NTC TRENDS AND TTPs, 3rd and 4th Quarters FY99

NTC TRENDS AND TTPs
3rd and 4th Quarters, FY 99

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by NTC O/Cs and pulled from unit Take Home Packages (THPs) and After-Action Reviews (AARs) for 3rd and 4th quarters, FY99. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with Blueprint of the Battlefield codes for use in long-term trend analysis.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon IPB Process

OBSERVATION (Mech): The scout platoon leader was able to take terrain and enemy situation and refine it at platoon level to plan OP positions and routes into sector.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Continue to do IPB at platoon level.

2. Train subordinate leaders in the IPB process to assist them in section and squad level planning. The greater the detail, the better the understanding for subordinate leaders.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: S2 Section Organization and Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): S2 sections are seldom working as a team and are not task organized according to METT-T.

DISCUSSION:

1. S2 sections often operate a shift schedule without regard to mission requirements.

2. Many sections set up a plans team, but do not fully brief the plan to the rest of the section.

3. The most underutilized member in most S2 sections is the NCOIC, although they are usually senior NCOs with maneuver backgrounds who can offer great assistance.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Phase soldiers into work schedules. Work and sleep plans should be based on METT-T. Avoid massive personnel turnovers. Giving soldiers 12 hours off in one day is excessive.

2. Conduct detailed shift-change briefings.

3. Utilize the S2 NCOIC.

(TA.5 Intelligence BOS)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Engineer Reconnaissance

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Engineer reconnaissance is seldom incorporated into the overall reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

DISCUSSION: The employment of engineer reconnaissance is a critical task for the engineers in the offense.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers should provide increased input to the brigade/task force plan.

2. The staff engineer/S2 should develop engineer named areas of interest (NAI) and decision points.

3. Engineer commanders should establish a system for tracking the location and activity of the teams.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Integration and Synchronization of Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plans

OBSERVATION (Armor): R&S plans are seldom an integrated staff effort.

DISCUSSION: Assets are normally either overtasked or undertasked.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Issue guidance early. Integrate as a battle staff product.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): R&S operations lack commander's emphasis and integration of staff elements during planning and execution.

DISCUSSION:

1. There is seldom anyone in charge of the R&S fight.

2. R&S operations are treated as a part of the current operation and not seen as independent.

3. Sub-units are not given sufficient time to prepare and execute.

4. The R&S plan is reduced to a matrix in the intelligence annex.

5. R&S operations are not rehearsed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Rehearse! Rehearse! Rehearse!

2. Commanders must give clear and concise guidance on what they need to know in the form of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) or information requirements (IRs).

3. The S2 must use company/teams, CSS, fire support, ADA, chemical, and higher headquarters as intelligence gatherers.

EXAMPLE:

Will regimental reconnaissance elements (one BMP and one BRDM) go through NAI 4 along AA 2A before 232200 Dec 98? LTIOV 232300 Dec 98, friendly decision point: Commit 2ndPlatoon, Charlie Company to kill regimental recon team.

Scout platoon will confirm or deny existence of enemy OP at NAI 4 (NK 123456). Look for one BMP or one BRDM and possible dismounts. Start looking at 231900 Dec 98 and check every hour until 232300 Dec 98 for enemy activity.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Knowledge of Enemy Doctrine and Predictive Analysis

OBSERVATION (FS): S2 sections frequently lack detailed knowledge of enemy tactics and doctrine.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S2 must be the battalion's expert on enemy doctrine. An S2 officer/NCO professional development class on enemy doctrine will benefit the unit at Home Station.

2. Threat analysis must be based upon a clear understanding of enemy doctrine and is greatly enhanced by complete situational templates (SITEMPs) for multiple enemy courses of action (ECOAs).

3. Situational maps (SITMAPs) allow the S2 to confirm or deny ECOAs.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Integrating Intelligence Collection Assets for Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The entire battle staff is not consistently incorporated into the collection planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. S2s need to focus their efforts on the collection, but the collection effort is seldom synchronized with subordinate units.

