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SECTION IV - NEEDS EMPHASIS TRENDS


INTELLIGENCE BOS (TA.5)

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan Development and Execution

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99
64537

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: The S2 is often left to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning without input from the other members of the staff. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Although priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) are usually based on the commander's guidance, the R&S plan seldom ties together named areas of interest (NAIs) and specific information/operation requirements (SIRs/SORs) that would answer PIRs throughout the depth of the battlefield. As a result, NAIs are not prioritized or focused and do not support the unit's scheme of maneuver.

2. Early R&S guidance is seldom issued. The R&S plan is often not disseminated until the OPORD is published. As a result, R&S plans do not support decision points or incorporate fires.

3. R&S planning does not incorporate all collection assets available to the unit or synchronize them to gain timely intelligence. As a result, some unit assets are either overtasked or underutilized.

OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) R&S operations are often unsuccessful. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. There is a lack of emphasis on R&S operations by commanders. Commanders are not giving guidance or developing good priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to guide the R&S effort.

2. There is a lack of integration of all staff elements during planning and execution.

3. R&S operations are treated as a part of the current operation and not seen as important and independent.

a. Guidance and orders for R&S operations are usually disseminated with the TF OPORD and not put out early enough to give sub-units time to prepare and execute.

b. The R&S plan is usually reduced to a matrix in the intelligence annex. The matrix usually addresses NAIs that cover key terrain and known or templated enemy locations. Mission statements and a task and purpose for each mission or recon element are not given.

4. No one is put in charge of the R&S effort or identified as the one responsible for tracking, adjusting and updating the R&S effort.

OBSERVATION 3: Task force (TF) commanders, S3s, and S2s routinely have problems developing reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans that answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR). (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Often the situational template (SITEMP) is not complete prior to course of action (COA) development, and an event template is not used.

2. R&S plans are not developed throughout the width and depth of the zone/sector, resulting in the commander not being able to see the enemy.

3. Often the S2 develops an R&S plan in a vacuum, with no integration or synchronization with other combat multipliers such as indirect fires, engineer, NBC reconnaissance, retransmission, and CSS. There is seldom any coordination or parallel planning with the brigade. Although the S2 generally identifies the intelligence requirements, the remainder of the staff is unable to identify and manage the resources necessary to answer the PIRs. Poorly coordinated, synchronized, and integrated plans lead to destruction of TF R&S assets and poorly executed plans that do not answer the TF commander's PIR.

4. Units lack an understanding of the technical abilities of unit and external assets such as combat observation lasing teams (COLTs), enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETACs), dismounted infantry, air defense artillery (ADA), and so forth. They also do not understand the sustainment and force protection requirements for all R&S assets. The results are overtasked assets due to repetitive and redundant collection requirements and poor management of assets by the TF staff.

OBSERVATION 4: Too often, the TF engineer and TF S2/S3 do not incorporate engineer reconnaissance into the battalion reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION: Engineer reconnaissance teams (ERTs) are often sent out as an afterthought, without a clear task and purpose.

OBSERVATION 5: Engineer battalions have difficulty incorporating ERTs into reconnaissance operations. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer battalion staffs do not adequately coordinate with the brigade staff to integrate ERTs within the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

2. Engineer battalions have developed numerous TTPs for employing ERTs (such as incorporating ERTs with brigade COLTS or conducting independent engineer reconnaissance missions). Most enginer battalions, however, are not using the full potential of the ERT.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: R&S operations routinely falter due to a lack of emphasis by commanders and a lack of integration of all staff elements and BOS during planning and execution. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. S2s seldom assist commanders in developing good and detailed priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). S2s are developing R&S matrixes that usually cover too many named areas of interest (NAIs) and give little guidance to sub-units on when to look at the NAIs and what to look for.

2. Other factors that can be attributed to R&S problems are:

a. R&S operations are treated as a part of the current operation and not seen as important and independent.

b. Guidance and orders for R&S operations are usually disseminated with the task force OPORD and not put out early enough to give sub-units time to prepare and execute.

c. No one is put in charge of the R&S fight. No one is being identified as the one responsible for tracking, adjusting and updating the R&S effort.

d. Commanders are not giving guidance or developing good PIRs to guide the R&S effort.

e. The R&S plan is usually reduced to a matrix in the intelligence annex. The matrix usually addresses NAIs that cover key terrain and known or templated enemy locations. Mission statements and a task and purpose for each mission or reconnaissance element are not given.

f. R&S operations are rarely rehearsed.

OBSERVATION 2: Throughout most campaigns, the task force (TF) engineer and S2/S3 do not incorporate engineer reconnaissance into the overall reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Employing engineer reconnaissance in the offense is a critical task for the engineers. However, they are often sent out as an afterthought without a clear task and purpose.

2. Engineer reconnaissance is an engineer squad task, yet the majority of the units rotating through the NTC cannot conduct this task to standard. It is not trained.

