The Army in Interagency Operations
Table of Contents
- The Interagency Abroad: The New Paradigm's Progress - Maj. G. J. David
- What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations- Dr. Joseph R. Cerami
- Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach - BG Jeffery Buchanan, Capt. Maxie Y. Davis, and Col Lee T. Wight
- Filling Irregular Warfare's Interagency Gaps - COL Lew Irwin, Ph.D.
- Interagency Command and Control at the Operational Level: A Challenge in Stability Operations - Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D.
- Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art - Dr. Christopher M. Schnaubelt
- The Interagency Future Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Task Force Marne - SFC Jesse P. Pruett
- Working Relationships: Interagency Exchange Program Improves Army's Relationship with Whole of Government - CPT Bryan Gibb
- The Challenge of Leadership in the Interagency Environment - William J. Davis, Jr., Ph.D.
- Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan - LTC(P) Tucker B. Mansager
- Afghanistan's Nangarhar Inc: A Model for Interagency Success - MAJ David K. Spencer
The following collection of articles is focused on interagency operations as they relate to the U.S. Army and other joint forces. Current counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of achieving unity of effort between military forces and the work accomplished by various agencies such as the Department of State, Department of Justice, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Agency, as well as nongovernmental and private organizations. The complexity of COIN operations and the reality of future conflicts require Soldiers to have a basic understanding of civil-military cooperation, roles and missions of interagency partners, and ways to improve leadership where it involves close coordination to ensure an integrated approach to mission success. The difficulty in achieving unity of command and unity of effort in military operations that include interagency players is compounded by education and training challenges for both Soldiers and interagency personnel alike. The articles in this newsletter cover a range of issues relating to military and interagency operations with a specific intent on establishing best practices and lessons learned that may mitigate some of these challenges. The articles should not be considered as all-inclusive. This is an effort to capture relevant articles published in recent professional journals and from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and other joint archives to inform Soldiers on relevant observations, insights, and lessons and provide an historical document for future reference.
In many instances, the ideas presented in these articles are personal opinion, and in some cases, not approved Army doctrine. The recommendations in these articles should always be validated with the latest approved Army and joint doctrine.
CALL acknowledges and thanks the professional journals and authors who permitted the reprinting of these articles, and in some instances, were personally involved in assisting CALL in the formatting process.
CALL editors note: Minor modifications to format were made by CALL editors to support the CALL newsletter format and in some instances pictures that were not referenced in the narrative were deleted to save space. Additionally, biographies were eliminated to avoid release of personal information.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|