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Road To War
Rotation 03-01 01 Nov - 13 Dec 2002
1st Armored Division


      The current conflict between the Republic of Sowenia (ROS) and the Republic of Vilslakia (ROV) represents the greatest threat to regional stability in the US European Command (EUCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The conflict threatens economic stability in Europe as it is disrupting major North-South trade routes in central Europe.


      Vilslakia is a land locked country that shares a historically disputed border with Sowenia. Sowenian peoples descended from Germanic tribes that settled in the region over 2000 years ago, and Vilish peoples descended from the Moors who migrated into the area after being driven from Spain during the First Crusades from the 11th to 16th centuries. The Sowenians are primarily of Catholic faith, and the Vilslakians are primarily of the Muslim faith. Vilslakia and Sowenia were first established as modern, independent nations in the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the close of World War I. The Contested Area of Sowenia/Vilslakia (CASV, a region of eastern Sowenia) was established following World War II as a reward to Sowenia for assisting in the Allied cause, and as punishment to Vilslakia for its part in supporting the Axis cause. The CASV enjoyed a period of relative peace, security and prosperity during the cold war despite their internal ethnic and religious heritage.



      The CASV is largely populated with ethnic Vilish (in varying density), who were forced to become Sowenian subjects at the end of WWII. Starting during the Cold War and extending to the present, Vilish-Sowenians are looked down upon by Sowenians regarding Vilish culture and traditions and their adherence to the Muslim religion. Sowenia exerted control over CASV initially through the creation of regional Police Districts; and, later via limited integration of Vilish-Sowenians into local government structures. The area is economically mixed between the wealthy industrial regions surrounding Regensburg, and historically agricultural and timber industries. Vilslakia has traditionally maintained close relations through official and unofficial contacts and through the use of Muslim Imams, with the Vilish population living in the contested area. Reclamation of the disputed territories would give Vilslakia access to (and control over) major European and regional markets as well as increasing several other elements of National Power.






Timeline of Events Leading to Hostilities




November.   Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and resulting worldwide surge of nationalism, the ROV held elections for the first time as a free republic in November 1989. General Moldinov, a popular former Chief of Staff of the Vilslakian National Army (VNA) was elected President based upon his platform to restore Vilslakia to its historic dominance within the region (and has remained President since).




January. Moldinov and his Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Interior met and developed a National Security Strategy for a National Strategic Campaign Plan (SCP) to achieve the goals of restoring Vilslakia to its historic economic/political dominance, and sustaining its military stature in the region. The purpose of a National Strategic Campaign Plan (national SCP) is to integrate all the instruments of national power under a single plan. This plan, over the next several years, will leverage the influence of ROV's Armed Forces' strong military presence and provide for the contingency that military force might become necessary even if the ROV hopes to achieve the goals of the campaign by nonmilitary means. The national SCP is the end result of the National Command Authorities Strategy Integration Department's planning effort. Based on input from all ROV ministries, this is the plan for integrating the actions of all instruments of power to set conditions favorable for achieving the central goal identified in the national security strategy. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is only one of several ministries that provide input and are then responsible for carrying out their respective parts of the consolidated national plan. The General Staff was tasked to develop, staff, promulgate, and review the military strategic campaign plan (MSCP). They must ensure that the military plan would end in achieving military conditions that would fit with the conditions created by the diplomatic-political, informational, and economic portions of the national plan that are prepared by other ROV ministries.


The MSCP's goals are:


      1. Neutralize the armed threat from Kolakia, its hostile neighbor to the Northeast, by establishing a large defensive presence along the border;


      2. Annex the CASV from Sowenia.


            a. Unify the Vilish peoples of Sowenia within the historic borders between the two countries.


            b. Seize the waterway, road and rail Lines of Communications (LOCs) within the contested area to provide Vilslakia increased economic influence within the region.


      3. Eliminate Sowenia as an armed threat to Vilslakia.


Strategic Operations


The nature of "strategic operations" at any particular time corresponds to the conditions perceived by the VNA National Command Authority. The ROV will try to achieve the annexation of the CASV through strategic operations alone without having to resort to armed conflict. This will be done through the implementation of the National Strategic Campaign. It may be able to achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by other-than-military instruments of power, perhaps with the mere threat of using its superior military power against the ROS. The ROV will employ several means against the ROS centers of gravity: diplomatic initiatives, information warfare (IW), economic pressure, terrorist attacks conducted by the ROV-sponsored guerrilla group the Vilslakian Guerillas (VG), and direct action by Vilslakian Special-Purpose Force (VSPF). Strategic operations are a continuous process not limited to wartime or preparation for war. Once war begins, they continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.



      1990 (NSCP Executed)


April. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the VNA General Staff meets to prepare and implement a military strategic campaign for NSCP. The General Staff develops a two-phased Military Strategic Campaign plan. Phase One is the use of guerrilla forces to overthrow or at a minimum change the ROS operational environment to uncertain. Phase Two is the use the VNA regular army to invade ROS and seize the CASV if Phase One fails to achieve its goal.


