TA.6
MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
(NBC)
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Proficiency of chemical staff personnel
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 NBC): Chemical officers and chemical NCOs in units participating in
rotations in the last 6 months are improving in integrating themselves into
the battle staff, particularly with the S2.
DISCUSSION:
This
resulted in greater effectiveness in chemical avoidance measures and selection
of the optimal protective posture. Chemical staff personnel also demonstrated
an improvement in the performance of required tasks in response to chemical
attacks.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
None.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Decontamination (decon) operations planning and site preparations
OBSERVATION
(DIV LF): Chemical platoons made reconnaissance of decontamination sites a
priority. Resupply of water was also integrated into the overall decontamination
plan.
DISCUSSION:
When
selecting a decon site, chemical platoons were able to ensure the site was
large enough to accommodate all types of equipment that may have been contaminated
in the brigade sector by conducting an IPB. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
None.
(TA.6.3.1.2.1
Decontaminate Personnel and Systems)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Guard mount
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Guard mounts at Base Camp Eagle are a strong daily routine for the
guard force and are executed to standard.
DISCUSSION:
NCOs
conducted PCCs/PCIs, put out daily information, and enforced camp standards
during the guard mount. This allowed soldiers performing the guard mission
to understand their tasks and created the professional image necessary to the
SFOR mission. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
None.
(TA.6.3.2
Employ Operations Security)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Minefield awareness
OBSERVATION
(ANTI-ARMOR CO): The major problem with minefield awareness is tracking and
disseminating minefield locations.
DISCUSSION:
Companies
are not getting updates from the battalion tactical operations center (TOC)
on enemy minefields or the leaders are not depicting minefields on their maps.
The company commander and platoon leaders need to ensure they are getting current
updates from battalion. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Each
time a leader goes to the TOC (often daily), he should look at the engineer
map and disseminate the information to the remainder of the company. Each leader
should then update his map with the new minefield locations. (TA.6.1
Provide Mobility)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Breach mined/wire obstacle
OBSERVATION
(LF DIV): Units typically do not incorporate the fundamentals of breaching
-- suppress, obscure, secure and reduce (SOSR) -- during execution.
DISCUSSION:
Leaders
usually organize their sub-units into a support, breach and assault element,
but fail to issue criteria or effects to be achieved by each. This results
in elements moving forward to conduct the breach without the enemy being effectively
suppressed or effective obscuration established. Additionally, leaders need
to pay special attention to the placement of the support element in relation
to the breach site. The breach element frequently masks the fires of the support
element, resulting in unnecessary casualties due to insufficient suppression.
Leaders should specify fire control measures in the operations order. If indirect
fire is being employed, graphic control measures should be used to show minimum
safe distances (MSD). This will facilitate continuous fires on the objective
while reducing the chance of fratricide. Another method for fixing responsibilities
is to task the breach elements, including the purpose, next to each element.
EXAMPLE:
Elements
available:
1
Sqd 2
Sqd 3
Sqd Weapons
Sqd Engineers
| Breach
elements | Who | Why |
| Suppress | Weapons | Prevent
enemy fires on engineers |
| Obscure | 1
Sqd/Eng | Obscure
enemy observation of engineers |
| Secure | 1
Sqd | Provide
engineer shoulder security |
| Reduce | Engineer | Employ
bangalore torpedoes to open a lane |
| Foothold | 2
Sqd | Pass
assault force to objective |
| Assault/Clear | 3/1
Sqds | Clear
objective to accomplish purpose |
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Simple graphics (with the task and purpose of each element) and a signal plan
will ensure that every soldier and leader knows what effects his tasks must
produce rather than focusing on the tasks themselves. 2.
Engineers are not synonymous to a breach element. Engineers are integral to
the success of a breach, but they are in limited numbers and must be augmented
with infantry to accomplish multiple tasks. (TA.6.1.1.1
Breach Obstacles)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Breach wire and mine obstacle
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Units are not applying the fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure,
and reduce (SOSR) during breach operations.
DISCUSSION:
1.
In the movement-to-contact operation, indirect fires are not planned or executed
during in-stride breaches. This is due mainly to a lack of rehearsals and route
reconnaissance; by the time the obstacle is identified, the element is too
close and/or in direct fire contact with the enemy at the obstacle. 2.
