FIRE
SUPPORT BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Targeting Process for Indirect Fires
OBSERVATION
(Aviation): The targeting process for indirect fires is fragmented and incomplete.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Fires do not meet the commander's guidance. 2.
The targeting process is not integrated and coordinated between the S2, S3,
and fire support officer (FSO). 3.
Units typically falter during execution, which is caused by an incomplete synchronization/decision
support matrix developed during the course of action (COA) analysis. Fires
planning conducted after the staff COA analysis is complete often results in
fires that are not supportive or synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.
Fires are consequently planned in a vacuum and the FSO is not aware of developments
and changes to the scheme of maneuver.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The S2, S3, and FSO should be familiar with FM
6-20-10, The
Targeting Process.
This publication explains the targeting process during the staff planning process.
2.
The use of the synchronization and decision support matrix will assist in identifying
when and where various targets should be attacked to influence and support
the operation. 3.
The targeting team must continuously refine the targeting plan based on enemy
information as it becomes available. This process continues after the initial
plan and is completed during the staff planning process. 4.
The S3, S2, and FSO should conduct an informal targeting meeting as a minimum
to review the targeting process and focus fires to support the operation by
phase. 5.
Staff planning exercises at Home Station will assist in reversing this trend.
(TA.2.1
Process Ground Targets)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Targeting Team Operations
OBSERVATION
(FS): Brigade staffs often do not conduct a consolidated targeting effort.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Despite all the capabilities and situational awareness available to the Force
XXI brigade staffs, they seldom fully integrate the unique intelligence gathering
capabilities within the brigade and link them with lethal and non-lethal fire
support assets to engage the enemy with a synergistic combined arms effort.
2.
Location of key personnel across the battlefield and lack of a clear understanding
of individual duties and responsibilities leads to breakdowns in targeting.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The targeting team plans for brigade level engagement of the enemy. The brigade
staff,
not just the targeting officer or fire support officer (FSO), must forecast
and anticipate events so the enemy is attacked simultaneously throughout the
entire depth of the battlefield. The targeting effort is the critical decide
element in the decide-detect-deliver-assess methodology. The focus of the targeting
process comes from the brigade's mission statement, the commander's intent,
the division's high-payoff target (HPT) list, and the attack guidance matrix
(AGM). 2.
The targeting team includes, but is not limited to, the following:
a. Brigade commander and XO.
b. Brigade S2 and S3.
c. Direct support (DS) artillery battalion commander (FSCOORD).
d. Brigade FSO and targeting officer or non-commissioned officer
(NCO).
e. Intelligence and electronic warfare support element (IEWSE)
personnel.
f. Other staff members, as necessary, including the air liaison
officer (ALO), chemical officer, S3-air, air defense officer, and engineer.
3.
The functions of the targeting team include:
a. Nominating targets for execution.
b. Developing the brigade's high-priority target list (HPTL).
c. Developing the brigade's AGM.
d. Establishing target selection standards (TSS).
e. Nominating targets to higher headquarters.
f. Receiving and monitoring target damage assessment.
g. Synchronizing lethal and nonlethal fires.
4.
The timing and structure of the targeting team meeting may vary, but it should
include the following agenda items:
a. Current enemy situation (S2).
b. Current friendly situation (S3).
c. High-value targets (HVTs) (S2).
d. Attack guidance (commander).
e. Collection plan (S2).
f. Assets available (FSO).
g. HPTs (FSO).
h. Target priorities (FSO).
i. Synchronization of attack assets (FSO).
5.
The agenda, formality, and sequencing of the targeting meeting in the Military
Decision-Making Process (MDMP) will depend upon mission, enemy, terrain, troops,
and time available (METT-T). The process, however, should never be eliminated
completely from the decision-making process. 6.
The products produced by the targeting process include, but are not limited
to, the following:
a. HPTL.
b. AGM.
c. Intelligence collection plan (vital to providing a clear
task and purpose to the striker platoon).
d. Draft fire support execution matrix (FSEM).
7.
The HPTL and AGM at the brigade and battalion levels are normally more detailed
and focused than at higher levels. They provide information that observers
require for identifying and attacking HPTs. (TA.2.1
Process Ground Targets)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Counterfire Operations
OBSERVATION
(FS): Counterfire operations are ineffective and are often not considered during
planning.
DISCUSSION:
1.
General support battalions seem to consider counterfire an ancillary mission,
and do not include counterfire in their unit mission-essential task list (METL).
2.
Battle staffs do not understand the challenge of conducting effective counterfire
operations. 3.