September. Vils agents infiltrate into Sowenia to recruit Vilish-Sowenian nationals for paramilitary training forming them into VG units. In late September 1990, VSPF training cadre entered Sowenia covertly under the guise of forming the Committee of Solidarity with Vilish Peoples in Sowenia, the political front for the VG. The purpose of the VSPF training cadre is to train the VG in the use of guerrilla tactics. The VGs are to be organized into three brigades. The VG command and support relationship is "affiliated" with the General Staff through the VSPF. That is to say, they are commanded by themselves, receive logistical support from the Vilslakians, position themselves throughout the CASV as they believe, and their priorities are established by mutual agreement between the VG and the General Staff.




March. Moldinov directs increased diplomatic, cultural and economic exchanges with the ROS and other neighboring countries within the region. Dunavija responds positively, and becomes aligned as an ally. Freedonia in the South, and Saxonia in the North responded formally, but retain their neutrality. Sowenia responds with mixed signals, but generally exhibits non-friendly intents to the ROV. Moldinov continues his diplomatic efforts by increasing participation efforts with the UN and in supporting a variety of International Organizations/Non Governmental Organizations (IO/NGO). VSPF elements continue to train the VG within eastern Sowenia.


      1992 - 1997


Moldinov continues his diplomatic efforts regionally, and for the first time, joins various coalitions of Non-aligned States. Moldinov directs the Vilslakian National Army to begin an aggressive exchange officer program, and sends a core of maneuver officers worldwide. The ROV greets the new US administration warmly, and aggressively works with elements of the US State Department to promote goodwill and harmony for the ROV, while continuing VSPF covert operations within the ROS. VNA observers deploy to Somalia with UN forces, and are present during the tragic actions that lead to the rapid US departure from the country. VNA observers are present in Bosnia during the initial UN deployment and peacekeeping efforts, to include the establishment of US peace support operations in Macedonia, and Bosnia. Within the region, ROV continues its diplomatic, economic, cultural and covert VSPF operations in eastern Sowenia. ROS police officials begin reporting an increase in VG urban operations, but are not completely successful in tying the VSPF and ROV formally to VG operations. Sowenia issues a stern public warning to the ROV about state-sponsored campaigns to destabilize the CASV. Moldinov intensifies his pursuit for favorable diplomatic assistance from the UN by initiating an aggressive media campaign within the region and in New York. The US initiates diplomatic dialogue between the two governments to defuse the situation and maintain regional stability.




February. Relations between ROV and ROS begin to deteriorate. Vilish-Sowenians in eastern Sowenia protest their "second-class citizenship" and lack of rights. Concurrent to the incidents reported in the world press, ROV media and governmental bodies increase demands for IO/NGO and other regional organizations to assist the "victims" of ROS policy. The VG increases direct action against "soft" targets throughout the CASV. Two buildings in Regensburg are targeted; firebombs damage the city library and tourist office inflicting several casualties. In Parsberg, a Vilish Mosque is defaced with graffiti with anti-Vilish slogans (now believed done by VG to purposely inflame the Vilish-Sowenian residents in the area). The US denounces all acts of ethnic violence. The U.S. Secretary of State meets separately with representatives of both governments to establish a dialogue over ethnic and religious differences. State Department representatives meet discreetly with ROV Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Prague regarding US objections and concerns regarding ROV attempts to destabilize the region. ROV representatives angrily deny the accusations and plead their case in the Vilslakian press, complaining of US high-handedness and accuse the US of threatening ROV sovereignty. The ROV Minister of Foreign Affairs cuts short the bi-lateral talks and orders the State Department representatives out of the country. The US responds by placing the ROV on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.





November. To combat increasing VG activity and to streamline security organization and operations, the ROS Ministry of Interior reorganizes the federal police throughout the ROS into seven Special Police Districts (SPD). The SPD generally follow historic regional boundaries within the ROS, but merge smaller locales into specific regional headquarters for centralized population control and communications. The purpose of these SPDs is two-fold: in peacetime, function as the regional headquarters for standardizing police operations, and in a time of crisis, convert to Special Police Divisions, to maintain order within ROS and report to and provide the SNA intelligence and basic rear area protection. The 9th SPD and 10th SPD share the responsibility of operating along the ROS/ROV border similar to the role the BUNDESGRENZCHUTZ performs in Germany. The SPD is armed with light weapons and side arms, and equipped with wheeled vehicles only. It is not a military force; rather it is an organized police force. During peacetime, each district is organized into three to seven sub-districts, based upon city/counties within the region. During a declared crisis or time of war, the Special Police Divisions reflect a structure of three to seven battalions, however their mission is not to fight, but to conduct interior security operations. The SPD consists primarily of ethnic Sowenians, but does have minority Vilish representation primarily in the CASV.




