TA.6
MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
(NBC)
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Fratricide prevention
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Units have made an improvement in air and ground integration resulting
in a reduction in fratricides.
DISCUSSION:
Units
continue to appreciate the importance of the rules of engagement (ROE) and
have taken significant measures to ensure all soldiers understand and follow
them. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Aviation units must continue to ensure this trend is sustained. A good starting
point is to develop unit fratricide prevention standing operating procedures
(SOPs). 2.
Review CALL
Newsletter No. 92-4, Fratricide:
Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses.
(TA.6.3.1
Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Crew-served weapons drills
OBSERVATION
(DIV LF): Squads are improving at employing MG 240 machine gun (MG) crew-served
weapons.
DISCUSSION:
M240
MG crew drills are paying off. Crews are more proficient at using tripods and
engaging targets quickly after occupying designated firing positions. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Continue
to employ crew drills for all crew-served weapons at Home Station training.
(TA.6.3.1.
Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Aircraft maintenance
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Aircraft maintenance continues to be one of the strong points of
assault/heavy lift units.
DISCUSSION:
Units
routinely average an operational ready (OR) rate of 85 percent during a rotation.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Continue
operational maintenance throughout the deployment. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Breach mined/wire obstacle
OBSERVATION
(LF DIV): Units typically do not incorporate the fundamentals of breaching
-- suppress, obscure, secure and reduce (SOSR) -- during execution.
DISCUSSION:
Leaders
usually organize their sub-units into a support, breach and assault element,
but fail to issue criteria or effects to be achieved by each. This results
in elements moving forward to conduct the breach without the enemy being effectively
suppressed or effective obscuration established. Additionally, leaders need
to pay special attention to the placement of the support element in relation
to the breach site. The breach element frequently masks the fires of the support
element, resulting in unnecessary casualties due to insufficient suppression.
Leaders should specify fire control measures in the operations order. If indirect
fire is being used, graphic control measures should be used to show minimum
safe distances (MSD). This will facilitate continuous fires on the objective
while reducing the chance of fratricide. Another method for fixing responsibilities
is to task the breach elements, including the purpose, next to each element.
EXAMPLE:
Elements
available:
1
Sqd 2 Sqd
3
Sqd Weapons Sqd
Engineers
| Breach
elements | Who | Why |
| Suppress | Weapons | Prevent
enemy fires on engineers |
| Obscure | 1
Sqd/Eng | Obscure
enemy observation of engineers |
| Secure | 1
Sqd | Provide
engineer shoulder security |
| Reduce | Engineer | Employ
bangalore to open lane |
|
|
| Foothold | 2
Sqd | Pass
assault force to objective |
| Assault/Clear | 3/1
Sqds | Clear
objective to accomplish purpose |
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Simple graphics (with the task and purpose of each element) and a signal plan
will ensure that every soldier and leader knows what effects his tasks must
produce rather than focusing on the tasks themselves. 2.
Engineers are not synonymous to a breach element. Engineers are integral to
the success of a breach, but they are in limited numbers and must be augmented
with infantry to accomplish multiple tasks. (TA.6.1.1.1
Breach Obstacles)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Two-man machine gun (MG) crews
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Crews are not carrying MG components and basic issue items (BII) (primarily
the tripod) because there is not a third crew member--the ammunition bearer
(AB).
DISCUSSION:
The
problem is compounded with the new M240G because there are more components
and BII, it is heavier, and the basic load is increased. MG crews are not proficient
at crew drill. MG crews are inexperienced because of frequent personnel changes
within platoons. Often newly assigned "first termers" are assigned as a gunner
just because they are new or large men. As a result, crews fire with the following
results: 1.
MG crews are not able to provide accurate fires during limited visibility and
during static operations (defense, assembly areas, ambushes). 2.
Crews are not providing timely and accurate fires. 3.
