Military

2. S6s do not plan for overwhelming success or catastrophic failure (contingency communications), which leads to a signal plan that provides insufficient redundancy.

OBSERVATION 5: Planning for C2 systems support is inadequate. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. The C2 plan is seldom wargamed during the planning process, resulting in only one-dimensional planning for C2 assets.

2. Redundant C2 is not incorporated into the plan.

3. Units do not react to failures in the retransmission system, and, as a result, scouts cannot communicate.

4. If the tactical operations center (TOC) is destroyed, the combat trains command post (CTCP) is not in a position to take over the fight.

OBSERVATION 6: TOC personnel often do not understand or adhere to the communications plan. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Battle staffs and TOC soldiers are often not trained on what the communications plan is and how movement of the TOC, following the initial communications plan, and tracking the battle can enhance the overall "visibility" of the battle.

2. Occasionally, frequencies or net identification are altered, or communications assets such as retransmission sites are moved by other than communications personnel during critical times on the battlefield.

3. Movement of the TOC is not fully synchronized with the original communications plan, and neither the signal officer (SIGO) nor the NCOIC enforce the plan during the execution phase of the mission.

OBSERVATION 7: Units do not fully integrate all signal systems into the fight. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION: A lack of integration of signal assets is caused by the S6s' lack of asset visibility, poor operator proficiency level, and the staff not fully understanding the capabilities and limitations of organic signal assets and external support.

NET CONTROL STATION

1. Upon completion of each Home Station training event, CTCP personnel should conduct an extensive internal AAR to capture and record all the lessons learned.

2. Capture and document the techniques that worked and eliminate those that did not. Take these results and immediately adjust the CTCP TACSOP accordingly.

3. Train using the new TACSOP until all personnel are proficient in collecting and disseminating pertinent information.

BATTALION/BRIGADE SIGNAL OFFICER DUTIES

1. Authorize the SIGO to plan and synchronize an approved command and control plan that goes beyond simply placing retransmission systems.

2. Require the SIGO to plan the locations for the tactical operations center (TOC) (to include forward and rearward displacement), the combat trains command post (CTCP), retransmission systems, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) assets, and so forth.

3. The SIGO needs to integrate his plan into the brigade's communications plans. Knowing the brigade plan will further enhance and could influence the task force plan through an understanding of where the MSE assets and key command and control nodes are located.

4. The SIGO needs to coordinate with other units. In so doing, a task force can develop a plan that utilizes other unit's assets and positioning efforts, and an ability to collocate retransmission assets for additional security.

5. Foster a working relationship with other SIGOs at Home Station through the use of weekly meetings. Hold daily meetings during field rotations, focusing on status updates of maintenance and overall equipment readiness.

6. Prior to a battle the task force should have a net call with all SIGOs in the brigade combat team (BCT) to obtain a final "dump" of communications planning.

COMMUNICATIONS PLANS

1. The S6 must coordinate constantly with all staff members and utilize all available tools (terrain teams, MSE commander, or BATCON/SYSCON) to ensure sufficient detail is provided and complete signal support is rendered to the unit.

2. Planning must be completed early and with consideration for overwhelming success and catastrophic failure. Incorporate "PACE" into each phase of the operation.

EXAMPLE (scout mission):

3. Train the TOC to understand the importance of integrating and adhering to a communications plan.

4. The SIGO should reinforce the communications plan with the battle captain and operations sergeant.

5. The communications NCOIC should continually monitor and position himself at the TOC to supervise the integration of the TOC with the plan while the unit is in contact.

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

1. Synchronize the MSE planning cycle with the brigade's timeline. Conduct concurrent planning with brigade.

2. Develop methods to continue to train the signal battalion LNO and provide him the tools to ensure MSE assets are included in the MDMP.

3. Develop a system to quickly disseminate information including FRAGOs, OPORDs, and graphics down to the soldier level. Use the most efficient method (TACLAN, TACFAX, etc.) to get information from brigade down to the signal company and platoon level.

