TA.3
AIR DEFENSE BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
No
positive observations were submitted during this period.
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I)/sensor management plan
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ADA): The most misunderstood capability air defenders bring to the
fight is early warning (EW) assets (LSDID/Sentinel) and C3I capability (SHTU/HTU/AMDWS).
DISCUSSION:
ADOs,
specifically battery commanders, do not fully understand the capabilities and
limitations of EW assets and C3I. Without knowing the capabilities and limitations,
the ADO cannot efficiently employ these assets to facilitate the "sensor-to-shooter"
link. Besides providing counter-air, SHORAD, air defense and other active defense
terms, the ADO's essential task is to provide "early warning" to the supported
unit and assist with passive air defense operations. This process starts with
the sensor management plan. This is more than just determining and publishing
a C3I frequency plan. It requires ADOs to define specific procedures for sensor
management and early warning dissemination. Sensor team chiefs must be included
during the planning process as they are the subject matter experts. They can
assist the commander in developing the sensor management plan, the employment
of sensors, and techniques to disseminate early warning. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The sensor management plan must include EW frequency management, sensor looping,
sensor chaining, and maintenance management. Batteries must understand linkage
architecture, correlation of tracks, and troubleshooting procedures. They need
to develop TTPs for each of these and include them in EW planning. This will
eliminate problems associated with early warning link-up with fire units. Batteries
experience significant challenges in getting all fire units to monitor digital
early warning. Fire units lack confidence using SHTU/HTUs. 2.
Batteries must improve in operating and integrating the system into daily air
defense operations. Additionally, there are inconsistencies within batteries
to monitor the division's early warning (DEW) net. Many fire units receive
early warning through platoon or battery command nets. The combined effect
of not using SHTU/HTU or monitoring DEW is late or poor target engagement.
Batteries must execute a C3I communication exercise (COMMEX) before deployment.
This will identify inoperable HTUs and verify the fire units' ability to gain
link-up. Batteries need to fully exploit the AMDWS capabilities. Batteries
should develop training scenarios to enhance fire units' confidence in the
HTU and exploit the full range of AMDWS capabilities. Batteries and platoons
must review technical manuals on the operation of HTUs and develop training
exercises to enhance their familiarity with use and employment. (TA.3.1.1
Select Air Targets to Attack)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Air defense officer (ADO) training
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ADA): ADOs are not trained in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
or have the required tools to achieve pattern and predictive analysis.
DISCUSSION:
The
four-step IPB process should be the methodology to achieve pattern and, most
importantly, "predicative analysis." ADOs must make the call on what enemy
aerial platforms will do and how it will contribute to a linked and integrated
threat picture. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Although
the brigade and battalion commander's mouthpiece for the intelligence OS is
the S2, the ADO must aggressively contribute in arming the S2 with the pattern
and predictive analysis for the enemy's most probable and dangerous course
of action. Bottom line: Without seeing the enemy we will never see ourselves
get integrated and synchronized at the brigade and battalion level. (TA.3.1.2.1
Determine System Capability for Engaging Air Targets)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Integration and synchronization of air defense at brigade and battalion
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ADA): Air defense batteries experience difficulty understanding and
contributing to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
DISCUSSION:
Air
defense officers (ADO) have difficulty coordinating, integrating and synchronizing
air defense due to incomplete aerial IPB, lack of clear task and purpose to
platoons, and ineffective communications with subordinate leaders. ADOs are
not integrated with brigade and battalion schemes of maneuver because they
are unable to articulate the aerial threat or the combat power they bring to
the fight. ADOs do not develop air defense priorities for the commander or
get his direct guidance on what the brigade's high-value targets (HVTs) are.
Without clear understanding of brigade and battalion commanders' priorities,
ADOs fail to allocate sufficient combat power to protect these HVTs. ADOs must
bring detailed aerial IPB and integrate it with the S2's overall IPB. This
provides the commander a clear, three-dimensional battlefield picture. ADOs
do not develop enemy air event templates and integrate them with the S2's product.
This would allow ADOs to predict when, where, and what type aircraft the enemy
will use to support its scheme of maneuver; again, a means to visualize the
enemy's plans so the commander can develop his fight. ADOs do not articulate
well on capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of threat aircraft.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Commanders must focus their junior leaders on the basic fundamentals of FM
34-130, Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield,
to
correct this problem. Once they have developed a knowledge base in developing
pattern analysis into predictive analysis, they will be able to incorporate
it into the MDMP, giving commanders the critical information they need during
each step of the process (FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations).
2.
FM
44-44, Avenger
Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations,
and
FM
44-100, US
Army Air Defense Operations,
offers
the basic fundamentals of system employment, but the ADO must understand and
be able to articulate to his supported commander the capabilities and limitations
of all the systems, and advise the commander on their employment in order to
support the ground tactical plan. 3.
Situational training exercises can be developed using the JANUS system to simulate
a changing battlefield where air defense leaders can train on the integration,
coordination, and synchronization of these critical tasks.
(TA.3.3
Integrate Air Defense Fires)
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
TA.6
Mobility/Survivability BOS & NBC Narrative
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