Military

COA DEVELOPMENT

1. Doctrinal references for commanders and staffs are FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, and FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion. FM 101-5-1 provides the correct doctrinal definitions that should be used when assigning company/team tasks and purposes. Chapter 2 of FM 7-20 provides procedures for development of COAs.

2. Although the commander provides his COA concept during commander's guidance, this concept must still be transformed by the commander, the S3, or the S3-Air into a set of maneuver graphics and a task and purpose for each company. Recommend the S3 refine the concept, leaving the commander free to work the R&S plan or other issues.

3. The final products of COA development are a COA maneuver graphic and a COA statement that includes task and purpose for subordinate units. If the task force does not have these two products, they will lose valuable time trying to develop graphics or tasks and purposes during the wargame.

4. The S3 must develop multiple COAs.

5. The staff must refine directed COAs prior to wargaming.

6. Commanders who give good guidance after mission analysis rarely need to be involved in the wargame.

TASK FORCE WARGAMING

1. Units must train on the MDMP with emphasis on wargaming. The wargame is a disciplined process with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the battle.

2. Units must become familiar with the wargaming techniques and recording methods outlined in FM 101-5. A unit SOP can be developed to enhance the process.

3. A complete COA must be developed prior to wargaming. If one friendly COA is developed in an effort to save time, the unit should wargame against several enemy COAs in order to develop branches to the base plan.

4. Adhering to the established timeline allows the staff to remain focused during the process and forces the staff to prioritize the amount of detail given to the effort.

5. The wargame should result in refining or modifying the COA, to include identifying branches and sequels that become on-order or be-prepared missions. It should refine location and timing of the decision point.

6. A synchronization matrix and decision support template (DST) should also be a result of the process. It should project the percentage of total enemy forces defeated in each critical event.

7. The TF XO must adhere to the timeline he establishes and keep the battle staff focused.

8. Integrate into the wargame all of the key players as outlined in ST 100-9.

9. The battle staff should identify critical events, prioritize them, and allocate time for each.

10. At the end of the wargame, the battle staff should have a synchronized plan in the form of a synchronization matrix, with operational graphics, so each BOS representative can finalize their portion of the OPORD.

11. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, outlines a very deliberate course of action (COA) analysis and wargaming process. The wargame should focus the staff's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction.

12. The wargaming process, adapted to the FA battalion, is described below.

Battalion XO
S3
S3 Air
S2
Fire direction officer (FDO)
Radar technician (if applicable)
Chemical officer (CMLO)
Reconnaissance and survey officer (RSO)
Battalion signal officer (BSO)
S4
S1

Synchronization matrix
Operational graphics
COA sketch/statement
Modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO)
Situational template (SITEMP)
Scheme of fires

13. The products that result from the wargame are:

14. Gather all the tools necessary to conduct a wargame (synchronization matrix, all staff members, and a technique such as the box, avenue of approach, or belt).

15. Consider beginning the synchronization with the decision point event/location. Utilize the matrix to facilitate the process and allow input from all the BOS representatives.

16. Establish a timeline and stick to it. Allot a specific amount of time per event. For example, 30 minutes for the R&S event, 60 minutes for the main attack, and so on. The XO or S3 must orchestrate the process and is responsible for controlling the timeline.

17. Adhere to the ACTION-REACTION-COUNTERREACTION technique.

18. The commander should, at a minimum, check on the process, provide guidance, and ensure that the COA still meets his intent.

19. Make necessary or "identified" changes to the graphics immediately. This will save time in reproduction later on in the process.

20. Have someone designated to record the unresolved or unforeseen issues and capture both friendly and enemy combat losses while wargaming certain events.

BRIGADE WARGAMING

1. Brigade staffs can achieve synchronization during a wargame only with frequent, rigorous practice. The staff must first be trained to understand what "good" looks like. The more frequently a staff practices, the better it will get, especially when the training session culminates with an after-action review.

2. Any division-level order can be used for training. If the commander or XO so desire, the staff can break the training up into several collective training sessions, such as receiving an order and doing mission analysis, followed by practicing the mission analysis briefing and receiving commander's planning guidance, then wargaming. Breaking the decision process into several sessions permits the staff to train together for two to three hours, such as during the weekly "Sergeant's Time," rather than having to find eight to ten continuous hours when all of the members can be present.