In the deliberate attack there is a lack of combat patience. Breach elements
are too close to the breach, and when indirect obscuration and suppressive
fires are initiated, the breach elements attempt to breach immediately. These
both result in increased time and exposure to enemy fire, both direct and indirect,
during breach operations. The breach element is being destroyed or attrited
to the point where assets are pulled from the assaulting element to complete
the breach. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Utilize dismounted techniques for route reconnaissance. This can be done with
scouts, dismounted infantry platoons, or even the soldiers from an anti-tank
(AT) platoon moving on foot with M2 machine gunners (MG) in overwatch. 2.
Posture breach elements where they can maintain visual contact with obstacles,
call for and adjust indirect fires, position direct fire weapons (M240s), and
gain advantage over the enemy during the suppression, and then conduct the
breach. 3.
Conduct rehearsals within specified route clearance elements to ensure SOSR.
(TA.6.1.1.1
Breach Obstacle)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Route clearance
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The heavy team's mobility, organic countermine equipment
(CME), and dependence on ground supply lines make it a likely candidate to
conduct route clearance.
DISCUSSION:
Consistently,
brigade staffs have difficulty in developing detailed route clearance plans.
Also, once obstacles are encountered and a bypass is not found, the heavy team
(and the brigade) has been impeded for up to 12 hours in successfully breaching
an obstacle. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Units
should review FM
20-32,
Mine/Countermine
Operations,
to
identify proper route clearance techniques. (TA.6.1.2
Enhance Movement)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Combined arms obstacle integration
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ENG): Brigade and battalion staffs do not understand the fundamental
relationship between fires and obstacle effects.
DISCUSSION:
This leads to poor execution of defensive operations often based on an unspecified
or unclear commander's obstacle intent (target, effect, relative location).
As a result, engineer and maneuver leaders are often unclear on how to shape
the battlefield or where the commander wants to mass the effects of his organization.
Additionally, the staff often fails to jointly consider and overlay key steps
of the IPB process as the basis for developing the defensive maneuver and obstacle
plan. Infantry leaders are often not proficient in siting tactical obstacle
groups or emplacing protective obstacles, resulting in minimal delay of enemy
forces. Fires are not consistently integrated with obstacles, and situational
FASCAM minefields are rarely planned with the detail required to achieve desired
effects. Obstacle
construction is often unnecessarily delayed because infantry units are slow
to occupy sectors and conduct ground reconnaissance. Additional obstacle effort
is often sacrificed by not identifying directed obstacles to support battalion/brigade
decisive points and by utilizing engineers to operate battalion Class IV/V
points. Obstacle emplacement is not tracked at battalion level, so the commander
does not adjust his plan based on actual battlefield conditions. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Review
the relationship between fires and obstacle effects outlined in FM
90-7, Combined
Arms Obstacle Integration.
(TA.6.2.2
Emplace Obstacles)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Task organization
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The heavy team does not properly task organize to conduct
a mission.
DISCUSSION:
Before
the heavy team is employed to conduct a combined arms breach, it must be task
organized with sufficient dismounted infantry and engineers to conduct the
mission. It must also have sufficient time to plan and rehearse breaches. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Review FM
20-32,
Mine/Countermine
Operations,
for detailed information on the employment of engineers in mechanical breaching,
as well as on the use of mine-clearing line charges (MICLIC) and manual techniques.
2.
A fundamental principle with obstacles employed by the opposing forces (OPFOR)
during low-intensity conflict: when you find an obstacle, you have found the
enemy. The OPFOR will cache additional mines near an obstacle to re-seed, and
he will overwatch with indirect and/or direct fires. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Conducting CSS by air
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): There are many elements to conducting CSS by air that are not considered
in planning.
DISCUSSION:
Primary
and alternate pick-up zones (PZs) and landing zones (LZs) are not discussed
and planned for during the planning process. Other efficiencies may be realized
from adopting a simplistic, effective method for managing air movement of CSS.
For instance, during the defense, air movement priorities are usually to Class
IV and V. Aircraft typically return empty. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Crews must be briefed to stop at the casualty collection point prior to returning
to the brigade support area (BSA). Many items may be "backhauled" quickly and
safely by this method. 2.
Routes in and out must be planned for. Security, load rigging, and inspection
are important elements in Army air command and control (A2C2). 3.
The ADA threat should be considered as well as the ever-present threat of the
opposing force (OPFOR).
(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
CSAR/DARRT
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Commanders at battalion level and below do not realize that combat
search and rescue and disabled aircraft repair and recovery (CSAR/DARRT) are
two separate missions.
