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United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

June 2008
Report to Congress iIn accordance with the
2008 National Defense Authorization Act
(Section 1231, Public Law 110-181)

---

Section 1: United States Plans to Assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Building the Afghanistan National Security Forces

1.1 Long-Term Strategy for Afghanistan National Security Forces Development

Building Afghanistan’s capacity to provide for its own security is a major priority of the U.S. effort in the country. Besides ongoing and concurrent efforts to defeat the Taliban-led insurgency and provide reconstruction and development to Afghanistan’s people, the United States and its international partners, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are focused on fielding and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ANSF are comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). These forces represent critical pillars for establishing security and stability in Afghanistan. The long-term goal is to build and develop ANSF that are nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and increasingly funded from GIRoA revenue.

The plan for ANSF development is consistent with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS lays out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the government’s overall development vision. The plan for developing the ANSF is also consistent with the Afghanistan Compact, an agreement which defined a political partnership between the GIRoA and the international community. According to the compact, the international community commits to providing the budgetary, materiel, and training support necessary to develop national military forces, police services, and associated ministerial structures and the GIRoA commits to providing the human resources and political will. Although the United States (U.S.) is the primary provider of ANSF training and development, other international members are contributing to the effort. Sections 1 through 4 address U.S. efforts to build and sustain the ANSF, and Sections 5 and 6 describe international efforts to do so.

Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain major impediments to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements. The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and anti-government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.

The long-term ANSF posture potentially may include a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. Additional analysis, study, and consideration must be given to the security environment, sustainability of the force, and available financial support for such efforts.

1.2 United States Plan for ANSF Development

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is the lead U.S. agency responsible for ANSF development. With policy guidance from Washington and the U.S. Ambassador, CSTC-A directs all U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip Afghan security forces, and seeks to integrate the efforts of lead nations and other members of the international community into a comprehensive police plan. With GIRoA and international partners, CSTC-A plans, programs, and implements the development of enduring national military forces and police services with associated ministerial and sustaining institutions. This development covers the full spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities.

The CSTC-A Campaign Plan, which has been developed in close coordination with the GIRoA, follows three lines of operation: (1) build and develop ministerial institutional capability; (2) generate the fielded forces; and (3) develop the fielded forces. Specific objectives include:

• Ministries capable of effective inter-ministerial cooperation and formulating, promulgating, and implementing policies, plans and guidance throughout all levels of the ANA and ANP;
• Reduced corruption in the ministries and throughout the ANA and ANP;
• Increased credibility of the ministries, ANA, and ANP as effective and professional organizations;
• ANA and ANP manned, trained, and equipped to conduct the full spectrum of internal security and law enforcement missions as dictated by the local security situation, independent of significant external assistance;
• Common ideology and procedures across all elements of the ANA and ANP;
• Well-developed personnel management systems for the ANA and ANP;
• An enduring training base that can provide basic training, professional training and education, and literacy education at all levels;
• Efficient and mature acquisition, maintenance, and logistics systems capable of identifying, acquiring, and distributing required resources to the ANA and ANP and thus providing an effective, long-term sustainment capability without external assistance;
• Fully operational units capable of independent operations with minimal external assistance; and
• A joint command and control structure coordinated at the national level to integrating the ANA, ANP, and the National Directorate for Security (NDS) at the regional and provincial levels.

Progress along the three lines of operation is tracked using four Capability Milestones (CMs):

• CM4 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. It may be capable of undertaking portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, international community support.
• CM3 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of partially conducting primary operational missions, but still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international community support.
• CM2 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of conducting primary operational missions with routine assistance from, or reliance on, international community support.
• CM1 describes a unit, agency, staff function, or installation that is capable of conducting primary operational missions. Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the international partners.

The Campaign Plan’s three phases are conditions-based. They are not sequential and they may overlap. The focus of Phase I (Field/Generate the Afghan National Security Capability) is to generate and field effective national military forces and police services, their ministries, sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands. Substantial assistance will be required from the international community in all areas during this phase. The end state of Phase I will be achieved when the programmed forces have been fielded, received some collective training, and are participating in operations. The Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), sustaining institutions, and intermediate commands will have been established.

