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The company commander established his command post in the trees within a low area. He proceeded to direct his three platoons in their search and attack for the Cortinian Liberation Forces (CLF). The first sergeant and executive officer were whispering about the location of the evening resupply. The fire support officer was off by himself while his fire support NCO was shifting the battalion mortar priority target. The mortars were setting up on the other side of the hill.

Suddenly 2d platoon made contact; the platoon leader gave a quick size, activity, location and time (SALT) report. The commander jotted the grid coordinates (grids) of the contact on a 3x5 card. After receiving additional reports, he started to maneuver his 3d platoon on the CLF. The 3d Platoon moved to the fight and ran into a known minefield -- suffering casualties. The 2d platoon leader reported that he had four friendly casualties at VQ891429 and two wounded prisoners at VQ893435. The 3d platoon leader reported that he had two friendly casualties at VQ893437. The company commander dutifully recorded all of the grids on his 3x5 card.

The commander went to the battalion command radio net and gave his report. The first sergeant (1SG) was on the company radio net talking to the platoon sergeants about casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). The 1SG gathered the grid coordinates (grids) from the platoons to determine the casualty locations to avoid wasting time evacuating soldiers.

At the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the preceding vignette is repeated in nearly every rotation. Infantry companies routinely do not have a standing operating procedure (SOP) for the company command post, thus creating avoidable friction as detailed below:

• The commander not accurately or efficiently tracking the battlefield, thus ineffectively commanding and controlling the fight.

• First sergeants (1SGs) and executive officers (XOs) repeatedly asking for the same information that has already been provided to the company headquarters.

• Units not properly recording, reporting, disseminating or tracking minefield information.

• Commanders not maximizing available assets (e.g., mortars, fires, helicopters) because they do not know where the assets are located.

• Commanders keeping key information on 3x5 cards, not disseminating that important information widely and, in the process, losing important grid locations.

• Company radio-telephone operators (RTOs) having to ask the commander for the updated grids of the platoons, when asked by battalion, because the grids have not been disseminated.

• Company commanders and fire support officers (FSOs) not communicating during the battle to employ fires or because they are not collocated.

• The company headquarters not recording information received when the commander is not present and thus neither the commander nor his command post (CP) is maintaining situational awareness.

• The company headquarters is not aware of a timeline; thereby, the CP is not holding platoons responsible for those times. The command post is not enforcing priorities of work.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). A solution to these problems is the use of a tracking format and layout configuration as shown in Figures 1,2, and 3. The two sheets can be taped back to back and covered in acetate for long-term use and portability. It can stay in the vicinity of the command post so either RTO or the commander can update it or read it. The examples used have been filled out with some generic information to show how they should be used. Using this tool, the company command group will have a common source to disseminate information to both the higher headquarters and subordinate units.

The tracking format is broken into different areas. Figure 1 is for movement to contact and current operations and Figure 2 is for the attack and the defense. The top of Figure 1 has current platoon location and combat power. There is also a space to record current enemy minefields in zone, both reported from subordinates and higher. The active grid box is space to record the current CASEVAC operations and the location for resupply link-up. Next, there is space to record the current contacts of the platoons. Therefore, they can be accurately reported to battalion. At the bottom is space to record any miscellaneous notes that come over the radios, which may be important to the commander. Finally, there is space to record a timeline so the RTOs can track completion of tasks as directed by the commander.

Figure 2. Attack and Defense.

Figure 2 has a matrix to track the defense preparation. There is space to record the number of planned fighting positions, obstacles, and caches and the number of those complete. In the offense preparation, there is space to list key equipment and who is carrying it. This allows the command post to track mission-essential equipment and cross level as the carrying unit sustains casualties. Finally, on page two of the figure is space to put a timeline with priorities of work and a means to record when they are complete. This enables the command post to track what the commander deems important.

Another problem with company command posts is that there is no standard layout. RTOs, the FSO, and the 1SG all get behind the closest cover. This creates an inefficient or even ineffective flow of information because the individuals are not close enough to share information. With an SOP, personnel would know their assigned place in any company command post and information is passed in an efficient manner to all personnel. Figure 3 shows three examples of good company command post configurations.