CHAPTER
1 Combat
Engineers in the Mechanized/Armored Fight
by
LTC Dan Wilson, 317th Engineer BattalionCombat Engineers in the Mechanized/Armored Fight
MORE MOBILE, MORE LETHAL
The armored/mechanized force of today is much different from that of the Cold War or even Operation DESERT STORM. Army War Reserve and Prepositioned Afloat equipment allow us to put an armored brigade in our contingency areas in the same amount of time it used to take us to get an airborne brigade there. Fast sea-lift ships allow the heavy division to bring its own equipment to almost anywhere in the world in a matter of days. Upgrades to the Abrams Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the fielding of Paladin, make the heavy force even more mobile and lethal. Today's mechanized infantry divisions pose unprecedented tactical mobility, as well as strategic mobility previously associated only with our airborne forces
Many of us whose engineer troop experience was largely in an Army focused on the defense of Europe (the "General Defense Plan," or "GDP") in the late 70s and 80s, or in light and construction units, are still struggling with how the divisional engineers fit into this force. The debate in the engineer community over the engineer squad vehicle demonstrates this. It is this author's belief that two deceptively simple statements should guide our vision:
PLATOONS, NOT SQUADS
Platoons are our basic fighting units. We fight as platoons in the mechanized force. During the GDP days, the squad was the most critical engineer asset, and the basic unit for executing our primary missions. As a company commander in Germany in the early 80s, my platoon leaders had a very minor role in executing our defense in sector. With the exception of a few large, platoon-sized obstacles, squads executed most of our obstacles. The squad was king, maneuvering independently around the battlefield executing the obstacle plan. The focus of platoon leaders and platoon sergeants was keeping their squads supplied. Today, in our offensively oriented mechanized force, there are virtually no independent squad missions. A platoon reduces an obstacle. Squads execute parts of that operation using their drills, but it is the platoon that orchestrates squads and equipment crews on the ground to form a lane through an obstacle (and it is largely the crews of specialty vehicles that reduce obstacles, not squads). A platoon lays a row minefield; squads lay a row or put up the marking fence. A platoon sites and marks a Volcano minefield. The squad is still an important building block, but the platoon is now the basic fighting unit of the mechanized Army.
ARMORED, NOT MECHANIZED
Some may disagree with me, but I believe we need to think in terms of armored rather than mechanized warfare. In mechanized warfare, soldiers ride to a point on the battlefield in a vehicle, and then dismount to do their job. In armored warfare, soldiers perform their primary mission while remaining mounted under armor. In a highly mobile, offensively oriented force on the lethal battlefield of today and tomorrow, we must be an armored engineer force -- not mechanized. Currently, we put our engineer soldiers in the most lightly-armored vehicles in our inventory, drive them to an enemy target reference point (TRP), and then have them dismount and breach an obstacle, totally unprotected from the fires swirling all around them! If we are to ensure the mobility of our armored maneuver forces, and survive the mission, we must be mounted in the most survivable armored vehicles we can get. We must be able to perform our primary missions from within these survivable vehicles, while preserving a dismounted capability to help root out determined enemies from their holes or dismantle obstructions
NOW, NOT LATER
What can we do today to make us a more effective armored engineer force? The Bradley, Grizzly and Wolverine systems promised the tools we need to fight as armored engineers, but the Grizzly and Wolverine systems have been cancelled, and the Bradley (or an engineer squad vehicle) is years away from fielding.
BG
Joseph Inge, Deputy Commandant, Command and General Staff College, |
It is now the 21st century. Do we just continue with the status quo? I would hope not, because I believe the status quo serves us poorly now! Our organization, equipment, and training focus remain rooted in the old GDP Army. We are not set up for success in today's highly mobile mechanized warfare. What we can do is make immediate improvements that will make us more effective today, and better prepare us to incorporate our forthcoming armored systems.
M113s, NOT HMMWVs
From the GDP army, combat engineers have developed the idea that platoon sergeants and first sergeants are logisticians, rather than the most experienced warfighters in our units. We mount our platoon sergeants in HMMWVs and give our first sergeants no vehicle at all, effectively taking them out of the close fight. As a consequence, command and control of our units suffer, particularly in offensive operations.