Key staff members, including the FDO, battalion S2, and battalion targeting
officer, do not understand their role in counterfire operations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The current trend of ineffective counterfire operations can be reversed with
systemic training. General support artillery units must consider counterfire
an essential task and must habitually train counterfire operations and rehearsals.
2.
Counterfire operations should be shown as a primary topic in doctrinal manuals.
(TA.2.2
Engage Ground Targets)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Development of Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs)
OBSERVATION
(Armor): EFSTs are not developed to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Fire support officers (FSOs) are not receiving commander's guidance. 2.
FSOs are not developing EFSTs and subsequent scheme of fires. 3.
FSOs are not adequately allocating available assets at the decisive point.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Identify task, purpose, method, and effects. 2.
Assign and position assets. 3.
Conduct proper analysis to determine allocation and triggers. (TA.2.2.1
Conduct Lethal Engagement)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Transition of Fires
OBSERVATION
(FS & Brigade Staff): Brigades often do not fully define the transition of
fire support from the deep to the close fight.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The transition of fire support from deep to close is arguably the single most
critical fire support event that takes place during a battle. Brigades often
do not fully define the point or times for transitioning from brigade to task
force, resulting in a lack of focus and massed fires. 2.
Transitioning of fires is often based on who has the greatest enemy threat
to his front rather than on the identified high-payoff targets (HPTs). TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The transition of fires must be planned and then rehearsed
with
the assets to support the close fight. 2.
The trigger to transition fires from either deep to close or from close to
close (shifting priority of fires) has to be based on a decision that should
be linked to an essential fire support task (EFST) to reach the desired endstate.
3.
Several conditions must be met to fully assume fires (i.e., communications
are established and responsibilities are fully understood by all). The chart
below further defines many of the conditions that must be met to make the decision
to transition fires. 
(TA.2.2.1
Conduct Lethal Engagement)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Essential Fire Support Task (ESFT) Development
OBSERVATION
(LTP): More definition is needed in the commander's EFSTs.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Brigade staffs continue to struggle with developing the task, purpose, method,
and endstate for EFSTs based on the commander's guidance and friendly course
of action (COA). 2.
The commander's fire support "purpose" usually does not provide sufficient
information to set the parameters of when, where, and how long. As a result,
the fire support system will not quantify the required endstate realistically
in terms of volume, duration, or amount of destruction, suppression, or obscuration
needed to be successful. 3.
The following are common mistakes staffs make when developing EFSTs:
a. The purpose
does
not describe why the task contributes to maneuver.
b. Fire support tasks
do
not support the combined arms operation and do not describe what effects
fires
are to have on the functionality of the enemy's maneuver formations, artillery
fires, and surveillance assets.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
EFTSs must be fully developed by the staff for the brigade to effectively employ
artillery fires to support the maneuver plan. Fully developed EFSTs will state
the task, purpose, method, and endstate of artillery delivered fires. The figure
below depicts the fire support methodology that staffs should use to develop
EFSTs. 
2.
The following is a good example of what an EFST should look like when developed:
(Note: This example is only for the purpose of illustration. EFSTs are always
METT-TC dependent.) Task:
Separate the Forward Security Element (FSE) from the Advance Guard Main Body
(AGMB) Purpose:
Allow
the destruction of the FSE and AGMB in echelon Method:
Emplace FASCAM (200 x 800) minefield between FSE and AGMB at WP0002 Endstate:
Delay
AGMB 20 minutes at WP0002
(TA.2.2.1
Conduct Lethal Engagement)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Fire Support Planning
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff and FS): Fire support planning is not to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
During most rotations, brigade fire support officers (FSOs) develop a fire
support plan for the brigade deep
fight.
2.
Some FSOs are reluctant to plan fires. In these cases fire support planning
is more top-down planning with bottom-up inclusion. 3.
Some brigade FSOs will develop a plan for fires in the close fight, but do
not hold task force FSO accountable for timely refinement. Refinements are
seldom received prior to rehearsals. The end result is a lack of responsive
fires. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Formal fire planning should be conducted through a deliberate top-down process,
with bottom-up refinement. The advantage with his method is that the fire support
plan is developed early allowing the artillery staff to plan concurrently.
Dissemination of the plan down, and the refinement of the plan up, does not
stop until the established cutoff time. 2.
While essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) are developed at brigade and task
force levels, the responsibility to refine and trigger these fires is often
pushed down to the observer who has "eyes on" the target. This does not mean
that the company fire support team (FIST) only executes what it is given. The
team leader and the company commander take the execution guidance given and
any resources allocated and develop a scheme of fires to accomplish the EFSTs
and support the scheme of maneuver. On the TF XXI battlefield, triggering observers
could be any digitally-equipped platform. Automated systems (position navigation,
far target locating) will enhance the capability of maneuver units to execute
EFSTs. 3.
Top-down fire planning is a continuous process of analyzing, allocating, and
scheduling fire support. It must be flexible. Allocation of resources should
emphasize the purpose, planning, and execution of fire tasks. Bottom-up refinement
is a key element of top-down fire planning. Targets must be refined on the
basis of the recon effort, actual occupation of the terrain, and updated intelligence.
Digital systems and focusing fires through critical fire tasks enhance the
refinement effort. (TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Fire Support Planning
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff and FS): Fire support plans lack sufficient detail, flexibility,
and synchronization to enable the brigade combat team (BCT) to attack the enemy
throughout the depth of the battlefield.
DISCUSSION:
Brigade
fire support elements struggle with providing timely and essential information
to the battalion/task force fire support officers (FSOs). Fire support elements
(FSEs) are hesitant to plan fires in support of the close fight, anticipate
and provide for the transition from the deep to the close fight, and assign
specific tasks to battalion FSEs. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The FSE must begin a battle drill on receipt of the new mission. 2.
FSOs must understand the higher maneuver and fire support plan, identify specified
and implied tasks, analyze effects of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB) on fire support, and translate the status of assets into capabilities
and limitations. 3.
The FSO must brief the results of his mission analysis to the commander and
conclude his brief with recommended essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). 4.
A cartoon sketch can clearly convey the fire support plan. 5.
Plans must include:
a. Concept of fires/draft fires paragraph
b. Draft fire support execution matrix (FSEM)
c. Draft target list worksheet and overlay
d. Draft target synchronization matrix
e. Collection/reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan
(TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Observation Plans
OBSERVATION
(Armor and Mech): Task forces do not develop or execute an observation plan
to support essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), the scheme of fires, or the
scheme of maneuver.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Fire support officers (FSOs) do not synchronize the observer plan with the
scheme of maneuver during wargaming. 2.
Rehearsals are frequently inadequate. 3.
Fire support teams (FISTs) are not getting into position to acquire the enemy
before becoming decisively engaged. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Observation plans must be constructed in concert with the S2/S3. 2.
Support the maneuver commander's decisive point and each EFST. 3.
Address location, security, communications, and route. 4.
Synchronize the scheme of maneuver. (TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Integration of Fires into the Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plan
OBSERVATION
(Armor): Fire support is frequently not integrated into the R&S plan.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Task force S3s/S2s are not integrating fire support acquisition assets into
observation plans. 2.
Units are not developing target areas of interest (TAIs) to help shape the
battle space and support the scheme of maneuver. 3.
Units are not developing zone management plans. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: The
R&S plan links the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to fire support
planning and targeting. It also tasks acquisition assets to find specific enemy
formations. The R&S plan requires combined arms operation planning and it supports
fire support planning. (TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Fire Support Team (FIST) Degraded Operations
OBSERVATION
(FS): Task forces (TFs) do not employ FIST personnel and equipment to maximize
target acquisition and location capabilities when their vehicle (FIST-V) is
non-mission capable (NMC).
DISCUSSION:
1.
When the FIST-V is down for maintenance, the company fire support officer (FSO)
frequently moves to the commander's Bradley or HMMWV equipped with a manpack
SINCGARS, binoculars, compass, and map. The remainder of the team's personnel
and equipment go with the FIST-V to the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP)
and wait. 2.
The ground/vehicle laser locator designator (G/VLLD) is not employed in the
dismounted mode. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
TFs
should develop a plan that provides several options for FIST degraded operations
based on personnel and equipment availability and METT-T (see example options
below). The plan should be approved by the TF commander, incorporated into
the TF tactical SOP (TACSOP), and followed by all commanders and FSOs. These
initiatives can ensure that FISTs are employed with the maximum capability
possible. EXAMPLE
OPTIONS:
Option
1: FIST-V turret or TSCD inoperable:
For
offensive missions, employ the G/VLLD mounted on the vehicle deck. For defensive
missions, employ the G/VLLD dismounted and dug in (on or off vehicle).
