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Adaptive Leaders and the IBCT -- Initiative Within Intent

by MAJ Brad C. Dostal, Military Analyst, CALL

Adaptive Leaders -- A Mandate for Change

In October 1999, as Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced his vision for transforming the U.S. Army in the coming decade, it was clear that significant changes to doctrine, organization, and personnel would follow. An aspect less evident, but no less important, is the far-reaching impact transformation has on leadership and its functions within our conventional forces. Coupled with this transformation of unit structure and operational capabilities, is a need for change in the manner which our leaders operate at unit level. The Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) design parameters demand that this takes place, as subordinate units now execute missions in a dynamic environment where aspects of the entire spectrum of warfare can be experienced daily.

To effectively lead an organization able to accomplish missions as diverse as those stated in the IBCT Organizational and Operational (O&O) Concept, Army senior leaders are challenged with developing a leader-training concept able to more effectively meet the dynamic requirements placed on the tactical leaders of the IBCT. The Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army, clearly defined this need following the announcement of the Army's transformation in October of 1999 when he stated, "We are working on producing leaders for change, not just leaders who are doctrinally capable and competent leaders for warfighting, but leaders also for all kinds of missions with the capability to deal with an evolving global situation in which the array of threats faced goes across the entire spectrum."1The Army has since established adaptability as an essential competency for its leaders of the 21st Century as they execute operations in highly complex environments predicted in future conflict. This desired adaptability has been further refined into a distinct requirement for all Army leaders, hence giving rise to the term "adaptive leader."

To meet the challenges of building adaptive leadership skills in the IBCT, the Army recently began an aggressive program of leader training developed by TRADOC. The program includes the Senior Leader's Course (SLC), Tactical Leader's Course (TLC), and other follow-on sustainment training programs covering leadership. The SLC is conducted at various installations and culminates in a weeklong exercise at Fort Leavenworth, KS, where leaders are faced with simulation scenarios requiring them to conduct decision-making processes while integrating situational understanding with the new technologies and enhanced capabilities of the IBCT. The TLC follows the SLC, where the focus shifts to the leaders at the battalion level, covering the capabilities of the unit, and how it fights at the tactical level. Upon completion of these courses, which have significant participation from various schools including Infantry, Armor, Intelligence, and Logistics, IBCT leaders gain the basis of knowledge required to operate more successfully with a thorough understanding of the operational capabilities and constraints of the IBCT.2

This article focuses on two portions of this ongoing adaptive leader training process, the Senior Leader's Course capstone exercise conducted at Fort Leavenworth, and the first iteration of adaptive leader vignette training conducted at Fort Lewis, WA. Both of these training events are key components of the adaptive leader training program begun in the IBCT last summer, and will be executed again in the future as more units begin transformation. Military analysts from CALL attended both of these sessions, gathering data, and conducting interviews of participants. By sharing the lessons learned during these events, and discussing general observations of adaptive leader theory from the perspective of different leaders, this emerging and vital aspect of our transformational Army doctrine will be better understood and applied.

Senior Leader's Course -- Adaptive Leader Introduction

The Senior Leader's Course spearheaded the adaptive leader training within the IBCT. The six-week course is carried out in six different locations with varying foci as follows: Fort Lewis, WA -- Introduction and Overview; Fort Lee, VA -- Combat Service Support (CSS); Fort Huachuca, AZ -- Intelligence; Fort Knox, KY -- Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA); Fort Benning, GA, -- Maneuver; and Fort Leavenworth, KS -- Capstone Exercise. Throughout the training conducted during the sessions at each location "adaptive thinking" and "adaptive leadership" is a common component. The importance of adaptive thinking throughout the SLC is best defined by COL Kevin Benson, Deputy Commander, Brigade Coordination Cell, when he said, "The only constants I've known in the Army is that personal leadership is always required, and change is constant."3The key objective of the SLC prepares leaders to meet with and succeed in the face of the element of constant change by "introducing adaptive thinking exercises.to stretch commanders and staff in a dynamic environment."4

The SLC meets the objective of fostering multi-dimensional thinking through the deliberate practice of applying adaptive techniques to problemsolving, and the practice of assigning mentors and subject matter experts (SMEs) with key leaders. It is anticipated that through this process, adaptive leader traits (as shown in Figure 1) can be fostered and enhanced during the training. During the Capstone exercise, leaders are given methodologies for "how to think" in a more multidimensional manner. Much of this relates directly to the actions of leaders in a digital environment. The training is focused on the leader's ability to process and use the multitude of information available on ABCS to increase situational understanding. The presence of mentors and SMEs is key to this process during the SLC. The mentors are critical because they assist participants in thinking on several levels, considering both multiple actions and expected results. The extra depth provided by the mentors increases the overall quality of the SLC by supplying the IBCT leadership an easily accessible base of knowledge and additional experience to expand the adaptive thinking process.