Lack of proficiency in crew drill deprives the MG crew of "the training in
the fundamentals of machine gun operation and confidence in their ability to
put the gun into action with precision and speed." (FM
23-67, Machinegun
7.62, M60)
4.
Crews are not proficient in basic skills such as preparing range cards.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Consider establishing three-man MG crews. Units with a nine-man table of organization
and equipment (TO&E) weapons squad have used the anti-tank (AT) assistant gunner
(AG) to be the ammunition bearer. Each rifle squad trains a rifleman on AT
AG responsibilities, and this becomes his primary duty during operations requiring
AT employment (defense, anti-armor ambushes). 2.
A recommended long-term fix is adjusting the TO&E. 3.
Train crew drill as found in Chapter 6, FM
23-67.
4.
Battle roster MG crews. Battle rosters are discussed in Chapter 4, FM
25-100,
Training
the Force.
Prioritize
manning and stabilization of crews (recommend 12 months). Place authority to
change crew manning at company level or higher. Assignment to crew should be
progressive; that is, start out as an ammunition bearer or assistant gunner
and then move up to gunner. (TA.6.3.1
Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Protection of the forward support battalion (FSB)
OBSERVATION
(DIV CSS): The unit's parameters for force protection lacked integration of
the battlefield operating systems (BOS) into an inclusive system of force protection
for the brigade support area (BSA).
DISCUSSION:
The
FSB needs to improve its planning and execution of force protection measures
and the integration of brigade support area (BSA) tenants into a comprehensive
force protection for the BSA. Sectors of fire are not interlocking, fields
of fire are not cleared, and weapons are emplaced without considering the characteristics
of terrain (dead space, trees, avenues of approach, and hills). Additionally,
soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card or how the traverse
and elevation (T&E) mechanism functions on several weapons. NCOs do not proactively
supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapon proficiency. The end
result is that despite the enormous firepower available to a battery, the unit
is unable to defend itself against a dismounted attack of three to five men.
1.
The BSA is weak in force protection. The battalion occupied the same BSA site
for nine days and yet less than 40 percent of the soldiers in the battalion
had survivability positions. 2.
Most significant was the placement of units within the BSA. Once a TF occupied
the aviation assembly area, the perimeter was not adjusted. The heavy team
remained oriented to the tree line and not a high-speed avenue of approach.
3.
A unit received more contact than was necessary due to its position within
the perimeter. The S-3 must ensure that key leaders at the platoon and company
level correctly emplace and employ crew-served weapon systems to provide an
integrated BSA defense. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Read and review Chapter 3 of FM
6-50,
Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery
and
page 3-6 of
STP
6-13Bl4-SM-TG.
2.
Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons' emplacement,
range card construction, clearing fields of fire, and, most importantly, positioning
all crew-served weapons to maximize their effectiveness given the constraints
of the terrain. 3.
Consider identifying positions of crew-served weapons prior to howitzer positions.
This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the
battery's subsequent occupation. 4.
Crew-served weapons' positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader
(battalion commander or 1SG) to ensure the weapon is being used effectively.
This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring
it is set up correctly. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Base camp protection Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE)/Peace Enforcement Operations
(PEO)
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): The base camp defense operations center (BDOC) had difficulty ensuring
all units within the base camp were in the proper uniform and that soldiers
knew the duties and responsibilities of a guard.
DISCUSSION:
Soldiers
inside the guard tower do not understand their own standing operating procedures
(SOP), rules of engagement (ROE), and the graduated response matrix (GRM),
and incorrectly fill out range cards for their weapons. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Rehearse battle drills with guards prior to them assuming guard duty. Battle
drills recommended are: -
Medical emergency.
-
Civilians on the battlefield (COB) taking pictures of the base camp.
-
COBs selling items to soldiers.
-
"Rat chase" (breach in perimeter).
-
Bags left at the gate or perimeter.
-
COBs "casing" the camp.
-
Vehicles parked or abandoned near the gate or perimeter.
-
Convoy operations.
-
Interaction with the media.