Our engineer MTOE provides no vehicle at all for our first sergeants. Of course, every first sergeant quickly takes the A&O platoon sergeant's HMMWV, relegating the platoon sergeant to a 5-ton truck. A HMMWV is fine for the many errands first sergeants do while running down problems during the preparation for combat, but it effectively prevents them from influencing the execution of the fight. History is full of examples of company first sergeants rallying units and turning the tide of battles. We need to give these experienced soldiers a survivable vehicle that gets them into the fight, rather than one that forces them to follow at a safe distance. Infantry first sergeants have M113s; tank company first sergeants have M113s; engineer first sergeants need M113s.
An engineer platoon organized to breach a complex obstacle typically controls eight to ten vehicles: four engineer M113s, one AVLM, one AVLB, one or two M1s with plows, and one or two ACEs. We place this large force under the command of our most junior officer, and ask him to maneuver it by himself into the most difficult operation we undertake while his platoon sergeant waits a safe distance behind. (Could this be why "poor command and control of engineer assets at the breach" is a frequent AAR comment at our training centers?) We must get the most experienced soldier in the platoon into the fight! Platoon sergeants need to be mounted in an armored vehicle and go forward with the platoon leader to help him maneuver the platoon and accomplish the breach. Infantry platoon sergeants are in Bradleys; tank platoon sergeants are in tanks; engineer platoon sergeants need to be in M113s -- (until we get Bradleys, when he must be in a Bradley).
Of course, putting platoon sergeants in M113s/Bradleys means either two squads or three smaller squads are carried across four vehicles. This is not a problem if you have made the leap from the old GDP focus on squad strength and integrity to the idea of platoons fighting mounted. The tremendous increase in command and control and the ability to maneuver our critical mechanical assets is well worth the minor reduction in dismounted strength.
BRING ON THE BRADLEYS!
Those
who argue against mounting engineers in Bradleys usually cite concern over
the loss of room to carry tools and a "full" squad of nine in a Bradley, because
all our drills are written for six dismounts. Could it be, perhaps, as we think
armored warfare and mounted breach, that our drills are out of date? Bradleys
will restore us as fully capable members of the ground maneuver team, rather
than lightly armed vulnerable specialists who must be escorted to our job sites
by "more capable" infantrymen or tankers. Wouldn't it be great if an engineer
company could be the breach force, rather than just the reduction force? This
will be especially important when infantry and armor battalions lose a company.
These smaller maneuver battalions will not be able to give up combat power
to escort engineers around the battlefield. We must be survivable, lethal and
capable of maneuvering ourselves across the battlefield, and we must be mounted
in Bradleys and fully trained in its systems.
VOLCANO PLATOON NEEDED
Volcano is our most powerful weapon system. Accurate, flexible, and lethal, it should be the obstacle of choice on the modern armored battlefield. Our current organization and doctrine do not allow us to take full advantage of this powerful weapon. We currently assign the Volcano as yet another specialty piece of equipment in the A&O platoon -- which has six different kinds of vehicles. For crew, we assign two SPC/PFCs. There is no section NCO, just two more vehicles in a very large platoon. This for a weapon system that must have the Brigade, Division, or even Corps Commander's permission to fire!
During defensive operations, the engineer company commander can assign his Volcanos to his platoon leaders or senior NCOs to control. In fact, the primary duty of an engineer platoon in the defense might be the employment of a Volcano if no conventional obstacles are being used. During offensive operations, however, the company commander and his platoon leaders are focused on the breach. The company does not have the planning or command and control resources required to effectively employ Volcano in the offense.
Using our GPS equipment, we should be able to navigate accurately to planned obstacle locations, and, by driving in different formations, simultaneously emplace entire groups of Volcano minefields without ever stopping and without any need to mark centerlines. An ad hoc "Team Volcano" will not be able to execute such a complex maneuver. We should pull the Volcanos into a platoon at battalion level, with a dedicated platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, and section sergeants. The engineer battalion has the planning resources to effectively get Volcano into the offense, and a dedicated Volcano Platoon can develop real expertise and unlock the full potential of this weapon system.