3. Most units have not developed an SOP for conducting obstacle reconnaissance either prior to the commitment of the breach force, to identify the point of breach, or to identify the parameters of an obstacle in order to mark the bypass. As a result, the TF is often held up or delayed during the attack, losing momentum while engineers attempt to execute what should be a well-trained battle drill.

OBSERVATION 3: Brigade observer plans lack detail and synchronization. (TA.5.2.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning often does not address in detail striker or combat observation lasing team (COLT) missions.

2. Brigade R&S planning often does not address named area of interest (NAI) or target responsibilities.

3. Brigade R&S planning lacks continuity with respect to responsibilities and how these flow into the execution of brigade deep fires.

4. Often observer teams deploy lacking a clear understanding of how their mission fits into a task and purpose for the brigade's fire plan.

5. The brigade planning staff leaves planning of insertion operations by ground/air, route planning, and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) to the brigade reconnaissance troop commander (or chief of reconnaissance), which often results in observers being out of position to perform their planned mission.

Under the new conservative heavy division (CHD) design, units equipped with brigade reconnaissance troops are using the striker platoon leader as outlined in ST 6-20-92, having him locate with the brigade reconnaissance troop commander and serve as his FSO. The end result in every rotation has been that command and control of strikers is difficult, and strikers are usually out of position and not prepared to execute the fire support plan developed during the brigade's planning process.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99, Observation 2)

OBSERVATION 2: R&S plans are seldom an integrated staff effort. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION: Assets are normally either overtasked or undertasked.

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99, Observation 1)

OBSERVATION 4: The entire battle staff is not consistently incorporated into the collection planning process. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. S2s need to focus their efforts on the collection, but the collection effort is seldom synchronized with subordinate units.

2. S2s frequently conduct reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning in a vacuum. As a result, the R&S plan does not necessarily link named areas of interest (NAIs) and specific orders and requests (SORs) that would answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Assets such as ADA, MPs, communications units, and so forth, must be exploited for intelligence gathering.

OBSERVATION 5: Brigades do not adequately employ NBC reconnaissance. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION: Fox reconnaissance is a division asset that is attached to a brigade combat team (BCT) to support the brigade fight. The brigade staff, however, does not fully integrate Fox reconnaissance into the brigade plan. This asset is usually assigned no clear task and purpose and is left out of the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. As a result, Fox reconnaissance is undertasked and the brigade has one less set of eyes to collect information on the enemy.

OBSERVATION 6: The engineer battalion rarely plays a major part in the brigade's R&S planning. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The engineer effort that does take place is normally part of an SOP that places some engineers with the task force scouts or occasionally with COLT teams. It is not based on a current warning order (WARNO), situation template (SITEMP), or commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

2. A firm relationship between the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) and the R&S planning cell rarely occurs. As a result, any engineer effort in support of the R&S effort is ineffective.

OBSERVATION 7: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99, Observation 3)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for R&S Plan Development and Execution

1. Doctrinal references:

a. FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning .

b. FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance .

c. FM 34-8-2, Intelligence Officer's Handbook .

2. Although there is no standard format for the R&S plan, the above references provide an excellent common framework for what should be included.

3. R&S planning is an entire battle staff effort. Most importantly, R&S plans should be developed in conjunction with the S3.

4. The S2 should develop and use the event template to assist in synchronizing the abilities of all collection assets.

5. Conduct R&S rehearsals whenever time permits.

6. Issue guidance early and refine the plan during the execution phase.

7. Make R&S planning and execution the initial main effort of the TF. Do not consider R&S planning as the S2's business.

8. The TF commander must give clear and concise guidance on what he needs to know in the form of PIRs and a commander's intent for what he wants R&S to accomplish.

9. The S2 must understand the capabilities and limitations of all assets in the TF.

a. The S2 should develop detailed PIRs that are tied to decision points.

b. Assign LTIOVs (latest time information of value) to the PIRs to keep from addressing questions that are no longer relevant.

10. R&S plans must be developed by the entire staff and integrated by all BOS.

11. Treat R&S as an operation of its own and not as an annex to the current TF OPORD.

12. Distribute R&S guidance and orders as early as possible to allow the TF scouts and other assets time to conduct their own mission analysis and prepare their own orders.

13. Rehearse, rehearse, rehearse!

14. TF commanders and S3s must recognize their role in R&S planning and supervision. Designate an S3 officer (Battle Captain, assistant S3) as the chief of reconnaissance. This does not relieve the TF commander, S3, or other staff members of responsibility. Rather, it provides one point of contact with the authority to begin early planning and coordination of the R&S effort and allows the S2 to analyze the information requirements and plan collection efforts.

15. TF staffs must plan R&S efforts as a team. If the S2 plans the R&S effort alone, the collection efforts will receive little or no protection or sustainment support.

16. The employment of engineer reconnaissance should be a critical task of the engineer battalion S2/S3.

a. The S2/S3 must provide increased input to the battalion TF plan.

b. The TF engineer and S2 must develop engineer-specific NAIs and decision points, and ensure that observation responsibility is assigned to the appropriate collection asset.

c. The TF engineer must synchronize the reconnaissance effort with the battalion TF R&S plan, and establish a system for reporting key engineer intelligence directly to the TF engineer representative and S2 in the TOC.