2.
During guard mount, the Sergeant of the Guard (SOG) should spot check a soldier's
knowledge of the SOP, ROE, and GRM. If the soldier is not knowledgeable on
these subjects, then his supervisor should be in the tower with him while he
is on shift. The SOG must also verify each range card during his first spot
check of the tower during each shift.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Force protection
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Units are not prepared to defend themselves from ground attack, air
attack, or indirect fire.
DISCUSSION:
Units
sustain more casualties than necessary. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The brigade engineer must adequately resource the FA battalion with engineer
assets. Once the engineer assets arrive at the batteries, the FA units must
maximize engineer potential. 2.
Batteries must begin force protection as soon as they arrive at the position
and not wait to dig until engineer assets arrive. Additionally, batteries need
to carry Class IV as part of their load plan so they do not depend on resupply.
3.
Review GTA
7-6-1,
Fighting Position Construction Infantry Leader's Reference Card,
in
order to build overhead to standard. 4.
Battery first sergeants ensure the battery has interlocking fires (see paragraphs
2-18 through 2-24, FM
7-8,
Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad)
and conduct adjacent unit coordination (see paragraph 2-26, FM
7-8)
in order to maximize all friendly weapon systems. 5.
Units must demand timely development and dissemination of fire support plans
from brigade to battalions. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Force protection and security
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Leader involvement in the planning and execution of both offensive
and defensive operations usually results in the failure of a company security
plan.
DISCUSSION:
Force
protection continues to challenge units. Lack of application of a security
plan during the movement-to-contact phase results in the unit being surprised
in its patrol base and suffering numerous casualties. Lack of application of
a security plan in the defense results in the unit being overwhelmed by a much
smaller force. 1.
Leaders often fail to clearly articulate the specific active and passive measures
they want. Those that are published are usually not enforced. 2.
Leaders fail to conduct company- or platoon-level intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB). 3.
Active measures, such as listening posts/observation posts (LP/OP), stand-tos,
and patrols, are often not conducted or enforced. When conducted, they are
rarely executed as the result of the leader's IPB. The result is LP/OPs that
are only 50 meters out and do not cover a likely avenue of approach, or patrols
that are not dispatched to known areas of activity but rather to areas of the
least restrictive terrain. 4.
Passive measures, such as the deployment of early warning systems, night-vision
device usage (especially attached TOW assets) in the surveillance plan, and
siting of the company position, are rarely given much thought. 5.
Units rarely dig hasty fighting positions in the offense (patrol bases). 6.
Leaders often fail to site-in key weapons systems. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Leaders must conduct IPB at their level. 2.
Unit SOPs give junior leaders direction in the application of appropriate security
measures; leader supervision/enforcement
will
ensure proper execution. 3.
Review Chapters 4 and 5 of FM
7-8,
The
Infantry Rifle Company.
4.
Reference CALL
Handbook No. 96-3,
Own
the Night,
Mar 96. 5.
Reference CALL
CTC
Quarterly Bulletin No. 96-7,
Jun 96, pages 8-24. 6.
Conduct officer and NCO professional development (OPD/NCOPD) on company and
platoon standard operating procedures with respect to security.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Standing operating procedures (SOP) and security
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Published SOP fails to provide an adequate security plan.
DISCUSSION:
Lack
of application of a sound security plan results in the unit being surprised
and destroyed by a much smaller force. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Conduct officer and NCO professional development (OPD/NCOPD) on company and
platoon standard operating procedures with respect to security. 2.
Conduct OPD/NCODPs on the movement-to-contact, rehearsals, intelligence preparation
of the battalfield (IPB), task and purpose, defense, modern weapons and their
capabilities, and operations orders (OPORDs). 3.
Use "What Now?" leader exercises at Home Station training. 4.
Use a Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TWET). 5.
Use sand table exercises. 6.
See TREND 6 above for additional techniques. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TA.3
Air Defense BOS
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS
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