4. The orders development process used at NTC by each company should be continually trained at Home Station in order to increase proficiency.

5. Node centers and radio access units (RAUs) must be prepared for rapid movement and must react to each phase of the battle. During the defense, MSE planners must plan additional locations for forward-deployed elements for survivability purposes and several locations should be identified for short-notice jumps. Close coordination with the brigade S6 section and battle tracking is required to ensure MSE assets react to offense and defense operations.

6. Conduct realistic training by planning and executing dynamic networks that support each phase of the mission and cover the width and depth of the battlefield.

EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

1. Signal soldiers must have the knowledge to troubleshoot and maintain the communications architecture, per FM 11-43, Signal Leader's Guide. Continue to train signal soldiers to become experts on all communications and automation equipment.

2. The signal soldier must also be able to train the users to become self-reliant. Place emphasis on signal soldiers providing proactive signal support to help users determine how to install, maintain, operate, and troubleshoot their equipment.

3. Ensure the SYSCON and node management teams are actively checking all systems in the communications architecture.

4. Develop a signal asset tracking system to include other available systems from CS and CSS units.

5. Develop a comprehensive training program that seeks to educate users at all echelons.

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Employing Tactical C2W

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Electronic Warfare (EW) matrices are inadequate. (TA.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. The EW matrix is not tied to the brigade's decision points and critical enemy events. This results in a hit-and-miss collection and jamming success rate.

2. EW assets are not fully synchronized with the brigade combat team (BCT) plan.

3. Military intelligence (MI) companies routinely attend the wargame, but develop the EW matrix before the wargame begins. Synchronization of IEW assets in the wargame is critical in synthesizing the IEW effort to support the scheme of maneuver and the scheme of fires.

OBSERVATION 2: Direction finding for electronic attack operations are at times nonexistent or nonsupportive. (TA.4.5)

DISCUSSION: TLQ-17s have not been a player in providing nonlethal SEAD in support of air insertions or attacks. When aggressively employed, direction finding significantly enhances the effectiveness of the TLQ-17s.

1. Develop a sound electronic warfare (EW) matrix with preplanned jump locations that are tied directly to clearly defined triggers during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The matrix must show the brigade's decision points and what actions each asset should take during the time leading up to and at the specified time/event.

2. Synchronize the EW matrix with the scheme of fires and correlate it directly with the high-payoff target list (HPTL).

3. Include direction finding as part of the jamming effectiveness reporting tasking for the electronic attack plan. Start with sound EW baseline construction, an EW matrix, and asset placement at the planning stage. Make direction finding a continual process.

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Operation Order (OPORD) and Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) Preparation

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: The orders process in the field trains command post (FTCP) is not standardized or followed. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. FTCPs normally have a good OPORD format in their SOPs, but the SOPs are not followed or used.

2. The HHC commander often attempts to write the entire OPORD himself, and most of the time he does not begin mission analysis until he receives the task force (TF) OPORD.

3. The FTCP chain of command often surfaces valid concerns about the upcoming mission that, as a result of late or improper mission analysis, are not elevated up to the TF level.

OBSERVATION 2: Medical platoon leaders are usually not integrated in the task force (TF) OPORD preparation process. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The S4 operates independently without input from the medical platoon leader.

2. The TF commander's intent and concept of support are often not clearly understood by those who will conduct casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations.

3. Current graphics that template obstacles, engagement areas, and enemy avenues of approach are seldom distributed throughout the medical platoon. As a result, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets are often destroyed by friendly and enemy obstacles and by enemy direct and indirect fires.

4. Company MEDEVAC teams maintain poor situational awareness because of inadequate FM communication with the TF command group. Often, only the administration and logistics (A/L) radio net is monitored. As a result, battalion aid station (BAS) locations, casualty collection points (CCP), and ambulance exchange points (AXP) are unknown throughout the medical platoon and TF.

OBSERVATION 3: FA batteries generally do not prepare for defensive operations to standard. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Commanders do not ensure that units understand the desired defensive endstate and do not prioritize their work efforts.