17. Engineer companies must issue clear and complete orders (IAW the TF R&S plan and scout platoon plan applicable) to the engineer reconnaissance teams, and must ensure they deploy with graphics, maps, reporting matrixes, and a communication plan.

18. Establish a system for tracking the location and activity of the teams, and for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating this critical information. This should be done regardless of the task organization.

19. Use the TF O&I net or the engineer company net for communications.

20. The engineer battalion staff must participate in the brigade R&S planning process to ensure that effective engineer reconnaissance is integrated into the brigade R&S plan.

21. The engineer battalion staff should conduct detailed mission planning and provide clear guidance and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to the ERTs.

22. The battalion must ensure that redundant communications systems are in place.

23. The ERT leader must participate in rehearsals or backbriefs to ensure synchronization with the maneuver R&S plan.

24. Specific techniques for the S2:

a. The S2 must develop detailed PIRs that are tied to friendly decision points. Assign LTIOVs (Latest Time Intelligence is of Value) or LEIOVs (Latest Event Intelligence is of Value) to the PIRs so that you don't continue to try to answer a question that is no longer relevant.

Bad PIR: What is the composition of the regimental reconnaissance and along what routes will it enter the task force sector?

Good PIR: Will regimental reconnaissance elements (one BMP and one BRDM) go through NAI 4 along AA 2A before 232200 Dec 98? LTIOV 232300 Dec 98 friendly decision point: commit 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company to kill regimental reconnaissance team.

b. The R&S matrix must give sub-units detailed and specific guidance on what they are looking for and when they are looking for it.

Bad: Scout platoon will report all enemy activity on NAI 4.

Good: Scout platoon will confirm or deny existence of enemy OP at NAI 4 (NK 123456). Look for one BMP or one BRDM and possible dismounts. Start looking at 231900 Dec 98 and check every hour until 232300 Dec 98 for enemy activity.

25. Engineers must provide increased input to the battalion TF plan.

a. The TF engineer and S2 must develop engineer specific NAIs and decision points, and ensure that observation responsibility is assigned to the appropriate collection asset.

b. The TF engineer must synchronize the reconnaissance effort with the battalion TF R&S plan, and establish a system for reporting key engineer intelligence directly to the TF engineer representative and S2 in the TOC.

c. The engineer company should issue clear and complete orders (IAW the TF R&S plan and scout platoon plan applicable) to the engineer reconnaissance teams and ensure they deploy with graphics, maps, reporting matrixes, and a communication plan. They must also establish a system for tracking the location and activity of the teams, and receiving, analyzing, and disseminating this critical information. This should be done regardless of the task organization.

d. Use the TF O&I net or the engineer company net for the communications plan.

26. Recently, engineer battalions have deployed to NTC and employed an Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon (ERP), sending out ERTs to conduct obstacle reconnaissance. THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED. Engineers do not own battle space, and as a result, fratricide usually occurs with the ERTs and TF scouts. Engineer reconnaissance is an engineer squad task. The reconnaissance effort should be directed and controlled at the TF level and tied into the TF R&S plan to facilitate coordination on the battlefield. The engineers should come from the engineer company executing the breach and be integrated into the TF scout platoon and feed off the same support systems.

27. Reports must come back to the TF TOC where the engineer company XO can gather the OBSTINTEL and report it to the engineer company and/or breach force. If the OBSTINTEL is reported only to the engineer battalion, it is of NO USE, because the engineer battalion staff will not be conducting the breach. The information must be passed to the executors with the minimum number of middle men to facilitate accurate and timely reporting.

28. Engineer squads must train reconnaissance tasks at Home Station. Obstacle reconnaissance is becoming a lost art in the engineer community. In order to maintain the momentum of the TF attack, engineers must be able to execute a battle drill for identifying the point of breach or obstacle bypass, and then must conduct the marking drill rapidly to allow combat power to safely reach the far side and continue the attack.

29. The observers exist to support the brigade's fight, and their employment requires the integrated and synchronized planning efforts of the entire brigade staff. Planning for observer operations should begin as early as when high-value targets (HVTs) are identified, be refined as a course of action (COA) is developed, and be finalized during the wargame. This technique should ensure full utilization of and execution by a critical asset and key combat multiplier for both the R&S plan and the brigade fires plan execution. Suggested responsibilities for staff planning include:

a. S2/striker platoon leader/fire support officer (FSO) - Determine the requirements for strikers. Identify target areas of interest (TAIs) and NAIs for the purpose of providing intelligence and destroying high-payoff targets (HPTs).

b. S2/assistant brigade engineer (ABE) - Conduct a terrain analysis to identify possible observation posts (OPs) using Terrabase and the expertise of the staff.

