TA.4
COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Company commander cross-talk
OBSERVATION
(TF 3): The command climate that fosters innovation and battalion unity allows
company commanders the ability to conduct operations in the absence of orders
from higher headquarters.
DISCUSSION:
A
thorough knowledge of the commander's intent facilitates mission execution
in a timely manner and ensures success for the battalion. Commanders that delay
decision-making in order to get approval from higher headquarters often find
themselves on the other end of the initiative. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Commanders
that conduct cross-talks are often able to synchronize the fight at a tactical
level and react rapidly against the enemy.
(TA.4.1
Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Reporting
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Unit communications from the gates and towers to the base camp defense
operations center (BDOC) remain strong.
DISCUSSION:
Guards
are reporting all activity at the gate and around the perimeter to the BDOC
in a timely manner. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Units
need to sustain guard and commander of the guard training to ensure unit security
and to maintain the status of unit security for decision-makers. (TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Prepare for combat
OBSERVATION
(LF DIV): Most leaders develop and communicate a well-planned operations order.
DISCUSSION:
Units
normally adhere to the 1/3-2/3 rule, but leaders often fail to develop priority
of work and a detailed timeline. This results in little or no rest time prior
to execution. Units conduct adequate rehearsals. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: A
good technique most units use is to start with a terrain model rehearsal with
team leaders and above prior to full-force rehearsals. This allows leaders
to synchronize their plans and allows the company commander or platoon leader
to make any necessary adjustments. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Command and control
OBSERVATION
(TF 3): Battalions have developed good standing operating procedures (SOPs)
for transition of command and control from the tactical operations center (TOC)
to the tactical command post (TAC).
DISCUSSION:
Each
operations center has their duties, responsibilities, and division of labor
defined during the current fight. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
Use
of a well-developed, simple, and complete SOP is essential for success. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Mission planning
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Mission planning at the aviation company level is especially noteworthy.
DISCUSSION:
Assault
crews consistently show considerable determination toward in-depth planning
and mission accomplishment regardless of limited information from higher headquarters
and time available. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Continue to reinforce Home Station training in planning and in the Military
Decision-Making Process. 2.
Review CALL
Newsletter No. 95-12, Military
Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning"
Update,
May
97. (TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Participation in company-level rehearsals
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Company fire support officers (FSOs) are actively participating in
the maneuver commander's rehearsal.
DISCUSSION:
By
integrating the fire support plan into the maneuver rehearsal, company FSOs
are improving the responsiveness of fires in support of forces in contact,
synchronization, and the ability to defeat high-payoff targets. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
There
is no substitute for a good unit rehearsal. (TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Cross-talk between brigade and battalion fire support officers (FSOs)
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Brigade FSOs are not communicating with battalion FSOs on a regular
(daily) basis to coordinate fire support to ensure synchronization within the
fire support system.
DISCUSSION:
Lack
of communication between fire support echelons on a regular basis is contributing
to battalion FSOs not fully understanding the brigade fire support plan or
the brigade commander's intent. Additionally, FSOs are unable to provide commanders
with adequate situational awareness information required for decision-making
because of a lack of information flow between echelons. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Brigade
FSOs should conduct, at a minimum, daily conference calls with battalion FSOs.
Timed to allow discussion of information contained in brigade FRAGOs, the calls
should focus on ensuring subordinates fully understand the commander's intent,
requirements placed on subordinate fire support cells by brigade, and all other
fire support products. Battle-tracking and situational awareness information
should also be discussed. These calls would ensure that all activities are
coordinated in time and space with the purpose to produce the most effective
fires supporting the scheme of maneuver.
(TA.4.1
Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Helicopter safety considerations
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Squads are not knowledgeable on helicopter safety considerations.
DISCUSSION:
Scout
members are not proficient in using aircraft seatbelts, weapon orientation,
"lock and load" procedures, and securing radio antennas. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Use planning guidelines and checklists found in FM
7-92, The
Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad,
and FM
90-4, Air
Assault Operations.
2.
Conduct static load training. If possible, plan transportation to the aviation
assembly area to conduct rehearsals with the crew flying the mission. (TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Aviation liaison team communication
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Internal communications via aviation liaison teams is usually poorly
done.
