The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare
Authored by Dr. Larry M. Wortzel
March 2014
82 Pages
Brief Synopsis
On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government announced plans to establish a new air defense intercept zone which will include the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands, sovereignty over which is disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. Due to complaints of cyber penetrations attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State are devising new means to protect intellectual property and secrets from the PLA’s computer network operations. This monograph explains how the PLA is revising its operational doctrine to meet what it sees as the new mode of “integrated, joint operations” for the 21st century. An understanding of the PLA’s new concepts are important for U.S. and allied military leaders and planners.
Summary
On November 23, 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. Pundits and policy analysts quickly engaged in a broad debate about whether China’s expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension in Asia, or is part of a broader plan to impose a new definition of China’s territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State are devising new means to protect intellectual property and secrets from the PLA’s computer network operations.
The ADIZ announcement by China is an example of the PLA General Political Department engagement in what it calls “legal warfare,” part of the PLA’s “three warfares.” In expanding its ADIZ, China is stretching International Civil Aviation Organization regulations to reinforce its territorial claims over the Senkaku Islands. On another level, the Chinese government will use the ADIZ as a way to increase the airspace it can monitor and control off its coast; the Chinese government is already suing the navy and maritime law enforcement ships to enforce these claims at sea. Additionally, the PLA and the Chinese government have sent a major signal to Taiwan, demonstrating another aspect of the “three warfares.” When the Chinese Ministry of National Defense put its expanded ADIZ into effect, the new zone carefully avoided any infringement into Taiwan’s ADIZ, signaling that in addition to the improved economic ties with Taiwan, there is room for political improvement across the
Taiwan Strait.
The PLA spent more than a decade examining U.S. military publications on network-centric warfare and the evolution of American doctrine on information warfare. After observing American information operations in the Balkans and the first Gulf War, the PLA saw the effect of modern information operations on the battlefield and in the international arena. The PLA then began to implement its own form of information warfare. The Chinese military has adopted information warfare concepts suited to its own organization and doctrine—blending its own traditional tactics, concepts from the Soviet military, and U.S. doctrine to bring the PLA into the information age. At the same time, the PLA has modernized and improved upon its own psychological warfare operations and expanded the role of its legal scholars in justifying military action and territorial claims.
The PLA’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs support the ground forces, navy, air force, missile forces, nuclear doctrine, and space warfare. China’s military doctrine depends on incorporating information technology and networked information operations. The PLA’s operational concepts for employing traditional signals intelligence and electronic warfare have expanded to include cyber warfare; kinetic and cyber attacks on satellites; and information confrontation operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. As this monograph explains, the PLA used innovative means to expand on Cold War Soviet doctrine on “radio-electronic combat,” which called for a combination of jamming and precision air, missile, and artillery strikes on North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces. The Chinese military, however, apparently intends to conduct these activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, envisioning attacks on an enemy’s homeland critical infrastructure and points of embarkation.
Along with these more technical aspects of information operations, the PLA’s combination of psychological warfare; the manipulation of public opinion, or media warfare; and the manipulation of legal arguments to strengthen China’s diplomatic and security position, or what China calls “legal warfare,” join together in a comprehensive information operations doctrine. This monograph explains how the PLA is revising its operational doctrine to meet what it sees as the new mode of “integrated, joint operations” for the 21st century. An understanding of the PLA’s new concepts is important for U.S. and allied military leaders and planners.
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