Military

7. Listed below are the battalion's eight steps for EA development. Listed inside the box are the specific planning roles for which the company is responsible. The arrow shows when company direct fire planning should occur within the battalion's EA development process.

8. Develop direct fire plans for all phases of an operation, not just the objective. The direct fire plan, based on the IPB, will focus scanning and sectors of fire at all times.

9. The direct fire system is the number one killer on the NTC battlefield. Each unit must execute detailed planning as outlined in FM 71-2. Develop a checklist from this manual and add it to the unit SOP for use during planning.

10. Use engagement criteria, target criteria, target priority, destruction criteria, trigger lines, and target reference points to help focus all the direct fire systems in the task force, thereby achieving mass.

11. To fully understand and execute the doctrine and TTPs outlined in FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, and FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breach Operations, engineers must understand direct fire planning concepts, doctrine, principles, TTPs, and terms. Engineers must understand and be able to develop a direct fire planning for the following reasons:

12. Add direct fire planning classes from the infantry and/or armor centers' POIs to the EOBC, EOAC, BNCOC, and ANCOC POIs at the engineer center. During the tactics phase of the courses, require the engineer leaders to develop an OPORD and include direct fire planning.

13. Consider the changes to FM 90-13-1 submitted by the engineers at NTC. NTC has recommended the additional graphic control measure of a release line (RL) to conduct battle hand-over between the breach force and assault force as they pass through the reduction area or breach lanes. This fire control measure is to prevent fratricide at the breach. A solid understanding of direct fire planning and having the direct fire planning of adjacent support force units will also help prevent fratricide at the breach.

14. When engineers commit to the point of breach during a combined arms breach operation, they must understand and know the TF direct fire plan and must have the graphic control measures posted on maps, so they can guarantee the safety of the soldiers at the breach.

15. Develop SOPs that include standard means for focusing fires while preventing fratricide based on FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Chapter 2, Principles of Fire Control.

16. Battalion commanders must integrate company commanders with their entire staff when working through the engagement area development process. This ensures that company commanders know where direct fire planning occurs in the process and which battalion WARNOs will initiate the company direct fire planning.

17. When training at Home Station, the battalion should develop SOPs that promote the use of engagement area criteria, target criteria, target priority, destruction criteria, trigger lines, and target reference points (TRPs).

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Movement Formations and Techniques

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Movement of Paladin batteries is seldom adequately planned or executed. (TA.1.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Artillery movement is not adequately planned for, resulting in a lack of synchronization with the maneuver plan.

2. The battalion staff does not correlate the movement plan with the execution of the brigade's essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).

3. The capabilities of the Paladin system present some unique movement challenges for the direct support (DS) FA battalion.

OBSERVATION 2: FA commanders often do not conduct proper preparation and planning for their tactical moves. (TA.1.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Commanders typically give little thought to control measures for ensuring timely, controlled tactical moves.

2. Most moves consist only of sending a move order to the guns with no thought of land deconfliction, boundaries, terrain, movement aids for limited visibility, reconnaissance, survey points, or movement control measures.

OBSERVATION 3: Engineer companies do not adequately control their maneuvers from crossing the line of departure (LD) to the breach site. (TA.1.1.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer company commanders do not adequately address in Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the company OPORD how the company will maneuver from the LD to the breach site.

2. Engineer companies rarely rehearse maneuver while preparing for a mission or moving to a new tactical assembly area (TAA) after a mission.

3. Engineer company leaders do not give clear and concise fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) or use decision point tactics effectively.

4. Engineer companies are normally slow in reacting to contact and do not adequately report, which allows the enemy to kill critical breaching equipment before it reaches the point of breach.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Units often have no movement plan from the line of departure (LD) to the objective. (TA.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Rotational units often establish a time for crossing the LD time and then plan actions on the objective. When the plan is executed, commanders often race their units to reach the objective as quickly as possible, moving with haste rather than speed.

2. The result of hasty movement is often the destruction of the force.

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 1)

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 2)

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 1)

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 3)

OBSERVATION 3: Units frequently do not maneuver to engage the enemy from initial fire positions. (TA.1.1.1.3)

DISCUSSION: Attacking units may not see the enemy from their initial positions, but do not maneuver to maintain contact and destroy the enemy.

