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Military

INTRODUCTION

Foreword
Table of Contents
Chapter 1:  Doctrinal Update

This newsletter provides a guide to maneuver commanders and their staffs on the importance and conduct of combined arms breaching operations. The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) have tracked negative trends for years to highlight areas in our Army's training that requires more focus. One such area is Combined Arms Obstacle Breaching. This newsletter is designed to assist commanders in reversal of this negative trend by providing units with the tools needed to successfully plan, prepare, and execute combined arms task force and brigade-level breaching operations. A Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) was established as part of a focused rotation to conduct a detailed analysis of the problem and recommend solutions. This entailed an analysis of the Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Material, and Soldiers (DTLOMS) and the training of a unit from home station through completion of a CTC rotation. The following narrative outlines the activities and findings of the CAAT over the past seven months.

1. DTLOMS Review.

A. Doctrine - (Green). FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, May 93, was reviewed and used as the basis for observation and development of a collection plan used for the focused rotation. The doctrine proved to be sound. However, the articles within this newsletter are based on the updated doctrine, FM 3-34.2, Combined-Arms Breaching Operations, 31 August 2000. The key changes to the current doctrine are that we no longer have the distinction between in-stride versus deliberate breach, and the breaching fundamentals now have "assault" added to "suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce" (SOSRA). Chapter 1 discusses the doctrine required for combined arms obstacle breaching in more detail.

B. Training - (Red). Soldiers and units typically know their individual parts, but fail at synchronization. Consistent and rigorous combined arms training, including rehearsals, at home station is the key to successful breaching operations. Training is the primary focus of this newsletter.

C. Leader Development - (Amber). Breaching doctrine is taught to our leaders, but more time needs to be devoted to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) at all branch schools (Forts Benning, Knox, Sill, Leonard Wood). In addition, we need to emphasize combined arms breaching operations at higher levels such as the Leader Training Program (LTP) at the CTCs, CGSC, and Pre-Command Courses. We must take every opportunity to train our leaders on current and emerging doctrine, organizations, and techniques.

D. Organization - (Amber). With the reduction of maneuver companies within the task force, we must look at additional ways to organize our forces for the breach. This newsletter addresses both traditional forms of organization as well as some newer methods.

E. Materiel - (Amber). Although we currently have methods and systems capable of breaching, procurement efforts are under way to develop and field new systems that will improve reduction capabilities within the breach force. Grizzly and Wolverine remain high on the priority list for procurement to fill an existing gap in breaching capability.

F. Soldiers - (Green). Squad- and crew-level proficiency in breach drills remains a strength. We need to continue to train the individual and collective tasks so that soldiers remain proficient.

2. Home-Station Training. Chapter 2 discusses a generic training plan for home station and some of the common faults associated with the training. Although there are other DTLOMS areas that need improvement, home-station training is the area that needs the most focus and is the easiest to fix in a short-term period. The paradox is that it seems easy, but for years it has been difficult to achieve. Since MTOE unit manning has been at the 80-percent level and soldiers have been deployed for missions short of war, leaders have not had the time, the money, or the maneuver area to adequately train. The tenets of Army training outlined in FM 25-100 and 25-101 still apply.

3. Collection Plan Development. The collection plan used during the focused rotation has been modified based on the current doctrine in FM 3-34.2 to make a Training Assessment Checklist (TAC) (See Appendix A). The TAC provides units with a tool to assist in the training assessment of their units.

4. NTC Observations. The CAAT gathered observations during a National Training Center (NTC) Focused Rotation as part of the Trends Reversal Program. A significant number of lessons learned were captured from this exercise. It is important to note that the rotation observed involved a heavy mechanized force. However, the lessons learned can be applied to the entire force. The CAAT saw some positive areas and some that need improvement. The CAAT concluded that:

D The combined arms breaching doctrine is sound.
T Combined arms training at home station provides the best opportunity to reverse the negative trend associated with combined arms breaching operations. Realistic combined arms training for TOE units at home station remains our greatest challenge.
L Leader development can be improved upon at branch schools, LTP, CGSC, PCC, and at the unit level. Leaders must train and rehearse combined arms breaching operations through aggressive unit-level OPD/NCOPDs and exercises.
O It is important to task-organize to support the mission(s) at hand. Execution must be based on the breach tenets. We must look at newer techniques of organization and not get stuck in the past.
M Materiel changes/improvements must continue to take full advantage of technological advances. However, the use of current TTPs, training, and the proper application of breaching tenants allows mission accomplishment.
S Soldiers remain our greatest assets and, therefore, demand tough, realistic training that ensures proficiency at the individual, squad and crew levels.

5. Focused Rotation Lessons Learned. The CAAT must be integrated early at home-station training as a full combined arms team. A large combined arms team that can gather observations and assist the unit during home-station training is better utilized than using a large team at the CTCs. The CTCs already employ a dedicated, competent, and trained group of observer/controllers with the primary mission of gathering observations for feedback.

Foreword
Table of Contents
Chapter 1:  Doctrinal Update



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