DISCUSSION:
Aviation
liaison teams are usually not staffed for 24-hour operations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
In the JRTC environment, in an infantry brigade task force the aviation LNO,
at a minimum, should consist of a four-man team - two officers (commissioned
or warrant) and two SPC/SGT, MOS 93P. 2.
The liaison team should be equipped with a vehicle, dual-net SINCGARS, and
UHF capability. The liaison team must have access to the TACLAN and, of course,
a mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) phone. 3.
This team would have the capability to function 24-hours-a-day, conduct split
operations if the TAC deploys, and maintain the capability to conduct face-to-face
coordination with the aviation task force and subordinate ground units when
required. (TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Brigade-level planning of aviation support for CSS operations
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): The principal CSS planner in the brigade task force is the brigade
S-4, who too often fails to sufficiently coordinate with aviation LNOs.
DISCUSSION:
The
S-4 is usually assisted by the aviation LNO and the support operations officer
(SPO) at the forward support battalion/main support battalion (FSB/MSB). At
the JRTC, this entire responsibility is often delegated to the FSB/MSB commander
and his SPO. Unfortunately in these cases, the loss in coordination and synchronization
across all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) results in little CSS moved
by air. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
S-4 should be the primary planner for support operations and should use LNOs
to focus on using all air assets available in the resupply and support role.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
MEDEVAC work cell
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): The forward support medical team (FSMT) is not fully integrated into
planning, battle-tracking, and communications.
DISCUSSION:
MEDEVAC
units need to place an operational work cell in the aviation tactical operations
center (TOC) when collocated with the aviation task force. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
forward support medical team (FSMT) work cell needs to track mission graphics,
frequencies, aircraft status, and number of patients moved. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Logistical reporting
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Reports submitted by battery operations centers (BOC) are not accurate.
DISCUSSION:
The
Administrative and Logistical Operations Center (ALOC) is not able to track
or project the battalion's logistical needs. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Battery
first sergeant approval of the LOGSTAT, prior to sending the report from the
battery to the ALOC, will minimize inaccurate reports and allow the battery
to receive proper supplies and repair parts in a timely manner, reducing the
need for emergency resupply.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Information flow and management
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Battle-tracking in the various command posts is insufficient.
DISCUSSION:
Friendly
unit locations are not normally updated and disseminated to subordinate companies.
Units habitually file critical information without any analysis or dissemination.
Most often the reason for this is the lack of a tactical operations center
standing operating procedure (TOCSOP) or the failure to follow an already existing
SOP.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Units
must develop a system for battle-tracking in the TOCSOP and properly train
their battle captains and NCOs in using critical documents. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Information management
OBSERVATION
(TF 3): Generally, battalions are challenged in information management.
DISCUSSION:
Each
staff section tends to not accurately depict or track critical, exceptional,
or routine information. The TOC must develop the appropriate information to
graphically display, at a minimum, critical or exceptional information. This
is the crucial information that achieves situational awareness for battle captains,
but most importantly allows battle-tracking, visual updates, and potential
decision points for the battalion commander. BOS integration and COA synchronization,
reporting and recording procedures, shift change and battlefield update briefs,
periodic review and update of CCIR, battle-tracking procedures, and definition
of duties and responsibilities for current operations and future operations
within the TOC are a few examples of tools that need development within the
TOC. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: The
commander should designate an information manager (battalion executive officer)
to outline and monitor the staff's performance and responsibilities in processing
information to support the operation and facilitate the commander's information
requirements. Review Annex I of FM
101-5, Staff
Organizations and Operations,
and
FM
101-5-1, Operational
Terms and Graphics.
(TA.4.1.2.4
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Mission analysis
OBSERVATION
(TF 1): The mission analysis process is only partially understood. As a result,
most battle staffs only "list" specified tasks (with little analysis of the
tasks) that are given to them from higher headquarters.
DISCUSSION:
What
results is a list of tasks rather than an analysis of those tasks that lead
to further defined tasks or missions. For example, the number of rounds available
or the CSR for a weapon system is usually quickly identified and listed on
a chart. The impact of these facts on the mission is seldom given a second
thought until too late in the planning process.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Commanders must do a better of job of time management or information management
will fail. 2.
