CHAPTER
12 FRATRICIDE
AND THE AVIATION TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA
FRATRICIDE AND THE AVIATION TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA
by SGM Kevin C. Krum
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Of all the combat skills and common tasks practiced at Home Station, units frequently overlook fratricide prevention. When a unit deploys to an area in conflict, the OPTEMPO can become overwhelming. As the pace and intensity of events escalates, a soldier's focus narrows and he relies on Home Station training to dictate priorities. If that training did not familiarize the soldier with fratricide prevention measures, it will be too late to establish the good habits and skills needed to ensure a unit does not pose a threat to itself. This article discusses fratricide prevention measures particular to the aviation tactical assembly area (TAA) and focuses on target identification, fire control, and the unit defense plan.
Target Identification
One of the main contributing causes of fratricide is that soldiers often do not identify the target before firing. When a soldier is unable to identify an aircraft, vehicle, or other soldiers as friendly, their anxiety level increases and they look for a sign that the target is hostile to justify the engagement. Contributing to target identification/misidentification are low-visibility conditions (weather, smoke, and darkness). Ensuring properly equipped soldiers, with the appropriate sights and vision devices, will aid in identification. Soldier knowledge is another factor of threat identification. A soldier who knows the current Air Defense Warning and Weapons Control Status (ADW/WCS), how to identify OPFOR vehicles and aircraft, and the current challenge and password (as well as daily changeover times) can better differentiate between friendly and enemy. All of the items listed above will help the soldier identify the threat, leaving only the decision to fire. However, once the engagement begins, how do we keep our rounds from striking our own? Fire Control.
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Fire Control
Fire control begins with the operator making the decision to fire, ensuring that the weapon functions properly and the rounds hit the target. The single most important factor that influences fire control is soldiers' situational awareness. The knowledge of friendly units operating near the TAA, the current ROE, and the proper use of deadly force will reduce fratricide. One check of fire control on the defensive perimeter occurs when NCOs verify the correct positioning of fighting position limiting stakes. Properly established limiting stakes will restrict the weapon to the proper sector of fire. Soldiers engaging moving targets will be less likely to swing their weapons out of sector when the weapon hits the stake during their track of the target.
Another method to ensure your fire is not directed toward friendly forces is to conduct a thorough fratricide risk assessment. A risk assessment card that addresses fire control areas is a powerful tool in the prevention of fratricide. This can verify the TAA defensive sector sketch to ensure no problems exist with interlocking fires, and that all sectors of fire are clear of friendly forces out to the maximum range of each weapon. Fire control issues can range from ensuring soldiers do not keep a round in the chamber of their weapons to coordinating a unit to pass near the TAA through a sector of fire without drawing friendly fire. The best method to ensure all soldiers are complying with fratricide reduction measures is to have a good plan established. This plan needs to be written into the unit's TACSOP and included in the units training management cycle.

Defensive Plan
The unit's defensive plan is another important area to fratricide prevention. This is an area that is hard to train unless in an environment conducive to collective training and set in the appropriate scenario. Until soldiers see the enemy attack their perimeter, they will not be able to address the fratricide issues that arise during this kind of exercise. The following contingencies should be a regular portion of the defensive plan and printed in the unit's TACSOP: If the enemy makes a brief contact with the perimeter and backs off a short distance, do we go after him? Do we consider the risk of leaving the perimeter and crossing other fighting position's sectors of fire? Do we have a plan for the quick reaction force (QRF) to respond to this scenario, and if so, how do we identify the QRF as friendly once outside the perimeter, at night, while in close proximity to the enemy? Do we use a running password, as a contingency, to reduce the time it takes to identify our own soldiers once the enemy has made contact with the perimeter? What are our procedures if the enemy breaches our perimeter? The chain of command should base these contingencies on those events the unit expects to encounter. Once established, training and rehearsals will validate the plan and build confidence in the soldiers.
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
1. Home Station training. Do not overlook these considerations at home: establishing a perimeter, reacting to all real or perceived enemy contact, movements inside and outside the perimeter, integration within the plan of a higher headquarters, and coordination with nearby units.
2. Properly equip your soldiers. Do not put a soldier on the perimeter at night without NVGs and/or some means of communication.
3. Keep soldiers informed. Soldiers with good situational awareness are more confident and more effective.
4. Leader involvement. Soldiers conduct PCCs and leaders conduct PCIs, from soldier knowledge to proper equipment to verification of range cards and sector sketches.
5. Risk Management. This is not just for aviation operations and/or convoys.
6. Thorough planning. Use your experience and the experiences of other units to build the SOP. METT-T dictates that every situation is different; however, flexibility improves when a unit is grounded in the basics.
7. Soldier discipline. Will soldiers do the right thing at the critical time? This is not solely a function of a good or bad soldier; effective training makes the difference.
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