COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Air crew coordination
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Crew coordination is clearly an active program in the field.
DISCUSSION: This continues to prove a major risk reduction tool and an integral part of accident avoidance at JRTC.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: None.
(TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
FM communications
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): FM communications has improved.
DISCUSSION: This success is directly linked with the sustainment training and new equipment training that units conduct at Home Station.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continue to emphasize communications during Home Station training.
(TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Tactical communications
OBSERVATION (TF 1): There has been a marked improvement in the task force scout's ability to communicate with the SINGARS and TACSAT systems.
DISCUSSION: This can be directly attributed to good Home Station training down to the individual soldier level.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Leaders are aware of the system requirements and idiosyncrasies needed to assist in the functioning of the system. Leaders are looking at the battlefield for potential problem areas and are developing courses of action to combat the situation during the planning process.
(TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Communications resources
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units that train at the Joint Readiness Training Center come with a very robust communications package.
DISCUSSION: This allows them to maintain communications at all levels. By keeping dedicated tactical nets for command purposes, reports and updates are continuously being passed in both directions.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units develop standing operating procedures (SOP) if communications are lost during operations.
(TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Physical set up of command and control (C2) nodes
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): The physical make-up of the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) and tactical command post (TAC) facilitates the flow of information throughout the staff.
DISCUSSION: Information is easily received, distributed, and analyzed. This allows the staff to gather resources and provide the commander with an integrated and coordinated staff recommendation. Command posts facilitate staff huddles and provide adequate planning space for future operations.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Brigades are determining their requirements for facilities and equipment well before coming to the JRTC. These requirements are defined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, as the elements of command and control: personnel, equipment, facilities, communication, and procedures.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Single-channel (SC) tactical satellite (TACSAT) operations
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): Single-channel TACSAT has worked well in the brigade combat teams. The operators are trained and able to effectively install, operate, and maintain this equipment.
DISCUSSION: Units are training with and using SC TACSAT radios to provide effective long-range communications when elements are beyond planning range for SINCGARS.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Develop operator certification training programs at Home Station for every type SC TACSAT within the brigade combat team (BCT).
2. Use computer based tutorials available at the Signal Regimental Officer Academy S6 website (http://www.gordon.army.mil/roa/course/s6/).
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Mission planning
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Mission planning at the aviation company level is especially noteworthy.
DISCUSSION: Assault crews consistently show considerable determination toward in-depth planning and mission accomplishment regardless of limited information from higher headquarters and time available.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Continue to reinforce Home Station training in planning and in the Military Decision-Making Process.
2. Review CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, Military Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning" Update, May 97.
(TA.4.2
Assess Situation)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Integration of special units
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Light, airborne, and air assault brigades are becoming more adept at using the armor/mechanized (mech) teams that deploy with them, primarily because of better integration of the armor/mech liaison team into the brigade's planning process.
DISCUSSION: When initially planned for at brigade and then followed up by battalion staffs, Army attack aviation and ground maneuver forces have been very successful in integrating their efforts.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: None.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Small unit leadership
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Small unit leaders in the platoon have been taking charge of the next higher unit when key leaders have become casualties or are taken out of the battle.
DISCUSSION: There has been a noticeable improvement in small unit leadership in Bradley platoons.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Numerous times young sub-unit leaders were observed taking the initiative, in the absence of orders, to ensure that the mission gets accomplished. It is interesting to note that most of the time these sub-unit leaders did not have a clear understanding of the unit's situational awareness and where they were going.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Integration of armor into the light infantry brigade/battalion
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Integration of the armor platoon into the light infantry brigade/battalion continues to improve.
DISCUSSION: Commanders are willing to use these assets and employ them within their doctrinal capabilities.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: None.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Military police (MP) platoon motivation
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) platoons demonstrate a positive attitude and a desire to learn.
DISCUSSION: These MP platoons practice new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and develop and validate new platoon standing operating procedures (SOP).
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: MP platoons demonstrate an incredible amount of flexibility and an ability to accomplish missions with limited resources available, a credit to proper troop-leading procedures.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP)
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Units have improved task force oriented TACSOPs.
DISCUSSION: These TACSOPs address a broad spectrum, including attack and cavalry, and assault tactics, techniques, and procedures.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The next step to a complete task force TACSOP is to include employment of other items that are frequently tasked organized with the task force. Include a combat observation and lasing team (COLT), various intelligence assets (REMBASS, LLVI, GSR), armor/mechanized team, ADA assets (to include Stinger/Avenger teams), and engineer teams.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Develop and communicate a plan and rehearse
OBSERVATION (LF DIV): Given the limited time between the planning and execution phases, most leaders develop and communicate an adequate operations order.
DISCUSSION: They then refine and finalize the plan through rehearsals and subsequent fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. By adhering to the 1/3-2/3 rule, company commanders and platoon leaders are allocating sufficient time to subordinates for sub-unit rehearsals prior to the platoon or company consolidated rehearsals.
2. Units are implementing contingency plans and conducting effective informal after-action reviews (AAR) at the completion of each rehearsal. However, one problem does exist concerning the link between the planning/rehearsal phase and the actual execution of the mission: Rotational unit leaders fail to advise their subordinates that the rehearsal location does not exactly mirror the terrain on which the unit will be conducting its mission.
3. Rehearsals are conducted on somewhat similar terrain, but leaders need to ensure that the focus of the rehearsals is on battle drills and on necessary individual tasks, not on the aspects of time, distance, and line of sight. When soldiers expect the objective to look exactly like the rehearsal site, the unit suffers a breakdown in momentum when its members experience the first differences.
4. This problem originates at Home Station where units habitually conduct a leader's reconnaissance, dry rehearsals, and numerous blank fires on the same terrain on which they live fire. Although a sound method for training fundamentals and ensuring safety, this practice does not train or ready units for realistic live fires or combat situations.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Time management
OBSERVATION (TF 1): The battalion-level staff has consistently done an exceptional job utilizing all available time to produce orders and plans.
DISCUSSION: By using the 1/3-2/3 rule, the battalion staff is providing subordinate units with adequate time to plan, resource, and execute missions at the company and specialty platoon level.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: None.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Command post (CP) operations
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): The executive officer (XO) provides the command and control (C2) for the forward support battalion (FSB) command post (CP)/tactical operations center (TOC).
DISCUSSION: This C2 organization ensures that the XO is in the center of information dissemination and flow, and allows him to continue constant communications with the brigade S2 in order to maintain situational awareness of the unit.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The command post is manned and resourced to operate effectively as the C2 hub for the unit. The CP NCOIC enforces the standard operating procedure (SOP); ensures all reports are accurate and timely; assists with planning and fragmentary orders (FRAGO); updates journals, charts and maps; supervises radio monitoring; and ensures information flows properly.
(TA.4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Battlefield circulation
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Brigade commanders are more aware of the status of their forces through well-planned battlefield circulation.
DISCUSSION: Commanders bring this first-hand knowledge back to the staff.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: None.
(TA.4.4.3
Provide Command Presence)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Commander's vision
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Commanders are conducting effective battlefield circulation, confirming the location and activities of forces, and providing guidance and orders to subordinate commanders.
DISCUSSION: Battlefield circulation greatly increases the commander's vision of the battlefield and his awareness of the status of his forces. It also increases his subordinate commanders' understanding of his intent. Additionally, the commander effectively communicates information garnered during battlefield circulation to his staff.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: This ensures that the commander and his staff maintained a common vision of the battlefield.
(TA.4.4.3
Provide Command Presence)
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Soldiers work together to achieve mission accomplishment.
