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Needs Emphasis

2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System

*Computation of executive officer's Minimum Quadrant Elevation (MIN QE):


1. MIN QE not computed in time for battery to commence fire mission upon occupation of position area.
2. Platoon leaders wait for section chiefs to compute site to crest data rather than computing and using a worst case themselves.
3. Units lack battle drills to include MIN QE.


1. Firing battery delayed or not able to fire.
2. Alternative site to crest data not computed.


1. Batteries train to compute MIN QE prior to occupying position area.
2. Platoon leaders train to use M2 compass for site to crest data.
3. Make MIN QE part of advance party battle drill.

2.1.3 Develop Order to Fire

*Scouts call for fire: Scouts appear weak at directing indirect fire:


1. Lack of knowledge of role in TF scheme of fires.
2. Do not understand call for fire.


1. Indirect fires not employed by scouts.
2. Scouts do not support TF scheme of fires well.


1. Train scouts in call for fire at Home Station.
2. Train scouts on their role(s) in TF scheme of fires and how to fulfill it.

2.2 Engage Ground Targets

*Fire Direction during jump tactical operations center (TOC) operations: Most artillery units do not plan in detail to control fires while the field artillery (FA) battalion TOC moves.


1. Efforts to use the single station IFSAS-equipped vehicle as the jump TOC (J-TOC) hamper efficient fires due to poor information transfer.

2. Some units transferring to mutually supporting units (MSU) simply tell the other unit to take over their guns and then relinquish control, without also transferring information.


1. Significant degradation in FA battalion's ability to provide timely, massed fires when battalion performs J-TOC operations during combat operations.

2. The transition between MSU is often awkward and causes animosity between the two units.


1. Develop a checklist of steps and information that must be transferred to the new controlling element; it should establish a clear end state for transfer of control.

2. In the MSU technique, the subordinate unit must use the same checklist as the transferring unit.

2.3 Integrate Fire Support

*Use of indirect fires in the attack: Brigades and battalions seldom effectively use close air support (CAS) and artillery fires to set the conditions for success on the objective during the attack.


1. They lack an effective observation plan and scheme of fires specifying killing fires, suppression, and obscuration.

2. They do not understand the precise definitions of killing fires, suppression, and obscuration, the volume of artillery required, and the rhythm of these fire support tasks in relation to the scheme of maneuver.


1. Emphasize event-driven versus time-driven planning for killing fires; define suppression and obscuration in terms of specific areas and duration.

2. Continue emphasis in leader training programs (LTPs), video teleconferences (VTCs), and training at Home Station.

*Integration of mortars: TF staffs have difficulty integrating mortars into both the scheme of maneuver and the scheme of fires.


1. The mortar platoon leader was rarely integrated into the staff planning process.
2. No leader or staff member took responsibility for integrating the mortar platoon or its leader.

RESULT: Mortar platoon not synchronized with the security/counter-reconnaissance force or the scheme of fires.


1. Fire Support Officer (FSO) integrates the mortars during planning process and develops a plan for using them to support security/counter-reconnaissance forces.

2. Link up security force FSO and mortar platoon leader.

3. Fire Support Element (FSE) plan targets and disseminate to scout platoon leader and mortar platoon leader.

4. FSE monitor battle tracking/situational awareness of current operations.

TA.1 Maneuver BOS Narrative
TA.3 Air Defense BOS Narrative

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