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CHAPTER 11

HOW TO DEFEAT THE PPG AT NTC

by CPT Robert T. Ault

One of the questions every aviation task force that comes to the National Training Center (NTC) has to answer is this: "How will I defend my tactical assembly area (TAA) from the People's Parumphian Guerillas (PPG)?" The security of the aviation TAA is vital to the overall mission of the aviation task force. Without a viable TAA security plan, the unit may find itself taking large numbers of unnecessary casualties and damage to equipment. Ultimately, survivability moves are the answer, but each "jump" the aviation task force conducts diverts time, energy, and manpower away from providing support to the BCT. It becomes critical for the aviation task force to have a comprehensive yet realistic plan to defend themselves against Levels 1 and 2 rear area threats.

The constraints of the average aviation task force do not allow manning 100 percent of the perimeter around the clock. In reality, when considering crew and mission cycles, the task force is usually forced to man a few dismounted crew-served weapons positions and not much else. This forces the careful consideration of key terrain and commitment of the remaining assets toward TAA defense and which positions to occupy.

TTP 1: Establishment of clear roles and responsibilities.
Discussion: One of the most important factors in defending the TAA is the assignment and definition of roles and responsibilities. The unit must establish and rehearse a solid chain of command prior to arrival at the NTC. The aviation task force commander, the HCC commander, and the task force CSM must work together to agree on who will do what with which assets, and when.

"A way" is to designate the HHC commander responsible for perimeter defense. This includes the entire perimeter and the FARP. This is a natural role for the HHC commander; he is often the leader of the quartering party and will establish the initial perimeter. In addition, the HHC commander is already in command of the majority of the task force's non-flying personnel, such as motor pool mechanics and cooks, so this technique requires no new chain of command.

The HHC commander should assume the responsibility of placing all crew-served weapons as well as supervising the placement of all obstacles. In consultation with the CSM and the S-2, the HHC commander develops the plan to restrict access into the TAA through designated routes both in and out based on METT-T. These factors must be considered before moving to the new TAA. The tactical analysis of the terrain, based on METT-T, may, in fact, dictate the placement of companies on perimeter.

TTP 2: Adhering to the priorities of work.
Discussion: In reality, the perimeter is well on its way to either becoming functional or not within 30 minutes of the quartering party's arrival. All personnel must understand and enforce the priorities of work. If the leader in charge of the quartering party does not establish good 360-degree security immediately upon arrival, the task force may never really get a grip on TAA defense.

TTP 3: Leader emplacement of crew-served weapons.
Discussion: It takes a strong technically and tactically competent leader to understand the placement of crew-served weapons and interlocking fires. Too many times, once the quartering party occupies an area, they "go admin" and wait for the arrival of the main body serials. A good quartering party SOP and rehearsals can go a long way toward refining this operation and defining roles within the quartering party.

TTP 4: Leaders must walk the perimeter.
Discussion: Once the HHC commander understands how he will defend the new TAA, he must walk the ground that is to become the TAA perimeter with his subordinate leaders. A shovel or stake can serve to clearly define where the HHC commander wants the fighting positions, as well their orientations. All too often the chain of command does not plan the orientation and the left and right limits of individual fighting positions. Once the subordinate leader receives his positions from the HHC commander, he must walk with his subordinates and physically place the marker in its position. This leadership involvement gives the chain of command the best chance to ensure the position locations are integrated.

TTP 5: Role of the task force CSM in TAA defense.
Discussion: The task force CSM is a key player in TAA defense. Because of his task force level focus and experience, the CSM must be included in the selection of crew-served weapons' locations around the perimeter. The CSM also helps establish, monitor, and enforce priorities of work in the assembly area. He ensures that construction of fighting positions is to standard and in accordance with unit SOPs.

TTP 6: Integration of the HHC commander, S-2, and CSM.
Discussion: The HHC commander, CSM, and S-2 must collectively review TAA sector sketches. This should confirm what the HHC commander already knows. If the CSM did not enter with the quartering party, he reviews the plan at this time.

TTP 7: Well-constructed leader supervised fighting positions.
Discussion: Soldiers in the TAA must have well-constructed fighting positions with interlocking fields of fire as well as simple, well-rehearsed battle drills. Communications from dismount points and LPs/OPs is critical. The reason for the effort in building fighting positions and wire obstacles to standard is force protection. In this sense force protection refers to the soldiers in the TAA being able to execute their common tasks and basic training skills to stay alive and fight until the TAA develops situational awareness about the attack. A task force that fails to take the basic steps of digging in, laying wire, and practicing battle drills is denying their soldiers the ability to survive in the first few minutes of an attack when the situation is not yet developed and the PPG has the initiative. It is in these first few moments that the PPG moves freely and kills the most BLUEFOR soldiers. This is because the soldiers in the TAA do not know where to go, what to engage, or who is friend or foe. If the perimeter can quickly establish control of the TAA, it reacts to the attack and the PPG will lose their "superman" status and be killed.