Mission analysis must be more than a repetition of the brigade's specified
task list. 3.
The battalion commander's guidance must be strong and focused. (TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Aviation unit execution of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision-making process.
DISCUSSION:
Staffs
do not have a clear understanding of the MDMP and the linkage between the steps.
Often the commander is focused on other issues and the executive officer deals
predominately with logistical matters. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units must know FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations,
and
must understand how the separate staff sections participate in the planning
process. Home Station training is crucial in becoming proficient in the decision-making
process. 2.
Review CALL
Newsletter No. 95-12, Military
Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning,"
Update,
May
97. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Aviation task force integration
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Maneuver task force battle staffs lack proficiency in planning for
the doctrinal employment of aviation assets not assigned to the unit.
DISCUSSION:
Attack
battalions have difficulty in employing assault and heavy lift assets.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
A
solution to this problem is Home Station training and the use of aviation LNOs.
Commanders must ensure that their staff officers, including the LNOs, are intimately
familiar with all aviation doctrinal references, not just attack, cavalry,
or assault employment. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Use of aviation assets
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Due to the inexperience of the aviation liaison, many units do not
properly use aviation assets.
DISCUSSION:
The
aviation LNO advises the brigade commander on the use of aviation assets within
his task force (attack, assault, medium lift, and EW). Additionally, he coordinates
for other aviation assets (external to the TF) and assists in integrating them
into the fight. He typically manages A2C2 for the brigade and assists in the
management of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC assets. He performs "911" liaison with the aviation
task force when standby aircraft are needed, and assumes staff responsibility
for aviation risk management. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
liaison must be prepared to advise the commander on interpretations of weather,
fighter management, maintenance, and tactical employment of the aviation task
force. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Aviation integration in mission planning
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Aviation assets must become involved early in the infantry battalion's
planning process to affect a coordinated effort in search and attack.
DISCUSSION:
The
aviation unit can do several things to facilitate the planning effort. Establishing
command relationships ("OPCONing") is one method which forces involvement in
the infantry's planning process. Sending liaisons (LNOs) to the infantry tactical
operations center (TOC) is another method. The bottom line is that aviation
units need to have the ground scheme of maneuver and graphics to affect a coordinated
search and attack. The brigade targeting process begins 48 hours out, with
orders going to infantry battalions 24 hours out. The infantry battalions should
have targets planned for execution 12 hours prior to execution. The brigade
LNOs have the responsibility to pass information from the targeting meeting
to the aviation task force for future planning. The 24-hour "window" is where
aviation integration in the planning process needs to occur at the battalion
level. Knowing when the infantry will start point (SP), their target, their
composition, and their movement plan to the target are basic elements aircrews
need. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The aviation unit needs to mirror supporting graphics, frequencies, and rehearsed
battle drills. 2.
Once the aviation unit has this information, it can plan "zone reconnaissance"
to coincide with the infantry movement. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Battle staff experience
OBSERVATION
(TF 1): Typically, at least two (and usually more) primary staff positions
are filled with first lieutenants, and leaders from attach elements may not
be of the grade and experience required.
DISCUSSION:
Most
S-1s, S-4s, and assistant S-3s (as well as many of the personnel performing
duties as battle captain, signal officer [SIGO] day battle captain, chemical
officer [CHEMO] night) are not advanced course graduates. On the same note,
TF engineers, air defense officers, and, to a lesser degree, fire support officers
are trained to be leaders and not staff officers. These untrained but highly
motivated staff officers generally lack the technical foundation to perform
their duties to the highest standard. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
More experienced officers are needed on the battle staff. 2.
Commanders need to make better use of their battle captains. 3.
Battle staffs must do a better job of more detailed planning. 4.
Refer to FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Use of combat multipliers
OBSERVATION
(TF 1): Battalions, for the most part, aggressively use attack aviation, mechanized
and armor assets, and indirect fire during all phases. However, this was a
function of initiative and aggressive execution by commanders and forward observers
at all levels, not as a result of detailed planning.