Senior Leader's Course -- Adaptive Leaders in Action

The primary event of the SLC Capstone exercise is a brigade simulation exercise conducted in the operational environment of Kosovo. The mission involves elements of the brigade securing an area including two major Lines of Communication (LOCs), while preparing to defend against a threat force armed with Soviet-era armor and mechanized equipment. The brigade staff executes mission planning and C2for the exercise, with the battalion staffs responsible for providing appropriate subordinate unit feedback into the simulation systems. JANUS is used as the simulations tool providing invaluable feedback at the operational and tactical level to all components of the brigade staff. Actual Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) are not used for the exercise, but instead, the capabilities of the systems are built into the simulation using "white box" technology.5 Permanent party personnel man JANUS terminals with input provided by the battalion staff elements to provide maximum realism for the brigade.

Staff personnel at Fort Leavenworth assist the unit in conducting the simulation in many ways. Operators familiar with the ABCS suite functions are provided and are responsible for entering data into the system unit operators would normally do. Contractors are assigned to ensure the proper functionality of the simulations suite, and provide valuable insight to IBCT commanders and staff on the functionality of the simulation. Lastly, and most important to the process of adaptive thinking are the mentors. These consist of personnel specifically designated to assist the senior commanders in developing techniques to conduct mission analysis and in exercising C2in the digital environment. All of these exercise support personnel are of great value to the unit, as they allow the unit to focus on the theory and practice of adaptive processes, and not get bogged down in the simulation.

Army Battle Command Systems -- Tools for Adaptive Thought

During the SLC, many tools are provided to the IBCT leaders to facilitate adaptive thought in the digital environment. One of these tools is the "whiteboard" capability of the MCS system.6 The brigade staff uses the whiteboard capabilities of the MCS system to demonstrate new techniques for staff planning in a digital environment. One specific example coincided with the critical exchange of information following events triggering significant changes to the current plan during the simulation. The brigade commander needed to maneuver a force to protect his flank from a recent movement by the enemy forces. Following input from the S2 and S3, the brigade commander developed a tentative Course of Action (COA) sketch with a commander's intent statement on the whiteboard. He then communicated with subordinates, discussing his thoughts and requesting feedback. A brief discussion took place via FM to ensure the COA was supportable by all. The brigade commander then gave the word to execute, and forces began moving against the enemy threat.

Upon completion of the exercise, the unit discusses the method it used to decide on the COA. All participants agreed that the sketch on the whiteboard helped to visualize what the commander was thinking. Once the sketch and commander's intent appears on the whiteboard, subordinate staffs can work to determine if it was supportable before and during the brigade commander's huddle on the net with battalion commanders. While the commanders are sharing information via FM, the XOs/S3s are getting the word out. Prior to the end of the FM huddle, most staff directors are returning to their boss with a tentative "thumbs-up" of the staff's initial analysis. These actions are clearly the beginnings of adaptive leadership in action during the SLC.

Another valuable trait developed during the SLC is an appreciation of situational awareness and why it is so critical for success in a digital brigade. In fact, many involved in the process of transformation see "situational awareness and understanding" as the single most important combat multiplier of the IBCT organization. When asked to state the defining characteristic of the IBCT, BG Paul Eaton, Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, TRADOC, stated, "It's about situational awareness.producing an outfit that is a full spectrum-capable and tremendously adaptive combined arms organization."7It is evident then that a grasp of situational awareness and corresponding situational understanding is clearly desirable in all adaptive leaders.

