TA.1
MANEUVER BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Move tactically
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 AT): Platoons and sections use proper movement techniques and formations
when conducting mounted movement.
DISCUSSION:
Gunners
maintained proper orientation and sectors of fire. Leaders employed the proper
movement technique and formation for the given terrain and enemy situation.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Move
tactically/mounted movement techniques can be referenced in ARTEP
7-91-MTP,
pg.
5-13. (TA.1.1.1.2.1
Move while Mounted)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Engage enemy
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2): Units consistently show that they can react to direct fire contact
at the squad level.
DISCUSSION:
Squads
are able to rapidly gain fire superiority and maneuver on the enemy. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
None.
(TA.1.2
Engage Enemy)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
React to contact
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 SIG): Companies react well to direct fire contacts.
DISCUSSION:
Individual
platoons and sections quickly use their superior mobility and firepower to
maintain contact with the enemy. Besides returning fire immediately, drivers
also take evasive action. The teamwork of "shooting and moving" together is
a successful technique. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Reference
ARTEP-7-91-Drill,
Battle
Drill 1.
(TA.1.2
Engage Enemy)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Marksmanship
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): During live-fire operations, soldiers quickly destroy targets, using
correct marksmanship techniques and fire commands from the small unit leader.
DISCUSSION:
During
force-on-force operations, leaders were diligent in maintaining the MILES zero
in order to provide accurate direct fires on the enemy. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Rifle
platoons must place an emphasis on marksmanship when training. (TA.1.2.1.2
Engage Direct-fire Targets)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Enter a building and clear a room, squad level
OBSERVATION
(LF): In most instances units have come on line with recent doctrine for clearing
rooms.
DISCUSSION:
Squads
employ internal support and obscuration when assaulting to seize a foothold
on buildings. Squads are quickly stacking on the exterior of buildings, checking
for booby traps, and entering rooms with well-rehearsed and synchronized three-
or four-man entry techniques. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Close
Quarter Battle (CQB) marksmanship has improved, and units are successful at
discriminating friendly from enemy inside the rooms. Some units are using white
lights for clearing, and others are clearing under night-vision goggles (NVGs).
Both have been proficient. (TA.1.2.2
Conduct Close Combat)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Enter a building and clear a room, platoon level
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Platoons are generally proficient at clearing rooms in a military operations
on urban terrain (MOUT) environment.
DISCUSSION:
Units
stated that emphasis on this task during Home Station training, within their
own MOUT site and tire cities for live fires, assisted greatly in perfecting
soldiers' speed and fire control. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Review
FM
90-10-1, An
Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas,
for
successful techniques in clearing rooms. (TA.1.2.2
Conduct Close Combat)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Assembly area operations
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Assembly area (AA) activities have not improved.
DISCUSSION:
Units
are still not executing basic daily tasks while in the AA. Units are conducting
security in name only; there is no plan and soldiers executing AA security
are not prepared for the mission. In conjunction with poor security, priorities
of work are not being established. Units have also failed to perform proper
consolidation and reorganization operations. They do not execute these missions
in any kind of organized fashion, and often do not execute them until it is
too late. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Units
must follow doctrinal procedures for occupation of assembly areas, and these
procedures should be part of any unit standing operating procedures (SOP).
Consolidation and reorganization operations allow a unit to adequately distribute
resources and prepare for future missions. (TA.1.1.1
Position/Reposition Forces (Unit and Equipment)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Integration of the heavy team into the scheme of maneuver
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The brigade often fails to integrate the heavy team into
the scheme of maneuver.
DISCUSSION:
The
most common result is to piecemeal armor and mechanized forces across the battlefield,
reacting to the enemy's success. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of
experience light infantry brigades have with employing heavy forces. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
There
is no easy solution to this Army-wide problem that is resource-driven. The
lack of training is primarily due to the way forces are stationed in CONUS
and the difficulty in routinely training together. (TA.1.1.1
Position/Reposition Forces (Unit and Equipment)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Moving mounted vs dismounted
OBSERVATION
(LF DIV): Two of the live fires incorporate both light and heavy forces. One
mistake made by commanders and platoon leaders in planning is identifying when
to dismount and lead with infantry or remount and lead with heavy elements.