During Phase II (Development of the Afghan National Security Capability) the ANA, ANP, and international forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. The ANSF, ministries, and institutions will continue to develop the capabilities necessary to achieve CM1. All elements of the fielded ANSF will undergo collective training and evaluation. For the ANA, each unit will go through a validation process conducted by international training teams with final certification being done by the ANA itself. For the ANP, validation and certification processes will be conducted in coordination with the MoI, U.S. Embassy, and various international organizations. The end state of Phase II will be achieved when most ANSF elements achieve CM1, i.e., ANSF organizations are between 85 and 100 percent manned, equipped, and trained and have the capacity to plan, program, conduct, and sustain operations with specified international support.

Phase III (Transition to Strategic Partnership and Afghan Security and Police Re-orientation) occurs when the GIRoA assumes full responsibility for its own security needs, with continued engagement with the international community. At this point, CSTC-A will transition to a more traditional security assistance organization. The end state is characterized by an ANSF configured to provide for the security needs of the country: the defense of national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against prospective enemies and internal threats.

1.3 Budget

CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 ASFF request totaled approximately $2.7 billion, including $1,711 billion for the ANA, $980 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. For the ANA, these funds will equip and sustain the 70,000-person, 14- brigade force in 2008; upgrade garrisons and support facilities; enhance ANA intelligence capabilities; and expand education and training, including the National Military Academy, counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training, mobile training teams, branch qualification courses, and literacy and English language programs. For the ANP, these funds will increase CIED, communications, and intelligence training; purchase additional equipment, weapons, and ammunition to respond to insurgent threats; enhance ANP intelligence capabilities; set conditions for interoperability with the ANA to respond to events; enhance border surveillance; add basic health clinics in select provinces to improve casualty treatment; and expand field medic and combat life support training. Because the operational and security realities in Afghanistan are constantly changing, it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of the long-term costs and budget requirements for developing the ANSF.

1.4 Tracking U.S. Funding

ASFF funds are appropriated by the U.S. Congress to the U.S. Army. The Secretary of the Army distributes these funds to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA provides funding to Military Departments Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs) for purchases in the continental U.S. (CONUS) (e.g., major end items, weapons, ammunition, and communication needs), as well as to CSTC-A for items that can be procured through the local contracting office, or to fund services performed by the Department of State (DoS) or the United Nations

CSTC-A’s annual program objectives for the force generation and development of the ANSF bridge the gap between the strategic aims of the CSTC-A Campaign Plan, subordinate development strategies, and budget execution. Baseline requirements are derived from the approved ANSF force structure. Any modifications to these requirements come from the GIRoA, in consultation with CSTC-A. Changes to requirements result either from a change to the security situation as reflected in updated strategic planning documents of the MoD or MoI, or from lessons learned through operational experience.

The ASFF is subdivided by Budget Activity Groups for the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police and Related Activities that include Detainee Operations. Budget activities are then further subdivided into sub-activity groups. Tracking of funds begins at the Budget Activity Group (BAG – e.g., ANA and ANP) and Sub-Budget Activity Group (SAG) – e.g., Equipment and Training) levels. BAG and SAG funding authorizations for each fiscal year are loaded into the Army’s Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS), as well as a database managed locally in Afghanistan. As Memoranda of Request (MORs) are submitted for CSTC-A requirements, funds availability is confirmed by reviewing current funds status.

For tracking of funds execution below the BAG- and SAG-levels, in addition to the MILDEP accounting systems, CONUS Life Cycle Management Command obligation reports are provided to the CSTC-A CJ8 and uploaded into a local database. For local procurement funds sent to CSTC-A via Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR), CSTC-A tracks all purchase requests against available MIPR funding and reconciles amounts daily. As contracts and payments are made against purchase requests, the CSTC-A CJ8 posts the transactions in the local database. CSTC-A provides funds status on local procurement cases to USASAC who records the activity in the accounting system (SOMARDS) and the local Disbursing Office provides DFAS documentation of the disbursements made. The various MILDEP accounting systems report funds status monthly to the DSCA reporting systems (DIFS). The DIFS position is official program fund status. A funds control analyst reviews and audits funds status through the local database on a daily basis. Any discrepancies are worked with the appropriate offices and corrected.

The status of funds and financial decisions are managed using a Program Budget Activity Council (PBAC) process. The CSTC-A PBAC process reviews budget execution rates, un-financed requirement prioritization, and recommendations for command decision on program changes on a monthly basis.

1.5 Tracking Equipment

1.5.1 U.S. Procurement

The CSTC-A CJ4 tracks equipment from the identification of the requirement, to the refinement of the requirement; from procurement source through shipment delivery; and from issue to end user.

A new requirement for a weapon or vehicle system is initiated by a request to the CSTC-A directorate or subordinate task force that owns the BAG or SAG. The initiator of the requirement works with the BAG or SAG owner, CSTC-A CJ7, CSTC-A CJ4 Requirements Division, and Security Assistance Office representatives to develop and refine the requirement details to a level that can be correctly sourced. The generation of new requirements is a formal approval process that is documented in an order that details CSTC-A’s ANSF development programs.

Once approved as a new requirement by the CSTC-A CJ7 (or the Deputy Commanding General for Programs, depending on the dollar value), the CSTC-A CJ4 coordinates with the CSTC-A CJ8 to determine budget availability. The CSTC-A CJ4 allocates the requirement to a specific budget program, the CSTC-A CJ8 commits the funds for the requirement, and the CSTC-A CJ4 conducts a final verification.

The CSTC-A CJ4 then determines how to source the requirement—via local purchase or CONUS Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. DSCA guidance requires weapons and vehicles to be purchased via CONUS FMS cases. Determinations for other items are accomplished in accordance with DSCA local procurement guidance and through liaison with DSCA.

For an FMS case, a MOR is fully staffed through CSTC-A prior to submission to DSCA. DSCA validates funding exists in the appropriate SAG and determines which service agent would best fulfill the requirement, and the services submit the requirement to their respective LCMCs. LCMCs work with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to develop and award contracts for equipment. Items procured through FMS cases that are designated by DSCA as requiring end use certification due to their sensitivity are certified by the end user through a program managed by the CSTC-A CJ4.

1.5.2 International Donations

CSTC-A works closely with the GIRoA at all levels to manage the manning, equipping, training, and provision of facilities for the ANSF. As requested in a December 2007 letter from Afghan Defense Minister Wardak to CSTC-A Commander General Cone, all equipment donations to the ANA are vetted through the office of the CSTC-A Deputy Commanding General for International Security Cooperation (DCG-ISC) to ensure that each donation fits an actual requirement for the ANA and will be logistically sustainable. A similar CSTC-A vetting process is in place for equipment donated for the ANP. Once vetted by CSTC-A, the donation offer is sent to the MoD or MoI for final approval. For Donations from NATO countries, the donor nation is notified of the initial acceptance of the offer through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Directorate of Army Training and Education Support (DATES), Joint Forces Command-Brunssum, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Non-NATO countries can make donations in one of two ways, both considered bilateral donations. The first is similar to the process for NATO countries. A donor nation can approach the DCG-ISC with a potential donation. The vetting process would proceed at CSTC-A as described above, though without the involvement of ISAF DATES. Final approval and acceptance of the offer falls to the MoI or the MoD. The second way that a non-NATO country can make a donation to the ANSF is by a direct offer to the sovereign GIRoA.

At this point, if necessary, an inspection in the donor country is conducted to verify the condition of the equipment. These inspections are required for all ammunition, weapons, and highly technical equipment. After the in-country inspection is completed, an arrangement for delivery of all accepted equipment is conducted. Regardless of the shipping method, the CSTC-A CJ4 transportation office is contacted with the arrival times of the donation in order to coordinate its delivery to a logistics depot in Kabul. A receipt (signed by a representative from either the MoD or MoI) is then sent to SHAPE to confirm the delivery and accountability of the donation.

Arrival information (e.g., specific quantities and types of equipment) is annotated in a donation database. Since 2002, 46 donor nations (both NATO and non-NATO) have contributed equipment worth $822 million. There are currently 18 pending donation offers from 14 nations with a total value of more than $194 million. Major items include Leopard-1 tanks, MI-17 and MI-35 helicopters, M2 machine guns, 81mm mortars, and millions of dollars in construction funding for such projects as the Kabul Military High School.