3. This training strategy is ambitious and requires the cooperation of numerous headquarters, but it will pay enormous benefits as the staff gets more and more proficient at what is arguably the most difficult step of the entire Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). With practice, the staff will be able to provide subordinate units with a coherent, synchronized plan that can be understood. Subordinates can then prepare and execute their own plans accordingly.

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Troop Leading and Discipline

3-4QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Unit SOPs on logistics package (LOGPAC) operations are seldom followed or enforced. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. LOGPAC turnaround times, as set by unit SOPs, are rarely met. Most task forces (TFs) meet their turnaround standard 25 percent of the time.

2. The excessive time consumed on unit LOGPACs affects the entire TF logistical arena, including mission preparation, draw times from the forward support battalion (FSB), and preparation for the next scheduled LOGPAC.

3. The support platoon suffers in many areas, with the biggest area being its rest plan.

4. Mission essential tasks for the platoon, such as pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs), inspection of vehicle load plans, equipment maintenance, personal maintenance, rehearsals, and the orders process at platoon level are inadequately conducted or not conducted at all.

5. The support platoon leader or HHC 1SG often closes the logistics release point (LRP) before all assets return.

6. Many drivers are not aware of the current mission when they depart the LRP and simply follow the truck in front of them. This is a major cause of accidents.

OBSERVATION 2: Troop-leading procedures are seldom followed in medical platoons. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. The medical platoon OPORD is often issued only a few hours before crossing the LD, with little time for rehearsal or further preparation.

2. Delegation of responsibilities to junior NCOs is rarely applied.

3. Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) are inadequate, resulting in faulty communications and equipment shortcomings.

OBSERVATION 3: Engineer TLPs at both company and platoon level remain inadequate and lack the required substance to properly allow the unit to succeed. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. TLPs are often overlooked and/or rushed to a point where they have no effect on the mission.

2. Engineer units often develop timelines (from past-due maneuver timelines) that do not identify key engineer essential planning and execution tasks.

3. Development of a tentative plan usually falls short because of incomplete application or a misunderstanding by the company XO during the tactical planning process.

4. Engineer company XOs do not identify essential, specified, and implied tasks that are critically important to mission accomplishment.

5. Unit orders lack clarity regarding the unit commander's intent, scheme of engineer operations, and sub-unit tasks.

6. Unit commanders misunderstand the importance of time management.

7. Rehearsals and backbriefs are executed poorly.

OBSERVATION 4: Task force SIGO and NCOIC troop-leading procedures (TLPs) are usually inadequate. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Many times subordinate soldiers do not fully understand their mission, reporting procedures, or routes. This creates confusion during mission execution phases.

2. There is poor situational awareness without TLP at every level. Placing the retransmission system on the wrong slope of a hill will not only cost the lives of the retransmission team, but also puts at great risk the lives of ground troops that the commander can no longer reach.

OBSERVATION 5: Engineer HHC commanders are not effectively using TLPs as a tool to plan, prepare, execute, and supervise CSS operations. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Because many of their tasks and missions are ongoing and/or repetitive, many HHC commanders find it difficult, or unnecessary, to conduct TLPs and issue HHC OPORDs. Without an OPORD, subordinates are not focused and do not possess the situational awareness necessary to fight, win, and survive on the battlefield.

2. Many engineer HHC commanders plan "on the fly" and do not establish timelines, leaving subordinate leaders (support platoon leader, CSE platoon leader, etc.) without the necessary information or time to conduct their own TLPs for successful execution.

OBSERVATION 6: Fire support teams seldom conduct PCCs/PCIs to standard. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION: Fire support teams are plagued with discovering problems with its equipment and capabilities during execution. For example, ground or vehicular laser locator designators (G/VLLDs) and targeting station control displays (TSCDs) are often unusable due to a lack of power cables or charged batteries.

OBSERVATION 7: Unit leaders do not routinely monitor or emphasize troop discipline on the battlefield. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Unit leaders do not emphasize the following critical areas:

2. Clear standards are not identified or enforced.

OBSERVATION 8: The use of PCCs and PCIs at the battery level is routinely poor and not focused on the specific requirements of the current mission. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Battalion tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) either lack sufficient detail regarding both PCCs and PCIs or are not identified and followed.