DISCUSSION:
Attention
to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) answers these questions.
By identifying templated enemy positions, lines of sight from these positions,
and ranges of weapons employed by the enemy, a commander or platoon leader
knows when to remount or dismount and when to lead with infantry or heavy forces.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
FM
7-7J, Mechanized
Infantry Platoon and Squad,
states
that dismounts should lead in danger areas or restricted terrain. Roads and
trails and forested terrain at JRTC obviously count as dangerous and restricted
terrain. Commanders and platoon leaders must identify probable enemy positions
and lines of sight and dismount outside this distance, then maneuver the dismounts
to a position from which to assault or clear prior to advancing the heavy weapons
of tanks or BFVs to a overwatch/support position. (TA.1.1.1.2.1
Move while Mounted)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Military police (MP) support to movement control
OBSERVATION
(BDE C2 MP): Movement control continues to plague rotational brigades.
DISCUSSION:
The
origin of this problem seems to be the lack of deliberate planning for the
movement control plan. Historically, the brigade combat team (BCT) loses numerous
personnel and equipment as a result of traveling on unclear routes. The MPs
possess a large capability to facilitate the movement control plan through
the execution of special circulation control measures, temporary route signing
operations, combined arms route clearance security operations, and hasty route
reconnaissance and reporting missions. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: The
BCT must recognize and plan movement control as a branch to the operation.
The MP platoon leader/PM provides MP input through the development of a traffic
control plan. (TA.1.1.1.2.1
Move while Mounted)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
React to contact
OBSERVATION
(LF DIV): The battle drill for react to contact is the most important task
performed at fire team, squad, and platoon level; however, units continuously
do not perform to standard. The number one reason for this centers on the individual
task of seek
cover/return fire,
and
the soldier's hesitation to immediately return fire.
DISCUSSION:
Seek
cover and return fire are two separate tasks, but are taught as a single task
that should occur simultaneously. The wording here is a problem for soldiers
to grasp, and, more often than not, soldiers dive to the ground in search of
the nearest tree without engaging the enemy. A SALUTE report follows and then
an engagement; O/Cs have witnessed this process take as long as ten minutes.
The process of finding cover does not necessarily imply that the soldier dive
to the ground; it may be as simple as stepping behind a tree or building corner.
The simultaneous piece of the task is that the soldier is thinking and looking
for cover as he returns fire. In some cases, the soldier may fire and move
at the same time, such as shooting as he dives to the ground or as he quickly
moves behind a tree or building. In the optimal situation, the react to contact
is not a reaction to enemy fire, but a case in which the soldier identifies
the enemy first and then engages. Nighttime
lethality has greatly increased with the advent of PVS-7B/7D/14s, AN/PAQ-4s,
and AN/PEQ-2/6s, but they have also somewhat slowed reaction times during a
limited visibility react to contact. Although better equipped to acquire targets,
soldiers hesitate to fire instinctively at a muzzle flash, movement, or sound,
and instead rely on their IR source, wasting valuable seconds trying to place
the "beam" onto the target before engaging. All too often, the "beam" from
the IR source bounces around the target for 5-10 seconds before a soldier fires.
This time increases when the distance is greater than 25 meters, all the while
giving the enemy more time to acquire and engage. This is compounded by the
fact that the soldier is usually prone and having a difficult time re-positioning
to where he can see through his night-vision goggles (NVGs) and fire at the
same time. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Soldiers must realize that returning fire is the most important task during
a react to contact. Instinctive fires from members of the unit in contact are
a must. The first rounds fired need not be completely accurate, but at least
aimed in the general direction of the enemy. If the first rounds strike near
the enemy or hit him, then the purpose has been served. The first rounds alert
the remainder of the lead fire team or squad to the location of the enemy and
will allow for placing more accurate fires. 2.
During daylight, the use of a jungle sling or snaps that keep the butt of the
weapon in the soldier's shoulder pocket will greatly enhance his ability to
fire instinctively, and he will not waste valuable time bringing his weapon
up. The jungle slings also works at night, but a soldier can just as easily
fire his weapon from the ready position utilizing the AN/PAQ-4 and NVG combination.
3.