Future solicitations for donations will focus on equipment from both the ANA and ANP requirements lists. However, CSTC-A, on behalf of the GIRoA, is putting more effort into seeking donor funding for equipment already being purchased for the ANSF and for engineering projects. In the search for these resources, CSTC-A is working with the local contingent of 20 defense attachés and with all of the national military representatives at SHAPE. The Polish contingent within the DCG-ISC office focuses on coordinating with Eastern European nations to meet ANSF needs for Eastern-bloc equipment and in-theater training to support this equipment.

1.5.3 Shipment of Equipment

CONUS-sourced weapons and ammunition for both the ANA and ANP are shipped by Special Assignment Airlift Mission to Kabul International Airport (KAIA). Equipment is transferred from aircraft to ANA trucks by the U.S. element of the Combined Air Terminal Operations (CATO) activity at KAIA. The CSTC-A CJ4 representative attached to CATO and the ANA transportation element commander both sign a transportation management document that is subsequently signed by an ANA Depot 1 representative (the national depot for ANA weapons) or a “22 Bunkers” Ammunition Depot representative (national depots for ammunition and ANP weapons) upon delivery.

Large equipment, including vehicles, is shipped via sealift to the port of Karachi, Pakistan, where they are transferred onto commercial trucks by contracted carrier for movement to Afghanistan. Commercial vehicles depart Karachi, cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at Torkham Gate, and proceed to delivery points in Kabul. The CSTC-A CJ4 receives shipping reports through the Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. ANA vehicles are delivered to ANA Depot 2 where they are signed for by ANA personnel and prepared for issue. ANP vehicles are delivered to a contracted maintenance organization for preparation and hand-receipt to the MoI Technical Department.

1.5.4 Issue Process and Documentation

1.5.4.1 Afghan National Army

Units at initial fielding are "pushed" weapons and vehicles from the national depots in Kabul to the Forward Support Depot (FSD) in the unit area. The directive to issue the initial fielding sets is generated in a "push letter" signed by the CSTC-A CJ4 and transmitted to the U.S. mentors at the national depots. Staff at the depots generate an Afghan MoD Form 9 Issue or Turn-in Order, which is signed by the ANA unit transporting the equipment to the FSD. One copy is kept on file at the depot. The FSD supply officer signs the MoD 9 acknowledging receipt of the equipment and returns a copy to the issuing depot. The FSD issues the equipment to unit supply officers using the MoD Form 9 as well.

After the initial issue, units request equipment and supplies on MoD Form 14 Request for Issue or Turn-in. Units submit these requests through their chain of command, through the FSD and Forward Support Group, to the Logistics Support Operations Center at the MoD Logistics Command. Each supporting level in the supply chain will either fulfill the request, forward to higher headquarters if unable to fulfill, or deny the request if it is not within authorization.

1.5.4.2 Afghan National Police

The initial fielding process for the ANP is similar to the ANA process described above, except that equipment is “pushed” only in support of the scheduled fielding of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) battalions and through the Focused District Development (FDD) program. Equipment is “pushed” to the Regional Training Centers (RTCs), which currently serve as the regional supply depots until the planned Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs) are constructed. RLCs will be the ANP equivalent of FSDs in the ANA. Documentation occurs through the use of the MoI Form 9.

After the initial issue, ANP units use the MoI Form 14 to request equipment. Other than support for the scheduled fielding of new units and the FDD program, all equipment is issued to the ANP by request only.

1.6 Efforts to Build and Maintain ANSF-Sustaining Institutions

CSTC-A provides military officers to assist in the education and mentoring of Afghan military and civilian leadership on a daily basis. These officers assess and evaluate ANA and ANP progress and provide valuable advice that is designed to assist the ANSF to meet its development goals. They build confidence and experience in the leadership at the ground level, serving as an example for success. On a daily basis these officers help move the ANSF towards becoming a reliable, capable, and professional organization.