The VG increase regional direct action under the direction of the VSPF. The VG changes tactics by attacking both ethnic Sowenian and Vilish- Sowenian targets to increase the tension between the two ethnic groups. Direct actions consist of terrorist attacks in rural areas striking at Sowenian military convoys and attacking both Sowenian and Vilish-Sowenian targets such as historical sites and ethnic education centers. The ROS responds to the attacks against Sowenian targets by imposing a curfew on Vilish-Sowenian citizens and prohibiting Vilish-Sowenian clubs from meeting. The ROV UN Ambassador makes claims of Sowenian atrocities in July. An intense media campaign by the ROV to gather international support succeeds only in bringing traditional US adversaries to the forefront, and fails to energize official UN support for the ROV cause. In October, the Sowenian National Police (SNP) begins official reprisals and jails ethnic leaders, bans ethnic clubs/activities and attempts to restrict historical teachings of the Islamic faith. The US subsequently advises ROS against extreme measures against the Vils minority, which will only inflame the regional situation. Relations between ROV and ROS begin to seriously deteriorate during this period. Vilish-Sowenians in eastern Sowenia begin to violently protest the "prelude to ethnic cleansing." Again, as these acts are reported in the world press -- ROV media and governmental bodies then increased demands of IO/NGO and other regional organizations to assist the "victims" of ROS policy.


Good Friday 31 Mar 2002. The Provocation. 75 "good" Vilish-Sowenians are killed in a Mosque bombing in Hohenburg, a town in eastern Sowenia with a majority Vilish population and city administration. The bombing occurs on a most holy Catholic day during the weekly Friday prayers, which creates great confusion regarding an unknown attack against the Muslims on a Christian holiday. Incidentally, this is the oldest Vilish Mosque in existence in the central region, thus this attack is viewed in the ROV as tantamount to an attack upon the ROV itself. A major media campaign is generated by the ROV Ministry of Public Affairs to enhance public support at home and within the international community. Major news organizations from around the world and regional media descend upon eastern Sowenia to investigate the bombing and subsequent investigation by the SPD. The ROS responds by investigating suspected VG, firing of many of the Vilish SPD officers, and jailing of known Vilish-Sowenian troublemakers. The US response comes in the form of an Embassy announcement of support for freedom of worship for all peoples, deploring the violence and cautions against retaliation. Despite the ROS opposition to intervention, the US supports IO/NGO investigations. The ROS attempts an even-handed response, but IO/NGO and media critics criticize ROS investigations as nothing more than a witch-hunt against the ROV and Vilish minority within the CASV. The ROV response is to increase political and media pressure to punish the ROS and to demand that ROV "peacekeepers" be permitted to enter the CASV to protect Vilish-Sowenian citizens. This call is soundly rejected by the ROS and the US. Regional tensions again increase when Moldinov announces that his Minister of Defense, Abramsov would meet with the National Command Authority to propose military courses of action. The Vilslakian National Command Authority prepares to execute Phase Two of the Military Strategic Campaign Plan to seize by military force the CASV.





12 May. Based upon increasing tensions in the CASV, and perceptions of a hostile ROS response to provocations, the ROV ambassador to the UN asks for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council regarding approval for peacekeepers in the CASV. After deliberation, the UN Security Council declines to approve either ROV peacekeepers or recommend third-country peacekeepers. When denied, Moldinov berates the UN, the ROS and its supporters on CNN. There are major demonstrations for intervention based upon the perceived "suffering of the Vilish-Sowenians" within the CASV. Moldinov directs increased VSPF and VG actions, and secretly initiates mobilization, forming five OSC headquarters. These headquarters will be assigned units over the summer as the army completes mobilization activities. The US response is to continue supporting dialogue between all parties in the region. The US recommends the European Union (EU) take the lead in managing this regional issue. VSPF and VG direct action increases within CASV, concurrent with increased ROV diplomatic, political, informational and economic pressure with all of its regional neighbors. The EU begins deliberations of potential peacekeeping, and tasks its individual members to obtain national approval first.


20 Jun. After a significant increase in political and media pressure, and sustained VSPF/VG activities, the ROS requests UN assistance to maintain regional stability. The UN responds by issuing statements of support for the ROS, and appoints a study group to evaluate options for deploying peacekeepers into the area.


12 Jul. Mobilization of active and reserve forces are complete. All five OSC's are assigned army and air force units to resource them for their wartime missions. 1st OSC, 3rd OSC, and 4th OSC are assigned missions for the seizure of the CASV. 2nd OSC and 5th OSC is assigned the mission to guard the Kolakia/ROV border. 1st and 3rd OSC begin combined arms training at local training areas. The 4th OSC conducts gunnery training near Prague. VNAF attack aircraft are observed conducting extensive air to ground training at VNAF ranges north of Prague. Moldinov is interviewed in Prague by CNN and states the VNA mobilizations are preparations for peacekeeping operations in the ROS. In reality this is part of the ROV Information Strategic Campaign Plan to deceive the international community of his intentions to invade the ROS.


Task and Purpose of the OSC, VG and VSPF


2nd OSC and 5th OSC.


. Task: Conduct security operations along the ROV/Kolakia border.

. Purpose: to prevent any violation of the ROV by Kolakia forces during the seizure of the CASV.


1st OSC

. Task: Attack to Destroy I (SO) Corps between Bamberg and Nürnberg

. Purpose: Fix Sowenian forces in the North IOT prevent their interference with 4th OSC attacks on Nürnberg.


3rd OSC

. Task: Attack to Destroy II (SO) Corps between Passau and Regensburg.

. Purpose: Fix Sowenian forces in the South IOT prevent their interference with 4th OSC attacks on Nürnberg.


4th OSC

. Task: Attack to Seize the port of Nürnberg and the Nürnberg Flughafen.

. Purpose: Prevent extraregional forces (US) deployment into the CASV.


VG Brigades

.Task: Conduct disruption zone operations, such as raids, ambushes, and terror tactics.

.Purpose: Provide Intel reports and targeting, and conduct direct action against high value systems, CPs & Logistics.



.Task: Conduct disruption zone operations, such as special reconnaissance, direct action, raids, and ambushes. (The VSPF also trains, equips and advises the VG)

.Purpose: Provide Intel reports and targeting, and conduct direct action against high value systems, CPs & Logistics.


20 Jul. The UN Security Council denies the ROV authority to conduct peacekeeping operations in the CASV. The ROV UN Ambassador walks out of the UN, and tells CNN that the ROV cannot be denied its lawful right to defend its citizens in the CASV. VNAF elements continue air to ground training with ground observers from the 1st and 3rd OSC's at the VNAF range complex north of Prague. Additionally, the VNA has increased border surveillance flights with helicopters flying the actual inter-border trace, while VNAF fighters provide aerial surveillance approximately five nautical miles east of the border. Following this incident, the President directs US Forces to prepare for a possible evacuation of American citizens (AMCITS) from AOR. JCS directs EUCOM to develop a CONPLAN for the evacuation of AMCITS from the ROS. VG members blocked a number of roads in the REGENSTAUF area, including all the roads to the airport in BODENWÖHR. The airport was closed by the blockades. Many people in the REGENSTAUF area were prevented from moving freely in and out of the area. Some tourists were stopped and forcibly detained by the VG at the blockade near the entrance to the airport. There were no reports of any injuries, but tourists were not allowed to leave the blockaded areas for about 36 hours. An American University archeological study group in the Hohenburg region of the CASV requests evacuation assistance due to increasing tensions between Vilish citizens and the students over allegations of desecration of historic Vilish grave sites.


25 - 28 Jul. The US Ambassador to the ROS orders an evacuation of US citizens from the CASV. EUCOM responds by directing deployment of a NEO Task Force centered on the 173rd ABN BDE. The NEO Task Force operation successfully evacuates a group of AMCITS and Third Country Nationals from the CASV without incident. However, a small number of Americans working with IO/NGO personnel have remained in the CASV in spite of State Department advisories and warnings. VG/VSPF elements do not hinder the NEO evacuation, and there are no indications of any response by VNA ground forces. VNAF elements continue robust border surveillance flights and continue air to ground training with ground observers north of Prague.


1 Aug. VNA 1st OSC and 3rd OSC deploy to forward assembly areas just east of the ROS/ROV border. VNAF ground to air training concludes for ground observers from the 1st and 3rd OSC units. 4th OSC ground observers begins intensive training with the VNAF, while simultaneously beginning discrete deployment to the West. VG activities within CASV surprisingly become discreet. ROS authorities become confused, and direct the ROS military to initiate immediate defensive measures in garrison.



6-7 AUG. US identifies movement of 4th OSC to the West as a strategic reserve force, and provides this information to the ROS. Based upon this information, I (SO) and II (SO) Corps deploy forward into defensive positions to augment Sowenian Police Divisions and counter provocative moves by the VNA. VNAF air to ground training for 4th OSC continues, to include night training. VNAF helicopters continue robust border surveillance flights. VNA 1st OSC and 3rd OSC move into attack positions near the border and initiate radio silence. US advises the ROS of likely ROV attack within 5 to 7 days. VG activities continue to target ROS government facilities. VNAF flights appear to have ceased, and maximum maintenance is being conducted.


8-9 AUG. US advises Allies of likely ROV attack within 72-96 hours. Rocket and cannon ammunition stockages for VNAF fixed-wing aircraft are pushed forward from ammunition storage sites to ready bunkers located on VNAF airfields. VNAF helicopter armaments are being pushed forward into prospective FARP sites close to the ROS/ROV border. VG activities continue to remain discreet.

The UN continues last minute diplomacy with both the ROS and ROV and increase media pressure to enlist international support for defusing the regional situation peacefully. VNA helicopter units are deployed forward from their traditional airfields near Prague into tactical deployment sites near the ROS/ROV border region. Units of the 1st and 3rd OSC are operating on communications silence. US Diplomatic efforts increase while simultaneously; JCS directs EUCOM to initiate CONPLAN review and refinement for potential combat operations within the CASV.


10-11 AUG. UN negotiators exhaust their options in shuttle diplomacy between Munich and Prague and report to the international and regional media that the ROV refuses to back down, leaving little hope for a peaceful end to the tensions within the CASV. The UN Security Council agrees to conduct daily emergency meetings regard the situation, until tensions ease. Peace activists from the US, Ireland and France converge on Prague to demonstrate their commitment to peace and freedom with speeches, music and poetry readings. Additional demonstrations are held outside the UN in New York and near the Capital in Washington, denouncing US failures to stop the war. In Prague, Moldinov declares to the press that all is now in the hands of Allah, and that history would judge the infidel ROS and its cohort in genocide, the United States, as the oppressors of liberty. He applauded the peace protestors in New York and Washington, and thanked the protestors in Prague for laying their lives on the line to protect the peace-loving Vilslakian peoples against a certain air campaign by the Americans. Forward deployed units of the 1st and 3rd OSC conduct final evening prayers with a call to Allah to grant them a life in the hereafter blessed as martyrs in their coming fight with the infidels and their dog friends.