2. Battery commanders routinely do not develop appropriate mission-specific PCCs and PCIs during mission analysis. The commander often specifies PCCs from FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery, or from the unit TACSOP, but does not specify PCIs.

3. PCCs are often designated and prioritized without conducting a thorough mission analysis, resulting in designated checks that do not match the battery requirements.

4. Often the PCCs and PCIs designated are not supported by realistic timelines and responsibility is not affixed for battery-level checks.

5. Poor movement PCIs result in avoidable fratricides and breaks in contact.

OBSERVATION 9: Supply company PCCs/PCIs are inadequate. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Supply companies frequently do not have a standardized checklist for first-line supervisors and other unit leaders to ensure that the unit is prepared for its movement or mission. Unit leaders, in many instances, believe that their unit is ready to move or execute a mission when they are not.

2. Units that have a standardized checklist often do not enforce use of the checklist and do not tailor it to the mission.

3. Units that do not have a checklist or do not enforce the one that exists have difficulty in moving and in initial occupation of a new operating site.

4. Elements sent outside the BSA perimeter usually do not have all of the equipment required to accomplish the mission, and are forced to make multiple trips back to the company area to retrieve mission-essential equipment.

1-2QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: Leaders at all levels are not conducting troop leading procedures (TLP) to standard. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Many leaders do not conduct TLP at all. Those that do conduct some TLP do not conduct them to standard, leaving subordinates unprepared to execute the coming mission.

2. Senior leaders frequently do not issue the WARNOs or FRAGOs needed by subordinate leaders to initiate movement. As a result, platoons and squads habitually link up with supported units late in the preparation phase and are unable to conduct adequate rehearsals prior to mission execution.

3. Leaders are not using time management techniques, such as timelines, to assist in tracking task completion and are not specifying the critical/essential tasks to be executed.

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat 3-4QFY98 Observation 8)

OBSERVATION 3: PCCs and PCIs are often not completed to standard prior to a mission. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION: There are two prevailing reasons for this problem:

OBSERVATION 4: PCC/PCIs are often not conducted to standard in the TOC. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION: TOC personnel and assets are not often supervised or inspected to ensure that quality products are being sent to subordinate units and that TOC personnel understand the upcoming fight.

3-4QFY99

OBSERVATION 1: TLP are not consistently conducted in the platoon. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Platoon- and squad-level OPORDs lack certain critical details, such as ambulance exchange point (AXP) locations, decontamination sites, air defense warning/weapon status procedures, and friendly unit locations.

2. Rehearsals were not prioritized and lacked the hands-on practicality to help soldiers understand their roles in certain operations.

3. Pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs) were not conducted to the depth required to ensure mission preparedness.

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat 3-4QFY98 Observation 8)

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat 1-2QFY99 Observation 3)

OBSERVATION 4: (Repeat 1-2QFY99 Observation 4)

TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

1. The medical platoon leader and/or platoon sergeant (PSG) must establish a timeline with priorities of work, follow the established timeline, and publish an OPORD for each mission.

2. PCCIs/PCIs must be incorporated into the unit SOP and conducted before every mission.

3. NCOs must be held accountable for supervising tasks, following up for proper completion, and reporting to the PSG when tasks are complete.

4. Two elements are absolutely critical to the successful execution of superbly executed TLPs--operational guidance and specific timelines. The commander's focus should be on:

5. Commanders should train their XOs in the tactical planning process. This requires months of coaching, mentoring, and repeated, multiple warfighting experiences, coupled with focused candid feedback. The company XO needs to understand that he is a critical member of the combined arms team and must understand all aspects of tactical planning to effectively integrate and synchronize the mobility and survivability battlefield operating system (BOS).

6. Pages 7-1 to 7-11 of FM 5-100, Engineer Operations, and FM 71-123 Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team, provide excellent cookbook approaches to tactical planning.

7. The SIGO, communications chief, and all the NCOs must exercise the TLP steps at Home Station. They must be clear and concise when conducting platoon or section OPORD briefings.

8. Signal soldiers must fully understand the scheme of maneuver and commander's intent to provide needed support to the mission.