2. Leaders do not supervise and enforce standard occupation defensive preparations.

3. Batteries seldom do the following in preparation for defensive operations:

4. Positioning of the field artillery ammunition support vehicle (FAASV) is often an afterthought in defensive preparations.

OBSERVATION 4: Supply companies do not prepare with sufficient detail to ensure mission success. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Companies usually wait for the battalion order to begin internal planning. As a result, supply companies rarely issue an operations order (OPORD) and when they do, it is never complete.

2. Company commanders do not use or are unaware of the eight troop-leading procedures.

3. Units do not plan to conduct rehearsals. Unit actions prior to movements are uncoordinated, and soldiers are usually unaware of the unit mission or key events or times for the next 24 hours.

4. Start point (SP) times are usually not met because units are not prepared.

5. Soldiers become disgruntled because of conflicting guidance.

6. Occupation of operating sites is frequently haphazard.

7. Low leader/soldier situational awareness inhibits initiative, and unit personnel waste large amounts of time.

OBSERVATION 5: Tactical tasks and purposes are not adequately assigned in medical platoons. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION: Medical platoons often do not understand the purpose of their mission or the specific task they need to accomplish.

OBSERVATION 6: The Class IV/V support plan for the defense is not being integrated into the BCT plan as a combined arms effort. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. While most engineer battalions understand the need for a combined arms approach to logistical support of the brigade's defense, they rarely execute an integrated Class IV/V plan. Combined arms responsibilities for packaging and moving Class IV/V barrier materials and for operating Class IV/V supply points are usually outlined in the engineer battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP), but are rarely addressed in the brigade's orders.

2. Most engineer battalions end up being the sole executors of the planning, preparation, and execution phases of Class IV/V logistical operations. This lack of participation by other members of the BCT in the execution of Class IV/V operations detracts from the engineer battalion's primary missions of countermobility and survivability during the brigade's defense.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 3)

OBSERVATION 2: Scout platoon leaders often do not tap the expertise of the platoon sergeant and senior scouts during the orders process. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION: Although the scout platoon sergeant is the most experienced scout within the platoon, the platoon leader seldom uses him and the other scout NCOs during the planning process.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: MP leaders have difficulty issuing clear, well-organized, and complete OPORDs and graphics. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. MP platoon and squad leaders do well with situation and mission paragraphs of the OPORD; however, execution paragraphs are usually substandard.

2. Maps, overlays, and terrain models to assist in understanding are not routinely issued with the OPORD.

3. Scheme of maneuver paragraphs do not clearly "paint the picture" needed for missions at hand.

4. Sub-unit tasks and coordinating instructions are not well organized or complete.

5. Leaders have difficulty using mission analysis and results from their reconnaissance to develop solid plans for achieving mission success.

6. Understanding and use of operational graphics is lacking, and the graphics rarely are disseminated down to the team level where they are needed the most. Conversely, the most successful platoons make extensive use of maps, overlays, terrain models, and detailed OPORD formats.

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 2)

OBSERVATION 3: Task forces are issuing incomplete FRAGOs. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Incomplete FRAGOs often result in either destroying the task force (TF) or causing the subordinate commander to execute an operation that was not intended. A common term for such orders is the "Go and Do" order.

2. An example:

ORDERS PROCESS IN THE FIELD TRAINS COMMAND POST (FTCP)

1. The FTCP command group should be consistently involved in the TF orders process and all maneuver and CSS rehearsals.

2. The HHC commander should use his XO, 1SG, and subordinate element leaders to give him input to the FTCP OPORD. This will make the order clear to all involved and allow the commander to accomplish his other duties.

3. The FTCP staff should establish a timeline when the WARNO is received and follow it.

4. The HHC commander should coordinate closely with available assets in the brigade support area (brigade rear and forward support battalion CP) to allow him to conduct a timely and adequate mission analysis.