2. S2s frequently conduct reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning in a vacuum. As a result, the R&S plan does not necessarily link named areas of interest (NAIs) and specific orders and requests (SORs) that would answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Assets, such as ADA, MPs, and communications units, must be exploited for intelligence gathering.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Produce and issue R&S guidance early; do not wait on higher headquarters! Refine/ update the plan during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and execution phase.

2. Conduct R&S rehearsals.

3. Avoid:

a. Unfocused plans that overtask some assets and undertask others.

b. Unprioritzed and unfocused NAIs that do not help support the unit's scheme of maneuver.

c. Unsynchronized and uncoordinated R&S plans that do not support decision points or incorporate fires.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigades do not adequately employ NBC reconnaissance.

DISCUSSION: Fox reconnaissance is a division asset that is attached to a brigade combat team (BCT) to support the brigade fight. The brigade staff, however, does not fully integrate Fox reconnaissance into the brigade plan. This asset is usually assigned no clear task and purpose and is left out of the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. As a result, Fox reconnaissance is undertasked and the brigade has one less set of eyes to collect information on the enemy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Integrate NBC reconnaissance by tasking it in the brigade R&S plan. This will facilitate effective use of the Foxes and provide the BCT with additional reconnaissance capability.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) Tracking

OBSERVATION (LTP): Tracking of PIRs is inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most brigade commanders approve or modify the S2's recommended PIRs during the commander's guidance portion of the staff planning process; however, once identified as the commander's PIR, they are rarely tracked, and the commander is not informed when a PIR has been answered.

2. Once the commander approves the PIRs, those PIRs are normally posted within the brigade main CP. However, these posted PIRs are then left unattended. There is normally no one tracking the commander's PIRs and, consequently, the commander is not informed when a PIR has been answered.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: PIRs must be tracked and the commander informed as soon as a PIR has been answered. Generally, there is a decision based on a specific PIR. Part of the problem lies with the transition from the planning phase to the execution phase of the operation. The S2 current operations staff does not fully understand the importance of the posted PIRs and associated decisions. This is especially the case when the S2 battle staff personnel function as RTOs rather than providing analysis of combat information. There must be an effective transition brief between the S2 planner and the S2 battle staff. PIRs must be tracked and the commander informed when PIRs are answered.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE) and Engineer Battalion S2 Responsibilities

OBSERVATION (LTP): ABEs and engineer battalion S2s are not coming to the Leader Training Program (LTP) with a full understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

DISCUSSION:

1. ABEs and engineer battalion S2s rarely arrive at LTP prepared to begin an orders process with their brigade staff. It is apparent that they are not being trained at Home Station. Seldom do they understand their duties and responsibilities within the battalion or in support of the brigade staff.

2. Basic products, such as a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and intervisibility line (IV) overlay, are often not produced.

3. The engineer S2 often becomes dependent on the brigade S2 and does not contribute to the brigade plan or the ABE.

4. Very little analysis of enemy engineer capabilities or predictive analysis is conducted.

5. The ABE and engineer battalion S2 frequently do not have or develop a full understanding of the equipment, organization, or capabilities of the enemy engineers. As a result, maneuver commanders are not prepared when the enemy uses its mobility/survivabilty assets.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The ABE and engineer S2 should, prior to deployment, become thoroughly prepared. They should have a MCOO and an IV overlay, and should understand the equipment and capabilities of the OPFOR engineers.

2. Engineer S2s must be able to determine how the OPFOR will use the terrain to their advantage conducting the engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) per guidance in FM 5-71-2, Armored Task-Force Engineer Combat Operations, Appendix A. Determine the enemy capabilities, organizations, and standard employment per the guidance found in FM 100-61, Armor- and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force Operational Art.

3. The ABE and engineer S2 should meet with the engineer battalion commander and S3 to determine their duties and responsibilities. They should attempt to understand the commander's basic intent for shaping the battlefield both offensively and defensively.

