.) reports to a different commander, they fail without exception.
2. Permission must be sought, and is rarely responsively granted, to redirect to reconstitute reconnaissance elements.
3. Missions are not synchronized because the whole effort responds to several commander's taskings.
- Fires are difficult, if not impossible to get clear
- CSS is not linked to recon maneuver
- Communications links are poorly maintained over several nets and devices
Technique: Appoint a brigade-level Chief of Reconnaissance, operating out of the Tactical Command Command Post (TAC CP). Give him the authority and communications structure to fight the recon battle. Make all reconnaissance elements reportable to and taskable by him.
* Brigade planning and execution of deep operations: The brigades rarely plan or execute a deep fight designed to set a specific condition or set of conditions to allow the close fight to be fought with success.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade staffs are not viewing the planning and execution of the mission according to the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear, security, and reserve).
2. The fire support plan is not designed around the concept of deep, close, rear. Routinely, the plans contain some amount of deep fires, usually executed by the Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs), but with no specific task, purpose, and end state determined.
RESULT: It is impossible to determine success or failure of the deep fight because the end state, the conditions to be set, are not determined by the brigades.
Techniques:
1. During course of action (COA) development, the brigade staff must array the forces, both friendly and enemy, as they should be at the decisive point. This is the planned end state for the deep fight.
2. The fire support officer (FSO), S-2 and S-3 must develop a series of fire support events for each particular COA that will get the brigade to the desired end state.
3. Wargame each COA and define detailed tasks and purposes in the deep fire support plan.
* Role of S-3 Air in air-ground integration: Brigade staffs are not utilizing the S-3 air to perform the functions outlined in FMs 71-123 and 100-103.
PROBLEMS:
1. The brigade S-3 air is utilized as a battle captain, and not to coordinate users of the brigade airspace.
2. There is often no coordination between the Assistant Division Engineer (ADE), Fire Support Element (FSE), or Air Liaison Officer (ALO) inside the Tactical Operating Center (TOC).
3. Most S-3 airs are not aware of their responsibilities to insure the brigade's battlespace is properly managed nor are they aware of the impact a poorly managed A2C2 program has on the brigade battle plan.
Technique: The role of the S-3 air that is only mentioned in 71-series field manuals must be expanded in unit SOPs and practiced at Home Station. The description of the S-3 air and the role he plays in the TOC as air and ground integration manager should be expanded to include details and checklists of the requirements to coordinate brigade level airspace.
4.5 Employ Tactical C2W
*Asset management and traffic analysis: As a whole, the traffic analysis cells do not--
- Maintain a current data-base of historical analytical observations
- Consistently plot manual direction finding results
- Provide meaningful feedback to the collection/jamming teams.
PROBLEMS:
1.
Lack of time management.
2.
Apathy or ignorance by traffic cell members.
3.
Lack of emphasis or concern by company team leadership.
RESULTS:
1.
Ineffective traffic analysis for leadership and collection teams.
2.
Ineffective platoon operations center (POC).
Techniques:
1.
Electronic warfare (EW) platoon leader and platoon sergeant must take more
active interest in traffic analysis cell operations.
2.
Hold cell accountable for accomplishment; ensure analysts work to basic standards
of analyst.
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 5
TA.5
Intelligence BOS Narrative
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