5. The format of a field train's OPORD is no different from that of a maneuver element; what is different is the information it contains. The commander must give a task and purpose to each subordinate element in the field trains to allow each platoon or section to conduct proper mission analysis IAW their given tasks.

MEDICAL PLATOON INTEGRATION

1. For a medical plan to be successful, it must be controlled as with any other operation.

2. Rehearse FM communications at every level. Use multiple radio frequencies to allow real-time communication with the TF command group, subordinates, and the supporting medical company (C/FSB).

3. Once incorporated into the TF planning process, the medical platoon leader must execute troop-leading procedures (TLP) and develop a timeline for issuing the OPORD and conducting rehearsals.

4. The platoon leader responsible for appropriate allocation of medical assets and responsive support must track continuous SITREPS from the S2 and line company medics. Intelligence reports, active AXPs, and FRAGOs must be disseminated to evacuation teams immediately for adequate situational awareness.

5. Friendly and enemy graphics and overlays must be understood by crews and posted in each evacuation vehicle.

6. The medical platoon leader should participate in the TF's Home Station JANUS exercises for additional battle-tracking experience.

7. Assign the task and purpose for all subordinate units, ensuring they are nested with the task force's main effort. The main effort has the same purpose as the task force.

8. Assign the purpose first. Determine why you need this force, then assign the appropriate task. Ensure that the tactical task is specific enough to tell the subordinate leader exactly what you want him to do.

9. Each subordinate unit should have a unique task and purpose within the context of the scheme of maneuver.

FA BATTERY ORDERS PROCESS

1. Conduct a battery defensive preparation battle drill. Develop a drill that clearly outlines:

2. Preparation begins when the battery commander receives the mission. He must begin his own analysis based on information received during the field artillery support plan (FASP) briefing.

3. The gunnery sergeants then begin their reconnaissance with a specific defensive concept in mind.

4. The battery commander issues specific defensive PCCs/PCIs for the platoon leaders, platoon sergeants (PSGs), and section chiefs to accomplish before any movement takes place. For example:

In these five short sentences the commander has told his junior leaders their likely threats and control measures to counter those threats, and has established a priority of work and a completion time. The commander can then address any changes during his battery OPORD.

5. The greater challenge of defensive preparation begins after the occupation, but it need not be a new concept at each position. A defensive battle drill, focused by the commander as illustrated above, will give the section chiefs sufficient time to prepare their sections.

6. Based on the WARNO, the gunnery sergeant should begin establishing TRPs. The TRPs serve several purposes:

7. Units should then establish range cards for each crew-served weapon and howitzer. The combination of range cards and TRPs will allow a section chief to easily reestablish his sectors of fire and defensive orientation after conducting a survivability move. Sections should be battle- drill trained to ensure that they re-mark their sectors of fire after each move.

8. Listening posts and observation posts (LPs/OPs), either mounted or dismounted, can be set up based on the threat.

9. PCCs and PCIs will ensure chiefs cover the specifics of each task.

10. The battery commander (BC) or a battery leader should conduct coordination with adjacent units. This coordination ensures each unit knows the other's location, the established call signs and frequencies, and recognition signals. Coordination also allows them to tie into defensive positions, and prevents confusion and misidentification of friendly vehicles.

11. The commander must consider survivability moves versus hardening of positions.

12. The platoon leaders and sergeants must plan and rehearse how they intend to fight their platoons/battery in a direct fire engagement.

13. The defensive preparation battle drill is vital. The battery commander, having determined what measures his battery must take, focuses his battery leadership through the WARNO and OPORD using PCCs, PCIs, rehearsals, priorities of work, and planning guidance. Defensive preparation is then a directed effort of priorities of work based on a logical analysis within the whole timeline, not guesswork as time permits.

SUPPLY COMPANY ORDERS PROCESS

1. Use the troop-leading procedures.

2. Do not wait for a complete order from the battalion to issue the company warning order (WARNO). The commander's intent and a no-later-than (NLT) time is enough to get the unit moving. Concentrate on what can be done do to prepare, inspect, rehearse, and spot-check.

