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Military

Urban Operations: An Historical Casebook

The Battle of Stalingrad

            S.J. Lewis

        

Looking at the big picture I've thought of one thing, Zeitzler; under no circumstances must we give it (Stalingrad) up we should never get it back again.  We know what that means.  I can't lay on any surprise operations.  Unfortunately it's too late now.  It would all have gone quicker if we hadn't hung about Voronezh. Then we'd have got through in the first rush, but it's ridiculous to imagine that we can do it a second time after having withdrawn and abandoned our equipment.

                                                            Adolf Hitler[1]

            

Originally it was Tzaritzin, but became Stalingrad in 1925.  In 1961, the city was renamed Volgograd.  Each spring, when the earth thaws, artifacts, skeletons, and unexploded ordnance are revealed by the change of season.  The artifacts can be sold in the West for hard currency, so children scour the Stalingrad battlefields for treasure.  About six children a year are killed and wounded by the old shells, numbers to be added to the one to two million killed there in late 1942 and early 1943.

The Russian state established Tsaritsyn in 1589.  About 934 kilometers southeast of Moscow, it rests on the west bank of a bend of the Volga River. A fortress on Russia's southern flank, Tsaritsyn grew as a trading center, although it was repeatedly threatened by the Cossacks.  In 1774, Yemelyan Pugachev's rebels briefly captured the city.  It grew in importance in the 19th century as more goods were shipped down the Volga.  From Tsaritsyn, materials were shipped overland to the Don River.  By 1897, the city had a population of 55,914, a harbor, several schools, and eight banks.  In 1917, Bolshevik forces captured the city, bringing into question its future as a financial center.  In the Russian Civil War, the Red Army defeated the White Army outside the city.  In 1925 after Stalin's assumption of power, the city was renamed Stalingrad.  The population at the start of World War II was 600,000, although by July 1941, refugees had swollen that sum to about 900,000.[2]

 There is no escaping that in World War II Stalingrad was a decisive campaign from which the Axis never recovered.  It was in fact one of three "hammer blows" delivered against the Axis in November 1942.  The first two were in North Africa: the British victory at El Alamein and the Anglo-American invasion of Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.  The third blow was the Soviet Operation Uranus, which would lead to the destruction of the German 6th Army.  Stalingrad also represents one of the high points in the art of campaigning, clearly a decisive battle of annihilation with profound strategic implications.  Consequently, the campaign has been analyzed extensively at the operational level.  In spite of the importance of Stalingrad at the strategic and operational levels, however, it is at the tactical level that Stalingrad serves as a lens magnifying not only patterns of past warfare, but also a possible glimpse into how warfare will be fought in the future.  These profound changes are a continuation of long-term trends stemming from the French Revolution and the subsequent industrialization of western society and warfare.  Conventional warfare in Stalingrad required ever-greater numbers of troops, which in turn produced very high casualties.  The increased number of troops required more ammunition, particularly for certain weapons systems.  The logistical systems consequently had more supplies to deliver.  There were also more casualties to be evacuated.  Air forces were especially important, not only in supporting tactical actions, but also in interdicting lines of communication.  But perhaps the most significant development, at least at Stalingrad, was the tendency for urban operations to increasingly impinge on the operational and strategic levels of warfare.[3]

    Carl von Clausewitz created the construct of "absolute war" as an intellectual tool against which he could measure gradations of violence.  Perhaps the closest war ever came to "absolute," however, was the Battle of Stalingrad.  Fighting in Stalingrad demonstrated the increasing lethality of the battlefield, primarily through improved technology.  It also led to a diminution of command and control, with leadership devolving further and further down the hierarchy. And concomitantly, smaller tactical units needed specialized weapons and equipment, which made them far more significant than their numbers would suggest.

Little of this was known when the Russian 1941/42 winter offensive stalled in the March thaw, signifying the failure of the Barbarossa offensive that had begun the previous June.  In January, Hitler had relieved the commander in chief of the German Army and assumed those duties himself.  He had never abandoned the idea of an offensive into southern Russia to seize the oil fields of the Caucasus Mountains.  Hitler consequently issued Directive Number 41 on 5 April 1942.  Code named Operation Blue, it directed that the remaining Soviet military units west of the Don River be eliminated and Russia's vital economic areas be seized.  It was an overly complex operation consisting of several phases, based upon wishful thinking, inadequate intelligence, and a presumably passive enemy. Both the Russian and German armies, however, were recovering from the previous year's fighting.[4]

The Germans did not have enough replacements to fill the depleted ranks, so only the divisions in southern Russia were built back up to their tables of organization and equipment (TO & E).  One should note, however, that after several weeks of combat, TO & Es had very little to do with combat on the Eastern Front.  The Fuehrer believed that the previous year's losses could be made up by his allies, some fifty divisions from Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Croatia.  On the map, they looked impressive, but their troops lacked motivation, skill, and equipment.  Their infantry divisions did not possess even one weapon that could knock out a heavy Russian  tank.[5]

Since 22 June 1941, the Red Army had also suffered enormous losses, and it had yet to overcome Stalin's massive purge of the officer corps from the late 1930's.  During 1942, the Red Army began to change from being an infantry force into one using increasingly larger mechanized formations.[6]

            Before Operation Blue started, the Red Army on 12 May launched a major offensive near Kharkov.  Army Group South, commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, countered with a double envelopment that trapped some 240,000 Soviet troops in the Izyum Pocket.  Through the summer of 1942, Army Group South conducted the pre-selected phases of the operation, even though the Soviets on 19 June captured documents compromising the plans.  Hitler became more and more confident as the German armies advanced across the broad steppes.  Von Bock began to worry, however, noticing that Russian units were withdrawing. The German Army was largely dependent upon railroads for supply.  It could operate comfortably up to the Dnepr River. Any advance further into southern Russia, however, had to be improvised and would be subject to interruptions.   The farther they advanced into southern Russia, the more problematical their supply would become.  In early July, the Germans reorganized, with Wilhelm List's Army Group A fielding the 1st Panzer, 11th and 17th Armies. Hitler replaced von Bock with Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs and redesignated Army Group South as Army Group B.  It consisted of the 2nd Hungarian, 4th Panzer, 2nd, and 6th Armies.  Hitler's interference in army operations also increased.  He issued Directive #45 on 23 July, which sent Army Group A south to the Caucasus region, which left the 6th Army unsupported to advance on to Stalingrad (see Map 1).  It also allowed the Soviets to withdraw most of their troops from the Don Bend.[7] 

            With his early tactical success in the south, Hitler concluded that he was triumphant.  He dispatched the 11th Army, the only reserve in southern Russia, north to Leningrad.  As the remaining German forces in the area began to fan out, enormous logistical problems ensued.  The steppes did not have the infrastructure to support a western European type army; conspicuously absent were reliable double tracked railroads and bridges leading to Stalingrad from the west.  All the German motorized forces periodically ran out of fuel.  The chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, whose divisions were to fan out into the Caucasus, described the logistical situation as catastrophic.[8]

            Stalingrad had not originally been a major factor in German planning and the 4th Panzer Army could have reached it much earlier.  But Hitler became increasingly fascinated with the city with his issuance of Directive No. 45, a decision that still mystifies historians.  It would now constitute the foundation for his conquest of the Caucasus.  The German 6th Army under Friedrich Paulus was to seize Stalingrad from the west.  Hitler changed his mind and directed the 4th Panzer Army to assist Paulus by advancing on Stalingrad from the south.  It moved forward against tough resistance, only reaching the suburbs south of the city on 10 September 1942.  The previous fighting had already reduced its infantry divisions' strength by 40-50%.[9]

