TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
5.3.2 Develop Impacts
* Task Force (TF) S-2 terrain analysis: TF S-2s now better articulate how the terrain will impact on the threat's available courses of action (COAs) and assist the commander and staff in determining friendly COAs that exploit opportunities the terrain provides.
1. More accurate Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) result in more accurate depictions of enemy avenues of approach into sectors/zones.
2. Improved identification of :
- Enemy kill sacks
- Potential friendly engagement areas
- Defensible terrain
- Specific potential system and equipment locations
3. Better use of TERRABASE products and 1:25000 scale maps.
4. Improved coordination with supporting elements such as engineers.
5.4.3 Prepare Tactical Intelligence Reports
* Improved use of TERRABASE/TOPOSKIMMER terrain visualization software: Units successfully use the software to improve their detailed terrain analysis; these products are being included in operations orders (OPORDs).
Technique: Prior to rotation, units should train on it to increase proficiency in using it and use this software at Home Station to develop a standard reference file of terrain analysis products:
- Friendly and enemy maneuver
- Line of sight for retransmission (RETRANS)
- Analysis of enemy battle positions
5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation
* Understanding the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process: Most S-2s know the IPB process and understand the products and information needed at the various steps of the Tactical Decision-Making Process (TDMP).
5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements
1. Too little staff integration into the R & S planning process.
2. R & S plans too general, failing to focus on gaps in intelligence holdings.
Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) is often too general to
R & S planning .
4. The scout platoon leader rarely knows the 1 or 2 items the commander absolutely needs to know in order to achieve success.
The scout platoon deploys over-tasked, with multiple objectives of supposed
2. Scouts fail to accomplish their mission.
1. The TF Commander, working with his S-2, must focus his PIR.; the focused PIR should determine subsequent R & S plan development.
2. Other staff elements must be involved in the detailed planning of R & S to provide sufficient support, tactically and logistically, for the scout platoon.
3. Make prioritization of R & S effort a joint process among Commander/S-3/S-2 during planning; force commander to identify 1-2 PIRs for success.
PROBLEM: Too many units at TF level "delegate" the entire responsibility for planning, integrating, and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S-2.
RESULTS: Reconnaissance effort fails.
The staff cannot determine threat weaknesses and strengths.
2. Courses of action do not avoid threat strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.
Techniques: Train at Home Station to integrate the reconnaissance effort in accordance with (IAW) the following command and staff responsibilities.
- Identification of collection requirements derived from the IPB process.
- Identification of R & S assets available.
- Integration of R & S assets into a collection plan that matches collection requirements against collector capabilities and focuses on threat course of action determination.
- Analyze reconnaissance results and recommend redirection of collection assets.
- Tasking assets to support collection; redirect assets upon S2's recommendation and approval by Commander.
- Synchronizing the reconnaissance plan with combat multipliers, ie, engineers, RETRANS, fire support, combat service support (CSS).
- Ensure the R & S plan is as well integrated, synchronized, and supported as the operations plan.
Commander: While ultimately responsible for the entire process, the coordination and staff integration is best executed by the S-2 in conjunction with the S-3. NOTE: The role of the Executive Officer (XO) in this process will depend upon the XO's commander-directed focus, ie, Operations or CSS.
1. Units do not prepare R & S plans until after the TDMP is complete, losing 24-36 hours due to delays in planning between brigade and battalion.
2. Units use R & S matrices as the executing document. This document does not address:
- Penetration/infiltration of enemy security forces.
- Command and control (C2) (especially long range comms).
- Terrain management
- Fratricide avoidance
- Clearance of fires.
3. R & S plans do not have enough operational flexibility:
- Insufficient planning in depth
- Lack of provisions for redirecting recon assets
- No plan to reconstitute destroyed assets.
4. Plans do not state missions in terms of task, purpose, objectives, and intent.
5. Commanders do not receive back briefs or use other methods to ensure reconnaissance intent is understood.
RESULT: Reconnaissance plans are often late and lack sufficient detail to support execution; therefore they often fail.
1. Brigade must take the major responsibility for reconnaissance operations and must plan and manage all aspects of a reconnaissance mission.
2. Plan reconnaissance as a combat operation, using the five paragraph orders format; include method(s) for penetrating the enemy's security forces and CSS and C2 for the recon effort.
3. Issue the reconnaissance order immediately after the brigade commander has issued his planning guidance; use fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to provide information or modify the reconnaissance order afterwards.
4. Use the R & S matrix only for internal command post (CP) planning of R & S operations.
5. Include the same level of detail control measures for reconnaissance operations as are afforded any other combat operations.
5.2 Collect Information
1. Units do not usually plan to maintain contact when enemy units move during an operation.
2. No attempt is made to have another observer gain contact with an enemy element which has moved out of sight of one recon element.
Units routinely have trouble maintaining contact with enemy force once discovered
by reconnaissance elements.
2. This loss of contact leads to "double counting" and complete loss of contact.
1. Establish observers throughout width and depth of the whole zone.
2. Use a central headquarters to designate enemy force(s) with a common name and track them continuously; name should not describe functions or missions but unit type.
3. Use intelligence handover lines and labeled enemy avenues of approach. NOTE: See preceding observation; this also is the sort of issue which brigade can successfully manage.
5.2.2 Collect Target Information
* Reconnaissance and surveillance execution: While task force scouts usually succeed in observing tasked Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), there are too many instances where there was no plan to reposition the scouts if the TF scheme of maneuver changes.
RESULT: Scouts are not in position to complete a key portion of their mission.