The term situational awareness is discussed at nearly every event and After-Action Review (AAR) during the SLC. The focal point for SA is the Common Operational Picture (COP), also known as the Common Tactical Picture (CTP). This is the view shown on the MCS for use by commanders and staff at all levels. At one point during the exercise, the senior mentor stopped the staff and asked leaders at different levels to describe what SA meant to them. It then hit home to all that the situational awareness they all had been using as a point of reference may not have been the same. It became evident that different sections were focused on their own "piece of the pie" within the framework of SA, thereby, at times not seeing the total COP. When this happens, situational understanding is not gained, since the collective picture is not being studied.

The communications and messaging systems available in the ABCS suite are also tools that provided valuable advantages to the adaptive leader processes trained during the SLC, enhancing information flow and situational awareness at all levels. The brigade simulation reinforces the importance of managing and processing the information available on the systems. The amount of information available to commanders and staff quickly overwhelms even the best of staffs. Procedures to manage communications and facilitate critical information flow are soon recognized as vital. During the early portion of the exercise, the brigade staff at all levels became engulfed by information from radio traffic and digital All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) feed.8 Dozens of digital messages were sent to subordinates, with no receipt verification plan in place. Although this was one area that the unit was not able to resolve during the SLC Capstone exercise, unit personnel clearly gained an understanding of the importance of digital message management of C2in the IBCT, and began to develop techniques to resolve the issue.

Senior Leader's Course -- Lessons Learned

Whiteboard Utilization -- During the SLC, there were many lessons learned relating to the practice of adaptive leader theory within the IBCT and the digital tools used to facilitate the process. One key lesson is in the understanding of the value of the whiteboard, as it allows the commander to share his vision of the battle with his subordinates in "real time," even if they are not collocated. Staff procedures and mission planning doctrine must take into account this new technology. It gives the commander a means by which he can quickly share his vision, build consensus, and begin execution. This allows the commander to capitalize on new information and act on it in a more dynamic fashion. The technique of sharing a potential COAs early on the whiteboard is useful since it gives the subordinates a start point to begin with in their planning. Parallel planning in the digital arena takes place at a much faster pace, and the commander must disseminate his intent early to allow subordinate units to continue to plan successfully. The effects of these techniques must be considered when developing doctrine for the IBCT. The impact of digitalization on the military decision-making process is significant. To gain an advantage from the digital systems, commanders and staffs must be able to not only see the current picture, but also to act on it in a timely manner as well.

Situational Awareness -- The focus on the topic of situational awareness (SA) and situational understanding (SU) is one of the value-added components of the SLC. Leaders and staff officers at all levels learn the importance of identifying the elements key to SA and standardizing the methods and inputs provided by all. Once all leaders understand the elements necessary to develop SA leading to solid SU, an accurate Common Operational Picture (COP) is better maintained. Many methods for building good SA through the COP are presented during the SLC. The use of mechanical filters is one of them. Unit locations on the MCS can be viewed with battalion, company, or platoon icons. The brigade staff may want to implement a policy of no icons below company level, to keep the COP less cluttered and clearer. Planners need to see the level most applicable to them, but at the same time understand others are not seeing the exact same screen. The brigade commander can look at company icons, while the battalion commander views platoon icons, thereby giving each a more applicable perspective. Another factor to consider is the management of the COP by the staff at each level. There must be a timely process for staff functional areas to update their input to the COP screen. Someone on the staff must be designated to ensure input is current and that the commander's guidance is incorporated into the information. The physical layout of the viewing screen is also important. It should be next to a communications suite and available at all times for the commander and staff to view.

Message Management -- Solutions to challenging TOC communications and messaging procedures within a digital organization are also shared during the SLC AARs. One key to message traffic management is the prioritization of messages. Units must have strict rules for users to follow as they categorize and send messages. By deciding ahead of time which messages are to be categorized as routine, priority, or immediate, messages will be read and acted upon by personnel in an appropriate and timely manner. The issue of sheer information volume is one of the most difficult issues to solve in the digital environment. One option to resolve this issue is the designation of an information management officer, not currently included in the IBCT O&O. This person would review and collate information from different systems and ensure its applicability and necessity to the COP. Of course the S2, S3, and S4 are chartered to do this at their level, but a collective effort completed within the operations cell should be considered. Video Teleconferencing (VTC) is another tool available to improve information clarity. The prioritization of the VTC capability with the main effort is a way to ensure the technology is available where the commander needs it most.