Option
2: FIST-V inoperable:
FSO
and fire support sergeant or a radio telephone operator (RTO) operate from
a 1SG or maintenance team M113 with the G/VLLD w/tripod, batteries, power cable,
thermal sight, forward entry device (FED), binoculars, compass, AN/GVS-5s and
three SINCGARS. For
offensive missions, employ the G/VLLD mounted on the vehicle deck. For defensive
missions, employ the G/VLLD dismounted and dug in (on or off vehicle). Option
3: FIST-V and team M113s inoperable:
FSO
and fire support sergeant, or an RTO, operate from a non-firing Bradley or
the company commander's HMMWV equipped with the G/VLLD w/tripod, batteries,
power cable, Thermal sight, FED, binoculars, compass, AN/GVS-5s and two SINCGARS.
(TA
2.3 Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Integration of Fires and Maneuver
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Task forces and squadrons typically have difficulty developing a logical
and executable concept of fires with clearly defined essential fire support
tasks (EFSTs).
DISCUSSION:
None.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
commander must state his desired task and purpose (what and why) for each fire
support asset. The task is defined in terms of a desired effect on an enemy
formation and its function. The purpose is defined in terms of a specific friendly
maneuver event. The endstate is the achievement of the purpose as defined in
quantified terms. (TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Fire Support Integration into Engagement Area Development
OBSERVATION
(FS): Task forces are experiencing difficulty integrating fire support into
engagement area (EA) development during defensive missions.
DISCUSSION:
None.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The task force fire support officer (FSO) should develop a scheme of fires
to support the commander's decisive point. This includes:
- Observer planning
- Target emplacement based on planned obstacles
- Target refinement based on the actual obstacle siting/emplacement
- Trigger emplacement - both tactical and execution (include
limited visibility/thermal)
- An EA mounted rehearsal
2.
Tasks should be prioritized with an established timeline and the status of
preparation reported and tracked in the TOC. This must be a coordinated effort
between the task force FSO/FSE and company/teams. 3.
Execution can be centralized or decentralized. The task force fire support
sergeant is the subject matter expert and should supervise and coordinate the
overall effort. 4.
Trigger kits should be standardized and resourced. Time/distance factors are
different for an enemy moving during day and night, and response and shift
times for mortars and artillery are different.
a. Establish both tactical and execution triggers. Emphasis
must be focused on emplacing tactical and execution triggers based on precision
time/distance factors IAW the moving target engagement procedures published
in FM
6-30, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire.
b. Primary and alternate observers should observe the marking
of targets and the emplacement of triggers from their OPs to ensure they can
see them, and they must record lased (AZ, VA, range) data to both.
c. FISTs should conduct target area surveys and prepare terrain
sketches and visibility diagrams.
(TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Radar Zone Management
OBSERVATION
(FS): Management of critical friendly zones (CFZ) is not adequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Brigade combat team commanders often identify their force protection priorities
during the planning process, but the staff seldom addresses critical friendly
zones (CFZ) during wargaming.
2.
Planned zones are not always disseminated through the system to the executor,
and the fire support element (FSE) seldom ensures activation of CFZs in accordance
with the plan. As a result, brigade combat teams sustain many unnecessary combat
losses to enemy artillery.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
All members of the FSE must understand the process to plan, disseminate, and
activate CFZs. 2.
During the fire support rehearsal, radar zones must be addressed. The FSO develops
a fire support execution matrix for all operations, and radar zones are usually
planned. 3.
The FSE must post the execution matrix and ensure specific tasks are followed
during operations. 4.
Cross-talk with subordinate FSEs should be increased to help ensure proper
activation of planned radar zones.
(TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Integrating Mortars into the Fire Plan
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Task force commanders seldom give the mortar platoon a specific task
and purpose for each phase of an operation.
DISCUSSION:
A
fire support matrix with mortar priority of fires (POF) and priority targets
is normally issued to satisfy the concept of mortar integration. This matrix,
however, does not identify the task or purpose for the use of the mortars;
it simply states some priorities. As a result, the mortar platoon is often
not in a position or prepared to support the task force mission. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Task force commanders should give the mortar platoon a specific task and purpose
during each phase of an operation. The platoon's mission must be realistic
and clearly understood by both the platoon and the observers who will be calling
for fire. 2.
The task force fire support officer (FSO) should develop two key products during
the planning process: the target list/overlay and the fire support execution
matrix (FSEM). 3.
Provide a copy of the target list/overlay and FSEM to the mortar platoon for
technical data processing. This enables the mortar platoon to precompute firing
data for each planned target, thereby reducing response time. If multiple firing
positions are planned, the sections can compute firing data from each firing
position for each target.
(TA.2.3
Integrate Fire Support)
TA.1
Maneuver BOS Narrative
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
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