Regional Operations


The ROV transitions to Regional Operations by attacking the ROS. During Regional Operations, the ROV will continue to use strategic operations to prevent the introduction of extraregional forces into the area. This will be done primarily through debates at the United Nations to justify its attack to the international community as a "just war" and to prevent the interdiction of extraregional forces, namely the United States and its NATO allies, into the region. The ROV will attempt to thwart the introduction of extraregional forces to preclude an overmatch in military strength that will have the capability to destroy the VNA.



12 AUG. VNA 1st OSC and 3rd OSC forces cross the ROS/ROV border and attack I (SO) and II (SO) Corps. Initial reports indicate an attack by up to three VNA divisions in the North towards Bayreuth, and up to three divisions in the South towards Deggendorf, with elements of the Vilslakia National Air Force (VNAF) providing close air support. A salient forms in the center, near Regensburg. 4th OSC moves into assembly areas vicinity PILZEN. VG and VSPF actions resume with localized observation and direct action targeted at Sowenian Police Division communications and logistics headquarters; and, against the Command Posts (CP's) and logistics headquarters of brigades of the deployed Sowenian divisions. ROS Air Force units are hindered responding to VNAF attacks by reports of contaminated fuel and a strike by Vilish-Sowenian Air Traffic Controllers. The ROS Air Traffic Control system is subsequently nationalized, but the resulting shortage of ATC personnel adversely impacts ROS flight operations. ROS requests immediate UN assistance, however the UN Security Council fails to produce a quorum. US intelligence agencies, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, begin closely monitoring the situation. EUCOM requests JCS alert a armored brigade from CONUS for potential deployment into the region, to secure an APOD/SPOD. EUCOM alerts USAREUR to prepare V Corps and selected units as ARFOR and as directed, prepare for deployment and combat operations. EUCOM directs USAFE to prepare as lead agency with USTRANSCOM for deployment support and combat operations within the CASV. At this time, there are no reported American citizens at risk, or any US forces deployed within the region. Regional and European press are reporting the attack, however, it is only receiving minor news coverage.



15 Aug. VNA 1st OSC in the North delayed by a determined defense by units of I (SO) Corps. 3rd OSC achieves limited success against in the South by II (SO) Corps. 4th OSC repositions into attack positions east of the ROS/ROV border, between Pilzen and Cham as a possible exploitation force. VG/VSPF forces continue to conduct localized direct action attacks against CP's and logistics nodes. The major threat is in the South with II (SO) Corps attempting to close the salient to prevent a possible 4th OSC attack through the Regensburg-B8 corridor to Nürnberg. The Sowenian Air Force (SAF) is finally able to launch, and provides localized close air support to I (SO) Corps in the North. The VNAF continues its ground support as well, but neither air forces are capable of other than localized air superiority. The UN Security Council obtains a quorum and conducts emergency meetings to discuss the destabilized situation in the region. EUCOM reviews current contingency plans for the region and revises the forces allocated and required for its execution. Regional and European press continue reporting the attack, however, CNN and other major US news networks are now beginning to report on the human side of war and its impact on the displaced citizens from the CASV. Coronan, Cortinian and other students groups supporting the ROV continue demonstrations in Prague, and are acting as human shields near ROV governmental buildings.




18 Aug. 1st OSC attacks in the North against I (SO) Corps begin to culminate West along a line BAYREUTH-WEIDEN due to extensive air attacks by the ROS Air Force against fuel and ammunition storage sites pushed forward into the ROS. The 3rd OSC also begins to culminate in the South, after confronting stiff resistance vicinity of STRAUBING from II (SO) Corps. 4th OSC prepares for commitment as exploitation force, with the 40th DTG to cross ROS/ROV border towards the salient created near REGENSBURG. The VNAF conducts limited air attacks against ROS airbases, attempting to control the battle for the sky by destroying runways, fuel and ammunition storage sites, and ATC facilities. The UN Security Council continues to deliberate and is unable to produce a congruent position, due to blocking efforts instigated by Cortina and Corona. EUCOM campaign planners present initial briefings to the Combatant Command staff focused on a four-part campaign:


I. Air Campaign

a. Rapidly gain air superiority in the CASV, followed by the ROV itself.

b. Search for, and as detected, destroy ROV ADA, C2 nodes and launch systems capable of firing WMD.

c. Destroy the strategic transportation and logistical infrastructure from Prague westward into the ROS.


II. Aerial Interdiction and Deployment of Land Forces

a. Provide air support of the Sowenian Armed Forces to augment SAF operations to stop the VNA attack into the ROS.

b. Deploy US forces from CONUS and the Central Region to an Intermediate Staging Base vicinity NÜRNBERG.

c Conduct RSOI and prepare for combat operations.