1. The staff must properly plan and execute a maneuver scheme for Paladins to maximize the ability of the battalion to provide responsive fires while remaining survivable on the battlefield.

2. To provide the fire support that maneuver forces require, the FA battalion staff must plan for repositioning during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

3. Some factors that must be considered as part of the FA battalion's planning process are:

Friendly events?
Enemy events?

Brigade commander/S3?
FSCOORD?
FA battalion S3?

4. Paladin battalions must understand and use maneuver graphical control measures. Using operational terms and symbols that are common to maneuver units will aid in an understanding of how Paladins maneuver.

5. The staff must provide firing batteries with clear guidance and triggers to conduct survivability moves and tactical moves. Tactical moves should be established using clear event triggers and Paladin axis (offensive operations) or zones (defensive operations) into which the batteries will move.

6. Because the Paladin can occupy places unsuitable for conventional artillery and has no requirement for sole use of terrain, the maneuver commander's land management concerns are simplified. Terrain management and coordination will be simplified once maneuver commanders understand Paladin movement techniques.

7. Paladin movement requires great detail in planning and flexibility in execution. Commanders should look early for potential problems, define specific control measures for the movement, and then position key leaders where they can see and influence the movement.

8. Movement planning must begin during the commander's mission analysis. Even if the battalion does not provide sufficient guidance for movement, this does not absolve the battery commander from planning movement in-depth to support his battery mission.

9. An initial examination of the scheme of maneuver, coupled with the Paladin zones provided from battalion, will give the commander a starting point for his maneuver plan.

10. The commander should look for obvious conflicts in the movement plan. By determining possible conflicts early, a commander can find solutions or work with the battalion staff to modify the plan.

11. The commander must then make specific decisions concerning his planned movement.

12. It is here that the gunnery sergeants can best assist the commander. The gunnery sergeants can easily place survey control points along the route if they know to do so in advance. By conducting a route reconnaissance within limits of the tactical situation, the gunnery sergeants can advise the commander on the terrain, routes, and possible conflicts. If ground recon is not possible, then the commander must conduct a detailed map recon.

13. The commander then determines how best to pass his movement plan to his platoons. One successful method is to develop battery graphics and disseminate them while issuing the WARNO or OPORD.

14. Control during the execution of the movement is no less critical than the planning phase. Commanders generally are good about using gunnery sergeants to link in with the rear elements of the maneuver forces. This gives the commanders eyes forward while positioning themselves forward to make their own assessment of the movement.

15. Commanders should plan for contingencies in their scheme of maneuver. By planning alternate Paladin zones and alternate routes of march, the commander can easily shift his unit when the situation changes.

16. The company commander must address in Paragraph 3 of the company OPORD how the company will maneuver from the LD to the breach site, based on the operational risks he has determined from the enemy situational template (SITEMP).

17. The company leadership must take every opportunity to practice maneuvering the company. For example, instead of just convoying to the next TAA for the next mission, the company should practice maneuvering to the next TAA as if it was the next breach site.

18. Units need a plan to follow for moving from LD to the objective. The plan must take into account where enemy contact is likely.

19. The commander should conduct a time-space analysis and then try and stick to the expected times, allowing his subordinates to move with speed but maintaining local security. Slowing the pace may take longer but will enable a larger force to survive.

20. The speed used in movement should be METT-T dependent. Set the conditions for success slowly and deliberately and then execute with speed and violence.

21. Units must develop adequate maneuver graphics, including control measures, throughout the engagement area. Triggers must allow attack helicopters to maneuver throughout the engagement area if the enemy is not initially detected.

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Use of Dismounted Infantry

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) seldom plan for employment of infantry during offensive operations. (TA.1.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. When infantry is employed, the initiative is normally at the platoon and company level.

2. Soldiers often dismount from Bradleys unprepared for the task and purpose they have been given.

3. Infantry squads are untrained and unfamiliar with infantry drills such as:

4. TF staffs do not take ownership during the planning process to set the conditions for success on the battlefield.

1. Commanders and staffs must understand the capabilities and limitations of mechanized infantry. FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, pages 1-7 and 1-8, outlines capabilities and limitations for dismounted infantry. Each element with a mechanized infantry unit can employ that infantry if they have a clear and attainable task and purpose. Tasks that infantry squads can best support include:

2. During the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), commanders must determine what the most vulnerable target is for the infantry. In fact, early in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, look for targets that will be vulnerable to infantry and plan to support their employment against those targets.

