Military

5. Engineer XOs start COA development without a solid understanding of the mission, terrain, enemy, and what their mobility/countermobility/survivability BOS could bring to the fight.

OBSERVATION 2: The task force (TF) S4 often completes the combat service support (CSS) planning process with little or no participation by other CSS leadership. (TA.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Maintenance, medical, and personnel representatives are rarely present for the TF mission analysis process or briefing.

2. The S4 is usually not prepared to properly brief for the battalion maintenance officer (BMO), medical platoon leader, or the S1. As a result, the TF commander does not receive a clear and concise picture of the TF maintenance posture, medical capability, and personnel status, or how they may affect the upcoming mission.

3. The S4 does not receive input or recommendations from the other CSS leadership prior to COA development, and often forms the TF CSS plan based on his best guess given the minimal information and guidance available to him.

OBSERVATION 3: Mission analysis is not conducted as an integrated battle staff function. (TA.4.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The staff is seldom briefed on the mission analysis prior to the initial brief to the commander.

2. The battle staff does not:

3. Frequently, the air defense officer (ADO), logisticians, and other attached staff officers are not informed that the main CP has received the order and that mission analysis is going to be conducted.

OBSERVATION 4: SIGOs seldom conduct a thorough mission analysis prior to the execution phase. (TA.4.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION: SIGOs do an adequate job fixing problems that develop, but many of those problems can be avoided if SIGOs anticipate them and build contingencies into their plans.

ENGINEER UNIT MISSION ANALYSIS

1. Engineer XOs should develop and brief a formal EBA during mission analysis so that the staff understands the impact of OPFOR engineers and terrain on the fight. The key is that the engineer and S2 must go beyond simply quoting enemy capabilities and actually provide some analysis. In short, they must be able to tell the commander the "so what" in terms of how the enemy will use the terrain and employ his battlefield shapers. This will help focus the squadron's planning to task organize its own M/CM/S assets and incorporate them into the scheme of maneuver.

2. Terrain analysis must begin at the earliest possible time, in conjunction with receipt of a WARNO.

3. The engineer and S2 must work together to develop and disseminate terrain analysis products to company/team commanders to allow them to visualize the fight early in the planning process.

CSS MISSION ANALYSIS

1. Ensure the BMO, medical platoon leader, and S1 attend the TF planning process if at all possible. This will promote integration of all the CSS assets into a team effort, allowing each leader's specific expertise to add to and build a viable plan, and preparing any of these staff officers to fill the role of TF logistics planner if required.

2. If the BMO, medical platoon leader, or S1 cannot attend mission analysis, they must provide the S4 with an accurate, current, and projected status of their assets and the TF status in each of the six essential functions of CSS. They must prepare the S4 to brief the information to the commander.

BATTLE STAFF MISSION ANALYSIS

1. The battle staff should conduct mission analysis, integrating all the key players as outlined in ST 100-9. This initial step in the decision-making process focuses the staff on the upcoming operation and provides information on tasks that they must accomplish according to the brigade OPORD.

2. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, Military Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning." A coherent and synchronized plan cannot be developed unless the battle staff presents a fully integrated mission analysis brief to the commander with all specified tasks, implied tasks, mission-essential tasks, facts, assumptions, assets available, and requests for information (RFIs) identified.

SIGNAL OFFICER MISSION ANALYSIS

The SIGO must analyze the task force mission, determine the elements critical for success, and assign resources to ensure achievement of the commander's intent. Resource assignments resulting from mission analysis could include, for example, planning for a back-up retransmission, ensuring mobile subscriber radio terminal (MSRT) coverage in the tactical operations center (TOC), and relocating personnel to best support the mission.

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Timelines and Time Management

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Because of inadequate time management at task force level, scout platoons are often not able to accomplish important tasks prior to crossing the LD. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION: The task force often gives the scout platoon insufficient time to prepare for a mission. The scout platoon often neglects or omits rehearsals, pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and boresiting because they run out of time.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces are not setting or adhering to an established timeline. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units are not following the 1/3 - 2/3 rule in the planning timeline.