Training to fire instinctively is the next step. Cogito
non ferio
(I
think; therefore, I miss) captures the essence of instinctive shooting. Instinctive
shooting is neither quick fire nor CQB, although there are similarities. To
train to a level of complete accuracy on it requires a great deal of rounds
and time; however, that is not the near goal. As long as a soldier understands
the principles of acquiring a target through sight or sound and firing in that
direction, he can be trained without ever firing a live round. Training to
fire instinctively is not done from the prone position. Firing from the standing,
kneeling, and squatting position is required because these are the positions
that a soldier will be in when contact is made. It also helps that the soldier
trains wearing the equipment he will be carrying (e.g., rucksack, LBE, Kevlar,
NVGs). The most important soldier task in a react-to-contact scenario is to
return fire. (TA.1.2
Employ Direct-fire)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Platoon leader actions on contact
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Platoon leaders are placing themselves in the fight instead of in a
position where they can assess the situation and report to integrate all systems.
DISCUSSION:
The
small unit leader is in a poor position to maintain situational awareness and
tactical patience and provide the company commander with a detailed contact
report. Platoon contacts ultimately are becoming direct-fire engagements for
the BLUFOR due to the primary leader not in the position to request, receive,
and adjust indirect fires. This results in: 1.
Slow development of battle drills on what step to take next (i.e., battle drill
attack or break contact). 2.
Late or insufficient reports to the company commander, resulting in slow repositioning
of forces and assets to support the contact. 3.
Indirect fire being rarely used to support platoon or lower contact. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Commanders must reinforce the platoon leader's positioning during the order
and backbriefs to ensure that the platoon leader understands his responsibilities
during the execution of battle drills found in ARTEP
7-8-DRILL.
2.
Incorporate leader actions on contact during battle drill training at Home
Station and during rehearsals for company and battalion training/missions.
(TA.1.2
Employ Direct-fire)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Fire control and distribution
OBSERVATION
(LF DIV): Many leaders, from team to company, do not understand the basic principles
of direct fire control.
DISCUSSION:
Leaders
almost always fail to develop a direct fire plan that includes control measures,
rules of engagement, ample marking and signals, and engagement priorities.
This results in poor placement of weapons, poor distribution of fires, and
the expenditure of all ammunition prior to completing the mission. Leaders
should develop a direct fire plan based on the enemy situation and rehearse
it. It
is very important that team and squad leaders understand how to acquire targets
and use commands to direct and control the fires of their elements. Technological
advances in the infrared (IR) spectrum allow for greater lethality and engagement
distances at night; however, leaders, whether in rifle squads or support-by-fire
positions, do not properly use the AN/PAQ-4C or Ground Command Pointer (GCP)
to "paint targets" for their subordinates. Some units have magnifiers for the
PVS-7Bs and PVS-14s; however, they either do not bring them to the rotation
or they do not know how to properly use them. The magnifier allows a weapon
squad leader to clearly see an objective at a distance of 600-800 meters, easily
doubling or tripling the normal engagement distance for a support-by-fire (SBF)
position. Although the M240B gunners may only see limited, blurred portions
of the objective, the weapon squad leader can clearly observe and mark bunkers
or enemy personnel with a beam from his AN/PAQ-4 or GCP. The gunners then only
have to line up the beam from their IR source with that of the squad leader
for an accurate engagement. Once the targets are acquired, the squad leader
can control the machine guns' rate of fire and distribution through either
voice commands or his IR source. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Leaders
must recognize the time required to breach or conduct a similar task. By understanding
the potential time requirements for certain tasks, leaders can compute the
amount of ammunition required for sustained fires by factoring the quantity
on hand versus time required. Leaders in the support-by-fire element also need
to consider the likelihood of a counterattack, and prior to computing the number
of rounds needed for suppression during the mission, subtract at least 200-300
rounds from the basic load for defending against a counterattack. Most importantly,
leaders and members of the SBF element need to know the difference between
suppression and volume of fire. (TA.1.2
Employ Direct-fire)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Planning for mutual support
OBSERVATION
(BN C2): During movement-to-contact operations (search and attack and approach-march
techniques), commanders do not always consider mutual support between platoons.