9. Regardless of time available, the engineer HHC commander must use TLPs to develop a systematic approach to formulating tactical plans.

10. An HHC OPORD must be issued to standard (written or oral) to include force protection (Force XXI risk sssessment). Without effective TLPs, the commander will seldom deliver an adequate OPORD on time or at all.

11. Leaders should apply troop-leading procedures (TLP) to every mission or task, whether tactical or administrative. This focus will inculcate the TLP methodology in leaders and their subordinates, making troop-leading procedures a basic and effective time management and planning tool.

12. Chapter 2 of FM 5-71-2, Armored Task-Force Engineer Combat Operations, provides an excellent analysis of the relationship between TLPs and the planning process.

13. The most disciplined and effective units abide by the imperatives of troop-leading procedures (TLP). While time may affect the depth and scope of such procedures, they are nonetheless prioritized in order to make the mission successful. Internalizing this system into unit operations is the only way to ensure consistent application and emphasis by all.

14. OPORDs should be practiced to the team level and must be reviewed by leaders to ensure the adequacy of subordinate orders.

PRE-COMBAT CHECKS/PRE-COMBAT INSPECTIONS (PCCs/PCIs)

1. When FIST leaders conduct proper PCCs and PCIs, they become aware of many potential problems and have the time to react and correct many deficiencies.

2. Task forces should develop a standard set of PCC/PCI checklists for the FISTs.

3. Once specific PCC/PCI checklists are identified for each particular operation, leaders must ensure the checks and inspections are conducted and conducted to standard (supervision).

4. Leaders must ensure proper actions are taken when problems are identified. Leader actions may include adjustment of the plan or cross-leveling of equipment and personnel to ensure the primary observers are the most capable.

5. Place more emphasis on conducting PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals as part of Home Station training.

6. Add refined PCCs, PCIs, and a battery rehearsal drill to battalion SOPs as appropriate. Batteries should establish useful rehearsal kits that will enhance different types of rehearsals.

7. Battery commanders should address PCCs/PCIs three times while completing their troop- leading procedures, as outlined below. (Refer to FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery, for an overview of the troop-leading procedures and how PCCs/PCIs fit into the development of the battery plan.)

8. Adherence to the timeline is essential at this point. The commander must have specified a completion time and must enforce this requirement. The priority of checks allows flexibility should the plan or timeline change, but does not negate the requirement to inform the commander on the status of the preparation. PCCs and PCIs are not a function set apart from normal battery mission preparation within the framework of the troop-leading procedures. They are the keystone in focusing the battery effort and ensuring maximum preparation and maximum readiness while keeping wasted effort and distractions to a minimum.

9. Develop a standardized checklist for movement and occupation of operations' sites.

10. Create section-specific checklists based on mission requirements.

11. Laminate and place the checklist in vehicle log record books.

12. Laminate and place a blank copy of the unit vehicle load plan in the log record book. It can be updated with either grease pencil or alcohol marker.

13. Use the checklist in garrison for all movement and, for support of brigade gunnery, or whenever a mission from the unit is executed.

14. Enforce use of the checklist by first-line supervisors.

15. Senior leaders in the unit must spot-check constantly to ensure unit compliance.

16. Time must be incorporated in the company timeline for conducting PCCs/PCIs. This is the commander's time to ensure that his unit is prepared for combat. In the event that the commander does not plan for PCCs/PCIs, junior leaders must do what is right and ensure that their soldiers are prepared for combat. Discovering shortcomings after contact is made is usually too late to correct them.

17. Develop priorities of work for TOC personnel in conjunction with a timeline to ensure personnel and equipment are prepared.

18. Section NCOICs should report to the OPS NCO or battle captain that inspections are complete.

TROOP DISCIPLINE

1. The NCO must be the backbone of unit standards.

2. All leaders play a key role in setting and enforcing standards. Senior leaders must assign responsibility for action and hold personnel accountable.

3. Most TF and field train SOPs adequately cover all aspects of the LOGPAC, but the SOPs need to be followed by each element within the TF.

4. The TF chain of command, beginning with the TF XO and CSM, must adhere to, enforce, and be actively involved to ensure this important mission requirement is accomplished in a timely manner.

5. Company teams and specialty platoons/sections can aid in LOGPAC turnaround time by: