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ON POINT II: Transition to the New Campaign

The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003-January 2005





Part I

Setting the Stage


Chapter 2
The US Army's Historical Legacy of Military Operations Other Than War and the Planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

 

Notes

1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC, 14 June 2001), 1–2.

2. Richard F. Grimmet, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1789–2004,” Congressional Research Service Report RL30172, as posted by the Naval Historical Center, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30172.htm (1 of 41) (accessed 16 April 2005).

3. For a survey of US Army historical involvement in operations other than conventional warfare, see Lawrence A. Yates, The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

4. FM 3-0, 14 June 2001, 1–14. See also Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC, 10 September 2001), 20.

5. FM 3-0, 14 June 2001, 1–14 to 1–17.

6. John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902 (Westport CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), chapter 7; Brian M. Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 12–18, chapter 2; Andrew J. Birtle uses the terms “Policies of Chastisement and Attraction” to describe the US Army’s two-pronged approach in the Philippines. See Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998), 119–126.

7. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), 116.

8. Birtle, 126.

9. Birtle, 138.

10. Birtle, 139.

11. Earl F. Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1989), 7.

12. Ziemke, 19.

13. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 15.

14. Crane and Terrill, 15.

15. John J. McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 30.

16. Crane and Terrill, 15–16.

17. Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support; The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1988), 56.

18. Clarke, 69–74.

19. Clarke, 373.

20. Marc Leepson, “Most USAID personnel in Vietnam, including State FSOs, labored in obscurity; here are some of their stories,” American Foreign Service Association, http://www.afsa.org/fsj/apr00/leepson.cfm (accessed 6 February 2006).

21. Leepson.

22. Clarke, 452.

23. Anthony Gray and Maxwell Manwaring, Panama: Operation Just Cause (Washington DC: National Defense University Press), 6.

24. Lawrence A. Yates, “Panama, 1989–1999: The Disconnect Between Combat and Stability Operations,” Military Review 85, May–June 2005, 51.

25. Yates, “Panama, 1989–1999,” 46–52; John T. Fishel, “Planning for Post-Conflict Panama: What it tells Us About PH IV Operations,” in Brian M. De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 169–178.

26. Fishel, “Planning for Post-Conflict Panama,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 173.

27. Yates, “Panama, 1989–1999,” 51.

28. Robert Baumann, Lawrence A. Yates, and Versalle F. Washington, My Clan Against the World (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 91.

29. Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion:” A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1998).

30. Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 122–132.

31. Robert F. Baumann, George H. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 101.

32. R. Cody Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The US Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995–2004 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 31.

33. Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 126.

34. R. Cody Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 37.

35. Headquarters, US Army Europe, Joint Guardian After Action Report (2000), III-5-7; see also, R. Cody Phillips, CMH Pub 70-109-1, Operation Joint Guardian, The U.S. Army in Kosovo (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007).

36. Headquarters, US Army Europe, KFOR 3, After Action Report, June 2001–May 2002 (2003), 21, 30, 38; see also, Phillips, CMH Pub 70-109-1, Operation Joint Guardian.

37. McGrath, Boots on the Ground, 91–109.

38. See, for example, Yates, US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations.

39. John D. Waghelstein, “What’s Wrong in Iraq or Ruminations of a Pachyderm,” Military Review 86, January–February 2006, 112.

40. Waghelstein, “What’s Wrong in Iraq,” 112.

41. FM 3-0, 14 June 2001, 1–14.

42. Birtle, introduction, chapter 1.

43. Birtle, passim.

44. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War; A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 456–457.

45. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations–Operations (Washington, DC, 1962), chapters 10 through 12.

46. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations of Army Forces in the Field (Washington, DC, 1968), chapters 11 through 13.

47. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-23, Stability Operations (Washington, DC, 1972), 4–3.

48. The Army did publish FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, in 1990, which defined and described in some detail the variety of missions renamed in 1993 as “operations other than war.” However, these operations did not gain formal acceptance as core Army missions until the 1993 version of FM 100-5, Operations.

49. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC, June 1993), chapter 13.

50. Task Force 2-5 CAV, Peace Support Operations, 1998.

51. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC, 20 February 2003), 1–12. This field manual continued the practice of defining stability operations both as a type of conflict and as a set of steps taken by military forces in a variety of types of conflicts.

52. Birtle, 256–257.

53. Birtle, 369–370.

54. Birtle, 656–659.

55. John D. Waghelstein, “Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Military Review 65, May 1985, 44.

56. Major Michael Eyre et al., “Civil Affairs (CA) Integration at the JRTC,” CTC Bulletin 98-12 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1998); “Intelligence BOS,” CTC Trends 98-20 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1998).

57. On the Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) scenarios, see Captain Robert S. Rigsby, “Kosovo Bound,” Army Logistician 33 (July–August 2001): 30; and, Captain Mark Stammer, “Peace Support Operations Rehearsals at the CMTC,” Stability and Support Operations Newsletter 98-11 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1998).

58. Colonel Joseph Anderson, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 November 2005, 9.

59. Anderson, interview, 4 November 2005, 9.

60. Anderson, interview, 4 November 2005, 9.

61. Anderson, interview, 4 November 2005, 9.

62. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 August 2006.

63. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 February 2006, 3.

64. Major Mark Black, Military Support to Elections: The Balkans Experience and the Implications for Future Planning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 27 February 2004).

65. Major General Thomas G. Miller, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 August 2006, 2.

66. Major General Buford C. Blount III, interview by Operational Leadership Experiences Project Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 February 2006, 17.

67. Major Darryl Rupp, interview by Operational Leadership Experiences Project Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 February 2006, 11 January 2006, 10.

68. Rupp, interview, 15 February 2006, 11 January 2006, 10

69. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Bryan Gray, interview by Operational Leadership Experiences Project Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 November 2005, 11 January 2006, 4.

70. FM 3-0, 14 June 2001, see chapters 1, 2, and 9.

71. JP 3-0, 2001, III-1–III-21.

72. Yates, US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 22–23.

73. General (Retired) Tommy Franks, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 June 2006, 3.

74. General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2004), 349.

75. On the pre-2002 plan, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006), 138. For Franks’ thoughts on the necessity for revising the CENTCOM plan, see Franks, American Soldier, 349.

76. Franks, interview, 23 June 2006, 4–5.

77. Franks, interview, 23 June 2006, 5.

78. Franks, interview, 23 June 2006, 4.

79. Franks, interview 23 June 2006, 6.

80. Franks, American Soldier, 393–394.

81. Gordon and Trainor, 42–54.

82. Franks, American Soldier, 207, 277, 278, 383, and 545.

83. Franks, American Soldier, 274–275.

84. General (Retired) John Keane, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 June 2006, 3.

85. Keane, interview, 29 June 2006, 3.

86. Kevin C.M. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 179.

87. Gordon and Trainor, 141.

88. For an example of George W. Bush’s statements on nation building during the 2000 campaign, see Terry M. Neal, “Bush Backs into Nation Building,” Washington Post, 26 February 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A6853-2003Feb26?language=printer (accessed 27 September 2006).

89. Franks, American Soldier, 423.

90. Franks, American Soldier, 441.

91. Gordon and Trainor, 144.

92. Jay Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 256.

93. Secretary of State, General (Retired) Colin Powell, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 July 2006, 7.

94. Colonel (Retired) Paul Hughes, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 March 2006, 6.

95. Powell, interview, 25 July 2006, 6.

96. Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 259.

97. Lieutenant General William G. Webster, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 December 2007, 11–12.

98. Webster, interview, 11 December 2007, 13.

99. Webster, interview, 11 December 2007, 13.

100. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 181.

101. Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2006, 6.

102. Colonel Michael Fitzgerald, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 January 2006, 3-4.

103. Fitzgerald, interview, 10 January 2006, 3.

104. For a paraphrasing of the CFLCC mission statement, see Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 185.

105. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 184.

106. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 189.

107. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 186.

108. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 187.

109. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 198.

110. McGrath, Boots on the Ground, 163–165. McGrath does not include indigenous security forces in calculating these particular ratios.

111. Benson, interview, 6 February 2006, 5.

112. Quoted in Gordon and Trainor, 139.

113. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 196.

114. Benson, interview, 6 February 2006, 15.

115. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 181.

116. Fitzgerald, interview, 10 January 2006, 2; Gordon and Trainor, 139.

117. Fitzgerald, interview, 10 January 2006, 4.

118. Benson, “‘PH IV’ CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” in De Toy, ed., Turning Victory into Success, 188.

119. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Landis, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 December 2005, 9.

120. Fitzgerald, interview, 10 January 2006, 3.

121. Wallace, the V Corps commander, stated V Corps was never tasked with postwar responsibilities. See General William S. Wallace, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 May 2006.

122. Petraeus, interview, 17 February 2006, 2.

123. Petraeus, interview, 17 February 2006, 2.

124. Colonel Thomas Torrance, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 November 2005, 7.

125. Colonel Marc Warren, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 March 2007, 6–7.

126. Warren, interview, 15 March 2007, 7.

127. Colonel J.D. Johnson, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 November 2005, 2.

128. Lieutenant Colonel Rod A. Coffey, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8 December 2005, 12.

129. Lieutenant Colonel Troy D. Perry, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 May 2006, 3.

130. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 4.

131. Wallace, interview, 22 May 2006, 4.

132. Keane, interview, 29 June 2006, 4.

133. Fitzgerald, interview, 10 January 2006, 6.

134. Garner stated in 2006, “[T]he other big mistakes we made the first 90 days were number one, the decision to disband the Army. . . . I had even briefed the President on bringing back the Army and he agreed with me. I briefed Condoleezza Rice every week on it and she agreed. I would bring it up with Rumsfeld every time I talked with him and he agreed with it. Wolfowitz and Feith agreed with it, and the President agreed with it.” Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay Garner, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 June 2006, 16. For a more complete description of how and why US plans for the Iraqi Army changed between March and May 2003, see Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York, NY: Harper, 2008), 366–368, 428–433. See chapter 3 of this study for more discussion of the effects of this policy on the military campaign.

135. L. Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 54–55.

 


Chapter 2. The US Army’s Historical Legacy of Military Operations Other Than War and the Planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM





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