            General Paulus issued his order for the attack on 19 August. The 6th Army headquarters expected both difficult fighting in the city and also Soviet counterattacks with armor from north of the city.  The XIV Panzer Corps would conduct the main thrust towards the northern suburbs of Stalingrad.  The LI Corps would cover the Panzers' right flank, while the VIII Corps covered the left or northern flank.  Even farther north, the 6th Army's XXIV Panzer Corps maintained a bridgehead over the Don River near Kalatch.  The main effort north of Stalingrad planned to cut the city's main LOC north along the Volga, although German planners knew this would not cut off all supplies.  In the tradition of the German General Staff, the plan had no contingent scenarios - it provided no details on fighting in the city.  The previous year, Hitler had prohibited the German Army from fighting in Leningrad and Moscow and German doctrinal literature tended to downplay the subject.  Thus the German Army had little if any training or experience for city fighting.[10]

On 21 August, the 6th Army seized a bridgehead over the Don River at Wertjatschij and two days later the XIV Panzer Corps began its 96.5 km dash eastwards.  Breaking through scattered opposition, the 16th Panzer Division broke into Rynok the evening of Sunday, 23 August, looking down on the broad Volga north of Stalingrad.  They seized Rynok from Red Army antiaircraft units, all female units that had been deploying north and east of Stalingrad during August.  Throughout the remaining hours of the day, troops of the 16th Panzer Division observed the start of the Luftwaffe's bombing of Stalingrad.

Luftflotte IV, tasked with supporting the advance into southern Russia, fielded half the air assets on the Eastern Front.  It, too, was drawn to Stalingrad; its VIII Air Corps supported the army with an average of 1,000 sorties a day.  Throughout the 23rd Colonel General Wolfram Freiherr Dr. von Richthofen's Luftflotte IV pounded the city, burning down the wooden houses in the southwest corner.  The large petroleum facility burned for days.  The walls of the white four and five story apartment buildings remained standing, but the bombs burned the interiors, collapsing the floors. The waterworks and communications center were also knocked out.  The many Soviet antiaircraft units only managed to bring down three aircraft, a consequence of insufficient training and very limited ammunition. The aerial bombardment during the week killed an estimated 40,000 Russians.  Although the Luftwaffe created considerable destruction, Anthony Beevor observed:  "Richthofen's massive bombing raids had not only failed to destroy the enemy's will, their very force of destruction had turned the city into a perfect killing ground for the Russians to use against them."[11]

Von Richtofen's forces were able to maintain air superiority until late October, by which time they had been considerably weakened by combat and mechanical failures.  Simultaneously, the Russian Air Force began to receive considerably more and better aircraft, while their anti-aircraft forces continued to improve. Most authors, including the official historians, maintain that both air forces limited themselves largely to ground support of the army, reconnaissance and very short-range bombing. As we shall see, however, there is reason to suspect that air operations by both sides were more important and extensive than suggested by the popular or official histories.  No less an observer than General Vasili I. Chuikov, before fighting even began in Stalingrad, noted how the Luftwaffe ranged across the steppes, striking communications centers and troop concentrations.  As historian R.J. Spiller observed, however, we will probably never know the specific sortie patterns of Luftflotte IV and the Red Air Force.[12]

The XIV Panzer Corps remained in its exposed position for several weeks, since the 6th Army's infantry divisions were strung out for some 322 km behind it.  While the German infantry divisions marched forward, the Red Army repeatedly counterattacked the XIV Panzer Corps.  The German infantry divisions reached the heights above Stalingrad on 10 September 1942.  From there, they observed the 56 km long complex of houses, apartment dwellings and factories pinned against the 1000-meter- wide Volga by the unending brown steppes. At many points, the city was only 2 km wide. Also visible were several of the Volga's islands and tributaries. 