3. TFs must take ownership to assist the infantry and ensure their success. TFs are best suited for planning and coordinating force protection measures such as:

4. The trend of infantry squads being unfamiliar with infantry drills indicates a lack of training at Home Station. Commanders need to include training exercises for infantry squads on the battle drills described in FM 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad, and 7-7J, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley).

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Actions on Contact

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Units often quickly become combat ineffective after initial contact with the enemy. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION: Companies and platoons are unable to execute maneuver in direct fire contact with the enemy. Units lose command and control, lose momentum, are rapidly attrited, and are unable to accomplish their mission. Contributing problems include:

1. Poor use of terrain or not using terrain to their advantage.

2. No integration or use of enemy combat multipliers such as smoke, indirect fires, and breach assets.

3. No preparation for contact. Units often do not plan for transitioning to maneuver; they use column formations and traveling techniques that do not facilitate rapid transition. When units are in the proper formation and technique, they are having problems rapidly transitioning from movement to maneuver.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Company/teams often make contact with the enemy while still in movement formation, and are unable to react. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company/team commanders often have a strong understanding of the threat facing the company in upcoming missions. However, the company/team commanders are frequently not able to incorporate the seven forms of contact to terrain. This results in contact with the enemy while still in or transitioning from movement to maneuver.

2. The inability to visualize the enemy forms of contact IAW terrain prevents the company from executing a company/team reaction to contact drill or massing direct and indirect fires on the commander's decisive point and attaining mission accomplishment.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: FA batteries do not react quickly to enemy direct and indirect fire. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION: FA batteries are demonstrating a weakness in battle drills when attacked by OPFOR direct and indirect systems. Batteries do not react to enemy aircraft.

OBSERVATION 2: Units too often do not know what action to take upon contact with the enemy. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION: Units tend to stop when first engaged. Units are not trained to react to or find dismounted weapons.

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 1)

1. During the planning process, the commander should identify a probable line of deployment based upon the enemy situation. At the line of deployment, the unit will conform to a movement formation and technique that will facilitate rapid transition to maneuver.

2. Units must train at Home Station on battle drills and unit SOPs that address actions on contact.

3. Commanders must practice and gain further knowledge of how the enemy fights in accordance with terrain.

4. The commander must focus company/platoon movement and maneuver during the planning phase to counter the actions.

5. Work battery battle drills for reacting to enemy attack into future training events.

6. Conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) to standard. PCCs/PCIs get the unit ready for an event and enable leaders to examine personnel, equipment, and capabilities and gauge the unit's ability to conduct a mission.

7. After the PCCs/PCIs, rehearse the actual event.

8. Include dismounted systems in Home Station training. Train for enemy fire from adjacent unit sector.

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Graphic Control Measures

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Units lack a formal effective system for the dissemination of graphic control measures. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Graphic control measures are not being disseminated in a usable form to the lowest level.

2. Technology has not yet advanced to the point that command and control documents can be electronically distributed in a usable form. In the interim, the Army continues to disseminate graphics using paper maps and acetate overlays.

3. Current unit SOPs do not meet the needs of the user at the lowest level.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Light engineer platoons do not adequately distribute usable maneuver, SITEMP, CSS, fire support, and obstacle overlays to the squad level in a timely manner. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. The lack of graphics at the squad level leads to inadequate situational awareness and initiative along with an increased operational risk category at the squad level.

2. Most units run out of overlay material due to waste and the failure to erase old overlays and recycle.

3. Most units suffer from inaccurate overlays due to hasty reproduction methods.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 1)

1. Units should use the same scale maps at all levels for the dissemination of graphics.

2. Establish a workable map size for the lowest-level user to handle in his work area; 24" x 18" has been shown to be a good size. Make mapboards from plexiglass or other suitable transparent material, and establish standardized reference points ("bolt holes" or "tic marks") so the maps may be placed on these mapboards in the same place, every time.

3. The engineer battalion TOC should evaluate the terrain of the operational area and pre-register all likely map subsections.

4. Prepare overlays from the higher headquarters' graphics to cover each map subsection. Sections should overlap, so that a leader need not refer to two separate overlays more than necessary.