Senior Leader's Course - Conclusions

The Senior Leader's Course Capstone Exercise is successful in demonstrating the specific tools available to the leaders of the IBCT to build flexibility and adaptability into operational planning and execution. Overall, the use of JANUS as a simulation suite for the exercise is positive. It provides the brigade staff with realistic tactical operational data to execute planning as required. The only drawback is the requirement to utilize maneuver battalion staffs to provide the simulation data feed, which limits their ability to participate in the larger ABCS play of the exercise. Although this provides realistic play for the brigade, it takes all commanders and staff of the maneuver battalions out of the true digital play and relegates them to conduct analog operations for input to JANUS. The advantage is the high quality input to the brigade staff; however, the disadvantage is the lack of ABCS hands-on for the battalions. However, this does not negatively impact the simulation since the intent is to build operational knowledge of the capabilities of the unit in the simulation, not to train on ABCS.

During the SLC Capstone Exercise, the brigade made great gains in learning the employment of the maneuver battalions, and the components unique to the IBCT organization. The exercise allows the battalion staff to practice the tactical employment of their forces in the complete spectrum of warfare, from Stability and Support Operations (SASO) to a Major Theater of War (MTW) environment as the simulation pits the deployed brigade against a mounting force of hostile armor and mechanized forces. The significant challenge poised by these formidable enemy forces raises the awareness of adaptive thought at all levels in the brigade. At the end of the SLC Capstone Exercise, the brigade leaders are clearly gaining an appreciation for the value of adaptive leadership within the dynamic operational environment of the IBCT.

Leader Vignettes --A Method for Change

To maintain the initiative of adaptive leader training within the IBCT, a series of training vignettes was developed as part of the sustainment-training package for the ongoing efforts of developing adaptive leaders in the IBCT. This part of the leader training model is named the "Adaptive Leader Vignette" training program. The goal of the program is to reinforce many of the concepts presented in the IBCT O&O. One concept of great importance is to replicate a situation where the operational environment of the unit places great demands on leaders to think and decide under ambiguous circumstances while executing initiative within the commander's intent. This key aspect of the leader vignette training program was made clear by Major General James Dubik, Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, when he stated, "The leader development program was developed from several aspects of the Operational and Organizational concept. One, the requirement for full spectrum warfare, two, the requirement for decentralized and dispersed operations, and three, the operational speed required of the unit. When you add these three things together, you realize leaders have to be more comfortable with ambiguity and more confident in knowing how to make decisions on their own."9

The leader vignettes originated from the desire expressed in senior planners of the IBCT leadership development program to develop a more structured program for leader development in units, one that could become the long-term pillar of adaptive leader training. Major General James Dubik clarified this vision during an interview by stating, "We wanted to create a series of experiences that leaders could learn from while learning with other leaders.We wanted an approach that would be structured and scheduled, and executed quarterly within the brigade."10The experiences are gained through the collective problemsolving of brigade-, battalion-, and company-level scenarios focusing on the four leader skills of interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical as defined in FM 22-100.11 By focusing on these skills, General Dubik strongly believes junior commanders will, "...start learning how the brigade commander thinks, understand how to solve brigade-level problems while focused on the doctrine of FM 22-100, and begin talking about key behaviors and values."12

Figure 2

The vignettes were developed IAW the guidelines of TRADOC under the supervision of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort Leavenworth. The vignettes are meant to facilitate training of junior leaders by providing situations, focusing on some of the problems their senior leaders may face during operations. By working through the problem, providing potential solutions, and then discussing the results with senior commanders, junior leaders gain a better understanding of their superior's decision-making processes, and valuable insight into how their commander thinks. With this better understanding of how the "boss thinks," junior leaders can build the skill set needed to meet the commander's intent. These skills are critical during times when additional guidance from senior commanders beyond the initial commanders intent is impractical or impossible based on the nature of decentralized operations and requirement for the increased timeliness of decisions within the IBCT.