CSTC-A mentors currently advise leaders throughout the MoI and the MoD. CSTC-A provides advisors to key leaders including: the Ministers of the Interior and Defense, Deputy Minister of Defense, 1st Deputy Minister of Interior, Deputy Minister for Counter-Narcotics, Deputy Minister of Security, Deputy Minister for Administration and Logistics, Chief of the ANA General Staff (GS), Chief of the Criminal Investigative Division, Chief of Uniform Police, Chief of ANCOP, Chief of Counter-Terrorism, Chiefs of Training and Education, Intelligence, Finance, Internal Affairs, and many others.

CSTC-A-contracted trainers also provide staff training via Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in the areas of logistics planning and property accountability, military decision-making processes, and other staff processes. A recent initiative has begun to expand this training to include students from district-level operations centers of the ANP.

CSTC-A is committed to working in concert with the MoD and MoI to build training management and assessment procedures which train personnel to meet the demands of the entire system, build honest and accurate assessments from the bottom up, and assist the leadership in identifying issues requiring action. In order to develop common objectives and standardization, the oversight of training, including the formation of new training and schools, remains with CSTC-A. To summarize, a few of the processes that assist the ANSF in becoming strong and fully capable are:

• Development of common core and synchronized programs of instruction ensures the same standards are met regardless of the source of the training cadre.
• Mentor and assessment teams confirm the accomplishment of training standards and the students’ ability to apply the processes, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
• Contracts for new training facilities and programs ensure that transition is planned and phased to ensure a successful transition to the ANSF.
• Training on management and leadership practices, and assisting in their implementation within normal ANSF operations, provides common procedures throughout the command structure to identify and resolve issues.

1.6.1 The Ministry of Defense

CSTC-A executes a ministerial development program that synchronizes the development of MoD organizations and institutions with the development of management and operational systems. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, functional boards, and the Ministerial Development Board, a group of senior mentors and staff that reviews methods to improve the ANA. CSTC-A functional staffs focus on building organizational capacity and capability; and contractors with prerequisite skills (working with military functional experts and staff) develop the core management and operational systems essential to enable the ministry to plan, program, and manage the army. The specific core systems being developed within the MoD include:

Personnel
• Personnel Management
• Reserve Affairs
• Public Affairs
Intelligence
• Military Intelligence
Operations
• Strategic Defense Planning
• Operational Planning
• Force Management
• Training Management
• Doctrine Development
• Readiness Reporting
• Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
Logistics
• Logistics
• Acquisition
Special Staff
• Resource Management and Budgeting
• Inspector General
• Installation Management
• Military Justice and Legal
• Ministerial Administration
• Medical and Health Care
Ministerial level Capability
• Disaster Response and Relief
• Parliamentary Affairs

Additionally, senior military and civilian personnel serve as advisors to selected senior Afghan officials and officers within the MoD and General Staff (GS) to assist with senior-level issues and serve as liaison officers between the Afghan officials and the CSTC-A Commander and principal staff on matters affecting the development of the security sector.

1.6.2 Ministry of the Interior

As the lead U.S. agency for ANSF development, CSTC-A works with the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission in Afghanistan, and others in the international community to develop and reform the MoI. Ministerial development is managed through a program that works to synchronize MoI headquarters agencies and the core management systems essential to reforming the ministry and enabling its organizations and personnel to plan, program, and manage ANP institutions and forces. Vertical and horizontal integration of systems is achieved through mentor meetings, working groups, and the Ministerial Development Board. The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) serves as the international coordinating body between the operational-level entities and ANP reform efforts at the political level. The MoI serves as a co-chair for this body. Once issues have been resolved via an international caucus, the IPCB provides direction for action.

Senior military and civilian personnel from the U.S. and international community advise selected senior Afghan MoI officials and officers on actions and issues associated with reform initiatives. These senior advisors also serve as a conduit between MoI officials, the CSTC-A Commander and principle staff, and the EUPOL Head of Mission. INL provides contractors who also assist with advising senior Afghan officials to facilitate reform efforts. CSTC-A functional staff focus on building organizational capacity and capability. Contractors with the prerequisite skills, working with military functional experts and staff, assist the Afghan senior leaders and staff to develop and implement policies, systems, and modern management practices essential to effective reform of the MoI. The core systems being developed within the MoI include:

1.6.3 Logistics, Intelligence, Medical Services, and Recruiting

The ability of Afghan security forces to operate independently will rely, in part, on adequate logistical support at all levels that allows the ANA and ANP to sustain their fielded forces. CSTC-A’s current policy is that equipment is not issued unless there is verification of appropriate supply and accountability procedures.