DISCUSSION: Improvisation is key in unit success, especially when providing support with short notice and limited resources. Soldier morale, dedication, and cooperation can sometimes overcome shortfalls in manpower, time, and equipment.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Tenant units residing in the brigade support area should coordinate efforts in security, defense, and sustainment.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Soldier load considerations
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Company leadership considered the impact of a soldier's load on the mission.
DISCUSSION: Soldier loads were tailored to meet the requirements of the mission.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Companies are attempting to conduct regular resupply operations and forcing the resupply system to support the company fight forward.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Soldier's load
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Although units arrive to fight with considerable equipment, leaders are tailoring the load to match the mission.
DISCUSSION: Contingencies are discussed and equipment requirements are identified to ensure swift movement and rapid response to actions on contact. Units cache the remaining equipment and use the location to conduct resupply and rest operations.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The use of the assault pack (ruck) and "camel back" improve the soldier's comfort and his ability to move easier during movement and while in contact.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
Needs Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
FM communications and actions on contact
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Chemical platoons have not grasped the importance of good FM communication with higher headquarters and adjacent units. They also fail to bring all of their communications equipment to JRTC (especially OE254 antennas).
DISCUSSION:
1. Consistently, platoons do not maintain radio contact with brigade headquarters, battalion headquarters, or the platoon command post. They typically have been using single-channel unsecure communications for their platoon internal nets. These internal communications shortcomings contributed to tremendous amounts of planning time lost and a lack of knowledge of the complete enemy situation.
2. As a result, the platoons made contact with the enemy when it could have been avoided. Also, actions upon contact were also not executed or planned in advance, leaving soldiers and leaders trying to figure it out under fire.
3. Because of these poor reactions, platoon casualty rates were very high during these rotations. Casualty rates were compounded with a lack of communications capabilities, support from the brigade for CASEVAC, and slow assistance from other units.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Platoons must review their tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) and modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) for communications requirements.
2. Ensure that the platoons bring all equipment authorized and maintain communications in accordance with the signal operating instructions (SOI).
3. Finally, each platoon must develop and train actions-on-contact battle drills prior to combat and as part of their troop-leading procedures during mission preparation.
(TA.4.1.1
Communicate Information)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Aviation liaison team communication
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Internal communications via aviation liaison teams is usually poorly done.
DISCUSSION: Aviation liaison teams are usually not staffed for 24-hour operations.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. In an infantry brigade task force, the aviation liaison team, at a minimum, should consist of two officers (commissioned or warrant) and two SPC/SGT, MOS 93P.
2. The liaison team should be equipped with a vehicle, dual-net SINCGARS, and UHF capability. The liaison team must have access to the tactical command post local area network (TACLAN) and a mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) phone.
3. This team would have the capability to function 24 hours a day, conduct split operations if the TAC deploys, and maintain the capability to conduct face-to-face coordination with the aviation task force and subordinate ground units when required.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Understanding the brigade combat team (BCT) communications plan
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): The command and control (C2) communications architecture is not thoroughly understood throughout the brigade.
DISCUSSION: During the latter planning stages in the intermediate staging base (ISB), many questions remain as to the exact communications architecture to support the brigade's C2. Issues remain concerning C2 aircraft, control of air casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and the C2 relationship to movement. BCTs have a difficult time linking each of these C2 nodes into a common picture shared by all in the brigade. The result was confusion among the units as to which nets were to be used for specific pieces of information.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Develop and distribute a detailed drawing of the C2 structure indicating the primary and alternate means of communications linking the C2 nodes together. Disseminate to all key leaders prior to the combined arms rehearsal.
2. Incorporating a C2 rehearsal with the combined arms rehearsal can pay dividends by providing clarity to the C2 organization and functions and by catching C2 shortfalls. The C2 rehearsal should consider "who" is controlling "what" and "how" each C2 node will pass their information to all that require it.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Information flow and management
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Battle tracking in the various command posts is insufficient.
DISCUSSION: Friendly unit locations are not normally updated and distributed to subordinate companies. Units habitually file critical information without any analysis or dissemination. Most often the reason for this is the lack of a tactical operations center standing operating procedure (TOCSOP) or the failure to follow an already existing SOP.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must develop a system for battle tracking in the TOCSOP, and must properly train their battle captains and NCOs in using critical documents.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Information management in aviation units
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Brigade aviation liaison officers (LNOs) have difficulty maintaining current aviation task force specifics (i.e., aircraft maintenance status, crew cycle/availability, forward area rearm/refuel point [FARP] locations/status, mission status, aviation unit locations).
DISCUSSION: This is due to many factors, including lack of personnel to man the aviation LNO section for 24-hour operations, fog of war, and the absence of established reporting procedures in unit TACSOPs regarding aviation operations. In addition, many aviation task force staffs funnel an inordinate amount of information through the LNO that more appropriately should be passed from staff to staff using established reporting procedures.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should establish a formal reporting format for more routine information, and require subordinate aviation task forces to pass tactical information through normal channels (such as the subordinate infantry) as opposed to using the aviation LNO as the primary contact at brigade. This will, in turn, free the LNO to assist in mission planning and coordination with the brigade staff.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Brigade-level planning of aviation support for CSS operations
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The principal CSS planner in the brigade task force is the brigade S4, who often fails to coordinate with the aviation liaison officer (LNO).
DISCUSSION: The S4 is the primary logistics planner who is usually assisted by the aviation LNO and the support operations officer (SPO) at the forward support battalion/main support battalion (FSB/MSB). At the JRTC, this responsibility is often delegated to the FSB/MSB commander and his SPO. Unfortunately, the loss in coordination and synchronization across all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) results in less CSS moved by air.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The S-4 should be the primary planner for support operations and should use LNOs to focus on using all air assets available in the resupply and support role.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Modifying the plan
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Units are not doing well in planning, coordinating, and modifying the plan as conditions change.
DISCUSSION: All too often the unit has a great plan on D-Day, but by Day 3 or 4, the plan is lost, and the unit is too busy manning the perimeter to rescue the CSS effort.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: CSS coordination and integration is as important an aspect of operational planning as combat maneuver.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Battle tracking and reporting
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Battle tracking and tactical situational awareness at logistics command and control (C2) nodes is insufficient, which results in poor situational awareness across the logistics batttlefield operating system (e.g., lack of knowledge of route status and enemy activity may negatively impact anticipation of unit requirements).
DISCUSSION: Logistical status (LOGSTAT) and personnel status (PERSTAT) reporting is inaccurate and untimely, which hinders logistical planning and execution. Poor stock status reporting/tracking at company and battalion level hamper the unit's ability to quickly determine assets on hand and prioritize distribution (e.g., ammunition transfer point [ATP] stocks and Class IV/V kits). Logistical support is not anticipative in nature, in that a plan is developed based on logistic estimates and executed in the absence of required reports. As a result, the unit is responsive only through "911" or "just in time" crisis logistics.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Staff roles between the materiel management officer (MMO), SPO, battalion S3, and brigade S4 must be clearly defined and combined with efficient and adequate information flow to enhance logistical operations.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Mobility and survivability battle tracking and command and control (C2)
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ENG): Engineer command and control nodes at the brigade, battalion task force, and forward support battalion do not maintain adequate visibility on mobility/survivability conditions within their areas of operation.
DISCUSSION:
1. Engineers are frequently unable to execute Battlefield Operating System (BOS) integrated predictive analysis in an effort to accurately forecast enemy activity and focus intelligence collection assets. Specifically, O/Cs observed a routine inability to maintain a minefield incident chart or analysis wheel and/or updated templates of critical minefield systems (81mm mortar and mine cache). Failure to maintain and jointly analyze such information results in an inability to identify or focus mobility assets against the decisive point.
