SECTION IV - NEEDS EMPHASIS TRENDS
COMMAND
AND CONTROL BOS (TA.4) (cont)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
| Observation frequency: | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 | 3-4QFY98 | 1-2QFY99 | 3-4QFY99 |
| 5 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 11 |
3-4QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: Task forces seldom integrate the SIGO into the planning process. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION: The SIGO is not involved in task force planning early enough to develop a plan and present recommendations for command and control (C2) assets.
OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) commanders and staffs continue to be weak in applying the S2's products during the MDMP. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION: Often the S2 will prepare an adequate situational template (SITEMP) or threat course of action (COA), but then the TF staff and commander will not fight that SITEMP/COA during staff wargaming or at the TF rehearsal. This leads to an inability to identify critical events/branches and an unsynchronized TF plan.
OBSERVATION 3: The aviation task forces, specifically the aviation liaison officers (LNOs), are not integrated into the brigade's decision-making process. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. Too often, the aviation LNO is a junior officer or warrant officer without the requisite experience to effectively integrate aviation into the brigade's scheme of fires.
2. Aviation LNOs do not aggressively seek out mission information.
3. Planning for aviation assets to support the brigade's mission is often an afterthought. The aviation LNOs are relegated only for last-minute planning efforts for missions that require timely and accurate information flow for execution.
OBSERVATION 4: The FDO's responsibilities during the staff planning process are not well defined. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION: The staff does not analyze the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) further than broad statements such as suppress lead MRBs, attrit the lead MRB, and provide smoke, FASCAM, Copperhead, and so forth.
OBSERVATION 5: CSS operations are seldom integrated into the battalion's battle rhythm and do not facilitate the battalion's tactical posture. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. Most battalions demonstrate the ability to plan, prepare, execute, and reconstitute logistics; however, the S4, S1, and XO are not primary players during the orders process. CSS is often an afterthought and seldom addressed.
2. The S4 often leaves the wargame to gather information or solve problems that should be handled by the ALOC.
3. CSS is briefed but rarely rehearsed during battalion rehearsals. Who, what, when, where, and how should be briefed during the battalion rock drill for R3SP, LRPs, medical support plan, MSRs, resupply triggers, and reconstitution of battalion assets.
4. S4s are not using a CSS execution matrix, and their CSS plan is rarely rehearsed.
5. S4s are not using a checklist during the battalion orders process, hindering their ability to both validate and synchronize the plan and ensure it supports the essential field artillery tasks (EFATs).
6. The S3 does not provide timely ammunition guidance or establish future requirements, thus hindering the S4's ability to develop an adequate resupply plan.
7. Battlefield calculus is rarely conducted, and ammunition requirements/triggers are not clearly identified (155mm).
OBSERVATION 6: FSB SPOs are not involved in the brigade combat team (BCT) logistic planning process. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. The FSB SPO does not routinely attend the BCT planning sessions. The SPO becomes a receiver of the BCT logistic support plan rather than being an active participant in its development.
2. SPOs tend to leave the planning of BCT logistics to the brigade S4 or a logistic planner on the brigade staff.
3. SPOs rarely provide the brigade S4 sufficient guidance regarding the involvement of direct support (DS) logistics in future operational planning. BCT logistic support plans are not synchronized to adequately support the BCT scheme of maneuver.
4. SPOs lack situational awareness regarding the BCT's tactical and logistic plan and are unable to provide the FSB executive officer (XO) timely information concerning the BCT concept of operations. As a result, the FSB XO is not able to publish a timely order for the FSB companies to execute troop-leading procedures (TLP) and company-level rehearsals.
1-2QFY99
OBSERVATION 1: The BMO or his representative have little or no participation in the task force planning process. (TA.4.2.1.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. There is seldom a maintenance representative present for the task force mission analysis process and the briefing. As a result, no clear and concise picture of the task force maintenance posture and no explanation of how it may affect the upcoming mission were provided.
2. The S4/S1 were unprepared to brief for the BMO. The result was an incomplete understanding of the maintenance status of key systems and assets in the task force (i.e., current and projected M1A1 and M2 slant by company and platoon, and the status of operational mine plows) prior to course of action (COA) development.
OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 4)
OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of 3-4QFY98 Observation 5)
OBSERVATION 4: Task force planning is inadequate during all phases of the operation. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. During the planning process, task forces are not developing the detail necessary to effectively accomplish their mission. Units frequently do not complete the final phase of the plan to ensure they achieve the commander's desired endstate.
2. Missions, such as forward passage of lines and breaching, are seldom planned with the required detail to synchronize all the BOS. Lack of detail results in confusion and the need for more refinement later in the process, which takes planning time away from subordinate units as they wait for information.
OBSERVATION 5: The MDMP at task force level is not being conducted to standard. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. The staff has difficulty establishing and adhering to a timeline and agenda to accomplish this process.
2. The staff often tries to combine course of action (COA) development and wargaming, resulting in a lack of focus and a plan that is not synchronized.
3-4QFY99
OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 1)
OBSERVATION 2: ADA officers struggle to integrate with brigade combat team (BCT)/task force (TF) staffs during the planning process. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION: ADA officers do not use doctrinal techniques and procedures, integrate the air defense plan into the supported unit's scheme of maneuver, or properly position ADA assets. As a result, there is high attrition from enemy air.
OBSERVATION 3: The Air IPB is not integrated into the planning process. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. Air defense platoon leaders do not cross-talk air threats with the S2 during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
2. The S2 and ADA officers do not brief the air threat during mission analysis and the OPORD brief.
3. On occasion, the intelligence information from the ADA officer is completely different from that of the S2.
OBSERVATION 4: Judge advocates (JAs) are rarely integrated into any phase of the MDMP. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. JAs do not participate in the mission planning process. This lack of integration hampers their situational awareness of the battlefield and contributes to problems with information flow that is needed to accomplish the various missions required of the brigade combat teams.
2. When the JAs are involved in the planning, they are able to increase battle staff awareness of the legal and CMO issues.
OBSERVATION 5: Regimental chaplain assistants are sometimes not allowed to participate during battle planning in the tactical operations center (TOC). (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION: While attempting to monitor the battle, chaplain assistants are sometimes asked to leave the TOC during battle planning.
OBSERVATION 6: The MP platoon is not effectively integrated as a member of the brigade battle staff. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. There is minimal consideration for MP operations during the MDMP. Consequently, MP employment was principally planned and/or directed by the S3 or XO following the issue of the brigade OPORD.
2. During the MDMP, the platoon leader, or designated MP representative, often inserts himself into the planning process in order to provide expert input on MP employment. Typical focus included using MPs to assist in circulation control in the offense and rear area security in the defense. However, these operations are seldom included in the brigade OPORD, and there are few specific tasks given to the MPs.
3. Security missions are assigned during the execution phase of an operation as an afterthought, with little analysis of the threat, criticality of assets in the rear area, and probability of attack from enemy ground forces or other elements. Many times the required critical assets are already operating in front of infantry and armor task forces.
OBSERVATION 7: The S6 is inadequately integrated into the MDMP. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. Inadequate integration of the S6 leads to underdeveloped, unsynchronized, and misunderstood signal plans that do not fully support the brigade/regiment throughout the width and depth of the battlefield.
2. Other staff members who rely on communications to execute their plans too often do not successfully coordinate signal requirements.
OBSERVATION 8: The SIGO is seldom integrated into the planning process. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. As a result of a lack of integration, signal support is not synchronized across the width and depth of area of operations.
2. There is no synchronization of C2 node locations and movement to support scheme of maneuver.
3. There is no synchronization of retransmission systems.
4. There is no synchronization of Force XXI and MSE systems.
OBSERVATION 9: Mortar platoon operations are seldom integrated during the task force planning process. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION:
1. Because task forces do not integrate mortar platoon leadership into the MDMP, mortar platoons seldom understand their task, purpose, and endstate during mission execution.
2. Task force fire support officers (FSOs) do not apply or understand battle calculus as it relates to mortars.
3. Task force FSOs do not assign motor priority of fires to elements during fights.
4. Task force staffs do not identify movement criteria/triggers, go-to locations, IPRT times, range for ammunition, ammunition resupply triggers, and DNE levels (ammunition management).
5. Task force staffs do not clearly assign locations for the mortar platoon inside the task force formation.
6. Task force staffs who assign mortar platoons OPCON to companies for movement do not ensure the company leadership understands the company responsibility to get the mortar platoons to the right location at the right time.