3. Conduct rehearsals. The more personnel involved the better. At a minimum, use a backbrief rehearsal to ensure that key leaders have the information needed to accomplish the mission.

4. Allow enough time for subordinate leaders to issue an OPORD to their soldiers and conduct internal backbrief, inspections, and rehearsals.

ENGINEER ORDERS PROCESS

1. Engineer planners at all levels should campaign for the active support of other members of the combined arms team in support of Class IV/V operations.

2. This support must be addressed in the maneuver order. Class IV/V operations are so critical to the defense that these responsibilities should be addressed in the scheme of manuever and sub-unit mission subparagraphs, and not simply relegated to the Engineer Annex.

3. In addition to the engineer battalion TACSOP, the task force and BCT TACSOPs must also delineate responsibilities for Class IV/V operations.

SCOUT PLATOON SERGEANT INTEGRATION

1. Use the experience of the platoon sergeant and NCOs to enhance the platoon's success during operations. Give them the jobs of selecting routes, preparing paragraphs 4 and 5 of the OPORD, constructing a quality terrain board, and risk management.

2. Include tasks to be performed by the NCOs in the platoon SOP to streamline the orders process and to train new subordinate leaders on the specific responsibilities they have during the orders process.

MILITARY POLICE ORDERS PROCESS

1. Units that do well at the NTC normally articulate a sound Home Station training program that requires the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders to give OPORDs under the observation of an evaluator, who then gives feedback on content and presentation.

2. It is critical that all soldiers have a complete understanding of graphic control measures and operational overlays. Teams must possess this critical information prior to mission execution to ensure accomplishment and avoid potential fratricide incidents.

TASK FORCE FRAGOs

1. The quality of FRAGOs is invariably an issue during force-on-force AARs, the same phenomenon seen in LTP. On the next page is a diagram O/C teams use to discuss FRAGOs. Of particular interest is the requirement for the subordinate commander to give a quick confirmation briefing to einsure that in the heat of battle he understands what he must do (Task) and why he is doing it (Purpose). Page H-29 of FM 101-5 shows the doctrinal format for a FRAGO, which is consistent with the technique advocated by O/C teams at the NTC.

2. Between the TF Commander, XO, and S3, someone needs to see the developing situation in sufficient time to allow for a brief but thoughtful plan. If the TF leadership will use the technique depicted in the slide above, the quality of FRAGOs will improve as will the quality of execution of combat operations. It is also wise to emphasize task, purpose, and endstate for each subordinate unit, so, in addition to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3a of the FRAGO, also issue an abbreviated execution matrix.

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Development and Use of Tactical SOPs

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: The majority of platoon SOPs are insufficient. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Many scout platoon SOPs are simply a reprint of FM 17-98 with the unit's cover on it.

2. Specific information that the platoon needs is not discussed in the SOP, and what is in the SOP is often not understood.

OBSERVATION 2: The majority of engineer companies do not have or use a TACSOP. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer company TACSOPs, if they exist, seldom contain the task force SOPs or the engineer battalion SOPs.

2. TACSOPs do not include procedures on how the company internally conducts tactical missions.

3. Most companies say they use their engineer battalion TACSOP, but the soldiers in the company are usually not familiar with it and do not follow it during the planning, preparation, and execution of tactical missions.

OBSERVATION 3: Task forces seldom have an established standard operating procedure (SOP) for the echelonment of tactical operations center (TOC) equipment and personnel to provide an interim capability. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force TOC jump plans are not synchronized into the task force scheme of maneuver.

2. The TOC loses situational awareness and the ability to conduct predictive analysis and timely recommendations to the commander.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: SOP knowledge and understanding within the platoon and the attachments is poor. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION: The scout platoon SOP is often not familiar to the platoon or made available to attachments.

OBSERVATION 2: Platoon SOPs are frequently not complete. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Mortar platoons do not manage time well, specifically at the squad level. Troop-leading procedures are conducted sporadically, rehearsals are incomplete, and priorities of work are different for all squads in the platoons.