2. Engineers are not consistently advising commanders and staffs on enemy obstacles, route status, or survivability. When associated information is relayed, it often addressees the "status" of operations, but does not include the analysis and recommendations necessary to portray and influence the "state" (answering the "so what question"). This often cripples the brigade's ability to maintain maneuver control and make decisions concerning force protection.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Recommend that brigade and battalion tactical operation centers (TOCs) develop standing operating procedures (SOP) to disseminate enemy obstacle data and route status to all members of the brigade. A technique similar to the clearance of fire battle drill used in most TOCs has proven effective in initial dissemination and reaction to discovered obstacles.
2. Additionally, identifying specific responsibilities for enemy obstacle verification, numbering, route status updating, and daily dissemination via intelligence summary or fragmentary order (FRAGO) helps maintain a clear picture of mobility conditions within the brigade AO.
3. Brigade and battalion task force engineers should conduct regularly scheduled information exchange with all BOS elements within the TOC to verify that each have accurate enemy and friendly minefield data.
4. The state of mobility conditions must be analyzed within the engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) framework in order to bring nominations and recommendations to targeting meetings. These nominations and recommendations focus on the combined arms effort required to mitigate or remove the enemy mobility threat and consider the complete range of enemy systems (mines, enemy, over-watching mortars, and caches). These systems may be viewed as targets to attack or collect against within the targeting process.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Field artillery battle tracking
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Fire support elements, FA battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs), and FA batteries are not effectively tracking friendly units in the brigade battlespace.
DISCUSSION: Units do not routinely plot or have situational awareness of all friendly indirect fire assets or know current locations of friendly maneuver forces. Poor battle tracking reduces the ability of units to perform their basic fire support tasks and contributes to fratricide.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Acquire, plot, and use all friendly indirect fire asset locations at the fire support elements (FSEs), battalion fire direction control (FDC), TOC, and radar section, and then use proper clearance procedures during counterfire acquisitions.
2. FSEs and TOCs must use effective information management techniques as outlined in CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, The Tactical Operations Center.
3. Battery commanders must assign ownership of the TOC to leaders within the battery and establish clear guidance and SOPs for operations in the field. FM 7-10, Infantry Rifle Company, pp. 2-9 to 2-10, is a good reference on how a command post should operate for a company-size unit. Commanders must resource the TOC with personnel and equipment, and provide sufficient field training to accomplish the mission.
4. Unit standing operating procedures (SOP) must address requirements for battle tracking. Requirements for tracking should be clearly identified (such as firing unit locations, locations of the TOC and ALOC, locations of subordinate units, locations of supporting general support [GS] assets). Commanders should be involved in the decision for all the details required in battle tracking. Additionally, standardized charts should be constructed and used by all subordinate elements.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Battalion staff planning
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Battalion staffs are not effectively incorporating division intelligence and operational (I/O) objectives, themes, and messages into their I/O plans.
DISCUSSION: This often results in battalion operations that are not synchronized or focused on achieving division objectives.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units preparing for deployment to peace operations must establish who will be responsible for planning and coordinating I/O and provide an I/O cell capable of performing I/O- related tasks.
2. Follow I/O tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) provided in CALL Newsletter No. 99-2, Information Operations, and FM 100-6, Information Operations.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Chemical section situational awareness
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Chemical sections do not maintain situational awareness of the current NBC fight.
DISCUSSION: Chemical staff sections must have the tools that will assist them in maintaining situational awareness of the NBC battlefield. The use of charts that help track items, such as subordinate chemical defense equipment (CDE) status, chemical unit status, weather data in chemical downwind message format, and planned NBC missions (recon, decon or smoke), is critical. Maintaining an NBC operations map with the current templated NBC threat and unit locations and an NBC duty journal are a few other tools to use.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The brigade needs to develop a system for updating the latest information across the brigade. The information flow between the brigade and battalions should be formalized and addressed in the brigade tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) with frequency and method of dissemination addressed.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Battle tracking
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): Brigade and battalion communications sections do not have fully developed mechanisms to battle track critical communications assets.
DISCUSSION:
1. Their equipment tracking mechanisms are largely reproductions of unit modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) documents that lack detail and do not provide information such as location, maintenance posture, or requisition status of communications equipment. Subordinate units are not required to submit standardized equipment status reports to the brigade, which hinders the brigade in determining the overall communications posture within the task force.
2. Additionally, units do not have a communication security (COMSEC) tracking mechanism, resulting in units having to start from scratch when investigating COMSEC compromises.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Brigade signal officers should work with other staff members and subordinate unit signal officers to identify critical communications assets and develop a method for tracking these items.
2. Brigade signal officers should also develop a standard format for subordinate units to report their equipment status to the brigade and enforce compliance with that standard. This report should be received daily from subordinate units or incorporated into the format for a daily signal conference call.
3. Review FM 11-43, The Signal Leader's Guide. Appendix A-14 provides a sample asset tracking list that can be adapted to meet unit specific battle-tracking requirements.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Command and control (C2)
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Commanders often have an incomplete picture of their units on the battlefield.
DISCUSSION: This stems from not having an established reporting standing operating procedures (SOP), communications challenges, and inadequate movement and fire control measures. Examples of poor command and control are often evidenced by fratricide incidents that companies inflict on themselves or on other friendly elements. In all cases, better command and control through reporting and battle tracking would have prevented the fratricides. Night operations only compound the effects of poor command and control.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: In the future the unit must work to establish and rehearse procedures (control measures, reporting procedures, and battle tracking) to ensure company situational awareness through command and control on the battlefield.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Minefield awareness
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Although battalions generally have a system in place to track minefields, there are numerous instances of multiple mine strikes in identified minefields during the movement-to-contact phase.
DISCUSSION: The dissemination of this critical information is lacking.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Increased emphasis on minefield awareness and dissemination will decrease incidents of multiple mine strikes and preserve combat power.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Commanders do not have a clear understanding of the "aviation tasks" necessary to support a search and attack mission.
DISCUSSION: Often the mission translated at the troop level is to "conduct a search and attack," which does not equate in terms that an aviator can understand. In other words, "Conduct a zone reconnaissance (recon) from this phase line (PL) to this PL oriented on finding the enemy" makes more sense to aircrews. Using aviation missions will also facilitate the planning necessary for search and attack. Telling a crew to plan a zone reconnaissance within specified boundaries will force them to plan the aviation tasks necessary to recon the zone in a methodical method. More often than not, aircrews launch with the following guidance -- "Conduct search and attack vicinity the brigade tactical operations center (TOC)" or "Sweep the area around the brigade support area (BSA)."
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: This results in aircrews flying around an area with no methodical search techniques that ensure a systematic movement through a specified zone. Aircrews end up conducting "911" missions with no preplanned integration with ground units. Other tasks an aviation unit can expect to perform during search and attack operations are area reconnaissance and hasty attacks. All of these tasks should be determined and allowed for in mission analysis during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Logistic estimates
OBSERVATION (CSS Div): Logistics estimates are not used in the planning process, which results in poor anticipation of future operational requirements.
DISCUSSION: Units fail to match assets to requirements. At a minimum, the forward support battalion (FSB) security, plans and operations officer (SPO), the brigade S4, and the battalion S4 must match capabilities to requirements and identify possible shortfalls or significant risks to advise the commander as well as plan and coordinate for outside support. Every plan will have shortfalls; one of the duties of logistics planners is to identify those shortfalls to the tactical commander to ensure he has all of the information to focus appropriate assets at the decisive point. Logistics estimates are being used for the request of the next day's push; this limits the ability of the FSB to anticipate potential requirements. The FSB's ability to react to situations is limited due to the lack of information provided by customer units.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, provides a description and example of the staff estimate on pages C-2 and C-3. The SPO Handbook (ALM 69-6932-HB-D) and G1/G4 Battle Book (Student Text) provide additional examples.
