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ON POINT II: Transition to the New Campaign

The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003-January 2005





Part II

Transition to a New Campaign


Chapter 4
Leading the New Campaign: Transitions in Command and Control in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

 

Notes

1. General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2004), 528.

2. Lieutenant General William Webster, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 December 2007, 6.

3. COL Gregory Fontenot, US Army Retired, LTC E.J. Degen, US Army, and LTC David Tohn, US Army, On Point: The US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 219.

4. Kenneth W. Estes, “Command Narrative: 1st Armored Division in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003—July 2004,” Unpublished study, 16.

5. Estes, 18–20, 28–30.

6. Webster, interview, 18 December 2007, 17.

7. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 February 2006, 2.

8. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006), 459.

9. Gordon and Trainor, 459.

10. Estes, 25–26.

11. Gordon and Trainor, 460–462.

12. General (Retired) Tommy Franks, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 June 2006, 8.

13. Franks, interview, 23 June 2006, 8.

14. General (Retired) John Keane, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 June 2006, 6.

15. Keane, interview, 29 June 2006, 6.

16. Franks, American Soldier, 531.

17. Franks, interview, 23 June 2006, 6.

18. Franks, American Soldier, 524.

19. “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations Have Ended: Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California.” Whitehouse.gov, 1 May 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html (accessed 23 October 2006).

20. Franks, American Soldier, 352.

21. Webster, interview, 18 December 2007, 12–13.

22. Peter Baker, “The Image Bush Just Can’t Escape,” Washington Post, 4 May 2007, 21. The President later used the phrase during a 5 June speech to US troops in Kuwait: “American sent you on a mission to remove a grave threat and to liberate an oppressed people, and that mission has been accomplished.”

23. General William S. Wallace, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 May 2006, 4.

24. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 August 2006, 4.

25. US CENTCOM briefing slides, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index. htm (accessed 20 February 2007).

26. Estes, 46–47.

27. Franks, interview, 23 June 2006, 12.

28. Major General Steve Whitcomb, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 June 2006, 3–4.

29. Keane, interview, 29 June 2006, 6–7.

30. Keane, interview, 29 June 2006, 7–8.

31. Keane, interview, 29 June 2006, 7–8.

32. Keane, interview, 29 June 2006, 7–8.

33. Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay Garner, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 June 2006, 6.

34. Garner, interview, 6 June 2006, 6.

35. See Colonel Marc Warren, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 March 2007. The V Corps Staff Judge Advocate and V Corps leaders knew they would be responsible to act in accordance of the Hague and Geneva Conventions in the immediate aftermath of military operations and planned accordingly. But that planning was very minimal and the term “occupation” was not used since it implied long-term responsibilities in Iraq.

36. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 5.

37. Major General Walter Wojdakowski, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 August 2006, 2.

38. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 5, 9.

39. Webster, interview, 18 December 2007, 13.

40. Webster, interview, 18 December 2007, 14.

41. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 6.

42. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 5.

43. Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, written comments provided to Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 December 2006. LTC Degan was a member of the V Corps staff during this period.

44. Degen, written comments, 20 December 2006.

45. Webster, interview, 18 December 2007, 14.

46. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 4.

47. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 4.

48. Colonel (Promotable) James Boozer, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 January 2006, 4–5.

49. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 6.

50. Webster, interview, 18 December 2007, 16.

51. Franks, interview, 23 June 2006, 14.

52. US V Corps, V Corps Update Briefing—V Corps Commander’s Conference, 16 May 2003, slide 5.

53. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, written comments provided to Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 February 2007; see also, General John Abizaid, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 January 2007, 11.

54. Gordon and Trainor, 489.

55. See, for example, Mr. Rumsfeld’s comments on 30 June 2003 at a DOD press conference. “DOD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and General Meyers,” Defense Link, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030630-secdef0321.html (accessed 23 October 2006).

56. Garner, interview, 6 June 2006, 2.

57. Garner, interview, 6 June 2006, 4.

58. Garner, interview, 6 June 2006, 4. Various works have focused on the issue of interagency conflict. See, for example, Gordon and Trainor, 157-159; see also Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2006), 101–107.

59. Jay Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” in Brian M. De Toy, ed., Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 257; see also, Gordon and Trainor, 193.

60. Colonel Michael Fitzgerald, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 January 2006, 4.

61. Keane, interview, 29 June 2006, 8.

62. Garner, interview, 6 June 2006, 5.

63. Colonel John R. Martin, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 2006, 12.

64. Webster, interview, 18 December 2007, 7.

65. Webster, interview, 18 December 2007, 5–6.

66. Garner, interview, 6 June 2006, 2.

67. Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory Into Success, 253–256.

68. Gordon and Trainor, 471–472.

69. Garner, interview, 6 June 2006, 16.

70. Martin, interview, 18 May 2006, 15; Colonel (Retired) Paul Hughes, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 March 2006.