Technique: Establish scouting reposition triggers so they can be in place to support branches and sequels of the base plan. This implies at least a map rehearsal for these contingencies. 5.3 Process Information
TF S-2s frequently do not understand the application of IPB process, resultant products, and their integration into the TF planning process.
1. IPB process is not clearly articulated:
- Products required
- Who produces IPB products
- When products prepared
- To what standard are IPB products prepared
2. Staff planning process and specific IPB integration at TF level:
- Generally not understood
- Not articulated to S-2 by commander, XO, or S-3
3. Doctrinal literature more representative of process rather than technique.
- No good example of integrated situational template product with degree of resolution to focus planning at TF level
S-2s and S-2 section personnel first exposed to IPB process and integration
at Home Station, or during their initial CTC rotation.
2. No clear doctrine or training on integration of IPB at TF level.
1. Use every Home Station training opportunity to integrate S-2s into the Tactical Decision Making Process. IPB and its resultant products are integral to successful planning and preparation.
2. Use FM 34-130 as a base document for the process; develop your own methods to integrate the process into staff planning.
184.108.40.206 Consider Enemy Doctrine
* Implementation of US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 350 Series Opposing Force (OPFOR) Pamphlets: Units often do not appear to know of the implementation of TRADOC 350 series OPFOR Pamphlets.
Four out of six unit S-2s arrived at NTC without the TRADOC 350 series of OPFOR
2. S-2s cannot depict or articulate how the enemy fights from a doctrinal standpoint.
1. S-2s cannot portray an uncooperative enemy during wargaming.
2. The staff overlooks possible branch plans and contingency plans and poorly understands the enemy's task and purpose of various groupings and echelons.
1. Division G-2s ensure that brigade and battalion S-2s have these publications on-hand.
2. Initiate training of intelligence officers at home station on Light and Heavy OPFOR doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
3. TF S-2s communicate with Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to ensure they have the current manuals and understand them.
4. Use these manuals for force-on-force training at Home Station.
5. Conduct unit training at home station using these manuals: Officer Professional Development/Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development (OPD/NCOPD), train-the-trainer.
5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment
1. The enemy's use of terrain to build engagement areas and the impact on friendly maneuver is rarely found in development of friendly COAs.
2. S-2s do not incorporate terrain from the enemy's perspective when developing the situation template.
3. Similar trends exist in the analysis of weather impact on smoke, air assault, and enemy chemical use.
RESULTS: Key terrain or weather from an enemy's perspective is often not addressed in wargaming.
1. Commanders must require detailed analysis of the impact of weather and terrain on friendly and enemy operations and incorporate them into wargaming COAs.
2. Continue to highlight the importance and goals of terrain and weather analysis into new manuals and circulars.
5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports
* S-2 situation templates insufficiently detailed: S-2s situation templates frequently lack sufficient detail to assist the staff and commanders to visualize how the enemy will fight at the critical point.
PROBLEMS: In attempting to shorten the deliberate planning process--
S-2s are not depicting multiple enemy COAs (ECOAs).
2. The S-2 fails to depict the enemy's most dangerous COAs.
3. S-2s do not prepare threat models that would assist the staff in visualizing how the enemy would fight.
4. S-2s do not show the staff how the enemy would look entering potential engagement areas (EAs).
TF wargames selected friendly COAs without a full understanding of how the
enemy will react to or affect those COAs.
2. TFs cannot develop valid friendly branches and sequels which will hinder the enemy commander's decision making process.
3. The TF becomes reactive to the enemy rather than holding the initiative.
1. S-2s must consider the enemy's most likely and most dangerous (to friendly COAs) COAs to prepare situation templates and threat models.
2. This analysis must go beyond the level of detail in current manuals, because those manuals do not discuss or depict the level of detail necessary to support the TDMP adequately.
3. Situation templates should depict what the enemy what the enemy will look like at selected "critical points."
5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions
* Designing enemy course(s) of action (ECOAs): S-2s and battle staffs often design ECOAs that are scripts, reflecting "smart books" or checklist solutions, not dangerous, dynamic, unified plans. ECOAs should be well-grounded in military theory and science, not focused one or two enemy fighting styles or particular national doctrines.
1. ECOAs do not regularly reflect how the enemy would see friendly forces and COAs.
2. ECOAs do not reflect possible enemy COAs to different friendly COAs, ie, enemy defense COAs if friendly unit attacks abreast versus in column or in one sector versus another.
RESULT: ECOAs are not multiple or unique.
Technique: S-2s/analysts should array options open to friendly units and fight each friendly option from the enemy's point of view.
5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation
1. During IPB, S-2s continue to omit detail needed to focus COA development and their commander's estimate.
2. S-2s experience some difficulty in portraying enemy throughout the Area of Operations (AO).
3. For light infantry operations, the enemy threat during infiltration and/or airborne/air assault operations is frequently not adequately explained or templated.
Technique: More repetitive emphasis with battalion level simulations and/or live operations.
S-2 sections do not have a sequential system in place to receive reports, analyze
reports, and confirm or deny the situation template.
2. They do not update the situation template after the OPORD briefing.
Units have an excellent "read" of the enemy but fail to realize this due to
limited situation template refinement.
2. Units do not refine their direct fire plan or scheme of maneuver as enemy information develops.
S-2 sections practice IPB as a continuous process.
2. Organize the S-2 section to receive and analyze reports in a timely manner, including implications for the situation template.
3. Analyze and assimilate enemy information in the S-2 section even while the S-2 is involved in the orders process.
4. Do not wait for perfect information before disseminating information to lower units.
TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narrative
TA.6 Mobility/Survivability & NBC BOS Narrative
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