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Mission intent
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Commanders and staffs must understand the capabilities and full intent of the role and mission of the scouts. The scout platoon has not been used properly by the battalion.
DISCUSSION: Scouts are not placed in the decision loop of the enemy to assist the commander at the critical point on the battlefield. The staff (S2 and S3) need to conduct a thorough mission analysis and take this to the commander in time for him to employ his eyes and ears to the battlefield. At best the scouts are placed into the area of interest 24-36 hours in advance of the attack or on defense.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: In order to provide the commander critical and timely information, scouts need to be in the area of interest 72 to 96 hours in advance of the attack.
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Mission analysis
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Mission analysis is crucial to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Units rarely conduct all 17 steps and, if steps are omitted, rarely go back when time allows and complete those steps.
DISCUSSION: Mission analysis allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualization. The result of mission analysis is defining the tactical problem and beginning the process of determining feasible solutions. The mission analysis process consists of 17 steps. Each individual Battlefield Operating System (BOS) does not conduct a separate mission analysis and provide adequate staff estimates. This results in crucial pieces of information being left out of the process.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units need to refer to FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and conduct all 17 steps of mission analysis during Home Station training and staff exercises. Until they become completely proficient at the current process (as outlined in FM 101-5), units should not deviate from the process in order to save time. Additionally, units need to integrate their entire battle staff in all Home Station training events.
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Integration and synchronization of air defense
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Air defense batteries experience difficulty understanding and contributing to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
DISCUSSION:
1. Air defense officers (ADOs) have difficulty coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing air defense due to incomplete aerial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), lack of clear task and purpose to platoons, and ineffective communication with subordinate leaders.
2. ADOs are not integrated with brigade and battalion schemes of maneuver because they are unable to articulate the aerial threat or the combat power they bring to the fight. ADOs do not develop air defense priorities for the commander or get his direct guidance on what the brigade's high-value targets (HVTs) are. Without a clear understanding of the commander's priorities, ADOs fail to allocate sufficient combat power to protect these HVTs.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. ADOs must bring detailed aerial IPB and integrate it with the S2's overall IPB. This provides the commander with a clear battlefield picture. ADOs do not develop enemy air event templates and integrate them with the S2's product. This would allow ADOs to predict when, where, and what type aircraft the enemy will use to support its scheme of maneuver.
2. A means to visualize the enemy's plans so the commander can develop his fight is important. ADOs must articulate ADA capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of threat aircraft to the decision-makers.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
21
SUBJECT:
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision-making process.
DISCUSSION: Aviation staffs do not have a clear understanding of the MDMP and the linkage between the steps. Often the commander is focused on other issues and the executive officer deals predominately with logistical matters.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must know and understand FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and how the different staff sections participate in the planning process. Home Station training is essential in order to become proficient in the decision-making process IAW FM 101-5 as well as the unit's Leadership Training Program conducted at JRTC.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
22
SUBJECT:
Aviation task force integration
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Maneuver task force battle staffs lack proficiency in planning for the doctrinal employment of aviation assets not assigned to the unit.
DISCUSSION: Attack battalions have difficulty in employing assault and heavy lift assets.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: A solution to this problem is Home Station training and the use of aviation LNOs. Commanders must ensure that their staff officers, including LNOs, are intimately familiar with all aviation doctrinal references, not just attack, cavalry, or assault employment.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
23
SUBJECT:
Use of aviation assets
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Due to the inexperience of the aviation liaison officer (LNO), many units do not properly use aviation assets.
DISCUSSION: The aviation LNO advises the brigade commander on the use of aviation assets within his task force (attack, assault, medium lift, and EW). Additionally, he coordinates for other aviation assets (external to the TF) and assists in integrating them into the fight. He typically manages Army airspace command and control (A2C2) for the brigade and assists in the management of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC assets. He performs "911" liaison with the aviation task force when standby aircraft are needed, and assumes staff responsibility for aviation risk management.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The LNO must be prepared to advise the commander on interpretations of weather, fighter management, maintenance, and tactical employment of the aviation task force.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
24
SUBJECT:
Integration in the planning process
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation units do not get into the planning process early enough to affect a coordinated effort during the search and attack.
DISCUSSION: The aviation unit can do several things to facilitate the planning effort. Establishing command relationship operational control (OPCON) is one method which forces involvement in the infantry planning process. Sending liaison officers (LNOs) to the infantry tactical operations center (TOC) is another method. The bottom line is that aviation units need to have the ground scheme of maneuver and graphics to affect a coordinated search and attack. The brigade targeting process begins 48 hours out, with orders going to the infantry battalions 24 hours out. Infantry battalions should have targets planned for execution 12 hours prior to execution. Brigade LNOs have the responsibility to pass information from the targeting meeting to the aviation task force for future planning.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The 24-hour "window" is where aviation integration in the planning process should start at the battalion level. Knowing when the infantry will execute their start point (SP) in movement, their target, their composition, and their movement plan to the target are basic elements aircrews need.
2. Supporting graphics, frequencies, and rehearsed battle drills will facilitate the effort. Once the aviation unit has this information, it can plan its "zone reconnaissance" to coincide with the infantry movement.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
25
SUBJECT:
Forward support medical team (FSMT) integration into task force planning
OBSERVATION (BDE AV): The FSMT is not fully integrated into planning, battle tracking, and communications at the tactical operations center (TOC).
DISCUSSION: Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) units need to place an operational work cell in the aviation TOC when collocated with the aviation task force.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The FSMT work cell must track mission graphics, frequencies, aircraft status, and number of patients moved as an essential part of the brigade-level command and control.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
26
SUBJECT:
Integration of task force engineers
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ENG): Task force engineers are not integrated into battalion- level decision-making.
DISCUSSION: Staffs are not integrating task organized engineer platoon leaders, mainly because the platoon leader is not thoroughly familiar with the requirements of a staff officer. Specifically, the engineer lieutenant is not trained or armed with the tools necessary to complete and maintain a focused engineer battlefield assessment (EBA), which forms the foundation of his input to the battalion's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and targeting process. Task force staff officers often do not realize the importance of integrating engineer Battlefield Operating System (BOS) analysis and estimates in the planning process. As a result, the engineer often spends an inordinate amount of time away from his platoon completing unfocused and non-integrated engineer estimates. This hinders engineer C2 and leads to poor synchronization of mobility and survivability operations at battalion task force level.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Battalion task force commanders and staffs must accept that the supporting task force engineer has the dual requirements of battalion staff officer and engineer platoon leader.
2. The battalion executive officer and S3 must ensure that the engineer is fully integrated into the Military Decision-Making Process. Additionally, the task force battle captains and staff must be trained at tracking and assimilating critical engineer BOS information when the platoon leader is away from the TOC commanding and controlling his element.
3. The battalion engineer must ensure that he is familiar with staff procedures as prescribed in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. He must develop a mutual solution with the task force staff outlining his specific duties and requirements within the task force decision-making and targeting process.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
27
SUBJECT:
The field artillery battalion in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Too many FA battalions do not execute proper staff planning.
DISCUSSION: Battalions plan inefficiently using inaccurate data and ineffective procedures, which often leads to flawed execution. As a result, adequate information is not disseminated throughout the battalion, and a lack of synchronization is evident throughout most operations in both phases. Subordinate units are left with little time to prepare orders or conduct pre-combat inspections (PCIs), detracting from battery operations and preparation.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The staff must train on and execute the steps of the MDMP as outlined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, FM 34-30, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, and FM 6-20-1, The Field Artillery Cannon Battalion, to maximize the effectiveness of a direct support (DS) field artillery battalion.