DISCUSSION:
Because
of this lack of detailed planning, the use of these combat multipliers was
often delayed while fires were cleared, communications established, or appropriate
fire control measures delineated. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
See
TREND 14 above.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Staff knowledge and experience level
OBSERVATION
(TF 1): Even those staffs with a satisfactory understanding of the wargaming
process usually fail, not for a lack of understanding, but because they are
unprepared for the meeting itself.
1.
Units suffer from a lack of staff knowledge, experience, and education level.
2.
Units tend to wargame "best case" scenarios or the easy enemy.
3.
The synchronization matrix goes unused.
DISCUSSION:
"Gathering
the tools" is usually understood as "bringing a blank chart to the meeting."
Preparation of the staffs is usually nonexistent or overwhelmed by poor time
management. In no area is this lack of expertise and preparation in the "science
of war" more evident than in wargaming.
Synchronization
lies in the ability to accurately reduce battlefield activities and their effects
to specific time factors, and then successfully plan, schedule, and coordinate
these activities to occur at the desired time and place. To do this the staff
must specifically identify all critical battlefield activities across the BOS,
estimate time and distance factors for execution, and understand the mutually
supporting relationships among them. To effectively and efficiently execute
this, each staff officer must be an expert in his branch/operating system and
come to the targeting/wargaming session with a complete understanding of BOS
capabilities/limitations and the proper tools to determine/calculate task planning
factors. This is an extremely tall order for any staff; however, it becomes
even more challenging when the staff's only foundation is their LTP experience.
Most
units tend to underestimate the enemy's capabilities and often do not address
them correctly during the wargame. Units usually recognize that their wargaming
effort is poor; as a result, they end up disregarding the synchronization matrix
which is produced during the wargame. Often this synchronization tool has valuable
information that could be used to assist in writing the OPORD and in the actual
execution later. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
See
TREND 14 above.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Scout operations
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Scout operations are not fully integrated and synchronized when scouts
depart on a mission.
DISCUSSION:
Scouts
are executing operations that lack sufficient integration and synchronization
for successful mission accomplishment. Commonly neglected are detailed plans
for movement, fire support, casualty evacuation, and resupply. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The scout platoon leader must continually seek out the staff officer with scout
platoon tasking authority (normally the S-3, sometimes the S-2) for a FRAGO
or warning order. He must also continue coordination with the S-2 and S-3 as
products developed during the MDMP (battalion commander's R/S guidance, R/S
plan/matrix) affect the scout mission. 2.
In making a tentative plan, the scout platoon leader can use the estimate of
the situation process (found in FM
7-92, The
Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad [Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infanty])
to
decide on a course of action (COA) for the commander's approval. A useful tool
to present the COA to the S-3/battalion commander is a concept sketch (see
Chapter 2, FM
7-8,
Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad,
and Appendix G, FM
7-10, The
Infantry Rifle Company)
which includes the platoon's task and purpose, enemy situation, scheme of maneuver
(with graphic control measures), fires, and other pertinent data. Once approved,
this plan becomes the starting point for coordination, task organization, and
movement instructions and will provide more time for remaining TLPs. 3.
Scout leaders must know which staff officer with whom to coordinate support
(rehearsal areas, intelligence, operations, movement [air, truck, boat], adjacent
units, etc.). Platoon leaders can delegate coordination authority to subordinate
leaders. Checklists in Appendix D, FM
7-92,
or SH
21-76, Ranger
Handbook,
are
good references for platoon leaders to use when gathering/providing information
to/from the staff.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Battle rhythm
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Units do not establish a battle rhythm.
DISCUSSION:
Units
plan for the initial entry mission into the "box," then the tempo of the battle
grinds to a halt. Companies and platoons have two to three days of inactivity.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Refer
to "The Dying Art of Battle Rhythm" in CALL
CTC
Quarterly Bulletin No. 99-3,
Jan
99. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Using the wargame to synchronize the fight
OBSERVATION
( TF 3): Battalions have a difficult time wargaming.
DISCUSSION:
Many
problems that a battalion experiences during current operations should be detected
and planned for during a synchronized wargame. Staffs need to bring the right
tools and products to the planning table. Named area of interest (NAIs), target
areas of interest (TAI), and decision points (DP) need to be included in wargaming
products. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The intelligence officer must fight the combined arms fight and ensure that
the S-3 integrates the maneuver plan to address the enemy's most probable course
of action. 2.