c. S3/chief of reconnaissance - Allocate resources for the mission (enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETACs), Sappers, intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) personnel, scouts, aircraft, needed supplies and transportation, additional communications, and so forth). Plan for the insertion and extraction mission like any other operation, to include determining infiltration methods, planned routes, checkpoints, LZs, PZs, false insertions, FPOL or RPOL, and emergency resupply. Make coordination for aircraft, retransmission (retrans) vehicles, and land management.

d. Brigade signal officer (BSO) - Determines the overall communication plans and the requirement for retrans positioning. Assists in the coordination and use of alternate communications assets.

e. S4 - Support the infiltration and extraction. Plan resupply, CASEVAC, and if applicable, storage caches.

f. FSO/striker platoon leader - Prepare orders, give backbriefs to the commander, and conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs). Ensure rehearsals are conducted both at the team level and at the combined arms reserve (CAR).

g. S2/S3/FSO - Execution. Provide staff supervision until the mission is complete.

30. The striker platoon leader should remain at the brigade main command post (CP) to help in the planning and execution of strikers' missions, and the execution of fires by strikers in accordance with the brigade's plan. The platoon sergeant should locate with the brigade reconnaissance troop CP to help facilitate preparation of teams, deal with logistical issues, and perform liaison with the brigade reconnaissance troop commander.

31. Produce and issue R&S guidance early; do not wait on higher headquarters! Refine/ update the plan during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and execution phase.

32. Conduct R&S rehearsals.

33. Avoid:

a. Unfocused plans that overtask some assets and undertask others.

b. Unprioritzed and unfocused NAIs that do not help support the unit's scheme of maneuver.

c. Unsynchronized and uncoordinated R&S plans that do not support decision points or incorporate fires.

34. Integrate NBC reconnaissance by tasking it in the brigade R&S plan. This will facilitate effective use of the Foxes and provide the BCT with additional reconnaissance capability.

35. The engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) is critical to the brigade's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and is crucial when developing the brigade's R&S plan, especially when in support of offensive missions.

36. OPFOR vehicles have a tendency to move numerous times during the preparation of their defenses, but their obstacles, once emplaced, do not move. Known obstacle locations paint a detailed picture of the OPFOR defense.

37. The location, composition, disposition and intent of the enemy's obstacles must be known prior to crossing the line of departure (LD) in order to successfully task organize to breach the enemy's obstacles.

38. The ABE should step up and insure that he is considered as a key player during R&S planning. Engineer-specific PIRs must be established and refined.

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process and Application

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99
24147

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: The scout platoon leader seldom meets with the S2 early enough in mission preparation to assist in developing the templates for a successful mission. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The scout platoon leader does not conduct an IPB at his level.

2. Observation posts (OPs) cover vast observation areas, but with no specific focus.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Units are not conducting a thorough IPB of the battlefield. (T.A.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Although most units arrive at the NTC with the color coded maps that designate slow-go and no-go terrain, they often do not analyze these areas for potential opposing forces (OPFOR) ambush positions.

2. Units seldom identify mobility corridors, which allows the OPFOR to maneuver on the flanks and rear of rotational units.

OBSERVATION 2: The engineer unit commander frequently does not have a full understanding of the equipment, organization, and capabilities of the enemy engineer. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION: A lack of understanding of enemy capabilities leads to a superficial briefing of enemy engineer efforts and rarely includes their most likely location, timing, and method of employment. As a result, the commander is not prepared when the enemy uses mobility/ survivability assets against him. The plan to counter these actions are not resourced or synchronized into the friendly maneuver plan.

OBSERVATION 3: Air defense platoon leaders seldom provide air threat information to the S2 during the planning process. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Air defense officers (ADOs) do not understand air intelligence and cannot determine how the enemy will use his air assets to support his scheme of maneuver.

2. Neither the S2 nor the ADO brief the air threat during mission analysis and preparation of the OPORD. On occasions when the air IPB is briefed, the ADO's intelligence is completely different from that of the S2.

3. The task force commander does not identify air defense priorities because of lack of information on the enemy's air capabilities.

OBSERVATION 4: Engineer company XOs, as task force planners, are not conducting EBA to standard. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. There is little detailed discussion of the terrain and how it will affect both friendly and enemy maneuver plans during the planning process. The S2 often gives a general description of terrain that defines the area of operations (AO), but the S2/engineer team does not brief terrain effects in enough depth to assist the commander and staff in understanding the environment to any useful degree.

2. Task force engineers are not adequately using terrain analysis systems and products. While most engineer units deploy with Terrabase or Terrabase II capabilities, their training level on the system is rudimentary. Engineer companies frequently struggle to produce any useful products, and these products, if produced, are rarely used to focus the staff and commanders as they develop their estimates. The end result is the unit commander is not prepared for the challenges the terrain will pose for his unit as he fights the battle.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Air IPB is not integrated into the S2's situational template (SITEMP) or briefed as part of the OPORD mission analysis. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION: None.

OBSERVATION 2: Assistant brigade engineers (ABEs) often use an automated Engineer Battlefield Assessment spreadsheet to develop the mission analysis briefing. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION: None.