DISCUSSION:
Each
mission is required by doctrine to be included in the operations order (OPORD)
and standing operating procedures (SOP). CSAR is designed to recover crews.
DARRT is a separate mission used to recover the aircraft from the battlefield.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Review
CSAR and DARRT procedures listed in the following field manuals (FM): 1.
FM
1-500, Army
Aviation Maintenance.
2.
FM
1-513, Battlefield
Recovery and Evacuation.
3.
FM
90-18, (CSAR)
Multiservice Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue.
4.
FM
1-101, Aviation
Battlefield Survivability.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Intergrate and synchronize logistical operations
OBSERVATION
(CSS DIV): Forward support battalions and support battalions (FSB/SBs) rarely
establish a system to project, plan, and program logistical requirements for
the brigade at the 48-72 hour time period.
DISCUSSION:
Poor
battle tracking and reporting by both the brigade S4 and the support operations
shop hindered efforts to integrate and synchronize logistical operations. The
lack of timely and accurate LOGSTAT reports consistently hampered the logistical
planning process. CSS operations have became reactive rather than proactive
and focus on current operations versus future operations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Sections must develop an internal standing operating procedures (SOP) that
includes a battle rhythm, shift considerations, reporting procedures, and detailed
duties for each authorized soldier. Additionally, the use of maps with CSS
and CHS overlays, as well as updated stock status and significant activities
charts, will greatly improve the ability to focus on future operations. 2.
Within the FSB/SBs, poor stock status reporting by the supply company hindered
the support operations officer's ability to plan and synchronize logistical
operations, especially in the area of Class V planning and execution. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Force protection measures
OBSERVATION
(CSS DIV): The forward support battalion (FSB)/support battalions (SB) need
to improve their planning and execution of force protection measures and the
integration of brigade support area (BSA) tenants into a comprehensive force
protection for the BSA.
DISCUSSION:
The
units' parameters for force protection lacked integration of the battlefield
operating systems (BOS) into an inclusive system of force protection for the
BSA. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Review
FM
63-20, Forward
Support Battalions,
Chapter
5, for force protection recommendations. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Survivability operations
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ENG): Individual soldiers often do not know the standards for individual
and crew-served weapons fighting positions.
DISCUSSION:
These
positions are almost always substandard and frequently dangerous to the soldiers
in them. Leaders are not familiar with collective survivability and force protection
requirements outlined in FM
5-103, Survivability,
and
the force protection planning process described in FM
5-114, Engineer
Operations Other Than War,
and
Joint
Publication 3-10.1, Joint
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Base Defense.
Frequently,
units do not construct viable survivability positions for critical systems
such as artillery batteries, counter-fire radar, TOCs, signal nodes, aviation
assembly areas and ammunition transfer points, leaving them vulnerable to ground
and air attack. Cursory "berming," rather than "digging," are the norm. Camouflage
measures are rarely used outside immediate tactical operations center (TOC)
areas. Lastly, there has been a failure to identify low-density survivability
assets (dozers and SEEs) as enemy high-value targets (HVT), especially during
defensive preparation operations. The effect has often been a failure to plan
and/or execute viable job site or convoy security for these assets which frequently
results in their destruction. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Train leaders and soldiers on survivability standards in accordance with FM
5-103, Survivability.
2.
Plan for an appropriate level of security and force protection for survivability
assets based on the enemy situation template and assessment of his HVTs. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Base camp force protection
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): The base defense operations center (BDOC) had difficulty ensuring
all units within the base camp were in the proper uniform and that soldiers
knew the duties and responsibilities of a guard.
DISCUSSION:
Soldiers do not understand their own standing operating procedures (SOP), the
rules of engagement (ROE), and the graduated response matrix (GRM). Soldiers
inside the guard tower improperly fill out range cards for their weapon. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Rehearse the battle drills with guards prior to assuming guard. The battle
drills are: - Medical
emergency.
- Civilians
on the battlefield (COB).
- Taking
pictures of the base camp.
- COBs
selling items to soldiers.
- Rat
chase (breach in perimeter).
- Bags
left at the gate or perimeter.
- COBs
"casing" the camp.
- Vehicles
parked or abandoned near the gate or perimeter.
- Convoy
operations.
- Interaction
with the media.
2.