Combat multipliers, such as Army attack aviation, Air Force close air support,
and the use of FASCAM, need to be included in the targeting process. 3.
Only through a synchronized wargame will the battalion integrate and synchronize
its operations in time and space with nested task and purpose to achieve the
effects of combat power at the decisive time and place. 4.
Review Chapter 5 of FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Course-of-action (COA) development
OBSERVATION
(TF 1): Units seldom follow doctrinal sequence in developing a course of action
(COA) and misuse targeting meetings.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Commanders and S-3s tend to draw boundaries first, then slice up their task
organization before determining the decisive point or the main effort. Hence,
the COAs are not nested within the battalion or the brigade except when it
comes to the one unit that is assigned the main effort. That unit's typical
COA is verbatim of the higher headquarters order. 2.
Tasks and purposes are assigned but often without regard to the main effort
or decisive point. Although the main effort may appear to be supporting the
higher commander's intent (and often is), supporting tasks and purposes are
seldom tied to their own main efforts. 3.
Units tend to replace the COA/MDMP process with the targeting meeting process.
The targeting meeting was never intended to replace the MDMP but only supplement
it. The D3A methodology is merely a useful paradigm that many units employ
during the LIC phase to complement the MDMP. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The staff should review Chapter 5 of FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations,
to
follow the correct sequencing for COA development in the MDMP. 2.
Review CALL
Newsletter No. 95-12, Military
Decision Making "Abbreviated Process,"
Update,
May
97. 3.
The targeting process supports the commander's concept of the operation (including
his scheme of maneuver and concept of fires) and requires an in-depth understanding
of the mission, commander's intent, enemy, area of operations, and capabilities
and limitations of sensors and attack systems. The targeting process is designed
to answer the question, "How can we best use our combat multipliers in this
operation?" Most units use it to ask the question, "What will our battalion
do tomorrow?" Units that use the targeting process to answer the latter end
up desynchronizing their efforts by creating separate fights and never identify
the decisive point, main effort, and supporting efforts. (TA.4.3.2
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
21
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures (TLP)
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Scout leaders are not using troop-leading procedures as a method to
receive, plan, and execute a mission.
DISCUSSION:
Scout
platoons are conducting sequential planning instead of parallel planning when
waiting for a formal FRAGO or warning order which leaves insufficient time
to execute TLPs. Scout platoon leaders are waiting for a completed plan from
higher headquarters which results in insufficient time to execute other steps
of TLPs. Lack of supervision is leading to missing mission essential equipment
(i.e., field expedient antennas), unrehearsed actions (i.e., loading and unloading
helicopters), and changes to initial coordination. 1.
Scout platoon leaders are not being proactive in receiving the mission. 2.
Platoon leaders are not making a tentative plan; instead they are waiting for
a completed plan from higher headquarters (battalion or brigade staff). 3.
Scout leaders are not conducting all of the necessary coordination with supporting
agencies' higher headquarters or adjacent units when completing the plan. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
FM
7-92, The
Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad,
states,
"TLPs should be an instinctive and familiar way of thinking for a leader."
2.
The scout platoon leader must continually seek out the staff officer with scout
platoon tasking authority (normally the S-3, sometimes the S-2) for a FRAGO
or warning order. He must also continue coordination with the S-2 and S-3 as
products developed during the MDMP (battalion commander R/S guidance, R/S plan/matrix)
affect the scout mission. 3.
In making a tentative plan, the scout platoon leader can use the estimate of
the situation process (found in FM
7-92, The
Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad [Airborne, Air Assualt, Light Infantry]),
to decide on a course of action (COA) for the commander's approval. A useful
tool to present the COA to the S-3/battalion commander is a concept sketch
(shown in Chapter 2, FM
7-8, Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad,
and
Appendix G, FM
7-10, The
Infantry Rifle Company)
which includes the platoon's task and purpose, enemy situation, scheme of maneuver
(with graphic control measures), fires, and other pertinent data. Once approved,
this plan becomes the starting point for coordination, task organization, and
movement instructions and will provide more time for remaining TLPs.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
22
SUBJECT:
Battle staff planning and mission analysis
OBSERVATION
( TF 1): Units normally have a functional and published battle rhythm; unfortunately,
most battalions do not effectively enforce it.