5. Conduct training on graphical control measures until all involved leaders and soldiers are fully prepared to use them.

6. Take great care in the reproduction of graphics.

7. Unit troop-leading procedures (TLPs) should include a pre-combat inspection (PCI) by the unit commander to ensure subordinates' graphics are correct. Graphics can be the difference between life and death or success and failure on the modern battlefield.

8. The light engineer platoon must develop and enforce a system that is a part of the platoon tactical SOP (TACSOP) that addresses who makes the overlays, the standard map scale, how the overlays are distributed, who gets each type of overlay, and who conducts quality control of the overlays for accuracy.

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Aviation Integration into the Scheme of Maneuver

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Aviation and ground maneuver elements do not have an integrated planning process. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION: Air/ground integration problems begin during the planning process and continue through preparation and execution phases.

1. During operational control (OPCON) relationships, ground and air planning processes are often conducted independent of each other. They usually see each other's plan for the first time at the combined arms rehearsal.

2. The problem is not confined to OPCON relationships. Aviation units often execute operations in the brigade combat team (BCT) battle space with minimal situational awareness of the ground scheme of maneuver. The geographical distances between the aviation tactical assembly area (TAA) and the ground maneuver tactical operations center/tactical air command (TOC/TAC) further compounds the problem.

3. Lack of air and ground integration results in:

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 1)

1. In his guidance to the battle staff, the commander should identify the decisive point and the task and purpose of aviation assets.

2. Based upon the commander's guidance and the wargame results, the S2 should refine the collection plan to support the commitment of aviation assets.

3. A competent liaison officer (LNO), who has authority to speak for the aviation commander, should participate in the BCT battle staff's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) to ensure proper employment of aviation assets. The LNO should assist the ground maneuver element in planning all base orders and, on a case-by-case basis, specific follow-on missions. The LNO should have sufficient technical and tactical competence to be a productive force in the planning process. If possible, the LNO should remain with the ground maneuver TAC during mission execution. If a company or troop is in an OPCON relationship without its higher headquarters staff, it should provide an LNO as well.

4. Combined arms rehearsals between the ground and air maneuver elements are essential to mission success. Air routes, aviation decision points, assault-by-fire positions, holding areas, and Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) should be depicted on the sand table.

5. Prior to mission execution, the aviation TAC should be collocated with the BCT TOC/TAC to facilitate situational awareness and anticipate employment.

6. Aviation company/troop commanders should monitor the ground maneuver unit's command net to synchronize ground and air combat power and reduce the risk of fratricide.

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Actions on the Objective

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Battalions and companies frequently occupy their initial assault-by-fire positions at their primary engagement area (EA) and do not maneuver to engage the enemy. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. When the enemy is not exactly where predicted, or if the timing is off, the attack units probably cannot see the enemy from their initial positions.

2. When the enemy is encountered where predicted, units typically do not maneuver to maintain contact and complete the destruction of the enemy.

3. Helicopters remain in their assault-by-fire position far too long, resulting in enemy indirect and/or direct fires on their position.

1. When the enemy is not where predicted.

2. When the attack unit begins the engagement but does not maneuver to destroy the enemy.

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Engagement Area Development

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task force (TF) fire support officers (FSOs) and fire support teams (FISTs) do not adequately complete engagement area development during defense in sector missions. (TA.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Not all triggers are emplaced.

2. Time/distance factors for some triggers are miscalculated.

3. Targets are not tied into obstacles.

4. All primary and alternate observers cannot see triggers.

5. The target area survey is usually inadequate.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Units do not fully understand or implement the eight-step engagement area development process. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION: The lack of properly developed engagement areas limits the unit's ability to plan in depth or to take advantage of combat multipliers.

1. The task force FSO should develop a scheme of fires to support the task force commander's decisive point. This includes:

2. Tasks must be prioritized with an established timeline and the status of preparation reported. This must be a coordinated effort between the task force FSO/FSE and company/teams. Execution can be centralized or decentralized.

3. The task force fire support sergeant is the subject matter expert (SME) and should supervise and coordinate the overall effort.