The training concept for the vignettes is straightforward, with each scenario developed as a stand-alone product. The training is conducted at unit level, with the appropriate leaders facilitating the discussion. The goal is to conduct one week of training every quarter, with each week of training divided into brigade-, battalion- or squadron-, company- or troop-, and platoon-level training, as shown in Figure 2. The scenarios provide leaders with a choice of vignettes targeting the four critical leader skills required of competent leaders as defined in FM 22-100: interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical (see Figure 3). The importance of these leader skills was summed up best in a timeless statement by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, "The American soldier. demands professional competence in his leaders. In battle, he wants to know that the job is going to be done right, with no unnecessary casualties. The noncommissioned officer wearing the chevron is supposed to be the best soldier in the platoon and he is supposed to know how to perform all the duties expected of him. The American soldier expects his sergeant to be able to teach him how to do his job. And he expects even more of his officers."13

Figure 3

The leader facilitating the program chooses an area most comfortable to begin training, and then branches out into the more ambiguous topics presented in the vignettes, covering all of the leader competencies. Through the execution of the vignette training, it is anticipated that IBCT leaders can more effectively build this critical skill set through the process of thinking two levels up, exercising initiative within intent, and thinking "out of the box," as the vignettes are designed to lead to all of these actions from participants during the conduct of the training. Military analysts from CALL observed the training to assess these objectives, as well as the overall effectiveness of the program.

Adaptive Leader Training -- Putting Theory into Practice

The brigade commander led the first day's training, executing the event in a manner similar to a mission analysis session in a battalion or brigade plans cell during an exercise. The brigade used a vignette covering the deployment of the IBCT as part of a multi-national force to the port of Djibouti, Africa. The situation is one that has grown critical due to terrorist attacks in major cities throughout Djibouti, and the growing civil unrest related to these attacks. Based on a request from the host nation, the IBCT has been brought in to present a show of force that demonstrates U.S. and multi-nationals resolve to stabilize the situation and maintain friendly strategic control of the Suez Canal (see Enclosure 1 to view the vignette). A handout of the vignette is given to all participants, with a copy of a situational summary of the vignette. The brigade commander provides an overview of the scenario, and his expectations for the activity. Key to his remarks was his guidance that there is no "school solution," and that all participants determine a COA with the information provided, even if limited. The brigade commander clearly knew good leaders would want as much information as possible, and wanted to ensure that subordinates understood a decision on a recommended COA was necessary to facilitate a successful training event.

The brigade staff provided additional information, beyond what was included in the packets, to the leaders participating in the training. This information included a specific mission statement for the scenario, additional maps/graphical portrayals of the objective area, and a detailed summary of the political, economic, and military characteristics of Djibouti, the location of the vignette being trained. Providing leaders with a format they have grown familiar with through rotations to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), the S2 also briefed a road-to-war power point presentation. It covered a realistic scenario leading up to the situation described in the vignette, and offered greater detail of the historical context of Djibouti. After completion of the briefings, the leaders separated into small groups of eight to 10 members, and are informed that they will brief a BDE COA to the assembled group after an hour of preparation time. Nearly all groups immediately conduct a mission analysis on the information they are given to assist them in developing a course of action. The scenario calls for the IBCT to secure a logistical hub at the capital city, and then extend operations to two other cities, using a LOC approximately 110 miles long. During the conduct of the operation, the IBCT is augmented with a Saudi Arabian Mechanized Rifle Company (SAMRC). After identifying the facts, assumptions, specified and implied tasks and developing a restated mission, the groups draw concept sketches with the task organization and maneuver plan to brief to the BDE Cdr and collective leadership.

Leaders Study a Map of the Area of Operations while Planning a COA.

An NCO Conducts a COA Brief during the Company/Troop Adaptive Leader Focus Day.

Each group selects a spokesperson to brief the concept sketch to the collective group. All of the leaders are comfortable with the Djibouti scenario. It is one of the tactical scenarios and provides a level of familiarity since they are able to tackle it using the tools learned so effectively in the Captain's Career Course, ANCOC, and during routine mission planning in the unit. Most of the units continue to train using the tactical scenarios throughout the week because of this level of familiarity, rather than use the interpersonal or conceptual vignettes. The tactical vignettes also facilitate the COA briefback model better, and allow for a more objective presentation.