71. Garner, interview, 6 June 2006, 6 and 19.

72. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 8, 15.

73. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 8, 15.

74. L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 5–7.

75. Elaine Halchin, The CPA: Origins, Characteristics and Institutional Authorities (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2004), 4.

76. Halchin, 5–6.

77. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 12.

78. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 4.

79. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/ 20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf.

80. See Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington, DC, July 1956).

81. CPA Regulation Number 1.

82. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 30–31.

83. Martin, interview, 18 May 2006, 15.

84. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006. Lieutenant General Sanchez recalls this from some of the after-action reports and comments from V Corps staff officers who were present at the meeting.

85. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 12; see also Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 9.

86. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 12. Lieutenant General Sanchez has stated, “The very first contact I had with him was in Kuwait when he flew in, literally when he flew into the country from the United States. He flew in there and I spent about 10 to 15 minutes with him. My relationship with him throughout, to this day, is still a good relationship. The challenges that we faced in the professional relationship were at times fairly significant and that is kind of what blows around the press about this real bad relationship.”

87. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 12.

88. Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA Vision Statement, 13 July 2003. According to a memorandum appended to the vision statement, the CPA had circulated a draft of the statement before 10 July 2003 and had received comments from CPA staffers. The vision statement included a mission statement, end state, assumptions, and objectives.

89. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “After the Fight: Interagency Operations,” Parameters, Winter 2005/2006, 53–54.

90. Schnaubelt, 52.

91. Sanchez, interview, 18 August 2006, 4, 11.

92. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 13.

93. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 43. Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York, NY: Harper, 2008), 435–441.

94. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 42–44.

95. FM 100-15, Corps Operations (Washington, DC, 1996), 1-3, 1-4.

96. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 7.

97. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 3.

98. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 7.

99. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 7.

100. Sanchez, written comments, 15 February 2007.

101. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 7.

102. Degen, written comments, 20 December 2006. The Corps C5 staff had been divided into two parts—the main portion operating at Camp Victory with the Corps/CJTF headquarters and a two-person team collocated with the CPA headquarters in the Green Zone.

103. Boozer, interview, 24 January 2006, 7.

104. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 19.

105. Major General Thomas Miller, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 August 2006, 3.

106. Miller, interview, 25 August 2006, 4.

107. Miller, interview, 25 August 2006, 3.

108. Major General Barbara Fast, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 March 2006, 3.

109. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 8.

110. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 19.

111. Fast, interview, 27 March 2006, 4.

112. Miller, interview, 25 August 2006, 4.

113. Miller, interview, 25 August 2006, 10.

114. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 6.

115. Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Odom, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 March 2006, 6.

116. Odom, interview, 17 March 2006, 4–6. Odom’s fellow planners were Lieutenant Colonel Dan Stempniak, Major Dan Soler, and Major Charlie Costanza. Already in the CJ5 Plans Branch were Australian Lieutenant Colonel Dave Allen and British Wing Commander Martin Heath, though they departed relatively soon after. Between July and November a succession of officers led the CJ5—Lieutenant Colonel Allen, Wing Commander Heath, followed by Army Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) Mike Alexander, Lieutenant Colonel Butch Botters, Marine Colonel Dan Welch, and finally Army Brigadier General Dan Keefe when the situation stabilized.

117. Abizaid, interview, 10 January 2007, 12.

118. Odom, interview, 17 March 2006, 5–7.

119. Sanchez, interview, 18 August 2006, 17.

120. Sanchez, interview, 18 August 2006; see also, Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 4.

121. Odom, interview, 17 March 2006, 16.

122. Odom, interview, 17 March 2006, 5, 11–12

123. V Corps and CJTF-7, V Corps and CJTF-7 Transition and Challenges Briefing, 30 September 2004.

124. Miller, interview, 23 August 2006, 6–7.

125. Sanchez, interview, 18 August 2006, 18.

126. Odom, interview, 17 March 2006, 7, 16. This OPORD remained in place until August 2004 when MNF-I issued a new plan.

127. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 11.

128. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 19.

129. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 14.

130. General David McKiernan, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 October 2006, 9.

131. McKiernan, interview, 10 October 2006, 9.

132. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 15.

133. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 15.

134. Kathleen T. Rhem, “Officials Announce Plans for Iraqi Troop Rotations into 2004,” DefenseLink, 24 July 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28683 (accessed 17 December 2007).

135. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 16.

136. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 12.

137. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 11.

138. Sanchez, written comments, 15 February 2007.

139. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 12.

140. Wojdakowski, interview, 24 August 2006, 12.

141. Sanchez, written comments, 15 February 2007.

142. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 357; L. Paul Bremer III, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 April 2006, 7.