DISCUSSION:
Without
a well-understood and rigidily enforced time management system, orders are
not developed and communicated to subordinate units in a timely manner or in
sufficient detail. Scheduled staff and commander updates are often not consistent,
resulting in confusion among the staff. The staff struggles to stay abreast
of current operations and finds it difficult to synchronize future operations.
1.
Poor time management. 2.
Units slow to get on their battle rhythm. 3.
Mission analysis is a regurgitation of the brigade's "specified" task list.
4.
Battalion commander's guidance is stronger and more focused. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Battalion commanders, as a result of inexperienced staffs, have to produce
a much more detailed and focused commander's guidance and course of action.
2.
The staff should review Chapter 5 of FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations,
to
assist the battalion commander in mission analysis and in the further development
of his plan. 3.
Another good reference is CALL
Newsletter No. 95-12, Military
Decision Making "Abbreviated Process,"
Update,
May
97. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Units)
TREND
23
SUBJECT:
Pre-combat inspections
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Lack of supervision.
DISCUSSION:
There
is a lack of supervision leading to missing mission essential equipment (including
field expedient antennas), unrehearsed actions (including loading and unloading
helicopters), and changes to initial coordination. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
unit SOP should be detailed and thorough in dealing with required pre-combat
inspections for any mission-specific items. (TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
24
SUBJECT:
Developing plans for aircraft use
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Scout platoon leaders are not proficient at developing landing plans,
air movement plans, loading plans, or staging plans.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Scouts are passive passengers on aircraft. They are unaware of the aircraft
approach and departure directions on the LZ; flight routes, location of checkpoints,
SPs, and RPs; load procedures; or manifesting. 2.
Scouts are not proficient in using aircraft seatbelts, weapon orientation,
"lock and load" procedures, and securing radio antennas. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Use planning guidelines and checklists found in FM
7-92, The
Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry),
and FM
90-4, Air
Assault Operations.
2.
Conduct static load training. If possible, plan transportation to the aviation
assembly area to conduct rehearsals with the crew flying the mission. (TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
25
SUBJECT:
Platoon planning for actions on contact
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Enemy forces are consistently escaping with few casualties while friendly
forces are sustaining casualties in a majority of platoon-level actions on
contact.
DISCUSSION:
Leaders
are hesitant to re-position soldiers to improve the effectiveness of their
weapons or to seek better cover and concealment. Units fail to plan for or
rehearse actions on contact prior to mission execution. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Review ARTEP
7-8, Drill.
2.
Review FM
7-8, Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad.
3.
Reference CALL
NTC
Trends Compendium No. 97-17,
"Actions
on Contact." 4.
Conduct OPD/NCOPDs on movement-to-contact, attack, rehearsals, IPB, task and
purpose, defense, combined arms, and OPORDs. 5.
Use tactical exercises without troops (TWET), sand tables, and "What Now?"
leader exercises. (TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
26
SUBJECT:
Planning
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Commanders do not have a clear understanding of the "aviation tasks"
necessary to support a search and attack mission.
DISCUSSION:
Often
the mission translated at the troop level is to "conduct a search and attack,"
which does not equate in common terms that an aviator can understand. In other
words, "conduct a zone reconnaissance from this PL to this PL oriented on finding
the enemy" makes more sense to aircrews. More often than not, the aircrews
launch with the following guidance: "Conduct search and attack vicinity the
brigade TOC," or "Sweep the area around the BSA." This results in aircrews
flying around an area with no methodical search techniques to ensure a systematic
movement through a specified zone. Aircrews end up conducting "911" missions
with no pre-planned integration with ground units. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Using aviation missions will facilitate the planning necessary for search and
attack. Telling a crew to plan a zone reconnaissance within specified boundaries
will force them to plan the aviation tasks necessary to recon the zone in a
methodical method. 2.