A mature and continually improving national logistics infrastructure exists and is already supporting the ANA. A series of national and forward support depots currently provide the bulk of the ANA’s needs. Neither the United States nor the international community is involved in the distribution of supplies or equipment to ANA forces. Brigade-level logistics structures and systems are adequate and continue to develop. However, there is a gap in the linkage from the brigade level to the national level. This gap will require development of a corps-level logistics structure that will be addressed with the increase of 10,000 personnel beginning in 2009. Plans for 2009 lay the groundwork for making currently-contracted logistics an ANA core responsibility.

For the ANP, logistics development is currently focused on verification and accountability. CSTC-A is addressing regional, provincial, and district level gaps in ANP logistics that stem in part from still-developing MoI logistics policies and procedures and logistics officer training. The MoI is working to close these gaps through regional, provincial, and district level logistics officer training.

The Afghan intelligence community has three main components: the NDS, MoD, and MoI. Historically, information has rarely been shared; collaborative analysis and coordinated collection have been the exception rather than the norm. The establishment of clear roles and functions among the three major agencies has been hampered by distinct developmental paths, legacy Soviet paradigms, and disjointed U.S. Government and international support efforts. Although each agency is playing an increasingly effective role in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, much work remains to build national intelligence structures that encourage intelligence sharing and can provide coherent, timely intelligence to Afghan national decision- and policymakers.

Medical services are developing, but are not yet adequate. Existing emergency medical services do not meet the needs of the ANA and ANP. Routine medical care is also rudimentary. However, the integration of ANA and ANP medical personnel into a collaborative health care system with the Ministry of Public Health will improve care, especially for combat casualties. Three new regional hospitals have opened, medical logistics proficiency and patient record keeping processes have improved, and immunizations have increased. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain before the ANA and ANP health care system can provide quality health care to those serving in the ANSF and their dependents.

Effective ANA and ANP recruitment programs are in place. Both the ANA and ANP have consistently met recruiting goals year after year. Although separate and distinct, the ANA and ANP recruitment programs share resources where possible in order to remain as effective and efficient as possible.

1.6.4 Command and Control

During the 12 months prior to March 2008, mentors have engaged in a variety of activities to develop ANSF communications capabilities among the national command and coordination centers, the regional coordination centers, and the provincial coordination centers. CSTC-A has focused on strengthening and refining the established command and control centers by improving the efficiency of operations at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Police Command Center (NPCC) by standardizing reporting formats and procedures.

Efforts at the NMCC have been concentrated on enhancing operational command and control by developing standard operating procedures for Corps headquarters’ reporting of operational information to the NMCC. In addition, training and mentoring of liaison officers (LNOs) have been an ongoing activity designed to foster an attitude of urgency and accuracy in obtaining information from field units. A weekly video teleconference with Corps commanders was implemented to establish strong personal links at the command level.

Current efforts are being made in the NMCC to establish a common operating picture (COP). A COP is established using GPS-established unit locations and graphic control measures that will then allow the NMCC to share its COP with other command centers through e-mail. The NPCC is included in this effort in order to establish a national level COP for all ANSF. This effort also includes an ability to share intelligence at appropriate levels.

At the NPCC, efforts have been concentrated on developing standard operating procedures for internal NPCC operations as well as Joint Regional Coordination Center (JRCC) and Joint Provincial Coordination Center (JPCC) reporting requirements. The NPCC assumed control of radio communication operations and has been involved in an aggressive program of establishing and maintaining regularly scheduled communication checks with each JRCC. Command emphasis has been placed on the need to consolidate Regional Commands (RCs) and JRCCs in order to institute a single chain of command and control from district to province (i.e., JPCC) to region (i.e., JRCC) to the NPCC. Training and mentoring of LNOs has been an ongoing activity focused on coordinating all operational activities.

At the national level, a weekly video teleconference between the NMCC and NPCC has focused on the exchange of intelligence and operations information in an effort to enhance situational awareness of both organizations. In addition, each command center provides LNOs to the other command center to ensure timely and accurate exchange of operational information.