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ON POINT II: Transition to the New Campaign

The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003-January 2005





Part IV

Sustaining the Campaign


Chapter 12
Logistics and Combat Service Support Operations

 

Notes

1. Brigadier General Scott G. West, The Quartermaster General, “Supporting Victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, Autumn, 2004, http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/oqmg/Professional_Bulletin/2004/Autumn04/Quarter (accessed 21 April 2006), 2–3.

2. The Army’s own logistical doctrinal manual called it “brute force” logistics. See Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-10-1, Theater Distribution (Washington, DC, 1 October 1999), 3–1.

3. Laurel K. Myers, Ph.D., “Eliminating the Iron Mountain,” Army Logistician (July–August 2004), http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JulAug04/C_iron.html (accessed 6 June 2006).

4. Myers; A RAND study described distribution-based logistics as “providing support through frequent, reliable distribution flows with focused and right-sized inventories well positioned across the supply chain to cover consumption between replenishment cycles at the point of use and to buffer against distribution disruptions (examples of what is called special cause variability) and typical variability (i.e., the amount of variability experienced when processes are in control and working to “standard” or what is called common cause variability). . . . The goal of DBL is not inventory reduction, it is improved support effectiveness and agility. Eric Peltz et al., Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Major Findings and Recommendations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 1. The definition

is from footnote 1.

5. For the purposes of this study, distribution-based logistics, just in time logistics, or velocity-based logistics can be used interchangeably. The Army’s doctrinal term is “distribution-based combat service support.” See FM 4-0, Combat Service Support (Washington, DC, 29 August 2003), 1–10 and chapter 5.

6. FM 4-0, chapter 5.

7. For a survey of the evolution of Joint and Army doctrine in this area, see Lieutenant Colonel Victor MacCagnan Jr., “Logistics Transformation—Restarting a Stalled Process” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2005).

8. FM 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield (Washington, DC, 4 August 1999), chapter 1.

9. The summary of the creation and evolution of the LOCGAP in this and subsequent paragraphs is taken from three sources. See Charles Dervarics, “Contractors Fill Key Role Through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program” (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Materiel Command, 2004), 91–93; Charles Dervarics, “Contractors Fill Key Role Through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program” (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Materiel Command, 2005), 76–81; see also FM 100-10-2, chapters 1, 2, and 3.

10. FM 4-0, 1–10.

11. West, 2–3.

12. See FM 4-0, chapter 4.

13. FM 100-10-1, 1–2.

14. FM 100-10-1, chapter 2.

15. Major Randolph Duke, “More Than a Name Change,” Army Logistician (January–February 2001), Volume 33, Issue 1, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb01/JFIndex.htm (accessed 11 October 2006).

16. To supplement the 377th’s base operations capability, the 3d COSCOM provided base support for Camps Virginia, New York, and Pennsylvania through August 2003, even after it moved north into Iraq. Brigadier General Charles Fletcher, in written comments provided to author, 2 January 2007, on file with the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

17. Sergeant Frank Pellegrini, “Supporting Gulf War 2.0,” Army Magazine, 1 September 2003, http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf (accessed 11 October 2006).

18. Pellegrini.

19. US Government Accountability Office, GAO Report 04-484, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Long-standing Problems Hampering Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved” (Washington, DC, 14 April 2004).

20. Major General David E. Kratzer, “The Role of the 377th Theater Support Command,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 49, Number 3, Spring 2003, 28–35. See also Pellegrini.

21. Kratzer, 28–35.

22. Fletcher, written comments, 2 January 2007.

23. John D. Gresham, “Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Elements” (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Materiel Command, 2004), 72–77.

24. Robert G. Darius, “Operation Iraqi Freedom—It Was a Prepositioned War” (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Material Command, October 2003), 14–21.

25. It has proven very difficult to track the number and type of contractors in OIF due to the variety of roles they have performed—logistics, security, and humanitarian. For one attempt to measure their numbers, see John McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

26. Dervarics, 91–93.

27. West, 2–3.

28. COL Gregory Fontenot (US Army Retired). LTC E.J. Degen, US Army, and LTC David Tohn, US Army, On Point: The US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 408.

29. Fletcher, written comments, 2 January 2007.

30. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn.

31. Fletcher, written comments, 2 January 2007.

32. Brigadier General Charles Fletcher, interview by Mr. Charles Kirkpatrick, V Corps Historian, Wiesbaden, Germany, 11 February 2003.

33. Fletcher, written comments, 2 January 2007.

34. 3d Corps Support Command After Action Review, “History of the 3d Corps Support Command in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Heidelberg, Germany, January 2004, 2-1-4 to 2-1-7.

35. Fletcher, interview by Kirkpatrick, 11 February 2003.

36. 3d COSCOM AAR, 2-1-9.

37. Brigadier General Charles Fletcher, interview by Major Mark Pritchard, 3d COSCOM Historian, Baghdad, Iraq, 22 January 2004.

38. 3d COSCOM AAR, 2-1-19.

39. 3d COSCOM AAR, 2-1-10 to 2-1-14.

40. 3d COSCOM AAR, 2-1-16.

41. 3d COSCOM AAR, Executive Summary, 3-4.

42. Fletcher, interview by Kirkpatrick, 11 February 2003.

43. Fletcher, interview by Kirkpatrick, 11 February 2003.

44. “Initial Impressions Report No. 06-20, 13th Corps Support Command” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Center for Lessons Learned), April 2006, 22; see also, 3d COSCOM AAR, Executive Summary, 10–11.

45. FM 100-10-1, 3-2 and 5-6.

46. Fletcher, interview by Pritchard, 22 January 2004.

47. 3d COSCOM AAR, Executive Summary, 8. For a more detailed example of these challenges, see also Lieutenant Colonel Andrew W. Bowes, “A Corps Support Battalion’s Experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Army Logistician (July–August 2004), http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/Back.html.

48. 3d COSCOM AAR, Executive Summary, 7.

49. 3d COSCOM AAR, Executive Summary, 8.

50. Fletcher, interview by Pritchard, 22 January 2004.

51. US Army Logistics Whitepaper: Delivering Material Readiness to the Army, “Connect Army Logistics” (Washington, DC: G4 Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics), http://www.hqda.army.mil/logweb/focusareasnew.html (accessed 11 October 2006).

52. The problem persists. The future Battlefield Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) will tie together disparate CSS systems to provide a common operating picture to logisticians and combat commanders alike. In her 2006 article for AUSA “Green Book,” the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, G4, Lieutenant General Ann Dunwoody, lamented the lack of centralized databases and information systems. See, Lieutenant General Ann Dunwoody, “Working to Achieve Readiness for the Long Haul,” Army: 2006–2007 Green Book (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, October 2006), 201–202.

53. FM 100-10-1, 3-4.

54. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Strobel, “Common-User Land Transportation Management in the Layered, Non-Linear, Non-Contiguous Battlefield (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 18 March 2005), 7.

55. Richard E. Killblane, “Transportation Corps in Operation Iraqi Freedom 2: April Uprising,” Unpublished manuscript, 1–2.

56. Mitch MacDonald, “The Art of Combat Logistics: Interview with Major Bob Curran,” DC Velocity, Volume 3 Number 5 (May 2005), 20–24; Killblane, 1.

57. “Stryker Brigade Combat Team 1, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry: Operations in Mosul, Iraq,” Initial Impressions Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 21 December 2004), 101–102.

58. See Strobel, 3–6. In 2004 the 1st Infantry Division set up its own command and control system for coordinating the movement of non-1st ID vehicles through its area of operations.

59. Fletcher, written comments, 2 January 2007. This refers to the Joint Deployment Logistics Model (JDLM) system, which later became the Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3).

60. West.

61. Killblane, 8. The four men killed were Scott Helvenston, Jerry Zovko, Wesley Batalona, and Michael Teague.

62. Patrecia Slayden Hollis, “1st Cav in Baghdad: Counterinsurgency EBO in Dense Urban Terrain. Interview with Major General Peter W. Chiarelli,” Field Artillery, September–October 2005.

63. Killblane, 8.

64. West.

65. Killblane, 12.

66. Killblane, 14.

67. Killblane, 25

68. “Thomas Hamill On His Iraq Escape,” CBS New, 12 October 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/10/10/earlyshow/leisure/books/main648445.shtml (accessed 5 October 2006). Official and private investigations are continuing; see T. Christian Miller, “Iraq convoy got go-ahead Despite Threat,” Los Angeles Times, 3 September 2007, A1.