4. Working together, the ABE and engineer S2 should complete the following:

a. Template enemy engineer assets and assess their capabilities.

b. Analyze how the enemy will use his mobility and countermobility assets.

c. Template enemy obstacles and weak points in the enemy defensive plan.

d. Analyze terrain in the brigade area of operations using Terrabase II and TOPO (topographic) team products.

e. Develop engineer-specific named areas of interest (NAIs) covering templated obstacles.

f. Assist in the development of the brigade's reconnaissance & surveillance (R&S) plan to collect OBSINTEL.

g. Recommend routes to move and position engineers focused on specific NAIs.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Engineer Involvement in Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning

OBSERVATION (LTP): The engineer battalion rarely plays a major part in the brigade's R&S planning.

DISCUSSION:

1. The engineer effort that does occur is normally part of an SOP that places some engineers with the task force scouts or occasionally with COLT teams. It is not based on a current warning order (WARNO), situation template (SITEMP), or commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

2. A firm relationship between the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) and the R&S planning cell rarely occurs. As a result, any engineer effort in support of the R&S effort is ineffective.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) is critical to the brigade's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and is crucial when developing the brigade's R&S plan, especially when in support of offensive missions.

2. OPFOR vehicles have a tendency to move numerous times during the preparation of their defenses, but their obstacles, once emplaced, do not move. Known obstacle locations paint a detailed picture of the OPFOR defense.

3. The location, composition, disposition, and intent of the enemy's obstacles must be known prior to crossing the line of departure (LD) in order to successfully task organize to breach the enemy's obstacles.

4. The ABE should step up and ensure that he is considered as a key player during R&S planning. Engineer-specific PIRs must be established and refined.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Integration of Air Portion into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Armor): Air IPB is not integrated into the S2's situational template (SITEMP) or briefed as part of the OPORD mission analysis.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The S2 is the IPB coordinator, but input should be solicited from the ADA officer. AAAs, AOB, type, and capability should be included along with air IPB in the SITEMP, MDMP, and OPORD.

(TA.5.2.1Collection Information on Situation)

TREND 12

SUBJECT: Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA)

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Assistant brigade engineers (ABEs) often use an automated engineer battlefield assessment spreadsheet to develop the mission analysis briefing.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The ABE needs to focus mission analysis on how terrain and friendly and enemy engineers will shape the battlefield. The ABE should ensure that enemy situational obstacles, such as the MOD, UMZ, and BM-21 rocket-delivered SCATMINEs, as well as conventional obstacles, are templated throughout the battlefield based on each enemy COA.

2. The ABE needs to address mobility/countermobility and capability (numbers of lanes or meters of obstacle instead of numbers of MICLICs or line platoons) and link this capability to resources required, such as Class IV/V packages.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Production of Imagery and Terrain Analysis Products

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Units produce minimal terrain products prior to their arrival at the NTC.

DISCUSSION: Units that do produce terrain products prior to deployment generally focus their early efforts on analysis of typical key terrain features, intervisibility line analysis, and soil analysis.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) section must produce standard terrain analysis products of the projected area of operations as soon as it is known, or request products from a supporting corps or division terrain team. This production begins at Home Station.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis and Analytical Products

OBSERVATION (Armor): Terrain analysis products lack needed detail.

DISCUSSION:

1. Analysis of terrain effects on courses of action (COAs) is poor.

2. Tools are not used (Terrabase, Microdem).

3. Obstacles are not templated or are templated only for a single enemy COA.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT)/right seat ride involving S2/engineer conducting detailed analysis combined with Home Station preparation of products.

2. Disseminate products.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Understanding the Effects of the Terrain

OBSERVATION (Mech): Terrain effects are not adequately determined or understood.

DISCUSSION: Understanding the effects of terrain is imperative for offensive and defensive direct fire planning.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Terrabase products are superb as they augment both map and leader reconnaissance. The unit engineer must produce Terrabase products for both offensive and defensive direct fire planning.

2. The S2 should make clear the effects of terrain in an intelligence annex.

3. Once contact is established, elements in contact have the best "feel" for terrain effects.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (FS): Field artillery battalion S2s often focus only on the brigade's most likely enemy course of action (ECOA) and ignore enemy options.