Leader Vignettes -- Lessons Learned

Operations Planning -- During the brigade, battalion/squadron, and company/troop training, the junior leaders demonstrated a keen ability to plan operations two levels up, a credit to our institutional schools and leaders at all levels in the Army. The task organization of brigade assets by the company-level leadership, and the battalion assets by the platoon-level leadership is sound in nearly all cases. Junior leaders within the IBCT clearly demonstrate a grasp of the unique capabilities of the IBCT. Strong emphasis is placed on combined arms maneuver, with the role of the artillery, mortars, engineers, and reconnaissance assets discussed by leaders at all levels throughout the week. Even the purpose of non-lethal effects of unit assets was addressed during the concept briefs, with an appreciation that many incidents will not require lethal force. One common operational planning weakness noted is that because of the presence of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)14 capability within elements, leaders are less likely to clearly define graphical control measures during their concept brief, sometimes assuming the digital systems provide the necessary control. The brigade commander reiterated the need for graphical control measures, stressing that reliance only on digital systems as a replacement for graphics would lead to fratricide.

Communications Planning -- One particularly interesting aspect of the Djibouti scenario is the distance the unit is required to cover during the operation. Leaders are aware of the difficulties of route and convoy security with a 110-mile LOC, and its corresponding impact on communications and situational awareness within the brigade. Techniques to overcome the difficulty of maintaining communication between elements were discussed during the Bde-level vignette. The method of operating elements in nodes, or smaller groupings of forces on the battlefield to maintain full digital situational awareness was shared. To communicate outside of the node, leaders realized they would have to rely on limited retrans or analog capabilities to gain connectivity with other elements as required. This scenario emphasized the need for Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) and High Frequency (HF) radios within the IBCT, most of which are scheduled to be fielded in the next year, and the importance of integrating these systems to boost systems connectivity when operating over long distances. The scenario reinforced the fact that decentralized operations, as described in the O&O, are, in fact, a reality of conducting operations within the IBCT, especially when deployed as part of an early entry force.

Combined Operations -- The Djibouti vignette placed the junior leaders in a complex Stability and Support Operations (SASO) environment. As defined in the O&O, "SASO normally entail a combination of actions and operations within a single area of operations.and are often joint and multinational."15 The leaders are faced with the issue of augmentation of a Saudi Arabian Mechanized Rifle Company, which leads to some interesting discussion following each group's brief on the operational plan for integrating the Saudi unit. Some junior leaders do not fully appreciate the criticality of liaison officers (LOs), and senior leaders must emphasize the importance of their role within the IBCT during combined operations. Planners are also confronted with an issue of significance, the lack of FBCB2 and other digital assets with foreign forces working with or augmenting the IBCT. Leaders are reminded that this is similar to many other technologies not shared with our allies, although it does impact on the commander's ability to command and control his forces if one unit is not digitally tracked.

Route Security -- Route security and convoy planning operations were a major part of the discussion during the Djibouti vignettes conducted at all levels throughout the week. Since many of the subordinate units trained with similar, but scaled-down versions of the Bde's Djibouti scenario, the issue of route and convoy were of concern at all levels. Since it became evident that constant security of the 110-mile route was a significant task, leaders concluded they really had two choices. They could conduct route-clearance operations preceding major movements, and provide additional resources to convoy elements, or they could treat the route security effort as the main effort itself, dedicating a majority of the Bde's resources to full-time maintenance of the LOC. The brigade commander reminded everyone of the reality of an operation of this scope, and that it could easily take more than one infantry battalion to maintain a LOC of the magnitude discussed, becoming the primary focus of the brigade during a SASO mission.

Presence Patrols - During planning sessions for the Djibouti scenario, most leaders maintained the expectation that brigade elements must quickly push out to establish a dominating presence within the SASO environment. Nearly all COAs briefed placed the main effort of the unit moving to the farthest corner of the operational area, to influence events in a village 110 miles from the logistics base during the first few days on the ground. Although this mission is assigned in the vignette, the brigade commander raised the possibility that junior leaders had spread the brigade's assets too far, too early in the operation, before gaining an understanding of the full intent and capabilities of potential enemy elements in the area of operations. He reiterated the point that it usually is easy to establish the initial presence in a SASO environment, but much harder to maintain it once the enemy has assessed the situation and decides to counter your moves. He raised the issue of whether the leaders truly understood the risks of deploying a battalion 110 miles away from the support base; especially after supply convoys begin having difficulty traveling the LOC.