2. Development of battle drills for the execution of the MDMP within the FA battalion tactical operations center (TOC) as seen in CALL Newsletter No. 99-11, An Artillerization of the MDMP, would help train staffs in the process. The inclusion of key staff (such as the fire direction officer [FDO] or radar technician) who have significant input into the MDMP helps keep the process on track. Train all staff sections in the standard MDMP as well as the accelerated MDMP as described in CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, Military Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning," Update, May 97.
3. Effective use of warning orders helps subordinate commanders prepare their units prior to receiving the field artillery support plan. The S2 must disseminate the needed products from his IPB in these warning orders (WARNO) to assist subordinate commanders in their own IPB process and battlefield visualization.
4. The battalion operations officer and executive officer must supervise the staff to ensure the quality and dissemination of the products. They must know "what right looks like" to ensure that accurate information is produced from the staff planning process.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
28
SUBJECT:
Integration of the targeting process into the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP)
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Units are not effectively integrating the decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology into the steps of the MDMP.
DISCUSSION: Routinely units wait until after wargaming before they clearly identify high-payoff targets (HPTs), desired effects, and assets tasked to detect, deliver, and assess against those targets. As a result, units do not produce a plan that effectively integrates and synchronizes adequate combat power to achieve the commander's objectives.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Follow fire support planning procedures outlined in the White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the Brigade and Below, September 1998.
2. Develop a brigade targeting standing operating procedures (SOP) which clearly defines the responsibilities of participants during the MDMP.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
29
SUBJECT:
Synchronization of assets
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Brigade battle staffs have difficulty in synchronizing the subordinate battalions' fight as a result of wargaming and in not bringing the required products/tools to the planning table.
DISCUSSION: This usually results in a desynchronized course of action and a failure by subordinate commanders to gain a clear visualization of the brigade scheme of maneuver, task/purpose, and the enemy order of battle. Named areas of interest (NAIs), targeted areas of interest (TAIs), and decision points (DPs) should fall out of the wargaming process, but are frequently not addressed or captured. The intelligence officer does not fight a combined arms fight; his depiction of the enemy usually is not integrated with the S3 and results in a maneuver plan that fails to address the enemy's most probable course of action. Combat multipliers, such as Army attack aviation, Air Force close air support, and use of family of scatterable mines (FASCAM), are not tied into the combined arms fight. This results in CAS and FASCAM employment in an area where the enemy main effort is not templated.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Brigades need to focus on the processes and doctrinal tools normally used during combat operations. In developing the IPB, use FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; for targeting use FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process; or for achieving synchronization through the MPMP use FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.
2. Only through a continuous planning process will the brigade be able to react to a continuously changing battlefield. A synchronized wargame will allow the brigade to integrate and synchronize their operations in time and space with nested task and purpose to achieve the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
30
SUBJECT:
Integration of the Battlefield Operating System (BOS)
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Most battalion planning standing operating procedures (SOP) do not effectively integrate all of the BOS into planning or current operations.
DISCUSSION: BOS representatives still continue to not be fully integrated into the planning processes, and they are not integral members of the tactical operations center (TOC). This results in uncoordinated and unsynchronized plans and a lack of situational awareness across the task force.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The battalion should incorporate all BOS representatives into the TOC and include them throughout the planning process.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
31
SUBJECT:
Command relationships
OBSERVATION (TF 1): The scout platoon is a battalion asset but is not being treated as such.
DISCUSSION: The scout platoon leader must be involved in the MDMP from the beginning and not as an afterthought. He is essentially a company commander.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: There must be a battalion representative that takes a vested interest in the planning, resourcing, rehearsal, insertion, execution, extraction, and debriefing of the squads.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
32
SUBJECT:
Staff integration
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Tactical operations center (TOC) personnel are rarely part of the planning process, but are integral in the execution phase.
DISCUSSION: After a detailed MDMP, the entire staff is integrated into the operations order and prepared for execution. Units do a poor job of informing subordinates working in the TOC of the upcoming mission and on what is important.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The battalion XO or battle captain should issue TOC personnel a short OPORD (using the battalion rehearsal site as a tool). This allows TOC personnel to fully understand the plan, each phase of the plan, and important calls they might receive from subordinates during execution of the plan. At a minimum, the mission, commander's intent, execution by phase, CCIR, and important coordinating instructions should be covered.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
33
SUBJECT:
Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR)
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Commanders and staffs are having difficulty determining appropriate CCIR and relating those CCIR to critical decisions.
DISCUSSION: Often, brigade commanders develop CCIR that provide useful information but have little to do with decisions that the commander will have to make during the operation. The trend is for brigade commanders to develop CCIR that will more often relate to the subordinate commander's decisions rather than the brigade commander's decisions. The result is that the brigade commander becomes focused at the wrong level of detail and decision-making authority.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Brigade commanders should remain focused on the CCIR that influence their level of decision-making.
2. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) should be questions about the threat force that the brigade commander is opposing. If the brigade commander's opponent is an enemy division, then the brigade commander's PIR should ask questions that will help him determine the enemy division commander's plan.
3. The brigade FFIR should ask questions that will help the brigade commander make decisions about the brigade's force array or scheme of maneuver. Brigade essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) should be information about the brigade or the brigade's plan that, if compromised, could force the brigade commander to change his plan.
(TA.4.3.1
Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND
34
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures (TLP) in air defense artillery units
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Battery commanders and platoon leaders have difficulty applying the principles of troop-leading procedures.
DISCUSSION:
1. Warning orders and fragmentary orders are seldom used to facilitate planning and coordination for subordinate leaders. Timelines detailing critical events are not developed to manage planning and preparation time. Leaders do not conduct reconnaissance before moving teams to ensure routes are clear of mines/obstacles and secured for transit. Air defense batteries are unable to synchronize their plans due to the lack of backbriefs and rehearsals. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and team chiefs do not understand the difference between pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Within their planning sequence, they fail to provide leaders the opportunity to check soldiers' equipment or their understanding of future operations. Air defense officers do not understand the difference between a confirmation brief and a backbrief and how they are used to ensure leader understanding of the commander's intent. Most critical to TLP is the conduct of rehearsals. Leaders do not take the time to rehearse critical events and contingencies of future missions.
2. Leaders do not understand the need to establish a battle rhythm that manages their planning and preparation time. Air defense officers need to synchronize brigade, task force, battery, and platoon timelines to backward plan time available for mission preparation. This gives soldiers and first-line leaders maximum time to conduct reconnaissance, plan, rehearse, and execute. Battle rhythm establishes a daily routine to manage the current fight and future planning. It allows first-line leaders time to conduct their inspections and checks.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Troop-leading procedures are essential to effective planning and time management. It provides fire units necessary preparation time to conduct checks, inspections, and rehearsals. Subordinate leaders must be given sufficient planning and preparation time to execute future missions.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
35
SUBJECT:
Pre-deployment training
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Pre-deployment training continues to be a problem for the armor and mechanized infantry units that deploy to the JRTC.
DISCUSSION: The emphasis (or lack of) and amount of training are evident within days of initial mission execution.
1. Platoons have not deployed with an operational document that they can refer to for the execution of routine tasks. This lack of a standing operating procedure (SOP) has been the demise of many operations. Crew members do not know their duties and responsibilities, the execution of battle drills is poor, and no standard is enforced.
2. Units that are deploying lack basic knowledge on their tactics and equipment. This is the result of not having a true subject matter expert (SME) that can discuss the capabilities and limitations of their systems. It is critical that each platoon-sized element and higher has an SME so that when they are attached and/or operational control (OPCON) to a light infantry unit, they can provide accurate information about their capabilities and limitations. When units do not have an SME, they cannot properly employ the systems they have. In addition to general knowledge, units are deploying with personnel that have not trained on critical pieces of equipment. The counter-mine equipment (CME) is essential to success in the area of operations (AO), but few units have a well-trained team.