7. Task force mortars are not properly integrated into task force fire support rehearsals.
OBSERVATION 10: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 4)
OBSERVATION 11: (Repeat of 1-2QFY99 Observation 5)
for the Military Decision-Making Process
SIGNAL OFFICER INTEGRATION
1. Integrate the SIGO into the planning process at the early stages of planning.
2. Once they have a general idea of the enemy situation, friendly situation, and the commander's intent, the SIGO and NCOs can make a tentative C2 plan.
3. Discuss each phase by BOS to integrate the signal plan.
4. If time does not permit detailed discussion, revisit the C2 plan.
5. Ensure adjacent unit coordination with other units and higher headquarters to provide redundancy.
6. The S6 and other members of the staff (XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, and FSO) must gain a complete understanding of signal matters as it relates to each staff function. This new understanding will lead to ensuring the S6 is completely involved in all phases of the MDMP. Ultimately, this will result in a coordinated and synchronized signal plan.
S2 PRODUCTS
1. Doctrinal references:
2. The TF battle staff must understand that the S2's SITEMP and enemy COAs are the most important products for determining critical events and developing a synchronized TF plan. Staffs must integrate the S2's products into mission analysis, COA development, and wargaming.
3. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, Military Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning," May 97.
AVIATION LNO INTEGRATION
1. The aviation LNO should form a working relationship with the brigade staff before it deploys.
2. The aviation LNO should be familiar with the standard operating procedures of all battlefield operating system (BOS) elements working within the brigade headquarters.
3. The aviation LNO should continuously seek out mission information and "sell" aviation to the brigade staff.
FIRE DIRECTION OFFICER (FDO) INTEGRATION
1. All members of the battalion staff must have a good understanding of the staff planning process and all members must contribute in varying degrees. The information and tools each member should bring to the planning table must be defined.
2. The FDO can contribute significantly to the planning process by reviewing the following information from the maneuver order:
- Attack guidance matrix: identifies desired effects and when to attack a target type.
- HPTs: identifies the priority to attack a target type by FS means.
- Target list: Identifies where they plan to attack target types.
- FS execution matrix (FSEM): Identifies how the scheme of fires will achieve the commander's intent.
- Attack guidance matrix: identifies desired effects and when to attack a target type.
3. By front loading the planning process with an understanding of these areas, the FDO can determine:
4. After COA analysis, comparison, and the decision brief, the staff begins a deliberate wargame of the selected COA. During this phase, the FDO focuses on the entire scheme of fires, to include the specifics of the EFST (i.e., FASCAM aimpoints and number and type of rounds per aimpoint, Copperhead EAs and artillery positions, smoke aimpoints and number of rounds, mass missions, and munitions and volume required to fire).
CSS INTEGRATION
1. A battalion logistician (S4/S1 or battalion XO) should be present at all battalion orders drills, aggressively representing the CSS arena and ensuring integration and synchronization of CSS operations. Better integration of CSS operations provides necessary time to reconstitute Class III (B) and V and reconfigure ammunition, thus posturing the battalion's CSS for the future battle.
2. The battalion XO orchestrates the orders process by acting as the chief of staff, ensuring all of the necessary players are present and participating.
3. The S4 must know the battalion's current logistical status before conducting mission analysis.
4. Develop a battalion OPORD CSS checklist that lists critical CSS functions which must occur before, during, and post battle, including grid locations of CSS entities. The list should be completed by phases of the battle and should include:
5. At a minimum, answer the essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) before leaving the battalion wargaming process and include them in any rehearsals.
6. Clear, timely ammunition guidance from the S3, better battlefield calculus, and ammunition positioning improves ammunition operations.
7. Focus on integrating resupply operations with the battalion operation, whether it be centralized or decentralized. This facilitates resupply operations in a more stable environment with less distraction and economizes the use of battalion logistical assets.
8. The S4 should maintain situational awareness and status of logistical assets and provide the S3 advice on execution of the logistics operations.
FSB SPO INTEGRATION
1. FSB SPOs must attend at least a portion of the BCT planning process, specifically mission analysis and course of action (COA) development, to provide the status of direct support (DS) logistics assets and guidance on how the maneuver plan can best be supported from a logistic standpoint.
2. The primary BCT logistics planner, be it the brigade S4 or a subordinate logistics planner, must keep the SPO informed throughout the planning process. The SPO can then begin parallel planning and keep the FSB XO abreast of the developing BCT plan. This will allow the FSB XO to set a viable timeline and publish an order that will enable FSB company commanders to execute TLP and conduct rehearsals.
3. The brigade S4 and the FSB SPO must ensure that the logistic support plan is synchronized with both the BCT maneuver plan and with the logistic support plans of each task force.
BATTALION MAINTENANCE OFFICER (BMO) INTEGRATION
If the BMO cannot attend mission analysis, the S4 and/or S1 must be able to provide an accurate current and projected maintenance status of the task force and an articulation of its impact on the course of upcoming operations to the commander and staff.
TASK FORCE MDMP
1. Units must execute detailed planning as outlined in FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. The staff needs to answer all questions prior to issuance of the OPORD.
2. Refer to FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, as a source for detailed planning of passage of lines and battle handover.
3. Develop a checklist from these manuals and add it to the unit SOP for use during planning.
4. The task force XO or S3 must establish and adhere to a timeline, not only to allow subordinates to plan and establish priorities of work, but to ensure the complete process is accomplished in the time allotted.
5. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning," May 97.
ADA OFFICER INTEGRATION
1. ADA officers must be actively involved in the MDMP.
2. Employment principles of ADA and the concurrent six employment guidelines (balanced fires, weighted coverage, mutual support, overlapping fires, early engagement, defense in depth) must be highlighted for the supported unit.
3. ADA officers must supplement the S2s in collecting and evaluating air threat capabilities.
AIR IPB INTEGRATION
1. ADA officers should coordinate with the S2s on who briefs the air threat.
2. The air IPB should be refined as information is collected on the enemy.
3. The ADA officers should develop an adequate ADA concept of operation that supports the task force scheme of maneuver.
JUDGE ADVOCATE INTEGRATION
1. Include the JA and legal clerks in Home Station CPX, STX, and FTX planning and training.
2. Ensure that the JA understands MDMP and reviews the commander's guidance before it is issued; include the JA in initial phases of the MDMP. The JA should review OPLANs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs at the lowest level possible.
3. The JA should coordinate and be included with the regimental battle staff.
CHAPLAIN INTEGRATION
1. During operations, the chaplain assistant performs many staff functions in accordance with FM 16-1, Religious Support. At the chaplain's direction, the chaplain assistant attends briefings, monitors the tactical situation at the TOC; helps prepare the religious support estimate, plan, and annex; and coordinates religious activities.
2. As the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) NCO at senior levels, NCOs plan, brief, and perform operational training with other staff NCOs, coordinate enlisted taskings, and recommend the assignment of replacement enlisted personnel to the G1/S1.
3. Commanders and staff members must be aware of the roles of chaplain assistants in the Army and support their mission in order for the assistants to be able to assist the chaplains in religious support missions. To accomplish the mission, the chaplain assistant accompanies the chaplain in the area of operations. Let them do their job.
MP PLATOON INTEGRATION
1. Combined arms operations occur when the proper systems for planning, preparing, and executing are employed correctly. The brigade combat team needs to ensure supporting units are included in the planning process to exploit the capabilities of all of its assets.
2. The brigade XO needs to ensure that the MPs are an integral member of the staff. The platoon leader, or his designated representative, can provide guidance on enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations, civilians on the battlefield (COBs), protection of critical assets, rear area counter-reconnaissaance, and maneuver/mobility support operations.
MORTAR PLATOON INTEGRATION
1. Involve the mortar platoon leadership in the task force MDMP. When the leadership is involved in the planning process, they gain a better understanding of their task, purpose, and endstate for their platoon. They are better able to conduct their own troop-leading procedures (TLP) and focus on the proper pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs) to accomplish their mission.
2. When task force mortars are OPCON to a company for movement, they should be involved with that company's leadership and TLP. Understanding when and where mortar fires are needed and from whom they can expect to receive CFFs will lead to better execution of suppressive/effective mortar fire missions.
3. Ammunition management must be conducted at task force level during all stages of the MDMP to ensure mortar platoons are able to deliver the right fires at the right time at the right location.
Section
IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS (TA.4), Part 1
Section
IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS (TA.4), Part 3
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