Logistical Planning -- Of greatest concern to the brigade commander was the fact that extending his forces over such a wide area unnecessarily exposed a vulnerability of the IBCT, while at the same time weakening a vital strength. The distance between the main effort and the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) in most COAs is significant, and relies on the austere support tail of the IBCT to cover a significant distance to resupply the main effort. In a unit with an already austere logistical tail, this may be too great a risk. Also, extending the force beyond reasonable retrans capability of the unit significantly hinders the situational understanding of the IBCT commander and staff. This could be an acceptable risk if the circumstances warranted, but to immediately exceed some of the capabilities of digital systems and greatly extend the supply tail is a substantial risk, limiting capabilities and options early in the operation.

RSTA Employment -- It also is clear that the RSTA must not be tasked with the main effort for conducting route security beyond the initial stages of the operations. If bogged down with resource-intensive route security operations, the RSTA Squadron cannot excel in the critical roles it is assigned in the O&O, that of conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition of enemy forces, and in the broader mission of providing situational understanding of the operational environment to the commander. In most small group's maneuver plan, the RSTA squadron was assigned more than just the initial role of route security followed by a supporting role in maintaining the LOC. In nearly all COA briefs, the RSTA was responsible for maintaining a presence on the three outer sides of the area of operations. Most leaders tasked the squadron with the mission of screening, requiring the areas to be covered by a troop ranging in size from 10 to nearly 60 miles. This quickly led to the discussion of the RSTA's doctrinal capabilities to screen, which is 15-25 kilometers, depending on terrain. Methods to cover this distance with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), or with the organic capabilities of the multi-sensor platoon were discussed as likely options to fill these gaps in critical areas.

Leader Vignette Training -- Conclusions

The adaptive leader vignette training is a highly successful event for the brigade. The sequential nature of the program, which begins with brigade-level leadership and reaches to the platoon level, allows commanders at each level to set a clear standard for training. On subsequent days, leaders meet their commander's intent as they execute at their level. The IBCT is not able to meet the goal of completing four vignettes per day; in fact, one to two daily is normal. With the time spent briefing the situation, reading the vignette, discussing in small groups, and presenting collectively, three hours' time per vignette is common. Since most participating units involve a high number of participants, feedback is significant, also leading to more time taken on each problem.

Throughout the week, training remained on target, accomplishing the goal of training subordinates to think two levels up, building the understanding of the IBCT capabilities, and getting leaders to think outside of established norms. During the platoon-level execution, there was a noticeable reduction in the quality of execution not seen in any of the previous three days, since many of the personnel at platoon level lacked the depth of understanding of operations at company level and above, and did not have the necessary background on the unique capabilities of the IBCT. Since all units involve squad leaders in the company-level training, and many in the battalion-level training as well, the platoon-level training should be reassessed, as the ability of these elements to execute the training within the guidelines is limited.

The brigade and subordinate elements invest significant time producing additional products to augment the packet prepared by TRADOC and CAL. Although the vignettes are already produced in a ready-to-teach form, units continue to add products because of the desire to provide more information. The large-scale map sheets and "Road-to-War" brief are appropriate, and helped leaders to better assimilate information in the format familiar to the unit. Although some participants desire even more information, such as 1:50,000 map sheets, or more detailed intelligence summaries, the vignettes could quickly overreach their original intent. The spirit of a packet that can be handed out, read, and executed on the spot, with minimal preparation time, is critical to the success of the leader vignette training. Although it is recommended that additional large-scale maps and sketches be added to the vignettes as applicable, the packets should not require extensive read-ahead or significant time by unit commanders or staff to prepare prior to executing the problems. The value of the program is in its ease of execution, allowing the commander and subordinates time to work together without distraction on many of the challenging situations future leaders of this highly lethal and rapidly deployable unit will face.

Adaptive Leader Training -- The Future Role

The significant challenges raised to the commanders, staff, and junior leaders of the IBCT during all portions of the adaptive leader training heighten the awareness of adaptive thought at all levels in the brigade. By the end of the SLC Capstone exercise, and the leader vignette training, the brigade leaders are clearly gaining an appreciation for the value of adaptive leadership within the dynamic operational environment of the IBCT. Although both programs have room for improvement, leaders at all levels are pleased with the results of the training, and respond during AARs that they would like to see the programs continued.

