First Look! Force XXI Combat Engineers and the Engineer-Bradley Fighting Vehicle; Chapter

CHAPTER 2
Observations on Force XXI and the Three-Company Battalion

by MAJ Michael Albertson, Center for Army Lessons Learned

Flexibility of the new three-company battalion.

During NTC Rotation No. 98-10, the 45-tank armor battalion did not provide the brigade or battalion commanders with an agile and flexible force. The unit lost flexibility once committed. The commander had a limited ability to designate a reserve/counterattack force (especially when facing a strong enemy. The three-company organization limited forms and techniques of maneuver (i.e., line, column, vee, and wedge).

Observation No. 1: The three-company organization does not allow the task force commander to effectively use a company/team as a reserve/counterattack force.

Discussion: The TF commander used a pure tank company (C Co) as a reserve. As a result, the battalion could fight with only two company/teams forward, which did not allow the battalion to mass as much combat power forward. The TF commander task-organized as follows:

MANEUVER A TANK 1/A (Tank) 2/A (Tank) 3/B (Mech)		RESERVE C TANK 1/C (Tank) 2/C (Tank) 3/C (Tank)
B MECH 1/B (Mech) 2/B (Mech) 3/A (Tank)

If a company/team is used as a reserve, there is less mass forward, and, therefore, less lateral distance can be covered by the two forward company/teams. With the Armor TF now having three company/teams, each company/team must be more highly trained, flexible, mobile and agile than the previous four-company/team organization. The pictures on page 2-2 depict how the TF now has four basic movement formations: Wedge, Line, Vee, or Column.

If a TF commander designates a company/team as a reserve, he neutralizes one third of his combat power. The commander also has the option of designating a platoon as the TF reserve. But the commander of an Army XXI battalion must now carefully weigh the decisive factor one platoon may have versus the degradation that one company will feel as that unit's combat power is cut by a third.

The formation that maximizes mass forward and still retains flexibility is the TF vee.

The formation that maximizes flexibility and retains mass is the TF wedge.

A company/team frontage in the attack varies from 500 to 1,500 meters (METT-TC dependent). Assuming a TF commander uses a company/team as a reserve, TF frontage is now between 1,000 and 3,000 meters. Previously, with four company/teams (one in reserve), the frontage of three forward, one back was 1,500 to 4,500 meters. This is a loss of 500 to 1,500 meters. Across a brigade front, this adds up to 1,500 to 4,500 meters of lost coverage.

In the Army After Next (AAN), it is anticipated that this lost coverage will be made up with improved technologies of the M1A2, M2A3, and the Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS). In the Force XXI Army, company/teams must make up that space with enhanced training and flexibility. Tactics, techniques, and procedures that incorporate the new technologies will be the key to becoming more flexible.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Reduce the doctrinal frontage for a task force until the enablers that provide greater situational awareness at the battalion are fielded and integrated.

2. Task-organize the brigade so that one or more task forces has four company/teams, thus making the brigade reserve smaller.

3. The company/teams under the new Army XXI framework must demonstrate battle drill proficiency. Company/team battle drills must be well-rehearsed to work well in a friction-filled environment. The ability to transition quickly and effectively from movement to maneuver is essential.

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Observation No. 2: Because attachments and cross attachments will be more prevalent under the new organization, a system for coordinating and exchanging "single page" SOPs should be developed.

Discussion: A company/team commander must know the capabilities of his attachments and his attachments must know where they fit in the big picture. If each has a concise method for articulating their capabilities, limitations, and general tactical employment, combat multipliers can contribute much more to the mission.

Many observer/controllers at the NTC have commented that combat multipliers are attached to company/teams too late in the planning and preparation phases of missions for them to be used to their full potential during the execution phase. It has often been noted that even if "attachments" do conduct an early linkup with their controlling organization, time is still not available to make them feel like "one of the team."

Because of the pace of operations during a rotation at the NTC, attachments are often forgotten and not thought about again until the after-action review (AAR) is conducted following the mission. Attachments are often not linked up with the unit they are tasked to support until after the planning and orders processes and the rehearsal for that mission have been conducted. The result is a company commander who is not aware of the capabilities the supporting attached units can provide and, therefore, does not adequately plan for them in the mission. The frequent end result is attached units moving under the control of the first sergeant with the combat trains, contributing little to the mission.