An observer with an eye for tactics would have noticed how the steppes are cut up by innumerable steep-sloped gullies, which in Russian are called balka.  The Tsaritsa Gully was the major balka, which separated the southern third of Stalingrad from the northern two-thirds of the city (see Map 2).  At the mouth of the balka was the old  town center, where the Tsar's officials and businessmen had maintained their two story houses. South of the Tsaritsa was a residential sector.  Its train station was near the grain silos, across from the large island in the Volga. North of the Tsaritsa was the city center, which had its own train station, several plazas, the post office and waterworks. This area housed the local Communist Party headquarters.  To the north was the large petroleum complex along the Volga.  West of the oil complex was Stalingrad's dominant feature, the Mamayev Kurgan (on German maps Height 102), on the northern edge of the residential sector, which overlooks the Volga River.  To the west of Mamayev Kurgan was the airport.  The northern sector was the industrial region.  Running south to north were the Lasur Chemical Factory (which from the air resembled half a tennis racket), the Red October Metallurgical Factory, Bread Factory No. 2, the Red Barricade Armaments Factory, and, at the extreme north, the Tractor Factory.

In spite of the pulverization of the city and the continued combat operations, there were still 300,000 to 350,000 civilians in Stalingrad.  Most of them lived in holes, cellars, and home-made bunkers.  Since even the German Army was incapable of its own logistical support, many of them faced eventual starvation.  Most of those remaining were women, children, and old men.  German authorities knew the civilians required evacuation, but were unable to carry out the movement.  By mid-October some 25,000 had fled the rubble, walking towards Kalatch.  Some of the outskirts of the city still stood, mostly grimy workers' houses.  Other than several major streets, most of the roads were unpaved.  Streets running east and west could be hit by Russian artillery units that deployed en masse east of the river. Streets running north and south were under Russian small-arms fire.[13]

Besides the enormous military problem of taking Stalingrad, General Paulus also had to safeguard his northern flank along the Don River.  He never solved this task because the Soviets held a number of bridgeheads, from which they launched numerous offensives.  Three Soviet armies launched the first offensive on 24 August.  Although they suffered great casualties, they succeeded in slowing down the arrival of German divisions in Stalingrad.[14]

Three weeks into the German summer offensive, Josef Stalin remained convinced that the main attack would be against Moscow. He responded clumsily in fits and starts, first splitting Stalingrad between two Front headquarters.  In mid-July, however, he corrected this error and created the Stalingrad Front under General A. I. Yeremenko, consisting of the 28th, 51st, 57th, 62, and 64th Armies. The Russians also deployed the North Caucasus, South, Southwest, and Bryansk Fronts in southern Russia.  Most men of military age in Stalingrad had already been drafted, but local Communist Party (CP) officials mobilized some 200,000 men and women to serve in "Workers Columns" and unneeded workers were placed in militia battalions.  Stalin  ordered that Stalingrad would not be given up and dispatched the dreaded secret police (NKVD) to enforce discipline.  The latter soon controlled all the boats on the Volga and allowed no one out of the city.  Luftwaffe General von Richthofen noted on 2 August that Stalingrad seemed to act like a magnet, drawing Russian forces from all directions.

 The last major headquarters left in Stalingrad was Chuikov's 62nd Army.  While the German 6th Army methodically attacked Stalingrad, Chuikov ferried over the Volga the equivalent of nine rifle divisions and two tank brigades.  As the struggle wore on and he gained greater strength, he increasingly resorted to aggressive counterattacks, with anywhere from 200 to 800 men.  Sometimes these attacks were supported by tanks.  This hyperactive form of defense forced the Germans to repeatedly shift from offense to defense and made the battle of attrition ever more costly.[15]