2. Staffs are not trained to meet specific requirements in the time allotted.

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 1)

1. Conduct abbreviated preparation training at Home Station.

2. The task force staff must be made aware of the minimum time required for the scout platoon to prepare for a mission. With sufficient time to prepare, the scout platoon will increase the probability of success in answering the task force commander's PIRs.

3. The task force S3 or XO must establish a realistic timeline and enforce it.

4. Make maximum use of parallel planning.

5. Train the timeline prior to arrival at NTC. Some units can meet a 6-hour window - others need 8 to 10 hours.

6. Exercise the orders process at Home Station under the same conditions as NTC.

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Synchronizing Tactical Operations

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: FA units too often do not integrate their battalions into the brigade's plan to build combat power. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. FA units are not identifying their own glide path to incrementally build platoons, batteries, and the battalion.

2. FA battalions are not including radar, survey, metro, command and control headquarters, and CSS assets.

3. Without an integrated brigade plan, field artillery units find themselves with no priority to draw classes of supply or receive maintenance support.

OBSERVATION 2: The engineer battalion rear CP often does not perform the rear area engineer function or integrate operations with the forward support battalion (FSB). (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer units regularly do not provide command and control over engineer operations behind the task force (TF) rear boundaries.

2. Engineer units do not provide the FSB with engineer expertise in planning and executing logistics operations in support of the brigade combat team (BCT). As a result:

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 1)

OBSERVATION 2: The indirect fire plan is seldom synchronized with the maneuver plan. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Indirect fires are seldom briefed in the company operations order.

2. Indirect fires are seldom synchronized during the company rehearsal.

3. The company/team FIST is often not present during the company rehearsal, and if he is, it is usually late, as an afterthought.

4. As a result, company/teams do not realize the terminal effects of indirect fires on the enemy in conjunction with the maneuver plan during the campaign.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Fire support is rarely integrated into the task force wargame. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces are not developing a scheme of fires with adequate triggers.

2. Observation plans are not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

OBSERVATION 2: Task forces and squadrons frequently have difficulty arranging activities supporting essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) in time and space during the wargaming process. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION: None.

OBSERVATION 3: Staffs are seldom able to achieve the level of detail required to fully synchronize a plan and apply all the combat multipliers to the battle. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Staffs do not integrate combat multipliers during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) due to lack of detail, partially developed courses of action (COAs), and lack of enemy visualization. Staffs are not using the action/reaction/counteraction method.

2. Battlefield Operating System (BOS) representatives do not come to the wargame fully prepared to integrate the effects of their assets in terms of task, purpose, specific location, times, triggers, events, and effects. As a result, combat multipliers are either not integrated or not sufficiently synchronized to have a significant effect.

3. COAs are not refined following the commander's guidance to the point that each staff officer clearly understands the overall plan. COA statements and sketches are rarely developed to enhance understanding.

4. Staffs are challenged with visualizing how the enemy will fight in terms of task and purpose for each enemy element and how the enemy uses the terrain. This leads to difficulty conducting action/reaction/counteraction discussions to further clarify opportunities to integrate the BOS.

5. The lack of detail and visualization in the wargame ultimately leads to decision support matrices that do not significantly assist the commander in making timely decisions.

OBSERVATION 4: TOCs do not achieve full potential for synchronizing tactical operations. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. TOCs seldom achieve full potential for predictive analysis, battle tracking, and targeting due to compartmentalization, lack of information sharing, and ineffective battle captains. As a result, CAS, FA, engineers, aviation, and ADA are often not fully synchronized.

2. TOC staffs do not conduct battle update briefs as often as is needed during fast-paced operations to ensure all staff elements are informed of the latest guidance and direction from the commander and XO.