III. Joint Air/Land Campaign to expel the VNA from the ROS

a. Provide air and air defense protection of the ROS

b. As directed, conduct offensive air operations into the ROV.

c. As directed, conduct offensive operations to expel the VNA from the ROS

d. As directed, conduct offensive operations into the ROV.


IV. Transition of Authority Operations

a. Upon expulsion of the VNA from the ROS, conduct transition operations to the ROS armed forces

b. As directed, provide humanitarian and military assistance.

c. As directed, redeploy to home station.

After staffing, the EUCOM Commander approves the list above and prepares to present the proposed campaign plan to the JCS.


19 Aug. The VNA commits its exploitation force, the 4th Operational Strategic Command (OSC), crossing the ROV/ROS border vicinity CHAM-RODING along the B16 corridor. The 4th Operational Strategic Command (OSC) is the VNA operational center of gravity. The 4th OSC deploys along a route to the north of II (SO) Corps in an attempt to maneuver around their flank. They attempt to bypass Sowenian Armed Forces (SAF) to quickly move from REGENSBURG to NÜRNBERG IOT seize the airport and canal docks to prevent their use for extra-regional forces as an APOD or SPOD. In the South, the VNA 3rd OSC attacks as a fixing force IOT allow 4th OSC exploitation in to the north. VNAF forces focus on supporting the attack by the 4th OSC, while the SAF Air Force provides support to both I and II (SO) Corps. EUCOM planners travel to Washington to gain approval on their proposed campaign plan. International news coverage swiftly changes from a focus on peace demonstrators near Prague to atrocities committed by VNA forces in the eastern region of the CASV. Upon arrival in the CASV, the reporters are not permitted to observe operations freely, but are escorted to the throngs of cheering Vilish-Sowenian civilians demonstrating their solidarity with the VNA. The UN Security Council continues debates regarding ROS requests for assistance, but is unable to break a stalemate.



23 Aug. 4th OSC attacks in the Regensburg salient stalls due to air attacks from the SAF. 40th DTG establishes a hasty defense vicinity NEUTRAUBLING-REGENSTAUF. I and II (SO) Corps succeed in fixing the attacks by the 1st and 3rd OSC, due to air support from the SAF. VG/VSPF continues to conduct localized direct action against Sowenian Force headquarters and logistical points, and initiates direct action against SAF airfields. The UN Security Council continues to be deadlocked over actions to respond to the aggression by the ROV. EUCOM planners travel to Washington to prebrief the JCS staff on the EUCOM campaign plan. The international press begins to report on the human-interest viewpoint of the aggression on the Sowenian peoples, despite VNA attempts to showcase their "humanitarian" assistance to the Vilish-Sowenians.


28 Aug. The UN Security Council finally breaks a deadlock and initiates discussion to direct NATO to respond to the ROV aggression in the CASV. The United States takes the lead, after other allied governments are unable to fully support combat operations within the region. JCS directs Commander EUCOM brief his campaign plan, assuming the UN Security Council would soon act and direct a UN approved response. The situation in the CASV remains as reported with the 1st and 3rd OSC culminated in the North and South respectively, and the 4th OSC temporarily halted in the salient in the Center. The SAF reports its ground forces have been reduced to 70%, and its air force is at less than 50% strength.


29 Aug. The UN Security Council meets, and following impeccable evidence, approves a UN mandated response, authorizing NATO to conduct combat operations to expel the ROV from the CASV, and provides strict guidelines for implementation. JCS meets with the EUCOM Commander and approves the proposed EUCOM campaign plan as shown below. JCS disapproved certain items, which are marked by strikethrough.  JCS added certain items, which are highlighted in bold text.


I. Air Campaign

a. Rapidly gain air superiority in the CASV, followed by the ROV itself. No violation of ROV airspace authorized.

b. Search for, and as detected, destroy ROV ADA, C2 nodes and launch systems capable of firing WMD. No violation of ROV airspace authorized. US forces permitted to search and destroy any ROV systems only in the ROS.

c. Destroy the strategic transportation and logistical infrastructure from Prague westward into the ROS. No violation of ROV airspace authorized.


II. Aerial Interdiction and Deployment of Land Forces

a. Provide air support of the Sowenian Armed Forces to augment SAF operations to stop the VNA attack into the ROS. No violation of ROV airspace authorized.

b. Deploy US forces from CONUS and the Central Region to an Intermediate Staging Base vicinity NÜRNBERG.

c Conduct RSOI and prepare for combat operations.


III. Joint Air/Land Campaign to expel the VNA from the ROS

a. Provide air and air defense protection of the ROS

b. As directed, conduct offensive air operations into the ROV.

c. As directed, conduct offensive operations to expel the VNA from the ROS No violation of ROV airspace authorized.

d. As directed, conduct offensive operations into the ROV. No violation of ROV airspace authorized.


IV. Transition of Authority Operations

a. Upon expulsion of the VNA from the ROS, conduct transition operations to the ROS armed forces

b. As directed, provide humanitarian and military assistance.

c. As directed, redeploy to home station.


