TA.5
INTELLIGENCE BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Ground lines of communication
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ENG):
Brigades
have recognized that establishing and controlling ground lines of communication
(GLOC's) is critical during low and mid-intensity operations.
DISCUSSION:
Brigades
understand the importance of conducting a thorough Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlefield (IPB). SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Units
are establishing a combined arms route clearance package to facilitate clear
and secure routes within their area of operation (AO). (TA.5.2
Collect Information)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Crater analysis procedures
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Units routinely conduct crater analysis in an effort to augment other
means of locating enemy indirect fire systems.
DISCUSSION:
None.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
None.
(TA.5.2.1
Collect Information on Situation)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), Evaluate the threat
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S2s and intelligence analysts in the military
intelligence (MI) company analysis and control teams (ACT) come to rotations
thoroughly prepared with adequate knowledge of the threat they will face.
DISCUSSION:
This
knowledge was effectively converted into doctrinal templates, databases on
threat tactics, options, and high-value target lists. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Home
Station training, the JRTC Leader's Training Program, and Mobile Training Teams
appear to be working and must be continued. (TA.5.3.1
Evaluate Threat Information)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Collection planning and reconnaissance and security operations and planning
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S2s consistently fail to plan effective
operations to collect the information needed to win.
DISCUSSION:
A
majority of units used well-developed matrices as planning tools, which indicated
they knew what needed to be done. However, not one unit was able to plan and
execute a successful reconnaissance plan in any phase of the rotations. Three
common areas characterized intelligence collection failures: lack of focus,
timeliness, and supervision. First, reconnaissance missions were unfocused
and not linked to the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)
or Decision Points (DP). Second, missions were initiated late, often uncoordinated,
and usually not tracked by higher headquarters. Third, units did not have a
system to double-check when a named area of interest (NAI) was or was not covered
or could not identify gaps in the coverage. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Collection/reconnaissance
and security planning must begin with receipt of the warning order so that
intelligence or reconnaissance teams can initiate collection operations while
the staff is conducting the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Although
this is not possible during initial entry missions, early reconnaissance would
allow the staff and commander to make a plan based on current
intelligence,
not just templated enemy situations. Commanders must strive to ensure they
have a well-focused collection effort. This includes limiting the number of
tasks given to collection assets, ensuring tasks are tied to PIR or DPs, and
ensuring the plan uses all assets available. EXAMPLE:
A
scout platoon can only
pinpoint
an objective and then observe it. Reconnaissance operations should pull maneuver
units toward enemy weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Too often units force reconnaissance
down one axis to support an inflexible friendly course of action. 1.
Small maneuver elements can conduct aggressive patrolling operations to help
the reconnaissance plan. For example, the JRTC OPFOR often probes defenses;
likewise, infantry platoons can probe the OPFOR's defense. They need to be
trained to do so prior to deployment. 2.
There is no hard and fast rule on the number of NAIs that a unit can handle.
However, the brigade staff must recognize that each NAI tasked to a subordinate
unit becomes a specified task to them during the mission analysis. 3.
S2s and S3s must have a combined method of tracking the collection/reconnaissance
and security operation. Although planned by the S2, the S3 must maintain visibility
over this set of combat assets maneuvering on the battlefield. One technique
is to post an NAI chart next to the map that shows when an NAI is active, what
is being reported, and when it should go inactive. This must be a staff battle
drill practiced by all members of the S2 and S3 sections. 4.
When combining assets from different units for reconnaissance missions (such
as Marine FCTs, LLVI teams, and scouts), sufficient command, control and communications
must be built in. These missions must be well coordinated and rehearsed routinely
at Home Station prior to deployment. A rule of thumb is that when two like-sized
units join to form a reconnaissance team, a headquarters from the next higher
unit is probably needed. 5.
Collection plans must be tied to the commander's key decision points. If a
valuable asset is placed at risk to support a tactical operation, then that
asset is potentially wasted. 6.
Reconnaissance is everyone's business. Every combat leader must conduct a reconnaissance
as part of routine troop-leading procedures and must be involved with running
the entire TOC. (TA.5.1
Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): IBP is a weak point for most aviation units.
DISCUSSION:
The
modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), normally developed at Home Station,
is usually not updated and used during a unit's rotation. Additionally, units
habitually do not refine the doctrinal and situational templates provided by
brigade, nor do they develop event templates other than for the defense phase.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units must develop a decision support template. 2.
Review FM
34-130,
Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.
