• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

The attacking battalion infiltrated past the LPs/OPs in the early morning hours closing in on the main defense line of the American infantry company. When the enemy attacked at first light, they had already "hugged the American unit's belt," rendering much of the defenders' indirect fire support useless. Only the company and battalion mortars had the short range and smaller warheads to affect the close-in fight that raged along the defensive line. Soon the mortar crews were engaged in the fight and mortar rounds began to drop close in front of the defenders. Unfortunately the battalion mortar rounds fell short, the 81MM warheads exploding among the American infantry, blowing a hole in their defenses and decimating a squad. The company commander screamed for a check-fire, but he was too late to save his troops or halt the breakthrough. As he scrambled to pull his unit back and reorganize, he wondered what had happened with his fire support. He knew the target grids were correct: he had plotted those himself. What he didn't know was that the firing positions for the tubes were not.

Observations at the Joint Readiness Training Center suggest that field artillery units are not making full use of their survey assets, particularly since the introduction of the Gun-Laying Positioning System (GLPS), the North-Seeking Gyroscope (NSG), and the Global Positioning System (GPS). The fielding of these systems in the light cannon battalion fundamentally changed the composition of the Field Artillery Survey section. The new equipment greatly improves the brigade's accuracy and allows the survey section to perform other functions on the battlefield. They have not, however, eliminated the basic function of the survey section: the standard second independent verification of every deliberate act.

As with all equipment, Field Artillery soldiers must understand the capabilities and limitations of the GLPS. It must be calibrated to ensure accuracy and it must be protected from needless damage. The GLPS should be taken down after the battery has been laid to protect it. The light field artillery is authorized three aiming circles and one GLPS. A declinated aiming circle should be placed over the orientation station (OS) in place of the GLPS. The battery cannot use the GLPS to establish a declination station. The telescope's minimal range of elevation does not meet the specifications for establishing a declination station IAW STP 6-82C 14-SM-TG. Neither can the GLPS be used for simultaneous observations. As stated in the interim safety release, October 28, 1998, for GLPS, "all weapon positions and direction of lay must be verified by a second means." An undeclinated M2 aiming circle or an aiming circle set on an azimuth given by the same GLPS is not an independent check. The survey section provides an OS and end of orienting line (EOL) to firing batteries to ensure the battalion is on common survey and validate the GLPS azimuth. The standard second independent verification is not complete without the surveyor validation. Even then, the survey section still must provide declination stations throughout the battlefield for other indirect fire units. A master station should be established to provide or verify direction in the event the survey section cannot get to a particular indirect asset. Consequently, providing survey control for firing batteries remains a critical duty of the battalion survey section.

At the same time, the addition of the new equipment has reduced the experience level within the survey section. The new modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) leaves only one Positioning and Azimuth Determining System (PADS) team, a junior survey sergeant, and an inexperienced reconnaissance survey officer within the battalion. Although the surveyors' knowledge of PADS and the NSG is good, they need to improve their understanding and their support to the firing batteries or mortar sections. The GLPS and PLGR were added to the light Field Artillery Battalion to assist the advance party in establishing accurate initial data for a new location without a survey section present. The GLPS is designed to augment the PADS, NSG and the M2 Aiming circle, allowing the gunnery sergeant to lay the battery and establish an OS and EOL until a survey team can get into position to validate and/or verify common survey.

All too often at the JRTC, that crucial second check is not taking place. With no senior survey expertise in the light FA battalions, the survey sections lack guidance. When produced -- and that is not always the case -- survey annexes in the Battalion Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP) provide few, if any, specific tasks. The survey teams remain largely ignorant of the FASP. They often sit inactive in a battery position in case the GLPS is damaged, not an unlikely event since the GLPS is often left in place over the OS where it can be damaged. Declination stations are either set up incorrectly or not at all and aiming circles not properly declinated. This means that the firing batteries do not have a second verification of the GLPS-produced azimuth, leaving the firing accuracy of the brigade's mortar sections, and platoons suspect. O/Cs usually hear that the battalion survey sections do not routinely survey in the mortars and the batteries have GLPS. Any field artilleryman will tell you that 60mm and 81mm mortars need to meet the five requirements for accurate predicted fire as much as, if not more than, a howitzer battery, because of the close proximity of their fight

If the surveyors are not verifying the battery GLPS data, then the battalion leaders have forgotten the most important rule of the field artillery: dual independent checks of all data before a round goes downrange. Battalion Commanders, S3s, and Reconnaissance Survey Officers (RSOs) must remember the importance of common survey for all brigade rear support assets. This includes providing an OS and EOL to all firing batteries, Task Force mortars, and declination stations for all aiming circles and M2 compasses across the battlefield. Leaders must set up a master station for simultaneous observations in case a survey team cannot reach an indirect fire asset. Common directional control can still be passed to any aiming circle in the brigade. All of these measures must be spelled out in the survey annex to the FASP. More to the point, the battalion leaders must ensure the survey sergeants and RSOs understand and execute their portions of the plan. The introduction of new reliable equipment, such as NSG, GLPS and GPS receivers, allows firing assets to establish more accurate survey control than ever before. Artillerymen still need to validate the survey data used by the firing assets and ensure our mortars are on common control. Otherwise, the unit expecting effective fire support -- such as the company in the opening vignette -- may find itself under not-so-"friendly" fire.