During guard mount, the Sergeant of the Guard (SOG) spot-checks the soldier's
knowledge of the standing operating procedures (SOP) and rules of engagement
(ROE). If the soldier is not knowledgeable, then his supervisor stays with
him in the tower while he is on shift. The SOG must also verify each range
card during his first spot-check of the tower during each shift. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Force protection
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Units are not prepared to defend themselves from ground attack, air
attack, or indirect fire.
DISCUSSION:
Units
sustain more casualties than necessary. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The brigade engineer must adequately resource the FA battalion with engineer
assets. Once the engineer assets arrive at the batteries, the FA units must
maximize engineer potential. 2.
Batteries must begin force protection as soon as they arrive at the position
and not wait to dig until engineer assets arrive. Additionally, batteries need
to carry Class IV as part of their load plan so they do not depend on resupply.
3.
Review GTA
7-6-1,
Fighting Position Construction Infantry Leader's Reference Card,
in
order to build overhead to standard. 4.
Battery first sergeants ensure the battery has interlocking fires (see paragraphs
2-18 through 2-24, FM
7-8, Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad)
and conduct adjacent unit coordination (see paragraph 2-26, FM
7-8)
in order to maximize all friendly weapon systems. 5.
Units must demand timely development and dissemination of fire support plans
from brigade to battalions. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Force protection and basic soldier skills
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 MP): Soldiers did not always apply basic combat skills (e.g., vehicle
dispersion, camouflage, cover and concealment, active and passive air defense
measures, 360 degree security, security at halts).
DISCUSSION:
While
conducting mounted patrols, military police (MP) followed each other too closely
and failed to dismount to provide security at halts. While moving mounted and
dismounted and at halts, soldiers did not seek cover and concealment quickly
enough to avoid detection and injury. Soldiers did not harden vehicles or sandbag
turrets, or dig fighting positions with appropriate overhead cover. Leaders
did not employ the platoon mine detector with squads on route reconnaissance
missions. Many soldiers did not know how to properly use the mine detector
or the M2, .50 cal machinegun. In addition, there is a need for nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) training across the entire spectrum of operations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units should review and apply the techniques outlined in FM
21-75, Combat
Skills of the Individual Soldier;
FM 19-4, Military
Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of
War Operations;
ARTEP
19-100-10-DRILL, Military
Police Drills;
and
STP
21-1-SMCT, Common
Tasks
(071-326-0513,
071-326-0502 and 071-326-5703.
This
review should help reinforce the importance of force protection. Incorporate
these measures, as well as NBC, into training scenarios that require leaders
and soldiers to react to challenging, complex situations. 2.
Continue to train and equip squad combat lifesavers. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Standards for fighting positions
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 SIG): Individual soldiers do not know the standards for individual
and crew-served weapon-fighting positions.
DISCUSSION:
These
fighting positions are almost always substandard and frequently dangerous to
the soldiers in them. Leaders are not familiar with collective survivability
and force protection requirements outlined in FM
5-103, Survivability.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Leaders
must be aware of the proper force protection measures and train to the survivability
standards in accordance with FM
5-103, Survivability.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Security at the halt
OBSERVATION
(ANTI-ARMOR CO): Platoons do not consistently conduct security
at the halt
battle
drill to standard.
DISCUSSION:
Vehicles normally move into a herringbone or coil formation when halted. However,
vehicles do not select covered and concealed positions, or squad leaders do
not dismount local security. This results in the element being surprised by
approaching enemy. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
ARTEP
7-91-Drill
(p.
2-15), Battle Drill 7, Secure
at the Halt,
provides a reference to improve this battle drill. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Protecting the force
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Aviation units fail to effectively defend their assembly areas with
organic personnel.
DISCUSSION:
The primary shortcomings are training and command emphasis. Common soldier
tasks, such as prepare a fighting position and prepare a sector sketch, are
not well understood by aviation leaders and, as a result, are not performed
to standard by soldiers. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Engineer assets must be used to compensate for lack of manpower. 2.
Leaders at all levels must read and understand FM
7-8, Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad,
and
FM
7-10, Infantry
Rifle Company,
for
techniques and standards in the defense. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Use of the M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 NBC): Units are very good at getting M8A1s out on the perimeter. Once
placed, however, they are seldom checked or maintained.
DISCUSSION:
None. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units should include a plan for employment of the M8A1 alarms in accordance
with the templated chemical threat. 2.
Additionally, the unit's NBC portion of the tactical standing operating procedures
(TACSOP) should address employment and periodic checks of the equipment to
ensure continuous operation when required. (TA.6.3.1.1.4
Employ Protective Equipment)
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
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