3. FRAGOs are rarely issued to clarify the current situation and proven clear tasks/purposes for future operations.

4. Battle captains are not key players during battles, often relegated to updating combat power charts only. As a result, XOs frequently handle radio traffic and fight the current fight rather than maintaining a broad perspective of the battle.

OBSERVATION 5: CSS is not adequately integrated into the brigade maneuver plan. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. CSS operators in the FSB/RSS, MSB/CSB and the brigade/regimental staff never fully integrate the concept of support with the maneuver plan or timeline.

2. In the case of combat health support (CHS), casualty estimates are completed. However, the triggers to move ambulance exchange points (AXPs) and Level 2 care are seldom identified, and the movement of such entities on the battlefield is neither effectively rehearsed nor synchronized with the maneuver plan.

3. The brigade S4s and FSB/RSS support operations officers are rarely fully involved in the brigade's/regiment's planning and course of action (COA) development process. The FSB/RSS support operations section continues to remain in the background and provides little input or planning in integrating CSS support with the rest of the BOS functions.

4. CSS rehearsals conducted by the brigade/regiment are not fully attended by the brigade/ regimental staff, the FSB/RSS, and the maneuver trains. Pertinent information provided in both the combined arms and CSS rehearsals is not always relayed to the FSB/RSS S3 for inclusion in a FRAGO (i.e., FASCAM locations enemy/friendly, templated chemical strikes, and enemy DIRT insertions).

5. Most OPORDs that are published by the FSB/RSS contain an incomplete concept of support paragraphs and supporting matrices.

OBSERVATION 6: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 2)

OBSERVATION 7: Brigade combat teams (BCTs) and task forces (TFs) are not massing overwhelming combat power. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units are not massing combat power during the force-on-force battles at the BCT and TF level. BCT plans, by their very design, ensure that combat power is piecemealed into the fight. The TFs further compound the situation by piecemeal commitment of company/teams into the close fight. In the defense there is no plan for the BCT to mass maneuver forces by repositioning. Each TF is on its own. For example, units often defend the central corridor with one TF arrayed behind the other. The OPFOR destroys the first TF with no interference from the second TF, and then destroys the second TF after the first is combat ineffective. The BCT also monopolizes artillery fires to conduct counter-battery fire, deep attacks, and fires against targets of opportunity. As a result, no artillery is available for the close fight--the decisive fight--and the enemy is rarely attacked with artillery while engaging with direct fires.

2. Units often include BCT-directed obstacles to support the deep fight and leave the TFs short of engineer effort in the main battle area. Furthermore, they expend their artillery and CAS with no aid from direct fire weapons and well before commitment of the MRR main body. The OPFOR need to only deal with CAS and artillery. They often breach obstacles unsupported by direct fires. Once the OPFOR defeats those forces or avoids them, they then fight BLUFOR maneuver forces that have no assistance from artillery or CAS and have a much diminished obstacle plan. In similar fashion, the BCT monopolizes attack aviation instead of allocating these forces to the TF.

3. In offensive operations, the BCT commits forces to the attack in a piecemeal manner. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent when the BCT has a light battalion. The infantry conducts a night attack to seize key terrain. They are unsupported by CAS, attack aviation, and mechanized forces. OPFOR concentrates on defeating the light infantry during the night; OPFOR is particularly effective at using artillery to kill BLUFOR infantry. By morning the light infantry is combat ineffective. The BCT then commits one mechanized TF to the attack. They are defeated with no help from the armor TF.

4. Units commit the armor TF last. They allow OPFOR to defeat the attack in detail, sequentially. In contrast, the OPFOR almost always makes the BLUFOR fight in at least two directions, and invariably the BLUFOR is faced with multiple forms of contact (NBC, direct fires, indirect fires, and obstacles). On the other hand, OPFOR usually faces only one form of contact at a time and less often fights from multiple directions. Even when the BLUFOR attacks the enemy along more than one approach (Valley of Death and Central Corridor for example), the attacks are not synchronized; and OPFOR can defeat one attack before he has to focus fires on the other.