TTP 8: Continual improvement of the defense.
Discussion: Defending the TAA is like any other defensive operation -- the defensive preparation never ends. The unit must continue to improve and strengthen its positions and obstacles. Units must develop a plan to use wire obstacles at Home Station. With a little forethought and coordination with the FSB during RSOI, the unit can arrange for sufficient Class IV. If Class IV is not available, the tactical placement of wire obstacles becomes even more critical to the TAA. Such a critical task must be the responsibility of the HHC commander.

TTP 9: Development of engagement areas.
Discussion: In the desert environment, almost any open area can become a high-speed avenue of approach for the PPG. Wire obstacles serve to channel and direct the PPG into predetermined pre-sighted engagement areas with TRPs. Very rarely does an HHC commander actually think about where he wants to kill the enemy. Wire obstacles that are not to standard and do not have an observation plan are useless. The PPG can easily breach a single strand of concertina wire with a 2 x 4 piece of wood.

How does the aviation task force set up this kind of a perimeter? An important point to remember is that the perimeter defense must improve over time. During quartering party operations, personnel must place any crew-served weapons that are present and plan for the placement of crew-served weapons yet to arrive. The HHC commander and subordinate leaders must understand the maximum effective engagement ranges for their weapons. The .50 caliber machine gun is not simply a big M16. Leaders must plan to engage at the weapon's most effective limit, and place the gun accordingly. This means that the HHC commander, to provide the best fields of fire for his crew-served weapons, must use key terrain effectively.

TTP 10: The need for leaders to look back at the TAA defenses.
Discussion: Once they have completed the general defensive plan on the ground, the HHC commander and CSM need to exit the perimeter and look back at the defenses. This will allow them to become more familiar with the various approaches to the TAA. The commander and CSM will be able to identify various wadis and aid in overall situational awareness.

TTP 11: Use of dismounted patrols.
Discussion: The use of dismounted patrols at NTC tends to work well. Dismounted patrols (especially during the hours of limited visibility) tend to give the TAA situational awareness. Patrols restrict the movement of the PPG. They are no longer free to approach as they want; they must evade the patrols and seek cover.

TTP 12: Fratricide prevention planning.
Discussion: Three simple steps can significantly reduce the risk of fratricide. Every soldier manning a position in the perimeter must know the patrol plan, when and where the TAA will conduct dismounted patrols. The chain of command must devise a simple communication plan between the dismounted perimeter patrols and the HHC commander or task force CSM. The commander must have a way to direct them if necessary and think through some simple IFF measures. Such measures could include: a running password (even over the radio), the designation of a "safe lane" to approach the TAA, or the use of predetermined signals. Another important point to remember is that none of these techniques takes the place of good clear rules of engagement and solid identification of targets prior to engagement.

TTP 13: Developing situational awareness immediately outside the TAA.
Discussion: A working knowledge and good situational awareness of the threat is imperative for everyone on the perimeter. Inform aircrews what to look for and how far out they can expect to see the threat. Using aircraft to sweep the TAA and FARP upon departure and arrival is another viable active defense method.

Once the PPG has attacked, what does the TAA do next? This is a contingency the unit must plan and rehearse continuously.

TTP 14: Employment of the quick reaction force.
Discussion: If possible, the unit should dispatch a quick reaction force (QRF) to counter the threat. If the task force is not able to mount this additional force, then maneuver of the dismounted patrol against the PPG is necessary.

TTP 15: Soldier reaction during an attack.
Discussion: The key to surviving a PPG attack is the quick reaction of soldiers in the TAA. They must know, and rehearse, what to do in the event of a ground threat to the TAA. The wrong answer is to do nothing, or to have soldiers attempting to individually fire and maneuver on the PPG without situational awareness.

TTP 16: The need to boresight.
Discussion: Once the PPG attack is underway, the single most important factor in killing the PPG is the basic marksmanship skill of being able to kill your target. The only way to accomplish this is to boresight the crew-served weapons on the perimeter daily. Once the PPG make contact with the perimeter, this is the only way to effectively stop them.

TTP 17: HHC commander command and control plan.
Discussion: Throughout the attack, the HHC commander must be in a position to command and control the defense. This location will depend on the situation, but he must have a plan. The task force CSM can serve a vital role during the attack by either directing the QRF or helping the HHC commander coordinate the defense. Once the task force responds to the attack, the immediate priority of the TAA must be defense of the perimeter and killing the PPG. To this end, the commitment of an aircraft to provide pressure on the PPG can be critical. If the ROE is clear and the threat is identified, door gunners, rockets, or chain guns make viable responses to the threat.

TTP 18: Post-attack actions.
Discussion: After the attack the TAA must consolidate and reorganize immediately. Commanders and 1SGs must begin assessing casualties and damage to equipment. They must begin the process of cross-leveling ammunition and requesting replacements, as well as processing reports to higher. Often the PPG does not allow days to pass before the next attack.

Conclusion

These are some of the successful tactics, techniques and procedures used at the National Training Center. Careful planning and rehearsals are crucial prior to entering the maneuver box. The BLUEFOR can defeat the PPG, but only if leaders know what "right" looks like and enforce the standards with their soldiers. With a little forethought, unit personnel can kill the PPG with minimum distraction to the aviation task force's mission in support of the BCT.

A final point to remember: Informed soldiers are combat multipliers!