OBSERVATION 3: Field artillery battalion S2s often focus only on the brigade's most likely enemy course of action (ECOA) and ignore enemy options. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. S2 sections often simply refine the brigade situational template (SITEMP) and develop their own SITEMP only if one is not provided.

2. S2s are not producing a decision support template (DST) or developing commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

OBSERVATION 4: NBC is not adequately incorporated into the IPB. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Although units tend to have a good understanding of the enemy's intent for special munitions, their terrain analysis for determining how the enemy will employ these munitions is poor.

2. Chemical strike templates lack detail and are not a part of the task force reconnaissance & surveillance (R&S) plan.

3. Effort to assign coverage of chemical named areas of interest (NAIs) is poor.

4. Utilization of NBC reconnaissance is poor.

OBSERVATION 5: Task force staffs often omit or do not integrate the air portion of the IPB. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Without a detailed air IPB, the task force commander, staff, and company commanders have very little appreciation for the enemy air threat capabilities.

2. Most S2s integrate air avenues on the situation template (SITEMP); however, few do a detailed air threat analysis to determine the most likely course of action (COA) for enemy air.

3. The aerial IPB is rarely updated/refined throughout the campaign. As a result, task force commanders give the air defense officers (ADOs) general guidance that lacks detail needed for mission execution, with no focus on priorities. A common example: "ADA protects the task force."

OBSERVATION 6: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99, Observation 1)

OBSERVATION 7: Brigade S2s generally conduct the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) without any input from any of the other brigade staff members. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION: While the S2 has the primary responsibility for the brigade's IPB, input from other staff members will ensure that the entire brigade staff has a common picture of the enemy, effects of the terrain, and weather conditions.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process and Application

1. The scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant should attend the Scout Platoon Leaders' Course (SPLC) for a thorough understanding of the IPB process.

2. The scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant should develop a good working relationship with their S2 and determine how they can assist each other in the IPB process.

3. The scout platoon leader or platoon sergeant should gather as much information as possible to start planning during mission analysis.

4. The commander must conduct a thorough IPB process to implement a complete direct fire plan. Knowing likely enemy locations and mobility corridors enables the unit to assign these areas for surveillance.

5. Any terrain that armored vehicles cannot maneuver on must still be watched because of the threat of enemy dismounts and rotary wing aircraft.

6. Engineers should conduct EBA in accordance with Appendix A of FM 5-71-2, Armored Task-Force Engineer Combat Operations.

7. Address enemy capabilities, organizations and employment as outlined in FM 100-61, Armor- and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force Operational Art.

8. Wargame these capabilities against the terrain and mission at hand to refine them from a doctrinal standpoint to a most likely method of employment.

9. The engineer should brief the effects of terrain using a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and the observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA) format during the mission analysis brief and the TF OPORD brief to the company commanders.

10. Units should become proficient in the use of terrain analysis tools prior to deployment. They should develop standard products that will be produced for each type of mission. These products should be produced as early in the mission analysis process as possible.

11. If possible, line of sight (LOS) projections should be produced at 1:50,000 scale on acetate. These should be distributed to other staff sections and subordinate units for their use in parallel planning.

12. As additional information becomes available on the courses of action (COAs) to be considered, the products must be refined. Refined terrain products should be included with the engineer annex to further assist subordinate commanders in their continuing planning process.

13. The ADO should coordinate with the S2 to ensure that the air IPB is developed and supports the enemy ground scheme of maneuver.

14. Identify who will brief the air threat during mission analysis and the OPORD preparation. The air IPB should be refined as information is collected on the enemy use of assets, his position, obstacles, and capabilities.

15. The ADO should develop an adequate ADA concept of operation, which can support the task force scheme of maneuver.

16. The ABE needs to focus mission analysis on how terrain and friendly and enemy engineers will shape the battlefield. The ABE should ensure that enemy situational obstacles such as the MOD, UMZ, and BM-21 rocket-delivered SCATMINEs, as well as conventional obstacles, are templated throughout the battlefield based on each enemy COA.

17. The ABE needs to address mobility/countermobility and capability (numbers of lanes or meters of obstacle instead of numbers of MICLICs or line platoons), and link this capability to resources required, such as Class IV/V packages.

18. The staff should produce/refine a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), SITEMP, event template and DST for every operation.

19. SITEMPs should be produced for every mission showing at least two enemy COAs. The SITEMPs and corresponding event templates drive wargaming, assist with CCIRs, and help synchronize combat power and develop triggers for movement and resupply operations.

20. Consult with the engineer staff officer for conducting a thorough terrain analysis.

21. Develop a format for chemical NAIs and a system for observing chemical NAIs.

22. The S2 and the ADO should work together to produce a solid IPB that accounts for the ground and air threat. The ADO should provide information on the air threat capabilities, referring to Appendix C of FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, for an understanding of the 3rd Dimensional IPB.