5. When the above is the BCT approach, the TFs are handicapped. However, at TF level, combat multipliers are not requested, and TFs focus almost exclusively on maneuver forces. Then they commit the maneuver forces to battle one company/team at a time. Rarely does more than one company/team mass fires on the enemy in force-on-force battles.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

1. Staffs must follow the requirements for a complete COA statement and sketch as outlined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Staffs must be prepared for the wargame and be aware of the enemy's capabilities and COAs. Each staff officer must talk in terms of specific details (task, purpose, time, location, triggers, events, and effects).

2. Implement the action/reaction/counteraction drill versus a "fill-in-the-synch-matrix- block" drill to ensure the staff is visualizing the battle.

3. Develop a decision support matrix (DSM) that clearly identifies the decision, enemy and friendly conditions that relate to the decision, the observer, and the named area of interest (NAI) that answers the priority intelligence requirement (PIR) relating to the decision.

4. The XO or battle captain must conduct battle update briefs on a more frequent basis and develop FRAGOs that clarify the situation and tasks/purposes for subordinate units.

5. Battle captains must be empowered to handle the current radio traffic to allow the XO time to look forward and develop FRAGOs.

RSO&I

1. Plan early with the brigade. Remember that RSOI is an operation heavy with logistical implications. Battalion XOs and S3s need to take an early interest in the plan and not totally depend on the battalion S4 to "make it happen."

2. Organize requirements in a logical sequence and assign responsibilities.

3. Establish priority vehicles and units, manage and supervise the plan, and adjust as necessary.

4. A recommended force package 1 to be ready NLT RSOI 02 would consist of:

SYNCHRONIZATION OF ENGINEER BATTALION OPERATIONS

1. Chapter 2 of FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored), clearly identifies rear area engineering and staff engineer support to the FSB as secondary functions of the battalion rear CP. The support to the FSB is similar to the support given to a TF by the TF engineer.

2. Engineer battalion rear CPs must fulfill their role as the rear-area engineer and FSB staff engineer. FM 5-71-3 recommends that the HHC commander be closely involved in support to the brigade rear CP. During the FSB's planning process, the HHC commander must provide staff input to the FSB order.

3. If a conflict develops between support requirements to the brigade rear CP and the FSB main CP, the battalion should consider providing a liaison officer (LNO) to provide the support to the FSB, under the coordination of the HHC commander.

SYNCHRONIZING INDIRECT FIRES WITH MANEUVER

1. Even when the company is not augmented with a FIST, platoons must receive a briefing on the scheme of fires and purpose of fires, because they are using a task force (TF) observer plan. With this information the platoon leaders would be able to utilize a target list or have knowledge of established targets during the mission.

2. The commander and FIST, when attached, need to work together during the planning process to ensure the indirect and direct fire plan will support the company's scheme of maneuver. This parallel planning ensures that the commander and FIST understand the TF indirect fire plan, and that the fires paragraph will be briefed during the company operations order. Information can then be disseminated throughout the company.

3. Recommend company/teams incorporate information listed in FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, chapter 6, section 1; FM 6-20-20, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below, chapter 2, section 2-6 and 2-7; and FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, into the company TACSOP.

4. The task force S3/XO and fire support officer (FSO) must ensure integration of fires.

5. Jointly develop adequate triggers based on time and space, relation to terrain and enemy, and the task force scheme of maneuver.

6. Develop both the scheme of fires and the observation plan.

7. The S3 and fire support officer (FSO) must ensure the complete integration of fire support into the wargaming process of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

8. The FSO must advise the task force commander and S3 when they want fire support to execute unrealistic tasks.

9. The endstate must produce an executable scheme of fires, an observation plan, and refinement submitted to brigade.

CSS SYNCHRONIZATION WITH MANEUVER

1. CSS support must be integrated with the BOS. The only way to accomplish this is to have the support operations officer fully involved in the brigade's/regiment's orders process, working in conjunction with the brigade/regimental S1 and S4.

