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Vanguard of the Objective Force

by Colonel Michael Mehaffey, U.S. Army,
Director, Battle Lab Integration and Technology Directorate,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, TRADOC

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army has repeatedly proven its value to the nation through adaptive crisis-response in Southwest Asia, Africa, Central America and Southern Europe. Indeed, in virtually every contingency since 1989, landpower has proven essential to lasting decision. However, the high frequency of joint contingency operations in the 1990s--a frequency expected to continue and perhaps rise during the 21st century--has sharply increased the significance of strategic responsiveness. Clearly, U.S. Army forces are increasingly important to a joint force that can rapidly deploy to prevent, contain, stabilize or terminate a conflict in its early stages.

In response to this new operational environment, Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and U.S. Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki formulated a new Army Vision in October 1999 to build a strategically responsive landpower force capable of dominance across the full spectrum of operations. The Army will implement the vision using three-stage transformation campaign over the next 10 to 20 years, leading to an objective force that will incorporate revolutionary improvements.

The Army's transformation campaign plan is the most challenging and significant effort to change the Army in more than a century. The interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs) now under development have been characterized as the vanguard of that future force.

Although the U.S. Army is capable of full-spectrum dominance, its organization and force structure are not optimized for strategic responsiveness. Army light forces--the best in the world--can deploy within days but lack the lethality, mobility and staying power necessary to assure decision. On the other hand, Army mechanized forces possess unmatched lethality and staying power but require too much time to deploy. The Army's 21st-century responsibility for effective strategic responsiveness demands rapidly deployable combined arms forces that exploit information and human potential and combine advantages of both light and mechanized forces. Meeting this immediate requirement and providing warfighting commanders with an important new option for decisive contingency response is the central near-term objective of the Army's decision to develop full-spectrum medium-weight brigades--the interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs). The IBCTs, operating within division structures, will provide a complementary capability to our current light and mechanized forces, serving as a bridging force until science and technology allow the U.S. Army to achieve objective force capabilities.

The Army is rapidly and nearly simultaneously developing two initial brigade combat teams using two existing brigades, one heavy and one light, at Fort Lewis, WA. The accelerated development of these brigades has jump-started the implementation of the Army transformation strategy. In fact, as the vanguard of the objective force, these IBCTs also incorporate many innovative concepts that will be fully operational within the objective force:

• Commander- and execution-centric command and control environment.
• Networked operations.
• Multifunctional soldiers, leaders and staffs.
• Effects-based planning.
• Execution-focused, distribution-based sustainment.
• Flattened hierarchies and integrated headquarters.

The IBCT has been designed as a full-spectrum, early-entry combat force. The brigade has utility, confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environments, against all projected future threats, but it is optimized primarily for employment in smaller scale contingencies (SSC) in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Under the command and control of a division fully integrated within the joint contingency force, the IBCT will deploy rapidly, execute early entry and conduct effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize or resolve a conflict. The IBCT conducts operations in major theater war (MTW) as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps, in a variety of possible roles. During military operations other than war (MOOTW), the IBCT conducts operations as an initial entry force or guarantor force to provide security for stability forces. (See Figure 1.)

The IBCT is a divisional brigade that will normally fight as the first-to-deploy brigade under a division headquarters. Preconfigured in ready-to-fight combined arms packages, the entire IBCT is intended to deploy within 96 hours of "first aircraft wheels up" and begin operations immediately upon arrival at the aerial port of debarkation. The brigade cannot conduct forced entry, but it provides the joint force commander an improved capability to arrive immediately behind forced entry forces and begin operations to shape the battlespace and expedite decision.

The major fighting components of the IBCT are three motorized combined arms infantry battalions, supported by additional organic combat, combat support and combat service support organizations. As much as possible, units are equipped from commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf equipment to accelerate development and reduce costs. To meet its demanding deployment threshold, the brigade's design capitalizes on the widespread use of common vehicular platforms, including highly-mobile, medium-weight interim armored vehicles (IAVs), coupled with minimized personnel and logistic footprints in theater.