DISCUSSION:

1. S2 sections often simply refine the brigade situational template (SITEMP), and develop their own SITEMP only if one is not provided.

2. S2s are not producing a decision support template (DST) or developing commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The staff should produce/refine a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), SITEMP, event template, and DST for every operation.

2. SITEMPs should be produced for every mission showing at least two enemy COAs. The SITEMPs and corresponding event templates drive wargaming, assist with CCIRs, and help synchronize combat power and develop triggers for movement and resupply operations.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis and Threat Integration

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The S2 and engineer seldom work together on terrain analysis.

DISCUSSION: When templating the opposing forces (OPFOR), the S2 and engineer seldom work together on analysis of avenues of approach, key terrain, and intervisibility lines. Even after receiving initial obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) reports, sections are often slow in their efforts to use available terrain analysis tools and update the situational template (SITEMP).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S2 and engineers must perform a detailed terrain analysis using all available tools when developing the enemy courses of action (ECOA). Special consideration must be given to intervisibility lines and key terrain when determining where the enemy will array his forces and employ his obstacles, based on a thorough understanding of OPFOR engineer mobility and countermobility capabilities.

2. Terrabase must be used to develop range fans for key OPFOR direct fire weapon systems.

3. As OBSTINTEL is acquired, analyze/update the template in order to accurately reflect positioning of vehicles/assets.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Armor): NBC is not adequately incorporated into the IPB.

DISCUSSION:

1. Although units tend to have a good understanding of the enemy's intent for special munitions, their terrain analysis for determining how the enemy will employ these munitions is poor.

2. Chemical strike templates lack detail and are not a part of the task force reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

3. Effort to assign coverage of chemical named areas of interest (NAIs) is poor.

4. Use of NBC reconnaissance is poor.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Consult with the engineer staff officer for conducting a thorough terrain analysis.

2. Develop a format for chemical NAIs and a system for observing chemical NAIs.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 19
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis

OBSERVATION (Mech): Engineer company XOs, as task force planners, are not conducting the engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineers have little detailed discussion of the terrain and how it will affect both friendly and enemy maneuver plans.

2. The S2 often gives a general description of terrain that defines the area of operations, but the S2/engineer team seldom brief terrain effects in enough depth to assist the commander and staff in understanding the environment to any useful degree.

3. While most engineer units are deploying with Terrabase or Terrabase II capabilities, their training level is rudimentary. Engineer companies frequently struggle to produce any useful products, and, if produced, the products are rarely used to focus the staff and commanders as they develop their estimates. As a result, the unit commander is not prepared for the challenges the terrain will pose for his unit as he fights the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers should conduct EBA following Appendix A of FM 5-71-2, Armored Task Force Engineer Combat Operations. This provides a good guide to the XO as he contributes to the IPB process during mission analysis.

2. The engineer should brief the effects of terrain using a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and the observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA) format during the mission analysis brief and the task force OPORD brief to the company commanders.

3. Units must become proficient in the use of terrain analysis tools prior to deployment. They must develop standard products that will be produced for each type of mission. These products must be produced as early in the mission analysis process as possible.

a. If possible, line of sight (LOS) projections should be produced at 1:50,000 scale on acetate and distributed to other staff sections and subordinate units for their use in parallel planning.

b. As additional information becomes available on the courses of action (COAs) to be considered, the products must be refined.

c. Include refined terrain products with the engineer annex to further assist subordinate commanders in their continuing planning process.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 20
SUBJECT: Aerial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Task force staffs often omit or do not integrate the air portion of the IPB.

DISCUSSION:

1. Without a detailed air IPB, the task force commander, staff, and company commanders have very little appreciation for the enemy air threat capabilities.

2. Most S2s integrate air avenues on the situation template (SITEMP); however, few do a detailed air threat analysis to determine the most likely course of action (COA) for enemy air.