A contingency-based and responsive Army must place an enduring premium on a soldier that can work at any level within the spectrum of warfare. The vision of such a soldier, and the Army to which he belongs is one of leadership that is flexible and adaptive. These leadership traits can only become intuitive to our leaders through a system of education and training for both officers and noncommissioned officers that continues to be innovative, sequential, and extensively resourced at all levels of training throughout the transformational Army.

Not only must changes take place in our professional development schools but also in the very nature that leaders make decisions and delegate authority to subordinates. Instead of "parallel planning" based on warning orders between elements and the "1/3rd-2/3rd's rule," digital systems in the IBCT bring true parallel planning through near real-time collaborative planning on ABCS coupled with simultaneous orders publication to nearly every element in the IBCT with FBCB2 access. The ability of leaders to command and battle-track units in this environment requires new methods of decision-making and adjustments in leadership style. Senior leaders must be able to clearly share their intent while providing freedom of maneuver while subordinate leaders couple initiative within intent to achieve success at the tactical-unit level.

To successfully develop the Army's leaders beyond the capacity of the traditional C2 role to a more responsive and adaptive leader is a difficult process, but one that must be undertaken. The Army Chief of Staff's vision statement says the following on leadership: "We are about leadership; it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us different. We take soldiers who enter the force and grow them into leaders for the next generation of soldiers...." The importance of leadership development as stated by the Army Chief of Staff must continue to be the Army's "stock in trade," and the model of training being implemented in the Army's first IBCT is a sound investment in the trade of leadership. The Senior Leader's Course and leader vignette training clearly demonstrate the potential for seeding the roots of adaptive leadership within the IBCT, and must be continued. The ability of adaptive leaders within the IBCT to gain dominance while executing full-spectrum warfare is paramount to their operational success. Although adaptive leadership is sometimes considered an inherent trait of all good leaders, its continued emphasis throughout the U.S. Army is now a critical component for success within the IBCT's O&O concept.

Enclosure 1

Appendix A to Enclosure 1: Soldier Support Material

Annex A to Appendix A: Extract of JFLCC Warning Order

Annex B to Appendix A: Area Map

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Endnotes:

1. The Honorable Louis Caldera and General Eric K. Shinseki, The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War. Publication available on TRADOC home page,
2. Ervin, Kent E., Colonel, and Decker, David A., Lieutenant Colonel, "Adaptive Leaders and the Interim Brigade Combat Team," Military Review, September-October 2000.
3. Benson, Kevin C., Colonel, Deputy Commander, Brigade Coordination Cell (BCC), Interview by CALL analyst at the BCC, January 2001, Fort Lewis, WA.
4. SLC Capstone Exercise Process Action Briefing, 23 March 2000, p. 4.
5. White box training involves the use of ABCS system software on a standard desktop computer not hardened for field use. Actual field-ready ABCS components are commonly referred to as "green boxes." Throughout the transformation process, GEN John N. Abrams, TRADOC Commander, has clearly stated his desire to use white box systems wherever possible to maintain the momentum in keeping IBCT training and doctrinal development on schedule.
6. The whiteboard is a collaborative planning tool provided to commanders in the Maneuver Control System (MCS) suite of software, which allows the commander to draw sketches onto a screen and project the image to other individuals at distant locations to facilitate collaborative planning.
7. Eaton, Paul D., Brigadier General, Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, interview by CALL analyst at the BCC, December 2000, Fort Lewis, WA.
8. The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) is an automated intelligence processing and dissemination system. It provides all-source intelligence fusion, allowing commanders and their staffs to gain timely and comprehensive understanding of enemy deployments, capabilities, and potential courses of action. It also provides operations security support, and aids in deception and counterintelligence operations.
9. Dubik, James M., Major General, Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, interview by CALL analyst at the BCC, September 2000, Fort Lewis, WA.
10. Ibid.
11. FM 22-100, Figure 2-3, Leader Skills, p. 2-25.
12. Dubik, James M., Major General, Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, interview by CALL analyst at the BCC, September 2000, Fort Lewis, WA.
13. FM 22-100, Section II, Competence: What a Leader Must Know, p. 2-24.
14. FBCB2 provides situational awareness and C2to the lowest tactical echelons through element positional and navigational reporting capability and near real-time graphical displays of friendly and enemy unit locations.
15. IBCT O&O Concept, Version 4.0, 30 June 2000, p. 61.