23. During mission analysis, the air IPB should be briefed to the task force commander early to allow him to prioritize ADA coverage relative to the threat and his intent/scheme of maneuver. This process will allow the commander to see critical points on the battlefield where the unit is most vulnerable to air attack and will facilitate the positioning of ADA assets to defeat that threat while posturing the force to take active or passive air defense measures.

24. The ADO/S2 should ensure that aerial named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs) are included on the SITEMP. This should be done so all units have a common understanding of when and where enemy air is expected to be employed, and, more specifically, where ADA assets should expect to kill them.

25. Per page 5-6, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, "The IPB is the commander's and each staff officer's responsibility; the G2 (S2) does not do the entire IPB himself. Staff officers must assist the G2 (S2) in developing the situation template (SITEMP) within their own area of expertise."

26. At the NTC, division warning orders (WARNOs) to the brigade will include the entire Annex B. This provides the brigade S2 time to develop his IPB products in support of the brigade. Upon receipt of the division's analysis of the threat, the entire brigade staff can assist the S2 in his IPB. The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) can provide analysis of the terrain as well as the enemy's engineer capabilities. Other staff officers within the brigade can provide their expertise on their threat counterpart.

27. Any system that will be affected by the weather must be identified. For example, the NBC officer must define the effects of the wind on friendly smoke employment and enemy's use of chemical munitions.

28. This integrated staff analysis will not occur without a specified event in the staff planning sequence. In one unit, upon receipt of the division WARNO, the S2 provided his initial enemy courses of action (ECOAs) to the brigade staff. The brigade staff then reconvened and each staff member briefed his enemy counterpart's assets, how they would be employed, and the effects of the environment on his friendly systems. This technique ensured that the entire staff had a common view of the enemy and the effects of the environment on the brigade's operation.

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Threat Evaluation and ECOA Development

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99
22222

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Battalion S2s seldom adequately analyze the effects of weather and terrain or identify probable enemy courses of action (COAs). (TA.5.3.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most battalion S2s do not provide the intelligence information needed for battalion mission analysis.

2. S2s seldom evaluate the effects of weather and terrain on friendly forces or consider multiple enemy COAs. They have difficulty describing an aggressive, uncooperative enemy to the battalion staff.

3. The staff seldom produces a decision support template (DST) or develops specific commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) for the course of the wargame.

OBSERVATION 2: Battalion S2s seldom develop several enemy courses of action (COAs). (TA.5.4.2)

DISCUSSION: The inability to develop more than one enemy COA is not normally due to a lack of competence on the part of the S2s, but rather a result of a restricted planning timeline. S2s are only allowed sufficient time to develop one threat COA, and the staff has no appreciation for the various avenues of approach or forms of contact available to the enemy. If the enemy executes a different COA than what is planned for by the staff, the unit does not have the systems in place to defeat the threat and is unable to react in a timely manner.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98, Observation 1)

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98, Observation 2)

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: S2 products are not adequately developed for use in the decision process. (TA.5.3.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Event templates are not developed or used during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

2. The staff usually wargames only one enemy COA.

OBSERVATION 2: S2s seldom develop detailed enemy COAs and situational templates (SITEMPs), event templates, or event matrixes that are focused on critical enemy events. (TA.5.3.1)

DISCUSSION: S2s seldom develop detailed event templates, producing only two or three sketches of enemy COAs. The result is an unfocused reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) effort. Detailed enemy COAs/SITEMPs must be developed to allow the S2 to fully analyze how the enemy will fight. The event templates allow him to understand time and space relationships.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Threat Evaluation and ECOA Development

1. S2s should follow the IPB process as described in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

2. Since the IPB process involves all staff members, not merely the S2, the battalion should train IPB and the orders process as a staff at Home Station.

3. For every mission, SITEMPs should be produced for at least two enemy COAs. These SITEMPs and corresponding event templates drive wargaming and provide the means to facilitate analysis of combat information during the fight.

4. A decision support template (DST) should be developed as a result of the wargame. The DST greatly assists the staff in refining priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs), in synchronizing combat power, and in developing triggers for movement and resupply operations. By identifying decisions that must be made, the DST serves to focus the battle staff during the course of an operation.

5. The battalion S2 should coordinate with the brigade combat team (BCT) S2 for early receipt of the situation template (SITEMP) to allow for more time to develop multiple threat COAs.

6. S2s and staffs should practice staff drills at Home Station. S2s must be able to produce SITEMPs in a timely manner to address at least the most likely and most dangerous threat COAs.

7. The S2 must develop more than one situational template (SITEMP) as an integrated staff product.

8. Depict all enemy combat multipliers.

9. Wargame multiple enemy COAs.

TREND 4
SUBJECT: S2 Analysis and Reporting

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99
20111

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Battalion S2s often do not pass important intelligence and combat information to higher levels or subordinate units. (TA.5.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. S2s send occasional periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREPs), but these reports are sporadic at best. There is also no system to track the times at which PERINTREPs are sent.