3. The aerial IPB is rarely updated/refined throughout the campaign. As a result, task force commanders give the air defense officers (ADOs) general guidance that lacks detail needed for mission execution, with no focus on priorities. A common example: "ADA protects the task force."

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S2 and the ADO should work together to produce a solid IPB that accounts for the ground and air threat. The ADO should provide information on the air threat capabilities, referring to Appendix C of FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, for an understanding of the third dimensional IPB.

2. During mission analysis, the air IPB should be briefed to the task force commander early to allow him to prioritize ADA coverage relative to the threat and his intent/scheme of maneuver. This process will allow the commander to see critical points on the battlefield where the unit is most vulnerable to air attack and will facilitate the positioning of ADA assets to defeat that threat while posturing the force to take active or passive air defense measures.

3. The ADO/S2 should ensure that aerial named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs) are included on the SITEMP. This should be done so all units have a common understanding of when and where enemy air is expected to be employed, and more specifically, where ADA assets should expect to kill them.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 21
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are not conducting a thorough IPB.

DISCUSSION:

1. Many units arrive at the NTC with the color coded maps that designate slow-go and no-go terrain. They do not, however, analyze these areas for potential OPFOR ambush positions.

2. Mobility corridors are seldom identified, allowing the OPFOR to maneuver on the flanks and rear of rotational units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The IPB process must be conducted in order for the commander to implement a complete direct fire plan. Knowing likely enemy locations and mobility corridors enables the unit to assign these areas for surveillance.

2. Although a certain piece of terrain does not allow armored vehicles to maneuver through it, units must still watch that terrain because of the dismount threat.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 22
SUBJECT: Brigade Staff Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (LTP): Brigade S2s generally conduct the IPB without any input from any of the other brigade staff members.

DISCUSSION: While the S2 has the primary responsibility for the brigade's IPB, input from other staff members will ensure that the entire Brigade staff has a common picture of the enemy, effects of the terrain, and weather conditions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Per FM 101-5, page 5-6: "The IPB is the commander's and each staff officer's responsibility; the G2 (S2) does not do the entire IPB himself. Staff officers must assist the G2 (S2) in developing the situation template (SITEMP) within their own area of expertise."

2. At the NTC, division warning orders (WARNOs) to the brigade will include the entire Annex B. This provides the brigade S2 time to develop his IPB products in support of the brigade. Upon receipt of the Division's analysis of the threat, the entire brigade staff can assist the S2 in his intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) can provide analysis of the terrain as well as the enemy's engineer capabilities. Other staff officers within the brigade can provide their expertise on their threat counterpart.

3. Any system that will be affected by the weather must be identified. For example, the NBC officer must define the effects of the wind on friendly smoke employment and the enemy's use of chemical munitions.

4. This integrated staff analysis will not occur without a specified event in the staff planning sequence. In one unit, upon receipt of the division WARNO, the S2 provided his initial enemy courses of action (ECOAs) to the brigade staff. The brigade staff then reconvened and each staff member briefed his enemy counterpart's assets, how they would be employed, and the effects of the environment on his friendly systems. This technique ensured that the entire staff had a common view of the enemy and the effects of the environment on the brigade's operation.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 23
SUBJECT: Task Force Terrain Analysis

OBSERVATION (LTP): Task force staffs too often do not accomplish a detailed terrain analysis.

DISCUSSION:

1. Support-by-fire (SBF) positions are often established within the enemy "kill sack."

2. Token consideration is given to the effects of weather, enemy disposition, and the need to establish conditions prior to occupying the SBF.

3. Effective triggers, assault positions, and observation points are seldom planned, and, if planned, are usually ignored during execution.

4. Smoke plans are rarely made, and coordination of the targeting process between fire support and maneuver does not occur.

5. Task force mortars are given the task of obscuring an enemy position in order to permit occupation of the SBF. Even with 120mm mortars, it is difficult for a mortar platoon to initiate and maintain a smoke screen of any significant size.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Task forces must conduct detailed terrain analysis to enable them to conduct a synchronized suppression and obscuration effort. The result of an unsynchronized suppression and obscuration effort is the rapid demise of the SBF element and an enemy with the freedom to reposition at will.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 24
SUBJECT: Brigade Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning: Observers

OBSERVATION (FS): Brigade observer plans lack detail and synchronization.