69. Killblane, 30, 34, 38. Killblane addresses each of these events, and the individuals involved in them, in detail.

70. Killblane, 44.

71. Captain John-Michael Insetta, e-mail interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 June 2006.

72. Insetta, e-mail interview, 6 June 2006.

73. Insetta, e-mail interview, 6 June 2006.

74. Captain Jason A. Miseli, “The View From My Windshield: Just in time Logistics Just Isn’t Working,” ARMOR Magazine, September–October 2003, 13.

75. Major General Walter Wojdakowski, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 August 2006, 11.

76. Joe Borlas, “CENTCOM Up-Armored Humvee Requirements Being Met,” Army News Service, 6 February 2004; see also Donna Miles, “Up-Armored Vehicle Effort Progressing Full Steam Ahead,” American Forces Press Service, 29 October 2004.

77. Scott Gourley, “Protecting our Soldiers, Armoring Vehicles” (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Materiel Command, 2005), 106–113.

78. Randy Talbot, “Forging the Steel Hammer: US Army Tank and Automotive Command Support to the Global War on Terrorism, 2001–2005” (Warren, MI: US Army Tank and Automotive Command, May 2006), 50–51.

79. Gourley, 106–113.

80. Talbot, 77.

81. Talbot, 80.

82. Russell Carollo and Mike Wagner, “Deadly Price Paid for HMMWV Armor Used to Protect Soldiers,” Dayton Daily News, 11 June 2006.

83. Lieutenant General R. Steven Whitcomb, “US Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript,” DefenseLink, 9 December 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/ tr20041209-1765.htm (accessed 6 October 2006).

84. Dr. Jeff A. Charlston, “The Evolution of the Stryker Brigade—From Doctrine to Battlefield Operations in Iraq,” in John J. McGrath, ed., An Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conflict, The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2005 Military History Symposium (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 48–51.

85. The TUSK program was not funded until mid-way through FY06. See Talbot for an overview of these various Army programs.

86. In 1998 the US Army Natick Soldier Center issued the first contract to produce Interceptor Body Armor System to Point Blank Body Armor, Inc. See Program Executive Office Soldier Web site, https://www.peosoldier.army.mil/factsheets/SEQ_SSV_IBA.pdf (accessed 2 July 2007).

87. For a description of the Interceptor Body Armor System, see Program Executive Office Soldier Web site at https://www.peosoldier.army.mil/factsheets/SEQ_SSV_IBA.pdf.

88. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 11.

89. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report 05-275, Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations (Washington, DC, 8 April 2005), 56.

90. GAO Report 05-275, 58.

91. GAO Report 05-275, 57.

92. West, 2–3.

93. West.

94. Suzi Thurmond, “Analyzing the Lessons of OIF Distribution,” Army Logistician (July–August 2004), 4.

95. Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Tunnell IV, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, 23 January 2006, Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 23 January 2006, 3.

96. “Initial Impressions Report No. 06-20, 13th COSCOM,” 80.

97. Thurmond, 4.

98. “Initial Impressions Report No. 06-20, 13th COSCOM,” 81.

99. West.

100. Miseli, 11–12.

101. Henry Simberg, AMSAA Sample Data Collection Ground System Usage/Parts Replacement Analysis Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing, Fort Belvoir, VA: Research, Development & Engineering Command/Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Army Materiel Command, August 2006, slides 14–16.

102. House Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office, The Potential Costs Resulting from Increased Usage of Military Equipment in Ongoing Operations, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 6 April 2005, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6235&sequence (accessed 9 October 2006).

103. House Committee on Armed Services, Statement by Lieutenant General David F. Melcher, Deputy Chief of Staff G8, and Major General Jeanette K. Edmunds, Deputy Chief of Staff G4, Army Equipment Reset Program, 109th Congress, 2d Session, 30 March 2006, 2–7.

104. GAO Report 05-275, 50–54.

105. GAO Report 05-275, 50–54.

106. Thurmond, 5–6.

107. This effort was not without precedent, having been used in World War II and Vietnam. See Christopher Prawdzik, “Support the Stryker Brigades” (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Materiel Command, 2005), 88–95; see also, Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Thompson, “Frontline Support of the First SBCT at War,” Army Logistician, (July–August 2004), 15.

108. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 9.

109. US Army Corps of Engineers, Fact Sheet, “Coalition Munitions Clearance Program” (Huntsville, AL: US Army Corps of Engineers, June 2006), www.hnd.usace.army.mil/pao/FactShtsFY06/PAO-CMC fact sheet.pdf (accessed 15 October 2006). This work was completed in June 2006 with the demolition of 248 tons of munitions, and it has now been turned over to the Iraqi Government.