143. Bremer, interview, 20 April 2006, 7. In an interview with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, Bremer stated that after sending the request to Mr. Rumsfeld, “The Secretary passed the memo on to the Chiefs and asked them for their view and they came back and said, ‘We think we have enough troops.’ I just had a different view.”

144. Sanchez, interview, 14 August 2006, 20.

145. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 9.

146. Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8 June 2007, 7.

147. The issue is complex because one must account for US and Coalition nation troop numbers, some supporting Iraqi operations from Kuwait and other locations, a wide range of missions, the roles and capabilities of various types of still-emerging Iraqi forces, and a host of other factors. Some details of troop deployments also remain classified. For a study that uses a consistent methodology to examine some half-dozen conflicts to include OIF, see John McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

148. McGrath, Boots on the Ground, 126. Even after the troop surge of the spring and summer of 2007, US force levels will be slightly below those in January 2005.

149. McGrath, Boots on the Ground. In Iraq, this ratio would have required some 640,000 troops, or more than three times the number of Coalition forces available in May 2003.

150. McGrath, Boots on the Ground, 105. Although NATO rapidly drew down to a ratio of only 7.9 troops per 1,000 for the second year under the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

151. McGrath, Boots on the Ground, 105.

152. McGrath, Boots on the Ground, 137.

153. McGrath, Boots on the Ground, 126, 130, 137.

154. The controversy over troop levels continues as of the date of publication, inside and outside the military. A GAO report (GAO-07-639T) released on 22 March 2007, for example, concluded that the US had too few troops to secure the vast number of munitions sites in Iraq.

155. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 15.

156. Abizaid, interview, 10 January 2007, 4.

157. Abizaid, interview, 10 January 2007, 4–5; see also Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 16.

158. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 16–17.

159. Chief, Commander’s Initiatives Group, Multi-National Force–Iraq, Building a Strategic Headquarters: Operations Research Support to the Theater Commander Briefing, 44th AORS, 11–13 October 2005, slide 7.

160. Metz, interview, 8 June 2007, 2.

161. Metz, interview, 26 August 2006, 3.

162. Metz, interview, 26 August 2006, 2–4.

163. Metz, interview, 26 August 2006, 8; Metz, interview, 7 June 2007, 4–5.

164. Metz, interview, 8 June 2007, 5.

165. Metz, interview, 8 June 2007, 14.

166. Metz, interview, 8 June 2007, 8, 10–11; Metz, interview, 26 August 2006, 11.

167. For a study of this operation, see Matt Matthews, Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

168. Metz, interview, 7 June 2007, 9.

169. Metz, interview, 15 December 2005, 10.

170. Metz, interview, 8 June 2007, 14, 20–21.

171. Metz, interview, 8 June 2007, 20.

172. Metz, interview, 15 December 2005, 10.

173. Metz, interview, 8 June 2007, 21.

174. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 9.

175. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 9.

176. Major General (Retired) Paul Eaton, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 August 2006, 4.

177. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 9–10. The CPA leadership was also concerned that the quality of the New Iraqi Army would be compromised by the inclusion of the ICDC forces that CJTF-7 had created to handle local security issues.

178. MNF-I Mission Statement. Dr. Alexander Cochran, Historical Advisor to Chief of Staff of the Army, e-mail correspondence with authors, 12 February 2008.

179. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 17.

180. Multi-National Force–Iraq, MNF-I Framework OPORD Rev 01 Nov 05 Link Index, 2005.

181. Multi-National Force–Iraq, MNF-I Framework OPORD Rev 01 Nov 05 Link Index, 2005.

182. General George W. Casey Jr., interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 November 2007, 3.

183. See Casey, interview, 27 November 2007, 4. Events in 2005 and 2006 would later cause him to change his understanding of the main threat to Iraq and to MNF-I.

184. Casey, interview, 27 November 2007, 13.

185. Cochran, e-mail to author, 12 February 2008.

186. Cochran, e-mail to author, 12 February 2008.

187. Casey, interview, 27 November 2007, 3.

188. MNF-I, Building a Strategic Headquarters Briefing, slide 11.

189. Casey, interview, 27 November 2007, 4–5, 9.

190. Casey, interview, 27 November 2007, 10–11.

191. The Army’s new counterinsurgency manual dedicates an entire chapter to this issue, placing far more emphasis on the relationships between the Army and the other branches of the Federal Government, allies, and NGOs. See FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington, DC, 15 December 2006), chapter 2.

192. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 245.

193. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 15.

194. Sanchez, interview, 25 August 2006, 19.

195. Abizaid, interview, 10 January 2007, 4–5. In the interview, General Abizaid wondered whether a unified civilian-military chain of command in 2003 would have been a better method.

 


Chapter 4. Leading the New Campaign: Transitions in Command and Control in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM





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