DISCUSSION:
Illustrating
this point is the fact that in most cases platoons are separated by at least
one kilometer. The result of this separation is that companies and platoons
typically find the enemy, but do not have the combat power available to fix
and finish him. The cost is friendly casualties and the enemy successfully
breaking contact. During
the defense, commanders consistently establish platoon battle positions that
are not mutually supportive. Commanders and platoon leaders systematically
fail to conduct rehearsals addressing maneuvering elements in support of one
or more battle positions. In
the MOUT attack, commanders do not employ the tenants of SOSR to gain a foothold
at the objective. Platoons are positioned at the breach without a support element.
Units effectively execute room clearing battle drills, but they struggle trying
to enter the building without the support of adjacent units. These actions
cause the following results: 1.
Platoons suffer high casualties during and after enemy contacts. After initial
contact, the OPFOR would break contact. The platoon would focus on casualty
evacuation and the OPFOR would then reinitiate contact, creating more casualties.
A mutually supporting platoon could move to the contact (to prevent the OPFOR
from breaking contact) and then finish the OPFOR. 2.
The OPFOR masses against one platoon battle position, destroys it, and then
continues to penetrate the battalion defenses. 3.
The company quickly becomes combat ineffective while trying to enter a town
or city. A platoon conducting its own entry operation did not have the firepower
to suppress all buildings and quickly suffered losses. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Search
and attack TTP (outlined in CALL
Newsletter No. 97-8,
Search and Attack. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,
pp. II-9 to II-10) executed at the company level applies the "hammer and anvil
technique" approach. One platoon forms the fix (anvil) element by establishing
ambushes along likely lines of drift into and out of the search zone. The remaining
platoons (hammer) search the zone, forcing the enemy toward the ambush. Other
references include FM
7-10, The
Infantry Rifle Company,
pp. 4-14 to 4-19; and FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion,
pp. 3-18 to 3-23. 1.
Platoons operate closer together based on terrain and vegetation and move to
the contact in a controlled manner. The platoon moving to the contact maneuvers
to finish the enemy, not allowing him to break contact. 2.
In the defense, company commanders must plan for maneuver. Platoons must be
able to shift fires or maneuver to put fires on the enemy to prevent him from
massing. Refer to FM
7-10, The
Infantry Rifle Company,
pp.5-22 to 5-32, for further information on defensive techniques. 3.
The company commander must plan for the tenants of SOSR to gain a foothold
into the town or village. He pinpoints a breach site, plans for a support platoon
with a detailed direct fire plan, and designates an assault platoon to exploit
the initial foothold. The company must rehearse this plan and be prepared to
switch tasks as needed. Refer to ARTEP
7-10-MTP,
task 7-2-1109, Execute
an Assault (MOUT),
for
more information. (TA.1.2.2
Conduct Close Combat)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Mutual support during movement-to-contact operations
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Company commanders are not incorporating mutual support within the
company concept of operations for movement to contact.
DISCUSSION:
There
is little or no company-level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
on the unit's zone. The company commander's initial action is to flood the
battlefield with infantry rather than understand the enemy's intent inside
the zone and shape the battlefield (placing units, assets, or effects at locations
where contact is likely) based on the results of a thorough analysis. This
method unfortunately makes it a platoon fight and no longer a synchronized
companies fight. The result is that the planning force ratio, friendly against
enemy, is significantly diminished, and the find,
fix, and finish
methodology
is disregarded. Chance contacts occur where the main and supporting efforts
are not postured to overwhelm what should be an outnumbered enemy. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Specify distance between friendly units within the company order and maintain
thorough radio communication (SITREPS). 2.
Incorporate the find,
fix and finish
methodology
within the commander's intent in the operations order. Clear identification
of these elements and how the commander envisions the fight will speed the
reaction time of platoon leaders. Refer to FM
7-10,
The
Infantry Rifle Company,
Chapter 4, Section III, para 4-10, for more information. 3.
Within the company zones, company commanders must analyze and predict the enemy's
high-payoff targets and locate the routes or areas the enemy will use to attack
those targets. Once completed, the company commander can decide on tasks to
subordinate elements, fire support guidance, and movement techniques for the
platoons. (TA.1.2.2
Conduct Close Combat)
TA.5
Intelligence BOS Narrative
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
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