30 Aug. JCS approves the EUCOM proposed force package, and issues alert instructions to FORSCOM to rapidly deploy an armored brigade from CONUS to secure an Intermediate Staging Base, and a Patriot Battalion to provide theater air defense. JCS directs TRANSCOM to provide sufficient airlift to deploy forces from CONUS to the theater of operations, and deploy a squadron containing an Army Wartime Reserve Prepositioned Stock to support an armored brigade to the SPOD at NÜRNBERG. EUCOM directs USAREUR to alert and deploy a Corps-level task force as the ground component command and establish an APOD and SPOD, and once established, an Armored Division. EUCOM directs USAFE to rapidly deploy an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) to theater and as directed, provide defensive air support for the SAF as the air component command. On order, AEF provides offensive air support for the ground component command. The international press immediately converge on the Pentagon, and on Forts Bliss and Riley, seeking to interview soldiers and family members connected with possible deployment to the CASV. USAREUR, V Corps and 1AD press spokespersons are unavailable for comment due to ongoing exercises at major training areas in Germany. In Prague, Moldinov angrily recalls his UN Ambassador, and in an hour-long rant on CNN, he rages that the infidel Americans would return to their homes in coffins, as he would soon unleash the dogs of war! He also vows that any American airman that violated sacred ROV airspace would be hanged on the spot for a war crime against the Vilslakian people, the Muslim religion, and the world. US national intelligence assets note movement of large, long-range rocket launch vehicles from warehouses, to covered and concealed locations outside of Prague.


Transition Operations


The ROV is prepared to engage extraregional forces, mainly the U.S., through a series of "transition and adaptive operations." The ROV will not shift directly from regional to adaptive operations. Thus, a period of transition operations overlaps both regional and adaptive operations. The transition can begin concurrently with regional operations and there are two possible outcomes: the U.S. suffers sufficient losses or for other reasons must withdraw from the CASV and the VNA may begin to transition back to regional operations or the U.S. is not compelled to withdraw and continues to build up power in the region forcing the VNA transition toward adaptive operations. Transition operations serve as a means for the ROV to retain the initiative and still pursue its overall strategic goal, the annexation of the CASV, despite its diminishing advantage in the balance of power.


When U.S. Air and Ground Forces start to deploy into the region, the balance of power will begin to shift away from the ROV. Although the ROV may not yet be overmatched in the early phases of U.S. forces deployment, it will begin to face a developing threat that it will not be able to handle with normal, "conventional" patterns of operations designed for the regional conflict. Therefore, the ROV must begin to adapt its operations to the changing threat. It is likely the VNA will attack the airbases for U.S. Air Forces, and U.S. APODs and SPODs IOT disrupt U.S. flow into country or to inflict heavy losses on troops and or our combat systems.


5 Sep. CNN reporters report that a Patriot Battalion from Fort Bliss, and an armored brigade from Fort Riley would deploy to the CASV. Army officials refused to confirm or deny the report, but did admit that units from those two posts were conducting preparation for overseas movement. Officials indicated that a previously scheduled deployment exercise to Kuwait would be delayed for the time being. V Corps units were reported conducting intensive training at 7th ATC facilities in Bavaria. 3rd COSCOM deployed logistical liaison personnel to the Port of NÜRNBERG. USAFE deployed initial elements of an Air Expeditionary Force to airfields in western Sowenia and in coordination with TRANSCOM, have deployed an airfield operating element to NÜRNBERG Flughafen (airport) to establish an APOD. The ground tactical situation in the CASV remains unchanged, with 1st and 3rd OSC fixed by the I and II (SO) Corps in the North and South respectfully. The SAF air forces continue to attack the 4th OSC in the salient in the Center, which poses the greatest threat to the ROS. In Prague, Moldinov and his Minister of Defense meet and agree to unleash a rain of terror on Americans violating the CASV.



10 Sep. Upon establishment of the APOD at NÜRNBERG, elements of the 69th ADA Brigade and 3rd BCT, 1st AD begin aerial deployment of troops and critical equipment from Biggs Army Airfield and Topeka, Kansas. The MSC afloat squadron containing an armored brigade set of equipment is expected to dock at the Port of NÜRNBERG SPOD within 48 hours. V Corps begins rail deployment of the 1st AD from Parsberg, Germany, and aerial deployment of the Corps Strike CP from Ramstein, Germany. The Air Expeditionary Force operating out of the Sowenian Airbase at KATTERBACH initiates operations to gain air superiority and initiates an air campaign to destroy the 4th OSC salient vicinity REGENSBURG. The ROV responds by launching all available aircraft to strip away the SAF aircraft.


20 Sep. The air campaign against VNA forces continues, and blunts any further movement West by 4th OSC, while fixing forces of the 1st and 3rd OSC. V Corps Strike CP is operational vicinity HERZOGENERAUTH. Both the APOD and SPOD are operational, with 3BCT 1AD securing both sites and providing V Corps a Task Force-sized reserve, and 3-2 ADA (Patriot) providing theater coverage. V Corps continues to deploy forces by rail and air from Germany.



10 Oct - 18 Oct. The Joint Air Campaign continues to delay VNA forces attacking into the CASV. V Corps forces begin closing in assembly areas near NÜRNBERG, and begin preparations for combat operations as directed. V Corps intent is to:


            a. Secure the APOD/SPOD with a Brigade (-), 3BCT, and provide ADA coverage with a Patriot Battalion.

            b. Receive, assemble and prepare 1BCT/1AD and 2BCT/AD for combat operations to expel the VNA from the CASV.