2. The concept of support must be integrated with the maneuver scheme, which links LOGPAC resupply times, AXP/MAS/FAS locations, and ADVON/FLE movements to major muscle movements in the brigade/regiment.

3. Critical information concerning tactical hazards and risk must be passed to the S3 for inclusion in any updates to the published order to prevent fratricide and needless loss of life, limb, or critical assets/commodities.

MASSING COMBAT POWER

1. Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive time and place. " To mass is to hit the enemy with a closed fist, not poke at him with fingers of an open hand. Thus, mass seeks to smash the enemy, not sting him." -- FM 100-5, Operations, p. 2-4.

2. The BCT should plan to mass maneuver forces against parts of the enemy. They should try to determine what is the critical phase of the battle and then mass overwhelming combat power against the enemy at that time. They should plan to employ artillery, obstacles, CAS, attack aviation, and direct fires against the enemy in a synchronized fight. The BCT should make the resources available to the commander who can actually see the fight.

3. The TF should employ more than one company at a time against the enemy.

"There is a tendency in each separate unitto be a one-handed puncher, by that a rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire . . . that is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music . . . to get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars must come into the concert at the proper place and at the proper time."

--GEN Patton

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Decision-Point Development

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Task force commanders often do not clearly identify and develop decision points for the operation. (TA.4.2.3)

DISCUSSION: A lack of commander's decision points makes it difficult for the staff to focus their efforts to ensure the plan supports this critical event/location.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 1)

The commander must establish decision point(s) early in the planning process (mission analysis) to focus the staff and supporting BOS elements in order to achieve success.

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Jump-TOC/Command Post Displacement

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Planning for TOC displacement is often inadequate. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. The TOC often delays displacement until just before the task force crosses the LD. This results in a loss of situational awareness at a critical point in time. It then becomes very difficult to regain this situational awareness or provide a clear picture to the commander.

2. Jump-TOCs (J-TOCs) have been ineffective primarily due to:

• a lack of planned triggers to execute the jumps,
• inadequate reconnaissance, and
• no effective communications plan.

OBSERVATION 2: Most units have difficulty integrating TOC and J-TOC operations into their scheme of maneuver. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units find that movement of the TOC is undesirable due to concern that communications will be lost or situational awareness would be reduced.

2. Typically units that execute TOC/J-TOC operations find that eventually both nodes move during contact, violating a major TTP in maintaining command and control.

3. Triggers are either not established or are not adhered to during execution.

4. TOC personnel are not fully briefed in the execution of the plan and do not have situational awareness of the battlefield once the operation commences.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Poorly planned and executed battalion J-TOC operations continue to hinder unit operations. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Personnel and equipment are often not identified by SOP or are deemed METT-T dependent.

2. Most often, there is no system or method to ensure that each staff officer in the J-TOC has departed the TOC with the information or tools needed for the J-TOC to maintain control of the battalion's fight.

3. There is very little doctrinal information on J-TOC operations. FM 6-20-1, The Field Artillery Cannon Battalion, offers assistance with reference only to normal TOC operations, personnel duties and responsibilities, and TOC layouts. There is no discussion about J-TOC operations, configurations, personnel, or equipment. The draft of FM 6-70, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for M109A6 Howitzer (PALADIN) Operations, offers a short discussion on the purpose of J-TOC operations, but nothing more.

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 1)

OBSERVATION 4: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 2)

1. The TOC must have a plan to battle track and provide the commander with critical information and recommendations throughout all phases of the fight. Using time/distance analysis based on critical events such as LD, first contact, actions on the objective, and forward passage of lines, the TOC should be able to plan their jumps to minimize the times when the TOC will be less effective.

2. Continue to refine and train the proper use of a J-TOC. If employed properly, the J-TOC can assist in ensuring the TOC maintains situational awareness.