As a full-spectrum combat force, the brigade typically maintains an offensive orientation. However, depending on the nature and evolution of the contingency, the IBCT is capable of conducting all major doctrinal operations: offense, defense, stability and support. Its core operational capabilities rest upon excellent operational and tactical mobility, digitization-based situational understanding, combined arms integration down to company level, and high dismounted infantry strengths for close combat in urban and complex terrain. Properly integrated and networked, these core capabilities enhance force effectiveness and compensate for any platform limitations in the close fight.

Despite its innovative aspects, the IBCT has not emerged as a freestanding concept. Army operational experience and experimentation during the 1990s and current technology support the concept of smaller, more capable organizations that exploit the power of information, networked systems, improved communications and refined tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).

Multiple schools and centers within the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), led by the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC), have engaged in comprehensive, continual analysis to inform decisions about the IBCT organization and operations. Based on mission analysis of the operational environment in which the IBCT would most likely be employed, TRAC and other centers employed a Serbia/Balkans case scenario to support analysis. Other geographic regions (Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia) were investigated and permutations within scenarios regarding the nature of the force, the threat, the nature of the contingency and other operationally significant factors were pursued. Investigators employed a wide range of methodologies, models and simulations, including JANUS, modular semi-automated forces, Fire Simulation XXI and others. An enormous number of insights and potential applications emerged from this effort, which informed multiple iterations of the IBCT concept and established a basis for initial and subsequent design decisions.

Key Design Parameters. The critical element in producing the optimum organization for the interim brigade combat team is the requirement to achieve balance in two primary areas. First, the IBCT design must balance requirements for strategic responsiveness with capabilities for battlespace dominance. This calculus requires the organizational scheme to balance deployability, sustainability and the IBCT's in-theater personnel footprint against its combat requirements for lethality, mobility and survivability. (See Figure 2.) In essence, the brigade must achieve the deployability standards of a light force while arriving with the punch and staying power approaching that of a mechanized formation.

Second, the organization must provide balanced full-spectrum utility. Although the brigade is deliberately optimized for early-entry operations in SSCs, mission analysis also requires it to be prepared to participate in MOOTW to permit peacekeeping and stability forces to carry out their missions in a secure environment. Similarly, the IBCT must be prepared to fight as a component within a division or corps structure in major theater war. In these roles, the IBCT is designed to be suitably augmented to compensate for recognized, specific shortfalls in its capabilities for fires and effects, aviation operations, countermobility, command and control (C2), communications and force protection. The organization includes the command, control and communications (C3) "hooks" for rapid integration of additional capabilities for operations outside the scope of SSCs.

Analysis indicates further that the IBCT is more effective if its capabilities are embedded within the unit's organic organization, rather than employing the traditional division-slice approach. Therefore, the IBCT design includes embedded unit-based capabilities--military intelligence, signal, engineer, antitank, artillery and CSS elements--that have been tailored specifically to the unique requirements of the unit's mission set. This approach also provides the organizational basis and organic relationships necessary for the brigade to achieve a higher level of training for its mission set, enabling it to execute an effective train-alert-deploy paradigm instead of the alert-train-deploy cycle that has recently characterized Army contingency response. The organic structure further maximizes the human potential within the brigade, strengthening unit cohesion and providing the foundation for developing soldiers, leaders and staffs who can perform multiple functions.

Similarly, although traditional combined arms task organization occurs at battalion level and higher, extensive analysis for the IBCT indicates that, within the environment of urban and complex terrain, force effectiveness is best enhanced through internetted combined arms capabilities to company team level. The organization described below fully embraces this conclusion.

Key Operational Capabilities. For the brigade to operate successfully as a full spectrum force, the following key operational capabilities and characteristics must be reflected in its organizational design. The first two capabilities--mobility and dismounted assault-centric close combat--are the IBCT's most distinctive qualities.

Mobility. The IBCT requires high mobility at all three levels of operations. Strategically, it must be organized, equipped and configured to meet its 96-hour deployment standard. At the operational level, the IBCT must be capable of intratheater deployment by ground, sea or C-130 air transport so the joint force commander can exploit opportunities and hedge against uncertainty. The IBCT also requires 100-percent tactical mobility to strike the enemy in depth, reposition its reserve rapidly, secure lines of communication in uncertain conditions and conduct noncontiguous platoon, company and battalion operations in urban and complex terrain.

Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight. Given its likely operational environment, the IBCT achieves tactical decision through combined arms action at the company level focused on dismounted assault, enabled by direct fires from organic IAV-based combat platforms, and the integration of mortars, artillery, mobility support, and joint fires and effects. Combined arms companies directly link infantrymen and supporting weapons to produce a very responsive "point-and-shoot" capability that permits successful engagement of fleeting targets in complex, urban and compartmented terrain. Dismounted infantry can also improve survivability of the unit's platforms by allowing them to achieve standoff and avoid man-portable antitank fires.

Enhanced Situational Understanding (SU). Situational understanding is the fundamental force enabler across all IBCT battlefield operating systems and the foundation for risk mitigation with respect to its vulnerabilities, particularly the lack of substantial armor protection. The brigade employs an integrated suite of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) capabilities and digitized battle command systems to develop and disseminate a common operational picture throughout the force, achieving SU as the commander applies judgment and experience. The reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron is the organization primarily responsible for providing combat information to build the knowledge base necessary to achieve SU. Situational understanding and information superiority enable the force to avoid surprise, develop rapid decisions, control the time and place for combat, conduct precision maneuver, shape the battlespace with precision fires and effects, and achieve decisive outcomes.

Lethality. Given the IBCT's combat mission, the brigade must possess a robust array of direct and indirect fire systems adequate to shape the battlespace and achieve decision in the close fight. Mortars are embedded to company level to enhance responsiveness and facilitate noncontiguous, distributed operations. A limited antitank capability within the IBCT is required to deal with the possible presence of enemy mechanized forces within the area of operations (AO). Force effectiveness requires fire systems that are mobile, fully integrated, internetted and mutually supportive within the IBCT concept of operations. The primary lethal systems within the interim brigade combat team include:

• Mobile gun systems.
• Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) 2B antitank guided missiles.
• Javelin antitank missiles.
• 120mm, 81mm and 60mm mortars.
• 155mm cannon artillery.

The high mobility of these systems sharply increases their effective use in combat operations, generating greater combat power than light forces of comparable size.

Holistic Force Protection and Survivability. As a force equipped with medium-weight armored and thin-skinned vehicles, the brigade faces the challenge of achieving an adequate level of force protection and survivability against enemy fires without significant passive protection. Overall, the IBCT must meet its force protection challenges through the holistic application of a variety of capabilities including early warning, situational understanding, the avoidance of surprise, deception, rapid mobility, signature control, nontemplatable operations, avoidance of enemy fires, mutual support, use of cover and concealment, and the implementation of innovative TTP.

Force Effectiveness. The IBCT will offset the limitations of its IAV-based platforms through the integration of other capabilities, particularly the internetted actions of the combined arms company teams. Force effectiveness is further enhanced through the use of common platforms, shared SU, rigorous combined arms training, and multifunctional soldiers and capable leaders. (See Figure 3.)

Reachback. Reachback enables the brigade to exploit a multitude of nonorganic resources to accomplish its assigned missions. The IBCT executes reachback routinely and deliberately in five primary areas: fires and effects, intelligence and information, planning and analysis, force protection, and sustainment. Reachback permits the IBCT to reduce its footprint in the AO without compromising its ability to accomplish its assigned mission. Reachback is executed primarily through the division headquarters, although the employing headquarters may authorize direct linkages between the IBCT and resource providers.

Given its orientation on urban terrain and its core capabilities of high tactical mobility and dismounted assault, the IBCT is organized primarily as a combined arms organization, including:

• Three Infantry Battalions. These motorized, combined arms infantry battalions are the primary maneuver elements within the IBCT. Within the battalions, snipers, mobile gun systems, mortars, Striker-equipped fire support teams and reconnaissance elements provide the appropriate systems required for combined arms integration vital to support dismounted operations by squads, platoons and companies.