Aviation units can also expect to perform area reconnaissance and hasty attacks
during search and attack operations. (TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
27
SUBJECT:
Rehearsals
OBSERVATION
(TF 1): Most units tend to conduct "oversized" terrain model or rock drill
backbriefs rather than rehearsals.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Most units do not do very well on backbriefs and confirmation briefs at all
levels. Unfortunately, this trend bleeds into "rehearsals" as well. When conducting
rehearsals, most units do not show or capture the relationship between where
one unit is on the ground to another in a given time or space. One unit simply
backbriefs its plan and then another unit briefs, never truly showing the relationship
between them. 2.
Companies seldom conduct full-scale rehearsals. Often even "routine" activities,
such as detrucking, will go unrehearsed at the company level and become a problem
area for the unit during execution. Most full-scale rehearsals occur at the
platoon level or lower. PCIs as well are seldom conducted above platoon level.
This becomes apparent when breaching kits and marking equipment maintained
at company level are not inspected, properly assigned, or available during
execution. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Most units understand not to get "caught up in a wargame" during rehearsals,
but they tend to gloss over templated or known enemy locations. Commanders
and subordinates, therefore, are not prepared to make contact at given locations.
2.
Full-scale rehearsals are essential in providing the commander and his subordinates
with the opportunity to practice actions on contact and movement techniques,
and allow commanders at all levels to understand their relationship to other
units in the plan. (TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
28
SUBJECT:
Timely development and dissemination of fire support plans from brigade to
battalions
OBSERVATION
(FS DIV): Brigade fire support officers (FSOs) are failing to develop required
fire support products and disseminate them to subordinates early enough to
facilitate the synchronization of maneuver with fire support at the battalion
level.
DISCUSSION:
Battalion
FSOs are forced to develop fire support plans without consideration of all
vital sets of information required (commander's intent or scheme of maneuver,
METT-T, and guidance from higher FA headquarters). Due to a lack of guidance
from higher headquarters, battalions are unaware of the responsibilities that
may have been assigned by brigade, and do not fully understand the commander's
intent and concept of fires. The end product is a fire support plan that is
not coordinated or integrated and results in an unsynchronized execution that
fails to optimize combat power. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Ensure fire support products are developed in time to be included in the corresponding
brigade fragmentary order (FRAGO). 2.
Brigade fire support officers must fully understand fire support planning considerations
as outlined in FM
6-20-40, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy),
and
FM
6-20-50, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Light).
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
29
SUBJECT:
Feedback in planning
OBSERVATION
(TF 2): Scout leaders are not using backbriefs, rehearsals, inspections, and
continuous coordination to supervise
and
refine TLPs.
DISCUSSION:
Scout
platoon leaders are not being proactive in receiving the mission. Platoon leaders
are not making a tentative plan; instead they are waiting for a completed plan
from higher headquarters (battalion or brigade staff). Scout leaders are not
conducting all of the necessary coordination with supporting agencies' higher
headquarters or adjacent units when completing the plan. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Platoon leaders should delegate coordination authority to subordinate leaders.
Checklists in Appendix D, FM
7-92, The
Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry),
or SH
21-76, Ranger
Handbook,
are
good references for platoon leaders to use when gathering/providing information
from/to the staff. 2.
Leaders must conduct a hands-on inspection of equipment. 3.
Rehearsals (map, sand table, key leader, full force) must be conducted and
tailored to the amount of time available. Because the scout platoon will normally
be conducting parallel planning with the battalion's MDMP, there must be continuous
coordination since changes will occur after the initial coordination. (TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
30
SUBJECT:
Unified maintenance
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Maintenance units have difficulty understanding the concept of maintenance
in operations other than war.
DISCUSSION:
One
AVUM is assigned responsibility in the OPORD for task force maintenance for
all attached assets. In a normal rotation, this generally will include three
to four different types of airframes. Most AVUMs have difficulty unifying the
maintenance effort, which results in poor status reporting to the task force
commander and, in most instances, higher not mission capable maintenance (NMCM)
and not mission capable supply (NMCS) rates. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The task force commander should unify the maintenance effort by attaching maintenance
test pilots, mechanics, and technical inspectors for each type of airframe
to the AVUM. The AVUM is delegated the responsibility for maintenance operations
IAW the TF OPORD. (TA.4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support)
TREND
31
SUBJECT:
Commanders' circulation of the battlefield (battalion and company)
OBSERVATION
(TF 1): Commanders' circulation of the battlefield fluctuates from either very
good to none at all, with the trend being towards the latter.