(TA.5.2
Collect Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Early reconnaissance
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Aviation cavalry and attack assets are not being used for early reconnaissance
of objectives.
DISCUSSION:
Many
times the reason given is that the player unit does not want to "tip their
hands." This lack of reconnaissance leads directly to poor planning and sometimes
to direct mission failure. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Allowing the aircraft to conduct an aggressive counter reconnaissance fight
early and getting eyes on critical LZs will lead to greater chances of mission
success and survivability. (TA.5.2
Collect Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Seeing the enemy
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): S2s are unable to provide detailed predictive analysis to drive
operations. S2 sections are unable to develop event templates with sufficient
detail to drive and shape friendly operations in a low-intensity environment.
DISCUSSION:
It
is not enough to tell the commander "where" the enemy is. What the commander
really needs to know is where is the enemy going, when he will arrive, what
he will look like when he arrives, and what he will do when he arrives. Additionally,
S2s must portray an integrated combined arms threat. S2s must recognize that
the enemy's battlefield operating systems (BOS) are integrated into an enemy
scheme of maneuver. This level of resolution in predictive analysis will assist
the brigade staff in developing and synchronizing a friendly course of action
that synchronizes combat power at the decisive point in space and time to defeat
the enemy. S2s should provide the same level of detail on the enemy that is
briefed by the S3 on friendly operations. The lack of a common vision of the
enemy across the brigade task force leads to the development and execution
of friendly schemes of maneuver that do not incorporate defeat mechanisms to
exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Ultimately the brigade staff ends up fighting
the plan vice fighting the enemy. Another
contributing factor to the brigade's inability to see the enemy is the lack
of ACT integration into the brigade S2 section. In this regard, ACTs do not
provide fused intelligence products to the brigade S2 to assist in developing
a threat picture nor do they provide periodic intelligence reports and updates
in order to provide the commander with a clearer picture of the battlefield.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The event template should include one or more detailed enemy COAs. Each enemy
COA should include a detailed enemy scheme of maneuver, which includes the
following:
a. Enemy task and purpose templated down to at least platoon
level and major weapon system (i.e. which mortar tube is tied to which obstacle
and supports which specific platoon).
b. Main and supporting effort (resources committed to each),
key and decisive terrain.
c. Enemy commander decision points.
d. Enemy control measures.
e. Friendly high-payoff targets (HPTs) that the enemy will target.
f. Integrated enemy BOS.
g. Integrated LUG and COB.
h. Time phaselines to track enemy movement.
i. NAIs to confirm or deny the enemy COA.
2.
The ACT should be physically integrated into the brigade S2 section. This integration
can best be accomplished through field or garrison training exercises comprising
the brigade S2 and the MICO ACT. Within this forum (utilizing FM
34-80,
Brigade
and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,
to
assist in identifying the mission and function of the ACT), roles and responsibilities
could be identified and SOPs established.
(TA.5.3
Process Information)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Event templating and collection management
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): After identifying the set of potential threat course of action
(COA), the initial challenge is to determine which COA the enemy will actually
adopt.
DISCUSSION:
The
art of identifying initial collection requirements revolves around predicting
specific areas and activities which, when observed, will reveal which courses
of action (COAs) the threat has chosen. The difference between the named area
of interests (NAIs), time phase lines, and indicators associated with each
COA form the basis of the event template. The event template is a guide for
collection management and R&S planning. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The S2 must make an effort to consistently update the event template. It is
the tool that allows the battalion to keep its collective focus on the enemy
and how he will fight. 2.
The S2 must be relentless in his pursuit of updating the event template, whether
it is for a targeting meeting or if the threat is seen as fighting differently
than was anticipated. An inability to develop a timely, visible product leads
to a less than synchronized collection plan and focus for the commanders. In
order to determine the ECOA, the S2 must also consistently update the collection
plan. 3.
References are Chapter 2, FM
34-130,
Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB),
and
Chapters 2 and 3, FM
34-2, Collection
Management and Synchronization Planning.
4.
These references will allow the S2 to achieve a better understanding of the
processes associated with event templating and collection management, as well
as give him essential insight into the benefits of knowing his higher headquarter's
collection focus. (TA.5.2.1.1
Collect Threat Information)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Situational awareness
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 MP): Many platoons continue to experience difficulty with situational
awareness because they do not have a system in place to properly battle track
and manage information.