• The RSTA Squadron. The RSTA squadron was developed to satisfy a set of unique operational requirements. As one of the IBCT's primary sources of combat information, the squadron supports situational understanding, empowering the IBCT to anticipate, forestall and dominate threats, ensuring mission accomplishment through freedom of maneuver and decisive action. Moving beyond traditional reconnaissance that focuses primarily on enemy forces, the squadron will see, know and understand the operational environment in detail. The RSTA squadron includes three reconnaissance troops and a surveillance troop. The surveillance troop is comprised of an unmanned aerial vehicle platoon, a ground sensor platoon, and a nuclear, biological, chemical reconnaissance platoon. Overall, the squadron can continuously and simultaneously reconnoiter nine routes or conduct surveillance of 18 designated areas. The squadron operates by stealth throughout the entire AO and employs human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence experts to compensate for shortfalls in sensors that are more suited for open terrain and force-based information.

• The Antitank (AT) Company. The AT company comprises the IBCT's primary stand-off antitank capability. The company increases IBCT flexibility and improves its survivability, particularly in open terrain. The company consists of three platoons, each with three long-range, fire-and-forget, TOW 2B systems mounted on IAVs.

• The Field Artillery Battalion. Because the IBCT is highly vulnerable to artillery casualties, the artillery battalion, while still required to provide supporting fires, focuses sharply on responsive, proactive counterbattery fires. The fire-support organization optimized for combat effectiveness would include a mix of cannon and rocket artillery, but that mix does not meet the IBCT's deployment and sustainment profiles. The initial brigades will be equipped with the M198 (155mm towed howitzer) while the Army pursues the development of an IAV-based, 155mm system for the interim force.

• The Engineer Company. Given the significance of tactical mobility to successful operations, the engineer company is optimized for mobility support. Issues connected with span of control and the complexity of its tasks dictate that the company be organized as a brigade-level asset.

• The Signal Company. The IBCT signal company provides the strong C4ISR1network required to support distributed operations within urban and complex terrain across potentially significant distances, as well as the linkages required for effective communications with the division or higher echelons. Considerably smaller than what would be provided from a division, the company supports and provides depth to the brigade S6.

• The Military Intelligence (MI) Company. The MI company essentially operates as an extension of the brigade S2 to manage ISR collection assets. It provides analysis to support the development of the IBCT common operational picture (COP), targeting and effects, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The company has the organic systems necessary to interface with ISR systems at the division, Army Forces, joint, theater and national levels and supports the tactical HUMINT activities required in the SSC environment.

• The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB). The BSB is designed to perform execution-focused, distribution-based, centralized logistic functions. Its effectiveness depends on the advances in combat service support (CSS) C2, enhanced CSS situational understanding and regionally available resources from joint, multinational, and host nation or contract sources. The small size of the BSB minimizes the logistic footprint in the IBCT AO.

The IBCT organization consciously excludes other unit-based capabilities often provided in a division slice such as aviation, air and missile defense, combat and construction engineers and military police. If the contingency environment requires these capabilities, they will be mission-tailored to the IBCT in augmentation packages.

Operations. The IBCT is specifically designed to operate in accordance with emerging warfighting concepts. In particular, the IBCT is designed to conduct distributed operations across the depth and breadth of the AO, against both traditional and asymmetric adversaries. Against a traditional (conventional) enemy, IBCT capabilities for early entry and exploitation of joint effects coordinated through the division considerably enhance its ability to shape the battlespace. The IBCT can conduct feints, demonstrations, offensive information operations, extended reconnaissance, and integrated maneuver and shaping fires. It can neutralize or destroy critical combat, C4ISR and logistic elements of the enemy force; deny the enemy's use of key terrain or resources; and prevent the enemy from achieving initial objectives or setting conditions favorable to his plans. When employed within its optimal SSC environment, IBCT-shaping operations can transition quickly to decisive operations although the brigade may often require reinforcement by follow-on forces.

When confronting a nonconforming, asymmetric adversary, IBCT-shaping operations assume a broader nature for a variety of reasons. First, centers of gravity and decisive points for asymmetric adversaries are more difficult to determine. In many situations, military capabilities will not constitute the primary vulnerabilities or best means of influencing the enemy. As a result, the traditional approach of employing lethal effects to degrade or destroy specific enemy capabilities is not sufficient to shape the battlespace and affect the enemy's will.