We must also fix our doctrine on the release authority for long duration Volcano. Why is it that I can, without anyone's permission, put in a conventional minefield that never goes away, yet I must get the Corps Commander's permission to put in one that will self-destruct in a few days? Isn't that backwards? We should require long duration minefields behind the FLOT to be marked just like conventional minefields, and give release authority to Brigade Commanders. Any further restrictions could be imposed as needed using obstacle zone and belt restrictions.
ENGINEER SCOUTS FOR ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
Authors have been writing for years about the need for better engineer reconnaissance, notably Mr. Michael Sayer of the National Training Center (Engineer). Maneuver scouts, Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs), and aerial reconnaissance units are force-oriented. They are not usually trained to provide the sort of detailed obstacle information required to plan a deliberate breach, nor to answer such intelligence requirements as the suitability and trafficability of routes and bridges. Engineers are best suited to answer these intelligence needs -- but engineers have no dedicated reconnaissance assets. Units have tried several different solutions to this problem, but I agree with Mr. Sayer that only a dedicated and specially trained platoon under engineer battalion control can perform this mission well.
Placing platoon sergeants in M113s frees up six HMMWVs in the battalion that can form the basis for a reconnaissance platoon. This platoon would provide the engineer battalion commander and maneuver brigade commander with a specially trained, dedicated unit to accomplish critical and often overlooked mobility aspects of the brigade reconnaissance plan, without diverting critical engineer platoons.
ONE ENGINEER BATTALION'S SOLUTION
The 317th Engineer Battalion created both a Scout Platoon and a Volcano Platoon, mounted our platoon sergeants in combat vehicles, and provided manning for such important but unsupported positions as track commanders for the battalion, company commanders and platoon leaders.
1. We created the units with a relatively simple reorganization of our existing assets and with no loss of capability in our engineer platoons (total reduction in dismounted strength in each platoon is only two soldiers).
2. We took the HMMWVs out of our engineer platoons and mounted the platoon sergeant in the 3d Squad's M113.
3. Our four-M113 engineer platoons maneuvered using the same techniques as the old M113 infantry platoons, with the platoon sergeant an integral part of platoon maneuver. This ensures the most experienced soldier in the platoon is in position to fight and survive, greatly increasing the effectiveness of the platoon.
4. We had the advantage in our battalion of having excess M113s for our first sergeants, providing this key leader the same mobility and survivability his infantry and armor counterparts enjoy.
5. We designated some of the NCOs from the 3d Squad as track commanders (TCs) for our company commanders and platoon leaders, freeing the latter to concentrate on fighting their units while the TC fights their vehicle. Command and control of engineers, particularly during offensive operations, is greatly improved.
6. The six platoon HMMWVs provide the transportation for the battalion Scout Platoon. The platoon is specially trained and organized to perform engineer reconnaissance, and provides a level of expertise that can only be achieved by a dedicated force. The platoon can operate as a unit under engineer battalion control to answer engineer priority intelligence requirements for the engineer battalion and maneuver brigade. It can also provide squads, or operate in two sections under task force control with task force scout platoons as part of task force reconnaissance and surveillance plans.
7. We consolidated our six M548s and Volcano systems, and three HEMMTs into a battalion Volcano Platoon. The platoon can operate as a unit to emplace dynamic obstacle groups, or as squads under task force control in a more traditional role.
The 588th Engineer Battalion enjoyed great success at NTC with their Volcano Platoon, getting Volcano into the fight on every mission. We plan to build on their success, further refining the tactics and techniques for the platoon and get this powerful weapon into the fight.
CONCLUSION
The 317th Engineer Battalion found that organizing now as a mounted, fighting force requires no additional equipment or personnel. By rearranging existing assets and changing the training focus of subordinate units, the battalion was able to create dedicated, expert reconnaissance and Volcano units and get the most experienced soldiers into the fight. We believe a similar reorganization across all Army engineer units now would enable us to better support today's mechanized battle, and better prepare us for the armored engineer warfare of tomorrow.
Introduction:
NTC Rotation No. 98-10
Chapter
2: Observations on Force XXI and the Three-Company Battalion
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