DISCUSSION:
Battle
tracking in platoon command posts was not to the resolution necessary to provide
squad leaders with visibility of enemy locations, friendly unit dispositions,
and the current status of combat operations throughout the battlefield. Inversely,
squad leaders rarely provided route or area reconnaissance overlays and did
not report information in a manner that "painted a picture" for the platoon
leaders. During operations, platoons did not always use control measures (e.g.,
phase lines, checkpoints, or rally points) to internally track progress or
to report locations to their higher command and control element. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The platoons must provide brigade combat teams (BCTs) with the information
necessary to have resolution of location, current status and missions of the
MP units. 2. MP
platoons should be considered during the BCT's clearance of fires drills. The
platoon command post must track the current brigade operation to the resolution
necessary to provide squad leaders with information to plan and conduct operations.
3.
Prevent fratricide. The platoon command post must also disseminate and provide
feedback on the PIR and CCIR. Platoon leaders must require squad leaders to
submit timely situation reports and route reconnaissance reports. (TA.5.2.1.3
Collect information on Social/Political/Economic Environment)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Five requirements for accurate predicted fire
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Units are not routinely placing proper emphasis on the five requirements
for accurate predicted fire during normal operations.
DISCUSSION:
Units
do not achieve effects on target. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Assign the battalion fire direction officer (FDO) to track how the individual
firing units are managing the five requirements for accurate predicted fire
(FM
6-40, Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery,
pp. 1-3 to 1-4). The Battalion FDO must ask the hard questions of the battery
FDOs and ensure the firing accuracy of the battalion. Battery FDOs must understand
their requirement to report to the battalion FDO on a regular basis. Problem
areas include:
a.
Firing
Unit Locations:
Inaccurate
individual data within the database of the BCS or on the chart. Incorrect or
inaccurate lay data or ORSTA locations.
b.
Weapon
and Ammunition Information:
Units
have no routine method for tracking their muzzle velocities. Unit MVV logs
are incomplete and not updated routinely. Unit leaders do not regularly use
the chronograph to update MVVs when the mission allows.
c. Meteorological
Data:
Units
are not actively seeking current MET data and are not using the messages they
receive from higher headquarters.
d. Computational
Procedures:
Some
unit leaders do not check their databases regularly, and have poor second independent
verification on fire mission data. Special munitions knowledge for fire mission
processing is lacking.
2.
Leaders at all levels must create checklists to ensure their units are meeting
the five requirements for accurate predicated fires.
(TA.5.2.2
Collect Target Information)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Sustained battalion operations
OBSERVATION
(TF 3): During sustained operations battalions have difficulty developing a
synchronized plan which integrates all of the battlefield operating system
(BOS) and maneuver elements into a coordinated fight.
DISCUSSION:
The
battalion's plan for finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy is often relegated
to individual company fights where platoons are not in mutual support of each
other. Furthermore, courses of action do not have sufficient detail to provide
flexibility and command and control to the fight. The lack of graphic control
measures and planning priorities for the reserve produced a rigid plan with
little flexibility from the original order. When
the formal staff wargaming is conducted, there is only a cursory view of enemy
reaction because the unit does not allow the S2 to fight the enemy's COA. Repeatedly,
the S2's enemy action was to allow the battalion to destroy his forces instead
of moving, reacting, and developing the situation. When it came back to the
friendly counter-action, there was a similar lack of detail, and few of the
details were ever recorded in the execution matrix. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Conduct offensive operations IAW Chapter 3, FM
7-20,
The
Infantry Battalion.
2.
While battalions do conduct daily targeting meetings, a more rigorous application
of the Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess methodology outlined in Chapter 5,
FM
6-20-10,
Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process,
will
aid in developing a more focused target plan. It is critical to focus the efforts
for detection and assessment of this effort and prioritize these efforts through
the HPTL. Accurately templating the systems will allow the battalions to attack
HPTs with multiple assets throughout the entire operation. For example, a template
of an enemy mortar should include alternate locations, cache points, resupply
routes and techniques, forward observers, communications assets, and how they
are tied into the obstacle plan for the defense. 3.
During sustained operations a daily meeting would allow the unit to resynchronize
its efforts as the event template is updated from the latest enemy actions
or is confirmed or denied by contact and observation reports. This will also
ensure that battalions will develop battlefield visualization: the process
whereby the unit develops a clear understanding of the current state and envisions
a desired end state, then visualizes the sequence of activities that will move
the force from its current state to the end state. The CSS concept of support
needs to be integrated into the wargaming process. 4.