2. S2s often have information which would be of tremendous value to batteries, the brigade, DIVARTY, or the DS and/or reinforcing battalion, but do not always relay this information in a timely manner.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98, Observation 1)

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: The brigade S2's analysis of the threat rarely defines the primary threat during the counter-reconnaissance phase of the operation. (TA.5.3.1)

DISCUSSION: Most S2s understand the importance of completing the initial IPB analysis prior to the mission analysis brief to the commander. However, the brigade S2's analysis of the threat must also be completed in order to support the brigade's counter-reconnaissance planning.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for S2 Analysis and Reporting

1. Battalion S2s should develop a standard PERINTREP format and a tool to track the times that the reports are sent.

2. Battalion S2s should develop a system to track the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs), as well as those of his higher headquarters and subordinate units. When information is received that answers a PIR or IR, this information should be sent immediately, and the time and contents of this report should be entered in the S2's log.

3. To effectively support brigade counter-reconnaissance planning, the S2 must define the enemy threat in the area of operations. That threat is the enemy reconnaissance. The S2 must define the enemy's reconnaissance composition, infiltration routes, reconnaissance objectives, and expected enemy timelines. This detailed analysis of the enemy's reconnaissance effort is a prerequisite to a successful counter-reconnaissance plan and execution.

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99
24036

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces seldom develop or use terrain analysis products. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION: Units frequently do not have an understanding of the terrain and its potential effects on friendly and enemy actions.

OBSERVATION 2: Engineer units are not conducting engineer battlefield assessments (EBA) to standard. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. While most engineer units are deploying with Terrabase or Terrabase II capabilities, their training level is rudimentary at best. Engineer companies frequently struggle to produce any useful EBA products, and these products, if produced, are rarely used to focus the staff and commanders as they develop their estimates.

2. During mission analysis, there is little detailed discussion of the terrain and how it will affect both friendly and enemy maneuver plans. The S2 often gives a general description of terrain that defines the area of operations (AO), but the S2/engineer team does not brief terrain effects in enough depth to assist the commander and staff in understanding the environment to any useful degree. As a result, the unit commander is not prepared for the challenges the terrain will pose for his unit as he fights the battle.

OBSERVATION 3: Engineer S2s often do not have a full understanding of their roles and responsibilities. (TA.5.3.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer S2s are not adequately trained at Home Station to understand what products are needed to visualize the battlefield or conduct threat analysis. They do not adequately understand terrain analysis.

2. Engineer S2s are dependent on the brigade S2 for all enemy templates and are not contributing to brigade planners, such as the ABE, with enemy engineer capabilities.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Units produce minimal terrain products prior to their arrival at the NTC. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION: Units that do produce terrain products prior to deployment generally focus their early efforts on analysis of typical key terrain features, intervisibility line analysis, and soils analysis.

OBSERVATION 2: Terrain analysis products lack needed detail. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Analysis of terrain effects on courses of action (COAs) is poor.

2. Tools are not used (Terrabase, Microdem).

3. Obstacles are not templated, or are templated only for a single enemy COA.

OBSERVATION 3: Terrain effects are not adequately determined or understood. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION: Understanding the effects of terrain is imperative for offensive and defensive direct fire planning.

OBSERVATION 4: The S2 and engineer seldom work together on terrain analysis. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION: When templating the opposing forces (OPFOR), the S2 and engineer seldom work together on analysis of avenues of approach, key terrain, and intervisibility lines.

Even after receiving initial obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) reports, sections are often slow in their efforts to utilize available terrain analysis tools and update the situational template (SITEMP).

OBSERVATION 5: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 2)

OBSERVATION 6: Task force staffs too often do not accomplish a detailed terrain analysis. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Support by fire (SBF) positions are often established within the enemy "kill sack."

2. Token consideration is given to the effects of weather, enemy disposition, and the need to establish conditions prior to occupying the SBF.

3. Effective triggers, assault positions, and observation points are seldom planned, and if planned, are usually ignored during execution.

4. Smoke plans are rarely made and coordination of the targeting process between fire support and maneuver does not occur.

5. Task force mortars are given the task of obscuring an enemy position in order to permit occupation of the SBF. Even with 120mm mortars it is difficult for a mortar platoon to initiate and maintain a smoke screen of any significant size.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Terrain Analysis

1. The engineers must produce Terrabase products during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to facilitate effective direct fire planning for offensive and defensive operations.

2. The S2 lays out the effects of terrain in an intelligence annex.

3. Use the Terrabase products to augment both map and leader reconnaissance.

4. During course of action (COA) development, units must gain an understanding of the effects of terrain on friendly and enemy actions. This is an imperative in direct fire planning for both offensive and defensive missions. With an understanding of how the terrain can affect the task force, the element that makes contact with the enemy will be better prepared to use the terrain to their advantage.

5. Engineers should conduct EBA in accordance with the guidance of Appendix A of FM 5-71-2, Armored Task-Force Engineer Combat Operations. The information from the EBA provides a guide to the XO as he contributes to the IPB process during mission analysis.