18 Oct. At the personal request of the ROV Minister of Defense, two SCUDs were launched with 1000KG HE warheads aimed at the KATTERBACH Airbase. The theater air defense command detected the launch and engaged with Patriot missiles. Neither SCUD hit the intended target, but the resulting shock and terror caused by the increase in ROV aggression was reported by the international press and by V Corps troops deployed in assembly areas.


20 Oct. Advance parties for 1BCT and 2BCT arrive at the Nürnberg Flughafen. A combination of U.S. Air Force MAC and contracted commercial aircraft bring in deploying troops and CP equipment such as computers, tents, and M113. The barges carrying tanks, IFVs, and heavier equipment arrive late in the evening at the Nürnberg SPOD south of the city. A VSPF team attempts to disrupt the SPOD unloading by conducting an attack on the giant cranes at the dock. The attack fails when the 3BCT TCF kills three VSPF soldiers and the rest of the team is captured. The crane operator is wounded and unloading is delayed for several hours before a replacement operator arrives.   The combined SAF/Air Expeditionary Force air campaign progresses in holding the 1st, 3rd and 4th OSC attacks.  I and II (SO) Corps continue to delay in sector and are approaching 65% - 70% combat strength.  1st and 3rd OSC have been reduced in combat effectiveness by the SAF air attacks, and have limited their advances and are conducting hasty defenses in sector.  4th OSC units have taken the brunt of USAF attacks and are also conducting survivability moves and only moving at night or during adverse weather.



25 Oct. 1AD finishes deployment into country and closes into divisional TAA north and south of Nürnberg. 1AD staff planning is ongoing. The order will be briefed to Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) and separates at the division main CP on/about 27 Oct. The division will conduct combined arms rehearsals for a night attack to destroy VNA forces vicinity of Hohenburg and Parsberg with 1BCT as the decisive effort and 2BCT as the shaping effort, followed by an attack rehearsal to destroy remaining VNA forces in AO HAWK. 1AD G2 briefs that the VNA has established an extensive disruption zone with forces from the 40th DTG across 1AD's front. In addition the disruption zone has VG and VSPF forces whose mission is to report 1AD unit locations and to disrupt through direct action and terror attacks the division rear IOT to reduce our forces before they enter battle. In addition, these forces will act as forward observes for SCUD launches against our APOD, SPOD, and major troop concentrations IOT sway American opinion against the coming ground offensive before it is even started.


1 Nov. Two additional SCUDs (1000kg HE Warhead) were launched and engaged by PATRIOT missiles, the debris landed near the APOD, damaging the end of the runway and disrupting APOD operations for over seven hours.  1AD planning is completed for the initial division night attack.  MSC and separate Commanders are called to the Main CP for a combined arms rehearsal, focused on an initial night attack, followed by offensive operations to expel the VNA. The combined air campaign continues to delay VNA forces, however it is anticipated that the allied air forces will need a maintenance period over the next several weeks, that could offer the VNA a window of opportunity to transition to attack to expel V Corps forces before Corps-units are fully deployed in theater. Should the VNA attack while in transition operations to regain the initiative to expel US forces, 1AD will be vulnerable and may have to deploy AO HAWK before the Corps and division are fully set for combat operations. CDR, V Corps intends on flexing Corps-deep attacks during the period of reduced fixed wing attacks to continue to blunt the 4th OSC in the salient.


10 Nov.  1AD conducts mission rehearsals at the 1AD Main CP.  V Corps continues to conduct deep operations with 11th Attack Regiment, supported by Corps Artillery, against 4th OSC forces.  On average, two SCUDs are fired into the V Corps rear on a daily basis.


Adaptive Operations


Once the U.S. begins combat operations with sufficient combat power that overmatches the VNA, the full conventional design used in regionally focused operations is no longer sufficient to deal with our threat. The VNA has developed its doctrine, organization, capabilities, and strategy with an eye toward dealing with both regional and extraregional opponents such as the U.S. Army. It has already planned how it will adapt to this new and changing threat and has included this adaptability in its doctrine.


The VNA still has the same forces and technology that were available to it for regional operations, but must use them in creative and adaptive ways. It has already thought through how it will adapt to this new or changing threat in general terms. It has already developed appropriate branches and sequels to SCP2 and does not have to rely on improvisation. During the course of combat, it will make further adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.


Even with the intervention of an advanced extraregional power such as the U.S., the VNA will not cede the initiative. It will employ military means so long as this does not either place the regime at risk or risk depriving it of sufficient force to remain a regional power after the U.S. intervention is over. The primary objectives are to preserve combat power, to degrade our will and capability to fight, and to gain time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed


The types of adaptive actions that characterize "adaptive operations" at the strategic level can also serve the VNA well in regional or transition operations¾at least at the tactical and operational levels. However, once the U.S. becomes fully involved in the conflict, the VNA will conduct adaptive actions more frequently and on a larger scale.


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One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger - by Matthew Yglesias