Downed aircraft, CASEVAC, and resupply operations need to be synchronized with
the maneuver plan. Contingency plans should be followed through until the unit
achieves the desired outcome. Recommend that battalions conduct wargaming by
battlefield operating system IAW Chapter 5, FM
101-5,
Staff
Organization and Operations.
(TA.5.2.2
Collect Target Information)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Direction-finding (DF) operations
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): The company leadership usually places little emphasis on direction-finding
operations.
DISCUSSION:
This
is due primarily to a lack of confidence in the direction-finding equipment.
As a result, many times there is no DF flash net and no tenable baseline. Ultimately,
communications and jamming (C&J) platoons are unable to answer the brigade
commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and often hinder the brigade
S2's ability to "see the enemy." TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
When
conducting electronic warfare operations on a non-linear battlefield, it is
not only imperative to intercept
enemy communications,
but
to also locate
the
enemy. Ultimately, this will assist maneuver commanders in economizing those
forces in order to neutralize targets located. Review Chapter 4 of FM
34-80,
Brigade
and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,
and FM
34-40-9,
Direction
Finding Operations.
(TA.5.2.2.1
Search for Targets)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Duties and responsibilities of the S2 section
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): The S2 section is operating without a clear understanding of duties
and responsibilities of each staff member.
DISCUSSION:
S2
section standing operating procedures (SOP) must address the procedures and
personnel responsible for logging, plotting, analyzing, and disseminating combat
information and intelligence. Clearly articulating these duties and responsibilities
will greatly assist the sections' ability to conduct battle tracking and facilitate
establishing a section battle rhythm. S2 sections must be proactive and continue
to pull information from both subordinate and higher echelon units when initial
reports are vague. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Tactical
command post (TAC) operations must be addressed in the S2 section SOP. The
SOP should include a checklist of battle-tracking tools that must deploy with
the TAC. This includes, but is not limited to, a situation template, collection
overlay/matrix, current priority intelligence requirements (PIR), intelligence
journal, and a functional radio. IBOS radios must be pre-combat checked (PCI)
and, if possible, participate in a communications exercise (commex) prior to
TAC operations.
(TA.5.3
Process Information)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Seeing the enemy through planning
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Air defense officers (ADO) have difficulty in contributing to
the brigade and battalion S2's intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB) products (R&S collection plan, situation and event templates).
DISCUSSION:
Without
contributing to these products ("seeing the enemy"), the ADO will struggle
in planning, coordinating, and integrating the Air Defense Operating System
(OS) into the brigade and battalion concept of operation. ADOs
must put more effort into mission analysis and their particular staff estimate.
Clear and concise aerial IPB is better received if it includes analysis of
enemy air capabilities, limitations, and, most importantly, their vulnerabilities.
When this analysis is integrated with the S2s IPB products, it significantly
contributes to linked analysis and truly articulates an integrated threat product.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
When
seeing the enemy air, the ADO must think in regard to the operating systems.
How will air contribute to the enemy's intel OS? The common sense answer is
reconnaissance (recon), intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA). Every enemy aerial platform will be focused on RISTA despite their
task and purpose. How will enemy air contribute to the fires and maneuver OS?
Lastly, how will enemy air contribute to the logistical OS? The challenge is
to articulate the "So What Analysis:" Who (type of unit and aerial platform),
What (clear task, recon, resupply deliver minefields/chem/bio or attack), When
(predictive based upon pattern and linked analysis with the S2), Where (location
or type of target [HVT/HPT]), and Why (purpose for the aerial platform). (TA.5.3.1
Process Information)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Processing captured enemy documents (CEDs)
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): At present there is a failure to timely evacuate CEDs to the analysis
and control team (ACT)/tactical analysis (TA) cell for exploitation.
DISCUSSION:
When
CEDs are properly exploited, they can provide information on enemy capabilities,
limitations, and vulnerabilities. Once this information is processed into intelligence,
it is used to direct the collection effort or target the threat.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Establish
a tracking system for CEDs to accurately track their recovery from the enemy
prisoner of war (EPW) to the human intelligence (HUMINT) teams (or another
element if HUMINT teams were not involved) to the ACT/TA cell, and then on
to higher. (TA.5.3.1
Process Information)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Integrating and synchronizing the management information control officer (MICO)
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): Analysis and control team (ACT) personnel do not fully understand
how to integrate and synchronize the MICO assets into the S2's collection plan.