110. Kenneth W. Estes, “Command Narrative: 1st Armored Division in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003–July 2004,” Unpublished study, 71–72.

111. FM 4-0, chapter 11; see also, FM 14-100, Financial Management Operations (Washington, DC, 7 May 1997).

112. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review, January–February 2006, 4.

113. CALL Newsletter 04-13: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR). Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2004; see also, Mark Martins, “No Small Change of Soldiering: The Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Army Lawyer, 11 February 2005, 5–6, http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/ (accessed 9 October 2006).

114. Colonel Michael Toner, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 May 2006, 3.

115. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 February 2006, 10.

116. Toner, interview, 24 May 2006, 5.

117. Brigadier General David Blackledge, 352d Civil Affairs Command, “Department of Defense Press Conference Transcript,” DefenseLink, 14 January 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040114-1144.html (accessed 9 October 2006).

118. Major Robert S. Widmann, USAF, “The Commanders Emergency Response Program, Part II,” in OnPoint: A Counter-Terrorism Journal for Military and Law Enforcement Professionals, http://www.uscav.com/uscavonpoint/Print.aspx?id=169 (accessed 9 October 2006).

119. Toner, interview, 24 May 2006, 6.

120. Toner, interview, 24 May 2006, 10–12.

121. Toner, interview, 24 May 2006, 11.

122. Toner, interview, 24 May 2006, 4.

123. Toner, interview, 24 May 2006, 14.

124. Major Jeffrey Madison, “CSI Conference Roundtable Discussion,” in Brian M. De Toy, ed., Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 307–309 and 315–317.

125. Estes, 67–68.

126. Defense Finance and Accounting Service Web site, http://www.dod.mil/dfas/news/2004pressreleases/pressrelease0425.html (accessed 9 October 2006).

127. General Accounting Office, GAO Report 04-89, “Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems” (Washington, DC, 17 November 2003), http://www.gao.gov/htext/d0489.html (accessed 5 October 2006).

128. Staff Sergeant Cheryl Hackley, “New System Helps Resolve Pay Problems,” Defend America, 28 July 2004, http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/jul2004/a072804e.html (accessed 9 October 2006).

129. Government Accountability Office, GAO Report 04-911, “Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems” (Washington, DC, 23 August 2004), http://www.gao.gov/htext/d04911.html (accessed 5 October 2006).

130. David McGlinchey, “Defense says steps taken to fix Guard, Reserve Pay Problems,” Govexec.com, 20 July 2004, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0704/072004d1.htm (accessed 9 October 2006).

131. McGlinchey.

132. FM 4-0, 14-1 to 14-3; see also FM 12-50, U.S. Army Bands (Washington, DC, 15 October 1999).

133. “History of the 1st Armored Division Band,” http://www.1ad.army.mil/Band/bndHistory.htm (accessed 6 October 2006).

134. Major General (Retired) Paul Eaton, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 August 2006, 15.

135. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 9–10.

136. Estes, 144.

137. The account of this operation in this and subsequent paragraphs is based on the draft 1st AD History compiled by Dr. Kenneth W. Estes. See Estes, 127–148.

138. Estes, 145.

139. Major Guy Jones, “Transformational Logistics: Solution or Shell Game?” in McGrath, ed., An Army at War, 345.

140. Jones, “Transformational Logistics: Solution or Shell Game?” in McGrath, ed., An Army at War, 353.

141. West.

142. CALL Newsletter 04-13; see also, Army Logistics Whitepaper: “Connect Army Logistics.”

143. Army Logistics Whitepaper: “Connect Army Logistics.”

144. Stephen Binova, Steve Geary, and Barry Holland, “An Objective Assessment of Logistics in Iraq,” Science Applications International Corporation, March 2004 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned).

145. The US Department of Labor tracks this data though it is based on claims for insurance benefits and medical benefits, not direct tracking of casualties in Iraq. For a nonofficial source, see Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif/.

146. For one example, see Joe Sterling, “Family’s Lawsuit Over Slain Contractors Stalls,” CNN International.com; http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/11/blackwater.lawsuit/index.html (accessed 3 April 2007).

147. Brigadier General Charles Fletcher, interview by Major Robert Smith, 305th Military History Detachment Commander, 19 May 2003, in Baghdad, Iraq.

148. West.


Chapter 12. Logistics and Combat Service Support Operations





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