Because of either time mismanagement by higher headquarters or the time-constrained environment, the amount of planning time at the company/team level is often limited. The commander must think about the tactical employment of his company, formulate a plan, and articulate it to his company in the very short amount of time he has. Additionally, he must integrate his fire support team (FIST) into his plan. What if the task force receives additional assets from the brigade combat team (BCT) and gives them to his company/team during his planning process? He made no prior coordination, and most likely the attachments will not find his assembly area (AA) until after the operations order. Often, the attachment finds the company/team as they cross the LD.

What can assist the company/team commander in planning for and integrating his combat multipliers? Because the commander has no staff to help him with his military decision-making process (MDMP), he must rely on his expertise and that of his attachments.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The company commander and his attachment should exchange one-page consolidated SOPs, reference cards, or information cards, which contain each other's capabilities, call signs, concerns, and other pertinent information. The following is "a way" of accomplishing this.

A company/team commander is planning his operations order and an engineer platoon leader arrives, attached by the task force to the company/team. The commander will issue his order in 30 minutes. The commander and the engineer platoon leader exchange the following one-page consolidated SOPs:

2. In this example, the commander is able to effectively plan for, and integrate, the engineer platoon in his order and the engineer platoon leader knows the company/team organization and general method of employment along with frequencies and call signs. This method was used effectively by units at the National Training Center, and can be used by commanders as a starting point for integrating combat multipliers. This method will work best when brigade level or higher directs all units to construct such consolidated SOPs.

Decreased Combat Power.

Observation No. 1: Under the new Army XXI framework, the combat power of a task force is cut 25 percent, reducing its ability to mass fires and conduct security operations accordingly.

Discussion: The principles of war that are affected by a cut in task force combat power are mass, security, and economy of force (Chapter 2, FM 100-5, Operations).

a. Mass is affected in the sense that there is inherently less firepower available in the task force. Additionally, it is more difficult to mass the effects of all weapons systems when the company/teams are more widely distributed across the battlefield.

b. It is more difficult to secure the task force with three company/teams. With less assets available, it is harder to secure the TOC, provide a tactical combat force (TCF) for the brigade combat team (BCT), and secure the task force or brigade flanks.

c. Economy-of-force missions are now more difficult to conduct. If a company/team is tasked to perform an economy-of-force mission, it takes away one third of the combat power of the task force.

Task force commanders must be judicious and will be required to accept tactical risk when assigning company/team missions that will take away from mass and firepower. With only three companies, the brigade may choose the division cavalry squadron to conduct the live-fire breach mission. This is because a cavalry squadron now possesses more combat power than any task force in the division. The cavalry squadron may become the force of choice for difficult missions, such as deliberate attack of an enemy strongpoint.

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Observation No. 2: Combat power is significantly affected by the unit's maintenance posture.

Discussion: With fewer combat vehicles available to the battalion, the battalion must have fewer vehicles down for maintenance to maintain a 90-percent operational readiness rate. For example, the loss of five tanks to a 58-tank battalion is a decrease in combat power of 8.5 percent. However, the loss of five tanks to a 45-tank battalion is a decrease in combat power of 12.5 percent.

This implies that the maintenance system must be improved sufficiently to counter the impact of fewer vehicles. Vehicles must break less often and must be fixed more quickly. Unfortunately, because company/teams may be required to cover more ground, they could travel greater distances. This will increase the wear and tear on combat vehicles, making them more prone to breaking down. If the rotational operational ready rates are indicative of rates the force will experience during sustained combat operations, the smaller battalion will experience comparably lower combat power rates.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Re-engineer the parts logistics system. Make it a customer-oriented process whereby units get parts they need as quickly as possible (easier said than done).

2. Ensure all vehicle commanders and operators are truly a "T" at their unit-level maintenance (ULM) programs emphasizing PMCS.

Intelligence.

Observation No. 1: During this rotation, it was observed that the brigade did not have enough of the right types of personnel to adequately enable the new technology to enhance the combat capability of the battalion. The S2 section only worked with two officers. Information that flows into the S2 section can originate from at least 20 different sources. Information overload occured whenever contact with the enemy was made. The increased number of collection assets did not result in an increase in intelligence. This was primarily because of the lack of experience and insufficient manning of the S2 section.

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Observation No. 2: The reorganized scout platoon reduces the number of scouts from ten to six. This degrades the task force's reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan, with fewer assets covering more battle space. This also makes it more difficult for a task force to concentrate a smaller force at the decisive point.

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Observation No. 3: The new technology had a tendancy to paralyze, rather than to liberate a battle staff. When a "perfect" enemy picture is attainable, the thinking that predominated was to "wait" for a perfect read of the enemy disposition, rather than act on a good one. The MDMP was observed to slow as a result, rather than to accelerate, until a perfect read of the enemy was available. The battle staff became focused on JSTARS and UAV feeds. In some cases, ASAS and other conventional sources, such as MISTY FAC, appeared to be delivering a better read of the enemy disposition, and the Canadian reconnaissance platoon was providing a better and more relevant enemy picture. These sources were often ignored, however, while the battle staff based its decisions on JSTARS and the UAV. When these assets were not operating, the brigade was observed to lapse into a state of paralysis.

Battle Command.

Observation No. 1: During this rotation, electronic communication was observed as the lynch pin of the digitized unit. If the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) capability is lost, units usually find themselves back to the older (but still current for most of our Army) system of FM only.

Discussion: During this rotation, the communication package was not robust, and it failed to provide the redundancy required for a digital and EPLRS network. The brigade also did not possess the experienced personnel needed for robust communication support, and their equipment was insufficient for transmitting reliable or redundant FM, TACSAT and MSE.

Situational awareness was hindered by uneven distribution of digital systems through the brigade combat team and command post in the brigade headquarters. There are currently no redundant or auxiliary channels for the transmission of the digital data communications. There was no deliberate communications plan for a digital communications loss. There was no communications redundancy with FM, S/C TACSAT, and EPLARS. The unit observed during this rotation was only adequately trained on FM.

RECOMMENDATION: There was only one signal company supporting the brigade; it probably should have been a battalion.

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Observation No. 2: An over-reliance on the new digital applique can have a destructive effect on a unit's situational awareness.

Discussion: Units that posses "digital enablers," seem to forget that they still need to "balance," and receive confirmation of current events as they unfold on a potential battlefield, with a clear unit cycle of reporting. As units cross the line of departure, and the shooting starts, the maneuver phase of the battle is underway. Reports are expected. These reports are critical to developing a read of the battlefield, and in keeping the commander informed.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. A system, or cycle of reports, must be in place for the command to see themselves in terms of available combat power, and to see the enemy as it is encountered on the battlefield. The cycle of reporting must inform the commander about the following:

What is to my front?
What is the enemy doing?
What are we doing?
What are we going to do?

2. A cycle of reporting needs to be an integral part of a unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).

3. Commanders cannot be everywhere, and they cannot see everything. Timely reports can facilitate teamwork and synchronization. Use whatever element is in the best position to see the battlefield to guide other elements to a position of advantage. The guiding element can drop down on the command net to give instructions to get the other element to the right spot.

4. Command assumption drills need to be rehearsed. Do "what if?" drills, where the order of command is different from that specified in the OPORD, since casualties usually do not occur in the same sequence. At all times, the officer in charge must know that he is in charge. Therefore, as leader casualties occur, the new chain of command must be announced, and the new commander must take charge immediately.

Counter-Reconnaissance.

Observation: The counter-reconnaissance mission for a task force is still best served by a company team.

Discussion: Positioning a company team, with the scouts attached, well forward of defensive positions, was observed to be effective. The scouts were positioned on high terrain and served as "lookers," and the tanks and BVFs developed engagement areas in the low ground and served as the "killers." On the two battles that were observed, the counter-reconnaissance company/team destroyed all regimental reconnaissance that entered the task force sector.

The company/team commander that executed the counter-reconnaissance mission was observed to spend the majority of his time preparing for the execution of that mission. He emplaced all tanks personally, looking at their fields of fire and ensuring that they were mutually supporting. He identified target reference points (TRPs) and engagement criteria. He coordinated with scouts and attached Canadian reconnaissance vehicles. When the regimental reconnaissance entered his sector, he destroyed all eight vehicles. However, there were numerous "double-tapping" of targets, resulting in an average of 4.5 rounds per kill. Additionally, there were no fire missions called by the company/team.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Put much time and effort into the counter-reconnaissance mission to ensure success.

2. To assist the counter-reconnaissance effort tremendously, maintain close coordination with scouts.

3. Plan for and use indirect fires when they are available.