DISCUSSION:
Often
the ACT is manned by junior soldiers who do not have the experience level to
integrate and synchronize various MICO assets. Responsibility must be established
for the MICO commander to integrate and synchronize MICO assets. He must ensure
that the ACT serves as the fusion cell for all of the MICO, signal intelligence
(SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), ground surveillance systems (GSS), and
other military intelligence (MI) collection reports that come into the ACT.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: MI
company commanders must be aggressively participating in the brigade's Military
Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to ensure MICO assets are fully integrated into
the fight. The MICO commander should brief immediately following the brigade
S2 during all briefings, updates, and planning sessions. He must clearly identify
the capabilities and limitations of each intelligence asset, and provide recommendations
on how best to utilize the system based on the overall scheme of maneuver.
(TA.5.3.4
Integrate Intelligence Information)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Reverse battlefield operating system (BOS) integration
OBSERVATION
(TF 3): The S2's responsibility to provide an integrated threat picture hinges
upon presenting how the enemy plans to bring all of his assets to bear upon
the battlefield.
DISCUSSION:
Presenting
this picture requires the S2 to make evaluations on some enemy capabilities
that lie outside his area of expertise. In order to portray how the enemy commander
will integrate his BOS, the S2 must rely upon and utilize the expertise of
the battle staff. The S2 habitually develops courses of action consisting of
a simple sketch that only portrays maneuver, fire support, and air defense
for the close fight. His task and purpose statement for the enemy only presented
a vague, broad overview. The results are an unfocused battle staff and unfocused
commanders. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
battalion staff should review the importance of reverse BOS integration in
the planning process as presented in Chapter 2, FM
34-130,
Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.
Additionally,
Chapter 4, FM
34-130,
illustrates
IPB requirements for the special staff and support units. The guidelines presented
there delineate the required information that staff sections should contribute
to reverse BOS integration. Using that information, the battle staff can develop
a systematic method to present feedback to the S2 and allow him to develop
an enemy course of action (ECOA) that integrates the enemy's entire BOS into
a cohesive plan. Developing a detailed narrative on the method the enemy commander
plans to employ concerning each BOS in support of his maneuver plan further
enhances the focus of the commanders. (TA.5.3.4
Integrate Intelligence Information)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Training the analysis control teams (ACT)
OBSERVATION
(INTEL DIV): There is a failure of the ACT to assist the S2 in developing a
threat picture.
DISCUSSION:
The
primary reasons for the failure of the ACT to assist the S2 in developing a
threat picture is that the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) operators are
not fully able to exploit all the capabilities of the system. ASAS operators
are not fully trained prior to a JRTC rotation. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Home Station training should emphasize radar warning system (RWS) training
and exploitation of the capabilities of the system 2.
The following should be done in a field environment and not in the comforts
of garrison:
a. The ACT should be physically integrated into the brigade
S2 section. This integration can best be accomplished through field or garrison
training exercises involving the brigade S2 and the MICO ACT.
b. Within this forum (utilizing FM
34-80-1/ST,
Brigade
and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,
to
assist in identifying the mission and function of the ACT) roles and responsibilities
could be identified and standing operating procedures (SOP) established.
(TA.5.3.4
Integrate Intelligence Information)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Information flow
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 NBC): Information flow from brigade to subordinate units: while integration
with the S2 is improving, there is still a need for improvement.
DISCUSSION:
Brigade
and battalion chemical sections do not see all of the intelligence that is
received by the brigade S2 from the division. In every rotation some critical
pieces of intelligence were missed. This resulted in unknown capabilities being
developed or moved within range of friendly forces by the enemy, and chemical
events happening out of sector that chemical staffs were unaware of. The development
of the S2's situational or event template did not include a complete picture
of the enemy's most likely or most dangerous NBC courses of action. Additionally,
there has been no mention of the NBC reconnaissance plan in any of the S2's
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans. With these pieces missing, the
chemical sections at battalion have been working without the same picture of
possible chemical events as the brigade. This results in a chemical plan that
is not nested from brigade to battalion and in battalions wasting time producing
products with their S2s that they should have received from brigade. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: The
brigade should conduct training with the chemical and intelligence sections
to allow more complete distribution of information within the battle staff
and to facilitate information flow to subordinate units. When the chemical
threat increases, there should be some type of communication, at least daily,
between the brigade and the battalion's chemical sections to ensure they have
the same relative common picture of the enemy and friendly situation. (TA.5.4
Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)
User's
Guide
TA.1
Maneuver BOS
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