DISCUSSION:

1. Brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning often does not address striker or combat observation lasing team (COLT) missions, in detail.

2. Brigade R&S planning often does not address named area of interest (NAI) or target responsibilities.

3. Brigade R&S planning lacks continuity with respect to responsibilities and how these flow into the execution of brigade deep fires.

4. Often observer teams deploy lacking a clear understanding of how their mission fits into a task and purpose for the brigade's fire plan.

5. The brigade planning staff leaves planning of insertion operations by ground/air, route planning, and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) to the brigade reconnaissance troop commander (or chief of reconnaissance), which often results in observers being out of position to perform their planned mission.

6. Under the new conservative heavy division (CHD) design, units equipped with brigade reconnaissance troops are using the striker platoon leader (as outlined in ST 6-20-92), having him locate with the brigade reconnaissance troop commander and serve as his FSO. The end result in every rotation has been that command and control of strikers is difficult, and strikers are usually out of position and not prepared to execute the fire support plan developed during the brigade's planning process.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Observers exist to support the brigade's fight, and their employment requires the integrated and synchronized planning efforts of the entire brigade staff. Planning for observer operations should begin as early as when high-value targets (HVTs) are identified, be refined as a course of action (COA) is developed, and be finalized during the wargame. This technique should ensure full utilization of and execution by a critical asset and key combat multiplier for both the R&S plan and the brigade fires plan execution. Suggested responsibilities for staff planning include:

a. S2/striker platoon leader/fire support officer (FSO) - Determine the requirements for strikers. Identify target areas of interest (TAIs) and NAIs for the purpose of providing intelligence and destroying high-payoff targets (HPTs).

b. S2/assistant brigade engineer (ABE) - Conduct a terrain analysis to identify possible observation posts (OPs) using Terrabase and the expertise of the staff.

c. S3/chief of reconnaissance - Allocate resources for the mission (enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETACs), Sappers, intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) personnel, scouts, aircraft, needed supplies and transportation, additional communications, and so forth). Plan for the insertion and extraction mission like any other operation, to include determining infiltration methods, planned routes, checkpoints, LZs, PZs, false insertions, FPOL or RPOL, and emergency resupply. Make coordination for aircraft, retransmission (retrans) vehicles, and land management.

d. Brigade signal officer (BSO) - Determines the overall communication plans and the requirement for retrans positioning. Assist in the coordination and use of alternate communications assets.

e. S4 - Support the infiltration and extraction. Plan resupply, CASEVAC, and, if applicable, storage caches.

f. FSO/striker platoon leader - Prepare orders, give backbriefs to the commander, and conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs). Ensure rehearsals are conducted both at the team level and at the combined arms reserve (CAR).

g. S2/S3/FSO - Execution. Provide staff supervision until the mission is complete.

2. The striker platoon leader should remain at the brigade main command post (CP) to help in the planning and execution of strikers' missions and the execution of fires by strikers in accordance with the brigade's plan. The platoon sergeant should locate with the brigade reconnaissance troop CP to help facilitate preparation of teams, deal with logistical issues, and perform liaison with the brigade reconnaissance troop commander.

(TA.5.2.2 Collect Target Information)

TREND 25
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Use of Thermal Night Vision Equipment

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout platoons are not using their organic thermal night vision equipment.

DISCUSSION:

1. The thermal sight is a significant night vision asset that the scout platoons do not use during force-on-force operations.

2. Scouts use PVS-7s in their observation posts (OPs) during night operations and, as a result, are not able to identify many enemy vehicles on the battlefield. The PVS-7 has a limited range for vehicle identification. When the enemy is using good light discipline, the OPs cannot find the enemy ambush and battle positions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The scout platoon must train to use their organic thermal sites in OPs.