6. The engineer representative should brief the effects of terrain using a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and the observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA) format during the mission analysis brief. Use the same formats for the task force OPORD brief to the company commanders.

7. Units must become proficient in the use of terrain analysis tools prior to deployment. They must develop standard products that will be produced for each type of mission.

a. These products must be produced as early in the mission analysis process as possible.

b. If possible, line-of-sight (LOS) projections should be produced at 1:50,000 scale on acetate. These should be distributed to other staff sections and subordinate units for their use in parallel planning.

c. As additional information becomes available on the COAs to be considered, the products must be refined. Refined terrain products should be included with the engineer annex to further assist subordinate commanders in their continuing planning process.

8. Engineer S2s must, prior to deployment, be thoroughly versed on battalion/brigade SOPs, as well as the engineer battalion commander's intent on shaping the battlefield offensively or defensively.

9. Terrain analysis should be ongoing at Home Station. Engineer S2s must be able to determine how the OPFOR will use the terrain to their advantage. Understanding OPFOR capabilities is paramount to any unit's success.

10. The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) section must produce standard terrain analysis products of the projected area of operations as soon as it is known, or request products from a supporting corps or division terrain team. This production begins at Home Station.

11. Conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT)/right seat ride involving S2/engineer conducting detailed analysis combined with Home Station preparation of products.

12. Disseminate products.

13. The S2 should lay out the effects of terrain in an intelligence annex.

14. The S2 and engineers must perform a detailed terrain analysis using all available tools when developing the enemy courses of action (ECOA). Special consideration must be given to intervisibility lines and key terrain when determining where the enemy will array his forces and employ his obstacles, based on a thorough understanding of OPFOR engineer mobility and countermobility capabilities.

15. Terrabase must be used to develop range fans for key OPFOR direct fire weapon systems.

16. As OBSTINTEL is acquired, analyze/update the template to accurately reflect positioning of vehicles/assets.

17. Task forces must conduct detailed terrain analysis to enable them to conduct a synchronized suppression and obscuration effort. The result of an unsynchronized suppression and obscuration effort is the rapid demise of the SBF element and an enemy with the freedom to reposition at will.

TREND 6
SUBJECT: S2 Section Organization

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99
00111

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: S2 sections do not work efficiently or as a team and are not task organized according to METT-T. (TA.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. S2 sections often operate on a 12-hours-on, 12-hours-off shift schedule without regard to mission requirements. This leads to mass turnover of personnel twice a day and offers little continuity in planning and execution.

2. The S2 and perhaps one assistant generally do all the work, which does not take advantage of the capabilities of all members of the S2 section.

3. Most S2 sections set up a plan team (which is a good idea) but do not fully brief the plan to the rest of the section for execution.

4. The most underutilized member in most S2 sections is the NCOIC. S2 section NCOICs are usually senior NCOs with maneuver backgrounds and years of experience who could offer great assistance to the S2.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 1)

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 1)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

for S2 Section Organization

1. Phase soldiers into work schedules; work and sleep plans should be based on METT-T.

2. Avoid having a massive turnover of personnel twice a day.

a. Do not give soldiers 12 hours off in one day. This is excessive and sacrifices too many available manhours.

b. Ensure that detailed shift change briefings are conducted and at least one individual works swing shifts to maintain section continuity.

3. Utilize the S2 NCOIC. Regardless of his MOS, he can offer valuable insight gained through his years of experience. Do not let the NCOIC become bogged down with all the details involved with running the entire TOC.

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Event Template/Event Matrix

Observation frequency:3-4QFY971-2QFY983-4QFY981-2QFY993-4QFY99
11110

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task force S2s rarely produce event templates or event matrices that focus on critical enemy events. (TA.5.3.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Event templates or matrices, when developed correctly, identify critical enemy events and help distinguish between enemy courses of action (COAs). Without the template or matrix, the focus of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans is reduced.

2. S2s generally develop two or three enemy COAs for each plan. These COAs are usually developed graphically through a sketch, but are rarely developed in sufficient detail. This causes a unit to misunderstand critical enemy events and time/distance relationships.

3. S2s often enter wargaming sessions with nothing more than a sketch of enemy COAs.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4Q98 Observation 1)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for the Event Template/Event Matrix

1. S2s must understand the importance of the event template. The event template facilitates development of an enemy COA. At a minimum, the following things should be found on the event template:

a. Friendly graphics
b. Key terrain
c. Enemy objectives
d. Avenues of approach
e. Mobility corridors
f. Time phase lines and named areas of interest

2. Other items that can be included but are not required are probable locations of high-value targets and enemy decision points.

3. The event matrix is another helpful tool in developing detailed enemy courses of action. It should be used as a companion to the template. An event matrix can help identify key decisions that the enemy commander has to make (such as when to commit the reserve), and can help the S2 determine what the enemy can actually do based on time, distance, task organization, capabilities, and limitations.

4. Event templates and event matrices help the S2 contribute positively to the wargame and significantly improve the task force's understanding of enemy COAs.


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