3. Use LNOs at adjacent unit TOCs to improve the situational awareness of adjacent units and enemy activity.

4. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on the development and execution of displacement operations for the TOC and J-TOC. Confidence and trust in the execution of such operations can only be developed through careful integration of the plan into wargaming, rehearsals, and synchronization matrices.

5. Clear understanding of what each C2 node is responsible for as well as the personnel needed to man those nodes should be established and rehearsed prior to execution.

6. Develop battle drills within the execution matrix of TOC jumps (such as map board mirroring, internal triggers, and TOC configuration at execution phases).

7. Conduct Home Station training on C2 jumping, and foster the trust and confidence in what such operations can do for the overall command and control as well as situational awareness on the battlefield and the extension of communications in the battlefield.

8. Reference: CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, Tactical Operations Center.

9. Units should develop a comprehensive checklist containing information needed to take control of the battalion's firing units and provide tactical and technical fire control based on an accurate friendly and enemy situation.

10. Each staff officer, as part of the J-TOC, needs to develop a kit/system containing products needed to support J-TOC operations.

11. To conduct good J-TOC operations that are not reactionary, a plan must be developed during the wargame to include triggers, new location, and a reconnaissance plan that will facilitate the transition of control.

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Reporting Requirements and Procedures

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Engineer units do not use the NBC warning and reporting system to warn other units of an actual or predicted chemical hazard. (TA.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units often neglect to make initial reports, resulting in unnecessary casualties due to chemical agent exposure.

2. Unit personnel do not understand the capabilities of the NBC warning and reporting system and do not use it to determine required protective measures or to plan operations.

OBSERVATION 2: Fire support teams frequently do not report information in accordance with doctrinal report formats. (TA.4.1.1.4)

DISCUSSION: None.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: There is often no standardized report format in the TOC. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION: Most TOCs have multiple charts for tracking statuses. TOC shift personnel are usually content to get the information and fill out the charts without regard for how the information might impact on the upcoming mission. With no standardized report format, information and reports are often copied on the nearest piece of paper and not filed for future reference.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Civilians on the Battlefield (COB) reports to the tactical operations center (TOC) are sporadic. (TA.4.1.1.4)

DISCUSSION: Information does not flow well from the units in the field through battle captains to the special staff, including the judge advocate (JA). Incomplete reports often come to the brigade battle captains and are never passed to the special staff for action. (As an example, during one rotation, the JAs often did not receive the corps' FRAGO for an upcoming mission until the morning of the meeting, or not at all. Had it not been for O/C intervention, the JAs and special staff would not have had any advance warning.) As a direct result, the brigade combat teams are often not prepared for the mission, necessitating an order for a reinspection.

OBSERVATION 2: Fratricide reports to the tactical operations center were sporadic. (TA.4.1.1.4)

DISCUSSION: In many cases, fratricides were not reported to the TOC through the subordinate units. When they were reported, they lacked the necessary detail and normally took over 24 hours to reach the TOC and the judge advocate (JA).

OBSERVATION 3: Current levels of reporting within the brigade combat teams do not provide the S4 with adequate visibility of on-hand supplies within the unit. (TA.4.1.1.4)

DISCUSSION: The lack of adequate information to properly track and control critical CSS assets on the battlefield results in inadequate asset visibility, delays in resupply, and many avoidable emergency resupply requests. In one rotation, 35 percent of all LOGREPs turned in during the rotation were emergency requests for resupply.

NBC WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEM

1. Refer to page 2-1 of FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Aviodance, for information on the use of the NBC warning and reporting system.

2. Include procedures for the use of the NBC warning and reporting system in the engineer battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP).

3. Standardize all reporting formats for NBC. If a SPOT or SALUTE report is used, ensure it has all the required information.

4. Ensure that all unit personnel understand the flow process of reports.

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM REPORTING STANDARDS

1. FISTs should report information and call for fire IAW the formats in FM 6-20-20, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion Task Force and Below, and FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire.

2. The FIST forward observer's (FO's) primary mission is to call for fires for the maneuver element. When fires are unavailable, the FO's next responsibility is to report. The task force (TF) needs to enforce reporting standards (i.e., call for fire, SALUTE reports, and SALT reports).

TOC REPORT FORMAT

1. Charts are great as long as the soldiers filling them out understand the reason why tracking those items is important and when the information given requires further action. Develop an SOP which illustrates "if this - then this." For example, IF a company reports a two under Class III/V after LOGPAC, THEN both the S4 and the task force XO are to be notified immediately.

2. The timeliness of information flow can mean the difference between life and death. Soldiers may die if the battle captain is not quickly informed that the engineers have received the grids to an air Volcano minefield that has been employed along his counterattack route. Use a five-ply standardized report format, fill it out correctly and completely, and distribute it simultaneously to the battle captain, S2 section, FSE, and engineers. The shift NCOIC should maintain the fifth copy. This system allows each of the BOS representatives to receive the same information quickly, and reminds the individual taking the report of items required in the report.

CIVILIANS ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND FRATRICIDE REPORTS

1. Create a standard fratricide and COB reporting format in the tactical SOP (TACSOP) so that all necessary information for a response can be relayed to the special staff in one message.

2. Add a standard distribution for COB/significant legal issue reports.

3. Make fratricides a commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) to the brigade combat team commander and record and forward the report to the JA for action.

4. Add a fratricide report to the tactical SOP (TACSOP) referenced under the current chapter on fratricides.

CSS REPORTING

1. Units should review their SOPs to ensure that required reports are appropriate and contain all of the information necessary to track the CSS effort without undue repetition or burden on subordinate units.

2. Units should use CPXs and other simulations as a vehicle to focus on accurate and timely reporting by subordinate units.

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Risk Management/Risk Assessments

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Engineer companies are typically conducting a form of risk management on a mission-by-mission basis, generally following the Force XXI model. (TA.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. The process is not organic to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), but often an afterthought.

2. Critical operational risks, such as conducting night tactical road marches and mitigating controls, are not identified.

3. Sub-units are not forced to continue the process at their level.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Battalions seldom conduct effective risk management planning. (TA.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. There is no process to look at risk during all steps of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

2. Battalion commanders and staffs do not have a firm understanding of all inherent risks -safety and fratricide - at the time of mission execution.

3. The battle staff and commanders do not continually assess risk during execution.

OBSERVATION 2: Leaders do not demonstrate proficiency in applying the risk assessment process to their missions. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Some leaders see the Force XXI Small Unit Risk Management Booklet for the first time at the NTC. Most have not had formal instruction on how the process works, and even fewer have received adequate instruction on how the process is integrated with mission analysis, planning, preparation, and execution.

2. Most platoons do well identifying such hazards as speed, night driving over hilly terrain, and heat and cold weather injuries. However, controls for reducing the factors surrounding fratricide are rarely considered. While some units have SOPs for anti-fratricide, many soldiers are unaware of the content of such SOPs. Consequently, anti-fratricide and operational risks do not receive adequate consideration.

ENGINEER COMPANY

1. Risk management is applicable to everything an organization does. All units should conduct a Force XXI-type risk management process for every mission.

2. Make the risk management process organic to the MDMP, with the risk management product issued not later than the higher echelon's OPORD.

3. Higher echelon commanders should add risk management to their pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) checklist and actually check it.

BRIGADE RISK MANAGEMENT

1. Emphasize risk management during the MDMP per the guidance of the Force XXI Risk Management Handbook.

2. The most successful units follow their SOPs when conducting their risk assessment, soliciting input from various leaders in the unit for a broader view of the mission at hand. Those demonstrating difficulty with the risk assessment process normally do not incorporate the system in their training at Home Station.

3. The extent of leader involvement in subordinate unit planning (guidance, backbrief, feedback) is a proportional indicator of success in this area.

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS (TA.4), Part 5

Acknowledgements