3. The briefing on succession of command goes well in the operations order (OPORD), but there really is not much thought given to it. When units deploy, there is no depth to their leadership. The perception is that the unit is training each individual for a single position; there is no cross-training or training for the next higher position. When the leadership or essential member(s) are not able to perform their duties, units have come to a complete standstill for periods up to 24 hours because they did not have any depth.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The specific areas identified above must be addressed in unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
36
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures (TLP) at platoon level
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Troop-leading procedures continue to hamper operations at the platoon level. The most noticeable problems are in the areas of planning and time management.
DISCUSSION:
1. Platoons fail to do a good mission analysis and thus fail to properly plan each of their missions. They are not looking forward and properly preparing themselves; pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCI) do not exist and, therefore, do not adequately address needed resources.
2. Time management is also another major concern for platoons. It is critical that leaders effectively manage their time in order to maximize their effectiveness. The inability to master available time leads to poor planning, little to no mission preparation, and poor execution. Leaders continually wait for information from higher before they begin planning -- putting themselves further behind.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Leaders must establish detailed timelines that provide subordinates with guidance to get them started in their mission preparation.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
37
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures (TLP) in planning
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Lack of troop-leading procedures affect the 1/3-2/3 planning, preparation, and execution rule.
DISCUSSION: Shortcuts to save time often negatively impact unit readiness for specified tasks. Leaders working in a "fire and forget" mode (not completing the final step, supervise) often lose situational awareness. As a result, leaders have not fully prepared their unit for a mission and are not minimizing the effects of events on the battlefield. Information gained by one unit is not being passed to other units. Minefields are being cleared the old fashion way -- one vehicle at a time.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The final step of the troop-leading procedures must be emphasized -- SUPERVISE.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
38
SUBJECT:
Battle drills for military police (MP) platoons
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): MP platoons continue to have difficulty aggressively executing battle drills.
DISCUSSION: Soldiers react to the contact and leaders direct action, but many times the reaction is slow and unrehearsed. Reacting to contact should be instinctive, immediate, and rehearsed.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should train on battle drills outlined in ARTEP 19-100-10, DRILL, and those developed for internal tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
39
SUBJECT:
Information flow to subordinates
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Information flow to subordinates and the use of troop-leading procedures are poor.
DISCUSSION: Chemical platoon leaders are familiar with troop-leading procedures, but do not practically apply the steps towards the execution of their mission.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The platoon's leadership must standardize troop-leading procedures. When leaders cut corners on troop-leading procedures, their subordinates miss critical information and intelligence needed to accomplish their mission. Platoons should review the troop-leading procedures outlined in FM 7-8, Rifle Infantry Platoon and Squad.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
40
SUBJECT:
Use of standing operating procedures (SOP)
OBSERVATION (ANTI-ARMOR CO): Most units did not have or follow their SOP.
DISCUSSION: In almost every mission, one or two critical steps are omitted because leaders do not follow or know their SOP. A thorough SOP assists in daily tasks such as maintenance (and other priorities of work). It further assists in the successful accomplishment of assigned missions, such as convoy escort/security or establishing a traffic control point.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (pp. 5-1 through 5-36) provides an example of a generic SOP. It can be used to develop or modify a current SOP to improve the unit's performance.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
41
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures for the company
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Most companies do not adequately incorporate or follow troop- leading procedures (TLP).
DISCUSSION: Units do not conduct a proper estimate of the situation, establish timelines, issue orders consistently, or conduct rehearsals and pre-combat inspections (PCI). Additionally, supervision (to include leaders' reconnaissance and battlefield circulation) at all levels by the unit leadership is lacking.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Unit commanders must follow and emphasize the troop-leading procedures as outlined in FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, and FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
42
SUBJECT:
Troop-leading procedures and mission analysis
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Due to limited planning time and being overtasked from battalion, leaders in companies did not conduct proper mission analysis, IPB, or rehearse mission-essential tasks.
DISCUSSION: Unclear missions and commander's intent from higher headquarters compounds this problem.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Leaders need to become more familiar with the eight steps of the troop-leading procedures, particularly with Step 3 (Make a Tentative Plan) and Step 8 (Supervise - Focus on Rehearsals).
2. FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (pages 2-3 through 2-10) provides a detailed explanation of each of the eight steps of the troop-leading procedures.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
43
SUBJECT:
Establishing priorities of work
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Commanders are not establishing timelines to accomplish tasks. Instead they are giving an "as-soon-as-possible" suspense for tasks.
DISCUSSION:
1. Commanders and leaders are not establishing timelines in their daily operations during movement to contact, the defense, and the attack.
2. Commanders are not enforcing established timelines. These bad habits result in the following:
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Commanders and platoon leaders must conduct backward planning for all operations. Leaders then issue the timeline in the warning order and operations order.
2. Refer to ARTEP 7-10-MTP, Task #7-2-1605 (Develop and Communicate a Plan) for further information.
3. A unit's timeline should designate "no-later-than" times with groups of tasks for the platoons to accomplish. Platoons have different strengths and weaknesses. When the commander gives a list of tasks to be accomplished by a "no-later-than" time, the platoon leader can manage those tasks in the order best suited for his platoon -- maximizing his time for platoon troop-leading procedures.
4. The company command post should maintain a copy of the timeline and receive reports from the platoons upon completion of tasks. The company commander should assign one individual, preferably the first sergeant, to enforce the timeline.
5. Refer to FM 7-10, The Infantry Company, p. 2-9, Company Command Post, for more information on the functions of the company command post.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
44
SUBJECT:
Battle drills
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Platoons continue to have difficulty aggressively executing battle drills. In many cases they lack common standing operating procedures (SOP).
DISCUSSION: Soldiers react to the contact and leaders direct action, but many times the reaction is slow and unrehearsed. Reacting to contact should be instinctive, immediate, and rehearsed.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should train on battle drills outlined in ARTEP 19-100-10, DRILL, and those developed for internal tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs).
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
45
SUBJECT:
Combat patience
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Leaders correctly position themselves well forward during contact, but too often make hasty decisions with negative consequences.
DISCUSSION: Leaders typically forget to use indirect fire, CAS, or attack aviation because they are in too much of a hurry to "kill the enemy." Additionally, junior leaders, at times, cause fratricide by requesting mortar support and then pursuing the enemy before the mortar rounds have landed.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Battle Drills 1 and 1A from FM 7-8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, explain how to exercise combat patience.
2. Leaders at all levels must allow their junior leaders to report, and then allow just enough time for the situation to develop before committing to a course of action.
(TA.4.4
Develop Courses of Action)
TREND
46
SUBJECT:
Develop and communicate a plan
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Leaders are not applying the estimate process at company level.
DISCUSSION: Specifically, company- and platoon-level leaders are not conducting an intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in accordance with FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, Chapter 2, Section III, Paragraph 2-16. The IPB is necessary prior to developing courses of action. Generally speaking, company commanders read the S2's intelligence annex verbatim to their platoon leaders as part of the company operations order (OPORD). Platoon leaders read the enemy situation sub-paragraph from the company OPORD verbatim as part of the platoon OPORD. Intelligence is not driving course of action development or maneuver.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Develop and communicate a plan.
2. Review FM 7-10, Chapter 2, Section III. The estimate process "helps the leader determine his mission, understand his situation, and select the best course of action to accomplish his assigned responsibilities."
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
TREND
47
SUBJECT:
Time management
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The most common phrase heard during an after-action report (AAR) about troop-leading procedures is: "We didn't have enough time." We have so many tools at our disposal as leaders to manage time during planning. Some areas requiring emphasis are assembly area procedures, priorities of work, timelines, pre-combat checks and inspections, and rehearsals.