2. Platoon SOPs do not define the standard for each task or how and when they will be conducted.

OBSERVATION 3: Scout platoons rarely have an established SOP for formatting and issuing their OPORDs. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION: Most NCOs used small notebooks to copy information. With the amount of information covered during the OPORD briefings, subordinate leaders are not able to write down all the important information.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 1)

OBSERVATION 2: Task force/squadron organic personnel are often not familiar with their existing TACSOPs. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION: A majority of task forces and squadrons arrive at the LTP with TACSOPs that are being revised or totally rewritten. Few personnel attending LTP have a working knowledge, let alone the requirement to know the TACSOP in minute detail. This habitual rewrite of TACSOPs renders the old document useless even though it may have been satisfactory. Units then arrive at their NTC "in-the-box" rotation with a fresh TACSOP that is known only by the author or authors and totally useless in planning, preparation, or execution.

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 2)

OBSERVATION 4: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 3)

PLATOON SOPs

1. Developing a good platoon SOP requires time and the involvement of the entire platoon. FM 17-98, Scout Platoon, is a good guide to use when developing an SOP, but each subject area must be tailored to the platoon.

2. Ask soldiers for input on different subject areas to get them involved and help them understand the information presented. If the lowest-ranking soldier can read it and understand exactly what to do, the SOP is a good product.

3. Incorporate any attachments that the unit normally has, and include specific tasks for each subject area. For example, if a mechanic is normally attached to the platoon, he is not only responsible for maintenance within the platoon, but also assists in construction of the terrain model or is assistant gunner on a certain vehicle.

4. All leaders should use a platoon OPORD SOP.

5. Modify the platoon's SOP to include procedures for formatting and issuing OPORDs. Each leader should use 8 ½" x 11" or 5" x 8" versions of the OPORD format. The format selected should be the standard for each platoon leader to use when writing and issuing his OPORD.

6. Every soldier within the platoon must have a copy of the platoon SOP and must know it and be trained to it.

7. Every soldier attached, whether the medic from HHC, the GSR team from the MI company, or the ERT, must have a copy of the platoon SOP and be familiar with it.

8. At the next rewrite of the platoon SOP, make enough copies for every soldier in the platoon, to include soldiers the platoon will receive over the next six months. Make enough additional copies for the ERTs, COLTs, GSR team, and any other possible attachments.

9. Incorporate at least one monthly class for the platoon to review the platoon SOP and to train new soldiers who have recently arrived in the platoon.

10. Develop a complete SOP. The SOP is the unit's guide for how it conducts business. From the SOP, the units identify or establish the standard on how they will plan, prepare, and execute their mission.

11. Use FMs and TMs to develop the initial SOP, and then further refine it for specific use at platoon level, revising and prioritizing TTPs as appropriate.

ENGINEER COMPANY TACSOP

1. Engineer company leaders must conduct bottom-up research on how they will conduct tactical missions and must produce a company-level TACSOP.

2. Once the TACSOP is produced, it must be disseminated to all soldiers, and the company leadership must enforce TACSOP use.

3. The TACSOP is a living document that is reviewed and updated after each major field training exercise (FTX).

TASK FORCE TACSOP

1. Use the existing TACSOP and modify only if absolutely necessary. A mediocre or average SOP that is workable and understood by the planners and the executors will be of much greater value than a "voluminous" production understood by only a few.

2. If the SOP must be modified, add the critical subjects that are often missing in unit TACSOPs: smoke planning/execution and observer planning.

3. Train the TACSOP at Home Station. Integrate it into every possible aspect of training and make it mandatory, with tested compliance.

TASK FORCE TOC SOP

1. The task force TOC should establish an SOP that addresses the organization of each echelon of the TOC as it displaces. The SOP should address:

2. Synchronize the TOC displacement into the task force scheme of maneuver.

3. Reference: CALL Newsletter No. 95-07, Tactical Operations Center.

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS (TA.4), Part 4

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS (TA.4), Part 6