Dealing with nontraditional adversaries places significantly greater responsibilities on the brigade commander and staff to integrate a variety of military and nonmilitary activities at the tactical level. This integration has two goals: first, to divine the enemy's patterns of operations, critical vulnerabilities and decisive points; second, to apply the right combinations of force to affect his perspectives, change his behavior and degrade his will to fight. Both goals are equally important, since action that is not informed by an accurate understanding of the enemy's vulnerabilities will not achieve the effects desired by the commander.

The RSTA squadron plays a central role in developing the situational understanding required in this complex environment. In addition, certain brigade staff sections--public affairs, staff judge advocate, psychological operations and information operations--fulfill particularly important responsibilities with respect to planning, preparing, executing and assessing the effects necessary for success.

The common operational picture developed within the IBCT must be expanded to include a comprehensive grasp of international, regional and local factors that affect friendly and enemy actions. The common picture must also reflect extraordinary understanding of the nontraditional adversary--his objectives, options for actions, inclinations and vulnerabilities--to determine the best means of influencing his will and behavior. The IBCT must continuously "take the temperature" of the asymmetric adversary by frequently assessing the effects achieved within the AO. Over time, these efforts will reduce uncertainty and enable the IBCT to improvise and adjust continually.

Commander and Execution Centric C2Environment. Understanding the C2environment in which the brigade will operate is critical to understanding its employment and tactical style. The IBCT's unique, evolving, commander- and execution-centric C2environment builds on lessons learned during Force XXI experimentation. The IBCT commander and staff will execute a significantly new approach to directing and managing operations. Advances in information technologies embedded in the brigade headquarters, coupled with substantial streamlining of the military decision-making process (MDMP) and the proficiencies of the brigade's multifunctional staff promise to shift focus more solidly to the commander's requirements (vice staff requirements) and personal command style. Specific features and products of this evolution include the following characteristics:

• Near real-time information updates from organic and external sources will support continuous assessment and early rapid dissemination of command decisions and informed adjustment to plans, orders and ongoing operations.

• Multiechelon collaborative planning, based on the IBCT COP, will streamline the MDMP and provide additional planning and preparation time to subordinate elements.

• Commander's critical information requirements will be more easily and frequently updated, based on better information.

• Command and staff energy will be expended less on understanding the present and focused more on anticipating the future and executing a continuously updated plan.

• The plan, prepare, execute, and assess phases of the operations process will merge, creating a relatively seamless transition between current and future operations.

To support this C2environment, IBCT elements will be equipped with appropriate Army Battle Command System (ABCS) or ABCS-like systems such as the All-Source Analysis System, Maneuver Control System, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, Combat Service Support Control System and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below down to platform level. The IBCT C4ISR networks and computers will have the rapid capability to receive and disseminate large volumes of voice and video data internally as well as externally to adjacent, higher, joint and allied units in all terrain and weather conditions. Long-range, non-line-of-sight tactical communication systems will be the principal means of connectivity for the command group, main command post and the brigade logistic support center.

The IBCT has a pronounced offensive orientation. Its key operational capabilities are deliberately designed to enhance its offensive power, with clear benefits for deterrence, conflict prevention, containment or conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the IBCT may be required to assume the defense temporarily in an SSC. In addition, some elements of the IBCT may assume a defensive posture while the brigade, as a whole, conducts offensive operations. In those situations, the IBCT will purposefully conduct a mobile defense. Enabled by RSTA operations that unveil and anticipate the enemy's plan, an IBCT mobile defense best counters the enemy's moves, deprives the enemy of initiative and enables rapid and seamless transition to the offense.

Offensive Operations. As a motorized force, the IBCT is designed for fast-paced, distributed operations. Typically, it operates within an area of operation approximately 50 kilometers by 50 kilometers. The RSTA squadron disperses throughout the entire AO while the infantry battalions normally operate within smaller, noncontiguous areas. Constituent rifle companies and platoons may also be dispersed within the battalion areas (as may RSTA units) depending on the situation. Robust C4ISR capabilities and high mobility enable the IBCT to operate according to a new tactical paradigm. In the past, maneuver forces normally:

• Made contact with the enemy.
• Developed the situation further.
• Maneuvered for decisive action.

Owing to enhanced SU, the IBCT will often be able to:

• Develop the situation out of contact.
• Maneuver rapidly to positions of advantage.
• Initiate contact at the time and place of the commander's choice to achieve decision.

