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The rear detachment commander (RDC) and rear detachment personnel have responsibilities for all of the personnel and equipment remaining at Home Station during a unit's deployment. Additionally, the rear detachment has significant family readiness responsibilities and provides Family Readiness Group (FRG) leaders with a point of entry into official Army financial, legal, and other personnel services systems. A positive and supportive relationship between rear detachment personnel, the unit in the field, and family readiness leaders is critical to the overall success of the family readiness effort. The mutual support and coordination of these leaders is a combat multiplier that clearly enhances the capabilities and morale of the organization in the theater of operations.

Effective Rear Detachment Organization

The organization of the rear detachment should be given strong consideration. Prior to deploying to become a part of the stabilization force (SFOR), one Task Force Eagle commander configured the rear detachments of his subordinate headquarters to provide the best possible support for the units' Family Readiness Groups. The commander directed that each brigade-level rear detachment identify a captain as rear detachment commander (RDC), a sergeant first class as rear detachment sergeant major, an experienced soldier (officer or NCO) as the family readiness liaison (FRL), a sergeant first class to be HHC RDC, and at least a staff sergeant in each of the various brigade staff sections. Similarly, the commander directed that each battalion-sized unit's rear detachment include a first lieutenant as RDC, a senior staff sergeant or sergeant first class as rear detachment first sergeant, an officer or NCO as the FRL, and company and staff section NCOICs in the rank of staff sergeant (with the exception of the PAC NCOIC, which was specified at the rank of specialist or sergeant). Additionally, the commander recommended that each battalion-sized unit include an armorer, mail clerk, PLL clerk, support platoon specialist, track mechanic, vehicle mechanic, and command financial specialist among their rear detachment contingents. This organization ensured that the rear detachment had sufficient personnel and skills to effectively assist the Family Readiness Groups.

Another unit directed that each battalion deploying as part of the SFOR designate an NCO to serve as a liaison with the unit's FRGs. This family readiness liaison was tasked to assist the FRG's efforts in caring for unit families while enabling the RDC to focus on the other administrative, supply, training, and personnel services tasks of importance to the unit. In selecting the FRL, commanders looked for NCOs with deployment experience and a familiarity with Army personnel and finance policies, someone with a charismatic personality who could work well with spouses and family members. The FRLs were tasked to assist FRG leaders and rear detachment personnel with any and all family problems that arose during the unit deployment.

While commanders did particularly well at staffing the rear detachments to enhance family readiness, a number of rear detachments were overtasked. While the units surveyed were well resourced for the family readiness tasks at hand, deploying commanders did not do as well at matching rear detachment end strength to the requirements placed on their RDCs. In one noteworthy case, a lieutenant (the RDC), a motor sergeant, and two mechanics attempted to conduct an artillery battery's worth of scheduled services. Another case revealed that the RDC was required to complete a normal company's worth of "Red Cycle" taskings with fewer than ten soldiers, several of whom were being "chaptered out" of the Army. While the division commander's guidance ensured that rear detachments were well staffed for family readiness operations, it was clear that there was a mismatch between other ongoing unit operations and the number and quality of personnel available to accomplish those operations.

Key Lessons Learned

• Rear detachment personnel must be of high caliber so that families will trust them when they have a special need.
• The primary mission of the rear detachment is to provide family assistance; however, they should not attempt to accept more responsibility with a limited number of personnel.

Deployed task forces benefit greatly from the careful selection of a rear detachment commander. Gone are the days when commanders leave "sick, lame, or lazy" soldiers in the rear while they deploy on a scheduled or contingency operation. In the case of Operation INTRINSIC ACTION, the task force commander and his subordinate unit commanders selected RDCs who had been previously deployed and who understood the dynamics of a unit deployment and family separation. Additionally, commanders selected individuals who were well versed in Army pay, and legal, medical, and other personnel services systems so that they had the best possible chance of solving family problems locally rather than involving soldiers deployed in the field. Commanders generally selected RDCs who were intelligent, good listeners, calm (and calming), willing to help, and energetic; in essence, seeking the same characteristics in that leader that they looked for in a good FRG leader. Commanders activated the rear detachment at least a week in advance of the unit's deployment date to give the RDCs a chance to work out any initial problems in structure or operation while the deploying unit was still at Home Station. Also, many units did not rotate the RDCs back into line slots, choosing instead to earmark the trained RDC as the RDC for subsequent deployments as well.

Key Lesson Learned: Personality and leadership characteristics of the rear detachment commander are essential.

Units who assign an officer or NCO as rear detachment leaders should instruct them on how to fulfill their duties correctly. One division commander developed a course of instruction for those soldiers designated to lead rear detachments during deployments, a course intended to train the rear detachment leadership in ways to successfully serve as a link between the deployed unit, FRGs, and support agencies. The soldiers were trained in FRG techniques, personnel management policies, and family advocacy programs. The course set forth formal RDC responsibilities, including information management, family assistance, FRG support and coordination, supply accountability, FRG financial auditing, and other aspects of family and unit readiness. Additionally, the RDC course covered information on installation support agencies, including their functions and the means through which the RDC and individual family members can gain access to their assistance. A thumbnail sketch was also provided on applicable financial entitlements, financial documents, and other relevant personnel policies that rear detachment personnel must know during a period of deployment.

Key Lesson Learned: Rear detachment personnel need to be trained for this duty and not just placed in this position.

Family Readiness Group leaders and RDCs tracked and reported family problems during unit deployments to Bosnia and Kuwait to focus family support resources. There were several reasons for this approach. First, by formally tracking and reporting family issues, FRG leaders and RDCs could ensure that no family problem "slipped through the crack" and that each problem was handled in a professional and timely manner. Also, all the units reported problems by general type (i.e., legal, financial, medical) so the division was able to maintain visibility on family readiness in general. Finally, by tracking and recording the incidence of family problems, FRG leaders and rear detachment personnel were able to verify actions taken when (in a few cases) spouses complained. Tracking sheets used by Task Force Eagle units included a case number, the spouse's name and unit, the general situation, actions taken, the name of the case worker, a priority designation, the date the action was completed, and the date the action was closed. While the mechanism enhanced family readiness efforts, it was also true that reporting was uneven across units. Units differed in their definition of "reportable incident/problem," which meant that the division's view on the incidence of family problems was undoubtedly skewed. Nevertheless, the formal tracking and reporting of family problems was certainly beneficial to family readiness efforts.

Teamwork has always been a hallmark of the Army. The same can be used very effectively in providing support for Family Support Groups. During Operation INTRINSIC ACTION, the commanders of two battalion task forces from the same brigade agreed to assist each other in their FRG operations while one of them was deployed. This reciprocal arrangement greatly enhanced the ability of the deployed task force to concentrate on the mission at hand. The commander at Home Station conducted a monthly briefing for the deployed unit's families in which he outlined the deployed unit's status and missions. In the process, he answered as many questions as he could about the unit's ongoing operations and anticipated redeployment schedule, as well as addressing the usual spate of rumors. The task force commander was also able to assist families of the deployed unit when the unit was unexpectedly extended in the theater of operations, helping to solve problems with family member travel arrangements and other administrative actions.

Key Lessons Learned

• Develop a tracking sheet to ensure that each problem is addressed and does not fall through the cracks.
  
• After the deployment the tracking sheets can be used to show where future training is needed.