DISCUSSION:
Many
commanders do not plan or do not make time to circulate the battlefield. Some
commanders overestimate the enemy's minefield capabilities. Company commanders
often wait for the battalion commander to come down, or conduct troop of the
line just before the commander arrives. Unit commanders seldom attend subordinate
OPORDS or rehearsals. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
To
be effective, commanders must be at critical places on the battlefield at critical
times. Planning and coordination are crucial to mission success. (TA.4.4.3
Provide Command Presence)
TREND
32
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures and battle rhythm
OBSERVATION
(TF 3): Battalion staffs have difficulty developing a battle rhythm that is
synchronized with both the brigade and their own maneuver companies.
DISCUSSION:
Battalion
staffs focus well on operations 24 hours out, but fail to continue troop-leading
procedures after the I/O synchronization meeting. Commanders' backbriefs, if
conducted at all, lack the attention to detail required to synchronize the
battalion fight. Company commanders seldom bring the correct tools to the table
and delay the backbrief process. This results in a de-synched course of action
and failure by the commanders to gain a clear visualization of the battalion
scheme of maneuver, task and purpose, and the enemy order of battle. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Staffs
need to review Chapter 5 of FM
6-20-10, Techniques
and Procedures for the Targeting Process.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
TREND
33
SUBJECT:
Mission projection
OBSERVATION
(AV DIV): Mission projection is difficult for units at company level.
DISCUSSION:
Typical
missions, such as CASEVAC and CSS, are often passed to assault companies within
one hour of execution, which results in crews flying a mission without proper
preparation. Normally crews sacrifice an update on the enemy and friendly situation
to ensure they meet critical time requirements. Standby crews often fail to
PCI aircraft or receive updates prior to assuming standby status. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Ensure that the proper level of command emphasizes to aircrews the importance
of conducting preflight preparation, pre-combat inspections (PCI), and S-2/S-3
update briefings prior to assuming their shifts. 2.
With minimal effort, commanders can adjust duty periods for crews which allow
preflight preparation to occur and still remain within the fighter management
cycle. (TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
TREND
34
SUBJECT:
CSS synchronization
OBSERVATION
(CSS DIV): Forward support battalions (FSB) continue to experience problems
in CSS synchronization.
DISCUSSION:
Battalions
need to improve sustained logistical support to the brigade in the following
areas: casualty evacuation planning and execution, logistical battle-tracking
and synchronization, and force protection measures. Although the battalion's
published battle rhythm included a daily logistical synchronization meeting,
it rarely occurred and never involved all necessary players. As a result, CSS
operations became reactive rather than proactive and focused on current operations
rather than future operations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Each staff section must develop an internal SOP that includes a battle rhythm,
shift considerations, reporting procedures, and detailed duties for each soldier.
2.
Additionally, the use of maps with CSS and CHS overlays, as well as updated
stock status and significant activities charts, will greatly improve the ability
to focus on future operations.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND
35
SUBJECT:
Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE)
OBSERVATION
(TF 3): Overall, battalions execute tasks well at the individual and collective
level. Battalion battle staffs should not overlook the use of doctrinal tools
for coordination, integration, and synchronization.
DISCUSSION:
Specifically,
the processes and doctrinal tools normally used during conventional combat
operations are not used. Whether it is developing the Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlefield (IBP) (using FM
34-130,
Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield,
or
FM
6-20-10, Information
Operations/Targeting)
or achieving synchronization (through FM
101-5, The
Military Decision-Making Process).
In general, battalion battle staffs need to possess a solid understanding of
the Information Operations (IO) Targeting Process. The purpose of the IO meeting
is the production of the IO/Targeting Synchronization Matrix. The battle staff
then recommends high-payoff targets (HPT) for the commander's approval and
receives his guidance. Following the commander's guidance, the staff conducts
a synchronization wargame. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The staff should review FM
34-130.
2.
Reference Chapter 5 of FM
6-20-10.
3.
Reference Chapter 5 of FM
101-5.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS
Acknowledgements
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