DISCUSSION:
1. Platoons fail to execute assembly area procedures/priorities of work (POW) to set the conditions for future planning and preparation. Usually when platoons first move into an assembly area, there is no sense of urgency to establish security or do the right thing. It seems to be more important to sleep, eat, and do hygiene. These tasks are important, but not that high on the POW list. Most units have some type of standing operating procedures (SOP) for these tasks, but platoons fail to adhere to them or follow the commander's guidance.
2. Platoons fail to set the conditions in the assembly area for future operations. Too many times BLUFOR units have poor time management techniques and do not use it to focus planning and preparation procedures. Too often platoon leaders do not issue a timeline to subordinates to reference in executing their steps of the troop-leading procedures. A majority of the time, subordinates just get a start point time and not-later-than time for the mission and that is all. Timelines need to be established, adhered to, and enforced by leaders to assist them in focusing their efforts in the troop-leading procedures process.
3. Leaders do not plan to execute pre-combat checks (PCCs), pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and rehearsals in their timelines. Too often leaders make excuses for not doing them or just do not do them at all. If platoons do not get anything else done, platoon leaders should at least execute PCCs, PCIs, and rehearsals. Platoons have been observed not having the appropriate equipment or personnel at the right place and time to be effective against the enemy. It has been observed that leaders do not ensure their soldiers are ready for the mission through pre-combat checks and inspections or that the soldiers have a clear understanding of the mission through a rehearsal at platoon level.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Platoon leaders (PLs) must have time to accomplish the key tasks in the troop-leading procedures. They must fight to get time and use it to their advantage to be thoroughly prepared to execute the mission. Platoon leaders must develop a timeline that is realistic and adhered to and which they enforce. Finally, the PL must ask himself this: Who is doing what during troop-leading procedures while I am at the company/battalion planning process? Platoon leaders must remember to give out specific guidance on what must be done by the unit to prepare for future operations and to be successful in combat.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
48
SUBJECT:
Prepare an oral operation order (OPORD)
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Squad and team leaders in military police (MP) platoons are not preparing and issuing OPORDs to standard.
DISCUSSION: As a result, soldiers often lack the critical understanding of how their mission supports the brigade combat team (BCT) operation. Additionally, the lack of detailed information, normally given during an OPORD, places units at a greater risk by soldiers not understanding the mission or how they are expected to accomplish it. Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are not being collected and reported, and troop-leading procedures are generally substandard as the result of no OPORD being issued.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Junior leaders must continue to train on the task "Prepare an Oral Operation Order" (STP 21-24-SMCT [Task #071-326-5626]).
2. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant should receive backbriefs and supervise as well as spot-check junior leaders while they issue orders and conduct troop-leading procedures.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
49
SUBJECT:
Supervise troop-leading procedures (TLP)
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units fail to supervise troop-leading procedures in mission planning.
DISCUSSION: During the planning process leaders fail to utilize the 1/3-2/3 rule. This results in not enough time allotted to conduct planning, pre-combat checks, and rehearsals to standard. This process should be enforced at Home Station. Leaders need to work through the condensed planning processes to be successful in the field. At the same time, parallel planning should be taught.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. All leaders must understand their duties and responsibilities in the process.
2. A checklist in the unit standing operating procedures (SOP) and a pre-fabricated operations order would be beneficial.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans or Orders)
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Most brigade rehearsals provide little added value in terms of helping key leaders visualize the operation and the linkage between various actions.
DISCUSSION: This is because rehearsals are not interactive; that is, rehearsals do not demonstrate the interaction between friendly and enemy forces or between various friendly forces. Usually, the S2 briefs the enemy plan. Then, one at a time, the battalion commanders and company commanders move to the terrain model and explain their plan to everyone. The problem is that this is much more of a backbrief than a practice session.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Commanders should make rehearsals as interactive as possible. Show and discuss the engagements between friendly and enemy forces. Let everyone see the location of various friendly units in relationship to each other over time so that they have a good visualization of the battlefield geometry.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
51
SUBJECT:
Range mentality and rehearsals
OBSERVATION (LF DIV): There are very few range fan restrictions during live fires at the JRTC, and the ones that exist need to be enforced or considered in real combat. This creates a problem for rotational units because they are accustomed to severe range fans and restrictions.
DISCUSSION: At Home Station, units habitually conduct a leader's reconnaissance, dry rehearsals, and numerous blank fires on the same terrain on which they live fire. Although a sound method for training fundamentals and ensuring safety, this practice does not train or ready units for the realistic live fires or combat situations at JRTC. The key problem with rehearsing on the same terrain is that both leaders and soldiers tend to conduct "battlefield recognition" instead of reading the terrain and developing the enemy situation. When a soldier conducts a walk-through, dry run, and blank fire on the actual objective, he ends up looking for and using the same tree, path, or fighting position during the actual live fire. On the other hand, if rehearsals are conducted on similar terrain, a soldier has to observe his entire surroundings, take into account what other soldiers are doing in relation to him, and take time to determine enemy locations and composition. He does all this before he decides where to bound to next, what terrain to use as cover, and when to engage the enemy and in what direction. This also applies to the unit's leaders.
Because units have gotten into the habit of rehearsing and sometimes even briefing their orders on the actual live-fire range, O/Cs have witnessed deterioration in the unit's ability to conduct rock drills as well as adequate full-dress rehearsals, which are JRTC minimum requirements for conducting a live fire. Leaders are usually the problem during rehearsals because they do not want to take part, but prefer to watch and direct. They also fail to advise their subordinates that the rehearsal location does not exactly mirror the terrain on which the unit will be conducting its mission. Overall, leaders need to ensure that the focus of the rehearsals is on battle drills and on necessary individual tasks, not on the aspects of time, distance, and line of sight. When soldiers expect the objective to look exactly like the rehearsal site, the unit suffers a breakdown in momentum and action when its members experience the first differences.
Another problem that exists is a combination of range mentality and an oversight in planning and rehearsals. Many leaders focus entirely on actions on the objective and overlook planning a good route to the objective. Unless enforced by O/Cs, units do not rehearse movement. This results in poor movement formations and techniques, and, unfortunately, O/Cs leading many units to the objective. With the majority of JRTC live fires requiring a tactical movement that may vary anywhere from 300 to 1500 meters, unit leaders need to take the time to plan and rehearse tactical movement and ensure that the point man has adequate land navigational skills.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Many post range regulations only require that a unit blank fire on similar terrain prior to live firing; however, again, units have fallen into the habit of conducting all rehearsals on the actual site.
1. Units should thoroughly check the regulations, and, if allowed, construct a mock-up of the range (if one does not already exist) and plan and rehearse as they would for a real mission. Leaders can still reinforce the range fans and other safety restrictions, but the elements of realism and surprise will be present during the actual mission.
2. If regulations require that a unit blank fire on the actual objective before live firing, another technique is to reserve the range for two consecutive weeks. Blank fire and live fire during the first week, which will satisfy the requirement. Return to the range a few days later, and after rehearsing on similar terrain, go straight into the live fire. Units will be much better prepared for JRTC live fires if they conduct live fires at Home Station in this manner.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
52
SUBJECT:
Fire support rehearsal integration
OBSERVATION: Most units understand the importance of conducting rehearsals and establish times for them in planning timelines. However, brigades and battalions routinely are unable to successfully integrate fire support into combined arms rehearsals, and often fail to conduct fire support rehearsals prior to execution.
DISCUSSION: Units experience difficulty providing responsive, synchronized fires, failing to maximize combat power due to friction caused by the lack of a practicing plan before execution. Common causes of friction are communications links, target list discrepancies, target engagement criteria, attack guidance, and fire support coordination measures.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Establish procedures for rehearsals as part of tactical standing operating procedures (SOP). At a minimum, the SOP should identify the following: who will participate in the rehearsal, what should be rehearsed based on time available, what the sequence of the rehearsal will be, and what the priority of methods for rehearsals will be.
2. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Appendix G, and FM 6-20-1, The Field Artillery Cannon Battalion, Chapter 3, provide detailed information pertaining to rehearsals.
3. When operating in a time-constrained environment, it is important to identify and rehearse, at a minimum, critical points of an operation.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
53
SUBJECT:
Mortuary affairs operations
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): The collection of remains is not planned as a combat operation.
DISCUSSION: No assets are planned or allocated, and no security package is planned. The S4 should plan for remains recovery as a contingency mission.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Contingency planning should consider routes, security, remains handlers, casualty feeder reports and witness statement collection, personal property collection and storage, and evacuation to the mortuary affairs site in the brigade support area.
2. Review FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
54
SUBJECT:
Discipline and enforcing priorities of work
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units do not make maximum use of their time in the defense.
DISCUSSION: Units often waste time by not following established defense or priority of work checklists. In some cases soldier fighting positions are not prepared by the NLT defend time. Additionally, units typically have no system or procedures in place to continue defensive preparations during limited visibility. During the movement-to-contact phase in company assembly areas, leaders do not follow or enforce priorities of work. This is a reflection of junior leaders in the company not enforcing discipline and ensuring soldiers do what they should at the appropriate time.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Leaders must identify the priorities of work and make the chain of command responsible for completion based on a time standard.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
55
SUBJECT:
Conduct rehearsals to standard
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units are conducting walk-throughs as the standard for rehearsals.
DISCUSSION: Platoons have only a little knowledge on how to conduct rehearsals to standard and the type of rehearsal needed. The reasons are: limited experience in conducting rehearsals to standard, lack of supervision from the chain of command, and not enough time allotted (not using the 1/3-2/3 rule).
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: There must be specific direction and guidance given to a rehearsal with a set agenda and a desired endstate. Units should rehearse the timing of MOPMS deployment and indirect fires and direct fire engagement from both organic and attached weapons systems. During preparations for MOUT operations, units should conduct extensive platoon and squad rehearsals on the following tasks: breach, squad clear a room, platoon clear a building, marking, overwatch (support by fire), and consolidation and reorganization to include casualty collection and evacuation. Rehearsals ensure that everyone down to the individual soldier level understands both the operations order and, more importantly, how to execute the plan.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
56
SUBJECT:
Detailed rehearsals at company level
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units do not conduct detailed rehearsals because of time management difficulties.
DISCUSSION: This seriously affects the unit during both the defense and the assault. During the defense, not conducting rehearsals is a contributing factor to missed opportunities to attrit and delay the enemy's main effort.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. During preparations for military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT), units should conduct extensive platoon and squad rehearsals on the following tasks: breach, squad clear a room, platoon a clear building, marking, overwatch (support by fire), and consolidation and reorganization to include casualty collection and evacuation.
2. Rehearsals ensure that everyone down to the individual soldier level understands both the operations order and how to execute the plan.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
57
SUBJECT:
Preparing for combat rehearsals
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Rifle companies typically conduct a few rehearsals at company level during a rotation. Most rehearsals are done on a map or terrain model at best.
DISCUSSION: The only full-force platoon rehearsals are conducted at the intermediate staging base (ISB). Squads conduct limited generic rehearsals during troop-leading procedures. Company combined arms rehearsals, including the integration of attached engineer, AT Company, CA, and air defense assets, are almost never accomplished. The result of not conducting company combined arms rehearsals is a poor understanding of the company scheme of maneuver for each operation by platoon leaders and attached element leaders.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Companies must conduct a combined arms rehearsal for every operation, and each platoon must conduct a full-force rehearsal whenever possible, including contingencies at all levels.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): In the brigade headquarters, staff roles are not well defined between the support operations officer and the brigade S4. The combat service support (CSS) plan is not fully integrated or synchronized with the maneuver plan.
DISCUSSION: The lack of defined roles between these staff officers, combined with inadequate and inefficient information between their staff sections, serves to degrade their ability to plan and execute logistical operations. As a result, logistics execution becomes reactive, and logistics planners are not able to be proactive. CSS planners must understand the commander's intent and work closely with operations planners. Logistics planning cannot be conducted separately (in a vacuum). By planning side by side with G3 and S3 planners, CSS capabilities and flexibility are increased by ensuring combat support elements appropriately support the CSS effort. Additionally, CSS elements are prioritized and positioned to best support the maneuver elements.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Review FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion, Chapter 3.
2. Review FM 100-10, Combat Service Support.
3. One technique is to have CSS planners take part in maneuver course of action (COA) development and then develop CSS COA for each maneuver COA. Using this technique, logistics planners are synchronized with the maneuver planners. FSB plans must be tied to tactical plans through unit S4 channels in coordination with the field trains.
(TA.4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support)
TREND
59
SUBJECT:
Integration during search and attack
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Commanders continue to have problems during the search and attack phase of the rotation.
DISCUSSION: Aviation units conduct search and attack operations by employing either a zone reconnaissance, an area reconnaissance, or hasty attacks as a finishing force. The commander may specify other reconnaissance objectives in his intent, but finding the enemy is usually the focus. Adherence to the critical tasks associated with a zone/area reconnaissance and the commander's PIR will help define the purpose of the reconnaissance for the aircrews. Units that plan a zone/area reconnaissance with supporting graphics and control measures have greater success in thoroughly searching a zone. For a zone reconnaissance, graphics break a zone up into logical segments that can be systematically executed, i.e. phase line to phase line. Flight techniques are important while conducting the zone reconnaissance. Due to the nature of the terrain, it is imperative that aircrews fly slow enough to search down into the trees. A common trend is for the aircrews to fly at speeds between 50-80 knots, which is too fast!
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Crews that slow down to speeds from ETL to 30 knots are more successful in finding the enemy, cache sites, and other targets.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND
60
SUBJECT:
Staff integration and synchronization
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Many platoon leaders do not fully understand where and how in the planning process they provide their input to integrate and synchronize MP support with the brigade combat team's (BCT's) operation.
DISCUSSION: There are also problems using information received from the BCT and producing timely combat orders for the platoon so that junior leaders can begin their troop-leading procedures and parallel planning. Many platoon leaders fail to ensure that MPs are included in the brigade's tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP). Platoons are habitually plagued with "911" missions.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The proper integration, synchronization, and mission prioritization of MP assets will prevent many of the "911" missions that are uncoordinated, unplanned, and unrehearsed. These unrehearsed missions lead to many unnecessary casualties and lost critical assets.
1. At Home Station, the provost marshal, commander, and platoon leader should conduct continuous leader/staff training at brigade on MP capabilities and employment.
2. The platoon leader, with assistance from the BCT commander, must ensure that MPs are included in the BCT's TACSOP. The MP annex to the TACSOP should describe capabilities, employment considerations, doctrinal missions, prioritization, and specific collective tasks that support the brigade mission essential task list (METL).
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND
61
SUBJECT:
Mission projection
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Mission projection continues to be difficult for units at the company level.
DISCUSSION: Typical missions, such as CASEVAC and CSS, often are passed to assault companies within one hour of execution. This normally results in a crew flying a mission without proper preparation. Normally, crews sacrifice an update on the enemy and friendly situation to ensure they meet critical time requirements. Standby crews often fail to PCI aircraft and receive updates prior to assuming standby status, which tends to make matters worse.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must ensure the proper level of command involvement stresses to aircrews the importance of conducting pre-flight, pre-combat inspections (PCI), and S2/S3 update briefings prior to assuming their shifts. With minimal effort, commanders can adjust duty periods for crews which allow these steps to occur and still remain within their fighter management cycle.
(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
Acknowledgements
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