In an SSC, offensive operations are orchestrated at the battalion level. Infantry battalions synchronize the maneuver of their companies with organic and supporting fires and effects. Companies, the centerpiece of maneuver, may retain a platoon out of contact to exploit success, flank enemy positions or commit as a reserve. Brigade-level assets, such as antitank, artillery and engineer units, are employed at that level or allocated to maneuver elements as dictated by the situation.

As necessary, the IBCT will conduct rapid tactical or operational movement for positional advantage, based upon highly accurate situational understanding, before dismounting infantrymen for close combat. Rapid, precision maneuver permits combat elements to avoid enemy strengths, attack from unexpected directions, achieve surprise or fix the enemy with one portion of the IBCT while mounting a precise, deliberate attack on the enemy's flanks or rear.

In cases of incomplete situational understanding, maneuver formations may also fight mounted if ambushed or forced into a meeting engagement. While fighting mounted is not preferred, motorized formations will execute battle drills to escape or overwhelm the enemy in unexpected encounters.

Normally, deliberate assaults by dismounted infantry companies and platoons supported by immediate, responsive direct and indirect fires will achieve decisions. Infantry support systems provide continuous, integrated coverage from overwatch positions, preferably from defilade, moving as required to maintain continuous suppressive and destructive fires on the enemy as directed by the dismounted element. Indirect fires at brigade and higher echelons shape the battlespace and suppress and destroy the enemy in the close fight. Antitank engagements are planned to counter enemy medium armor. Company mobile gun systems are positioned to place direct fires against hardened positions, light and medium armor and light tactical vehicles.

In the close fight, platoons and squads execute traditional fire and maneuver tactics. Intrasquad radios that permit communications among infantrymen and between their fighting vehicles improve synchronized action even at the lowest levels.

RSTA Operations. The squadron must excel in the traditional reconnaissance and surveillance roles and in the broader mission of providing situational understanding of the operational environment in all its dimensions--political, cultural, economic, demographic, and military. The squadron's efforts are complemented by direct access to intelligence and information sources external to the IBCT and focused by the ISR integration and management elements at the brigade level.

Typically, the squadron operates across the entire IBCT AO, executing its multidimensional roles according to an integrated brigade-level ISR plan. Troop operations are widely separated, but coordinated and synchronized. The squadron's ability to reconnoiter continuously nine routes or 18 designated areas of interest (or a combination) guarantees broad coverage that can be focused and prioritized to weight an ongoing operation. Done properly, RSTA operations have high payoff in the areas of warning, force protection, combat assessment, freedom of maneuver, and the commander's flexibility and initiative.

Integrated Fire Support and Effects Coordination. The IBCT employs lethal and nonlethal effects to protect the force, shape the battlespace and support decisive operations. Effects are the result of the directed application of lethal and nonlethal capabilities to achieve a desired purpose or outcome in support of the commander's intent. Effects are a component of the operational plan and must be fully integrated and synchronized with other elements of the plan, particularly the scheme of maneuver. Planning must include the control and management of unintended effects and their impact on the mission. Normally, effects planning does not include subordinate maneuver forces or the direct fires organic to those forces.

In combat-intensive contingencies, lethal effects are primarily for force protection and decisive results. In other environments, particularly when confronting asymmetric adversaries, nonlethal effects may rise in importance. The range of nonlethal effects includes the employment of civil affairs, public affairs, law enforcement, legal assistance and restorative human services. Fully integrated lethal and nonlethal effects, synchronized within a cohesive plan of operations, set the conditions for tactical success and combine with maneuver to achieve the commander's intent.

Although capable of serving many purposes, the organic artillery battalion focuses sharply on responsive, proactive counterbattery fires. The fire support system must capitalize on digitally integrated C4ISR capabilities to acquire, target and destroy enemy indirect fire systems before they engage IBCT elements. Effects planning is accomplished collaboratively with other battlefield operating systems resident within the IBCT. Links with the common ground station, coupled with voice and digital links to counterfire radars, fire support teams and reconnaissance elements are particularly important. Fire support teams are located down to company level within the IBCT's maneuver formations.

To sustain the IBCT, the BSB executes a unique, execution-focused concept of support that is fully integrated with the brigade concept of operations and scheme of maneuver. BSB support operations are characterized by continuous adaptation and creative tailoring, based on unit operating tempos, commander-designated priorities for support and the frequently changing battlespace requirements. Through centralized management and CSS situational understanding, the BSB combines distribution to unit level with area supply points to ensure that services and supplies are delivered when and where they are needed, fully synchronizing the IBCT's logistic rhythm with battle rhythms. Logistic flexibility and dynamic retasking of BSB elements typify its operations as supplies and services are tailored, packaged and delivered to specific supported units.

Initial sustainment will rely on a combination of unit basic loads and strategic configured loads in early arriving task force sets. Sustainment stocks must also be integrated into the deployment flow early to sustain first-arriving elements. Battlefield distribution will combine situational understanding with efficient air and surface delivery systems to form a seamless pipeline, eliminating most stockpiles and substituting speed for mass.

To this point, this article has focused on brigade-level operations during an SSC. However, the IBCT is a full-spectrum combat force normally employed as part of a division. Given this employment parameter, the following section presents some initial, brief, analytically based insights into how the IBCT would operate within three division variants.

Light Division. When deployed as part of a light division, the IBCT extends the tactical mobility available to the division commander and increases the organic firepower available to support dismounted assaults. As the most mobile, lethal and survivable element within a light division, the IBCT is likely to be employed as the main effort within the division. It may, therefore, receive the larger share of divisional assets, such as combat engineers, to assist mobility in offensive operations, an aviation task force to expand combined arms capabilities and air defense systems to improve force protection.

Heavy Division. When deployed as part of a heavy division, the IBCT will almost certainly be the first brigade to deploy, facilitating prompt reception, staging and onward integration of the remainder of the division by consolidating and extending the security of air and sea ports of debarkation. With its high tactical and operational mobility and proficiency in urban and complex terrain, the IBCT adds dimension to heavy-division capabilities. However, given the differences between the IAV-based brigade and formations based on the M1 Abrams Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the IBCT does require force tailoring for the heavy fight. When so task-organized, primarily with armor, antiarmor, aviation, artillery, air defense, military police, engineer assets and CSS resources, the IBCT is a full participant in division operations. It can form part of the division's main effort, execute the supporting attack, serve as the division reserve, conduct economy of force operations or conduct operations in urban and complex terrain while other division elements operate within open and mixed terrain. In short, the IBCT provides additional capabilities, but also consumes capabilities of divisional slice elements.

Interim Division (IDIV). The IDIV is still in its initial phase of design and evaluation. Nevertheless, initial analysis indicates that the IDIV, encompassing three IBCTs (in some form) as its primary fighting components, will provide more broad-spectrum capabilities than the other two IBCT-embedded divisions. The IBCT-based IDIV will be optimized for employment in the initial phase of major regional contingencies under an Army Forces command. As the lead division for a joint contingency, the IDIV will deploy an early-entry IBCT within 96 hours, followed closely by the rest of the division. The IDIV will shape the battlespace in initial operations, alter conditions to prevent the enemy's early success, facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces and expedite decisive operations.

Corps-level Considerations. Analytical scenarios set in the Middle East, South Asia and Eastern Europe all suggest potential locations for smaller scale contingency operations that would not necessarily require a division force. In these cases, the IBCT, augmented by corps assets, provides the warfighting commander in chief with early, dominant capabilities to deter, contain or decide the outcome of the contingency, allowing the corps and its divisions to retain focus and readiness for potential major theater war.

The development of the IBCT will produce immediate improvement in the strategic responsiveness of Army ground forces. When fielded, the IBCTs will offer a new option for decisive contingency response. At the operational level, IBCTs will sharply enhance the joint force commander's ability to respond to opportunity and uncertainty. Equally important, the IBCTs will represent a clear near-term improvement in national and theater conventional deterrence, providing the National Command Authority (NCA) the capability to place a credible and flexible combat force on the ground anywhere in the world within 96 hours. Finally, the accelerated development of the two initial brigades will also jump-start transformation without compromising the Army's ability to accomplish its most fundamental mission--fighting and winning the nation's wars.

Editor's Note: This article was previously published in Military Review, September-October 2000.

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Endnotes:

1. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.