4. Trigger kits must be standardized and resourced.

5. Refer to chapter 3 of FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations.

6. Battalion commanders and XOs must involve everyone in the staff planning process.

7. After analysis of the enemy's courses of action (COAs), the staff must determine the best ground to kill the enemy while at the same time ensuring that the terrain selected is synchronized with the ground scheme of maneuver. The commander's intent on where he wants the enemy destroyed allows the staff to integrate artillery, engineers, close air support (CAS), and ground maneuver into shaping the engagement area for the attack helicopters.

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Integration of Light and Heavy Forces

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Brigade combat teams (BCTs) are having difficulty integrating the light battalion's planning cycle into their timeline. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. The light battalion frequently does not get the BCT's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products early enough to support their Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

2. Brigade commanders are declaring themselves air assault task force commanders (AATFC) in according with doctrine. However, in reality, the light battalion's staff is doing the preponderance of the movement planning. This includes planning SEAD, CASEVAC, and producing the air movement table. All of this is time-consuming, considering the light battalion may be simultaneously developing a truck movement plan, an R&S plan, and a ground maneuver plan.

3. Another issue is the employment of the light battalion in the BCT scheme of maneuver. The BCT seldom maximizes the capabilities of the light battalion. Most light battalions have been employed close to the line of departure (LD) or to an intermediate objective. There is an apparent lack of understanding regarding the use of light infantry to minimize risk. The BCT does not fully realize how a light infantry battalion can enhance their R&S capability.

OBSERVATION 2: The light task force (TF) continues to have difficulty with planning for and employing OPCON'd heavy company teams. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. As part of mission analysis, the heavy company teams' capabilities and limitations are not being discussed in detail.

2. During course of action (COA) development, the resulting graphics have insufficient control measures to effectively integrate the heavy company team into the fight.

3. During wargaming, the TF staff usually does not sufficiently synchronize the heavy force. This is largely due to a lack of a heavy force participation in the wargame.

4. The TF commander usually does not understand how to properly set the conditions (smoke, breaching, suppression, and so forth) and maneuver the heavy force.

1. New doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (DTTP) should be developed on liaison packages for BCT operations to answer questions such as, "What does a BCT need as part of their staff to help with special MDMP requirements?" Just like a division main CP has a SOCCE to help with the integration and tracking of special operations, a standardized liaison package for the BCT should be developed when they have attached a light force. This package should consist of at least a captain and a SSG or SFC to assist in the MDMP and to help with movement planning for the light force.

2. The light battalion commander must make solid recommendations to the BCT on how his battalion should be employed. The light battalion commander needs to come face-to-face with the BCT commander at receipt of mission to understand his intent and talk about a course of action.

3. Include more tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) on light-heavy operations into the trend reversal classes and provide improved coaching of these considerations during MDMP.

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Integrating Direct Fire with Maneuver

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Mortar platoon split-section operations are not incorporated into the task force maneuver plan. (TA.1.4)

DISCUSSION: None.

OBSERVATION 2: Combat multipliers are not adequately integrated into the scheme of maneuver. (TA.1.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces (TFs) tend to focus on maneuver only and do not understand how to integrate other combat multipliers.

2. A lack of integrated fires, engineers, air defense artillery (ADA), dismounted infantry, and smoke results in a desynchronized plan.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Maneuver task forces have difficulty integrating combat multipliers into the scheme of maneuver. (TA.1.4)

DISCUSSION: Units are routinely not able to integrate fires and smoke into the scheme of maneuver, resulting in an unsynchronized plan.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 1)

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. References: FM 7-90, FM 23-91, and ARTEP 7-90 mission training plans (MTP).

2. Units should be aware of the advantages of employing mortars by section:

3. Conduct situational training exercise (STX) lane training at Home Station.

4. Consider all potential combat multipliers during wargaming to determine their most effective application.

5. Determine when each of the combat multipliers can be used during the next mission to bring about the desired effect. Timing the effects of combined arms and mass in the scheme of maneuver brings about the desired synchronization.

6. Refine the scheme of maneuver as needed during the TF rehearsal.

7. All combat multipliers must be integrated into the scheme of maneuver. Staff officers must familiarize themselves with weapons capabilities and their effects to successfully integrate them into the plan.

8. Determine the most effective application of the weapons systems during the wargame. Determine the best time for these multipliers to be used. This will help bring about the desired synchronization and effects of combined arms and mass.

9. The task force should establish a three-phase training plan for the staff on integration of combat multipliers.