2. Scout platoons must deploy to the NTC with the thermal site equipment they have been issued.

3. Battery recharging and replacement challenges should be worked out prior to deployment to the NTC.

(TA.5.2.2 Collect Target Information)

TREND 26
SUBJECT: Threat Evaluation and Enemy Course of Action (ECOA) Development

OBSERVATION (Armor): S2 products are not adequately developed for use in the decision process.

DISCUSSION:

1. Event templates are not developed or used during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

2. The staff usually wargames only one enemy COA.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S2 must develop more than one situational template (SITEMP) as an integrated staff product.

2. Depict all enemy combat multipliers.

3. Wargame multiple enemy COAs.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 27
SUBJECT: Threat Evaluation and Enemy Course of Action (ECOA) Development

OBSERVATION (Mech): S2s seldom develop detailed enemy COAs and situational templates (SITEMPs), event templates, or event matrixes that are focused on critical enemy events.

DISCUSSION: S2s seldom develop detailed event templates, producing only two or three sketches of enemy COAs. The result is an unfocused reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) effort. Detailed enemy COAs/SITEMPs must be developed to allow the S2 to fully analyze how the enemy will fight. The event templates allow him to understand time and space relationships.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 28
SUBJECT: S2's Analysis of Counter-Reconnaissance Planning

OBSERVATION (LTP): The brigade S2's analysis of the threat rarely defines the primary threat during the counter-reconnaissance phase of the operation.

DISCUSSION: Most S2s understand the importance of completing the initial IPB analysis prior to the mission analysis brief to the commander. However, the brigade S2's analysis of the threat must also be completed in order to support the brigade's counter-reconnaissance planning.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: To effectively support brigade counter- reconnaissance planning, the S2 must define the enemy threat in the area of operations. That threat is the enemy reconnaissance. To effectively support counter-reconnaissance planning, the S2 must define the enemy's reconnaissance composition, infiltration routes, reconnaissance objectives, and expected enemy timelines. This detailed analysis of the enemy's reconnaissance effort is a prerequisite to a successful counter-reconnaissance plan and execution.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 29
SUBJECT: Templating Enemy Movement/Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): S2 development of enemy force deployment and scheme of maneuver is not adequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. S2s often do not depict how an enemy motorized rifle battalion (MRB) would deploy its maneuver companies on firing lines in order to create an initial point of penetration in a BLUFOR defense. Instead, they draw enemy maneuver icons on an axis of advance.

2. Critical combat multipliers, such as the enemy's use of smoke, special munitions, artillery targets, and rotary wing air battle positions, are often omitted from the template.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. S2s should focus on developing situational templates (SITEMPs) that give commanders and the battle staff a good snapshot in time, at a critical stage, as to what the enemy is going to look like on the ground.

2. Incorporate ALL of the enemy combat multipliers.

3. The enemy courses of action (ECOAs) must be logically presented to the commander and staff during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

4. The S2 should template at least two levels down.

(TA.5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions)

TREND 30
SUBJECT: Dissemination of Intelligence Information

OBSERVATION (FS): Field artillery (FA) battalion staffs frequently do not share important intelligence and combat information with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.

DISCUSSION:

1. Unless intelligence information is exchanged, the staff is forced to make decisions without a complete understanding of the situation.

2. Too often, the fire direction center (FDC) and S3 do not share fire missions and friendly situation reports with the S2. Without a composite picture of the battlefield, the S2 cannot predict future enemy actions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. S2s should develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to aggressively push and pull intelligence and combat information.

a. Queries to higher, adjacent, and supported units may provide critical information.

b. Liaison officers (LNOs) within higher, subordinate, and adjacent units may help.

c. The FA battalion is an excellent source of information.

2. S2s should develop a standard intelligence report (INTREP) format and track the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs).

(TA.5.4.5 Convey Intelligence)

User's Guide

TA.1 Maneuver BOS Narrative

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Military

NTC TRENDS AND TTPs 3rd and 4th Quarters, FY 99

INTELLIGENCE BOS

NTC TRENDS AND TTPs
3rd and 4th Quarters, FY 99