            Stalin's advisors tried but could not stop him from launching several major counteroffensives from bridgeheads north of Stalingrad.  Three reserve armies filled with untrained conscripts began an attack on 5 September, but were checked with substantial losses. The Soviet Union had already suffered millions of losses, including most of its prewar military.  The Germans also occupied most of its industrial and manpower centers.[16]  In spite of this, the Soviets still possessed numerical superiority in men and weapons systems.  A German intelligence report of 20 September 1942 estimated the Soviets had 4.2 million soldiers, 3 million of those deployed at the front.  Factories continued to produce enormous numbers of tanks and airplanes and, just as importantly, a new military elite had begun to emerge from the earlier disasters of the war: hard men who understood the German's weaknesses and were not afraid of the Germans or of taking casualties.  Related to this development was the reemergence of the Soviet General Staff, which had arduously compiled lessons learned, from which their recipe for victory evolved.  One action symptomatic of the emergence of the new Soviet military elite occurred on 9 October 1942, when the Red Army gave commanders relative autonomy, reducing the old co-responsibility of the political commissar.  In late 1942, however, the Soviet military was still recovering from its serious wounds.[17]

            As the 6th Army deployed and attacked Stalingrad in September, a crisis occurred in the German High Command.  Hitler had become increasingly nervous over what he perceived to be the slow advance into the Caucasus.  Consequently, on 10 September, he fired Field Marshal Wilhelm List and personally assumed command of Army Group A.  The mood was tense at Hitler's headquarters at Vinitsa in the Ukraine, aggravated by the hot, humid weather.  Hitler had never liked the Chief of the General Staff, so General Franz Halder's relief was perhaps unavoidable under the circumstances.  Halder managed to last until 24 September, when Hitler replaced him with a relatively junior officer, General Kurt Zeitzler. When the latter arrived to assume his new job, he lectured the General Staff that the only problem Germany faced was the General Staff's lack of faith in the Fuehrer. So, while the fighting for Stalingrad raged, Hitler consolidated his power at the expense of the military professional class.[18]

Soon after the arrival of his infantry divisions on 10 September, Paulus launched a concerted attack on the city.  It progressed rapidly through the suburbs, but slowed in the inner city.  The Germans seized Mamayev-Kurgan on 13 September, but it changed hands repeatedly through the following months.  For both sides casualties climbed precipitously.  The Soviets threw in the 13th Guard Division, which sacrificed many of its 10,000 men in grinding down the German advance.  This was the first of four German attacks in Stalingrad.  It faltered on the 19th and 20th, as a result of massive casualties and dwindling ammunition.  This pattern reoccurred in the three subsequent attacks.  The first, from 22 September to 6 October, reached the Volga at the mouth of the Tsaritsa.  Then the attack from 14 October to early November from the north reduced the Soviet hold in Stalingrad to two small bridgeheads. The final futile assault from 11 to 17 November was against the two small bridgeheads.[19]

            On 23 September, a German General Staff officer visited the 295th and 71st Infantry Divisions in the center of the town.  He noted that the Soviet troops remained as physically close to the Germans as possible to reduce the effectiveness of the latter's firepower.  The Soviet troops were ever alert and whenever they thought they spotted a German weakness, they immediately counterattacked.  They were particularly tough now that there was little room left to retreat.  The German officer observed that after the heavy artillery bombardment, troops quickly emerged from their cellar-holes ready to fire.  In spite of German countermeasures, the Soviets continued to move supplies across the Volga at night.

            The two German divisions he visited were old battle tested formations that had been considerably weakened by infantry casualties.  He observed that their combat power was dropping daily and the average strength of an infantry company was ten to fifteen men.  Losses were particularly high for the officers and NCOs.  Although replacements had arrived, they were insufficient in number and considerably lacking in experience, training, and soldierly bearing.  When an officer fell, the men drifted back to their starting point.  To get them moving forward again, a higher-ranking officer had to intervene and lead them.  The soldiers were particularly dependent on the divisional Sturmgeschutze, heavily armored tracked vehicles whose 7.5cm gun was designed to take out point targets for the infantry.  The small bands of infantry did not want to attack without a Sturmgeschutz, and viewed it as a failure in leadership if one was not provided to them.  This German officer concluded that attacking through the ruins had exhausted the infantry, and that they were too tired and dulled.  With so few troops, there was no rest because every soldier had to be deployed.  There were no reserves. 

            It was especially hard to get necessary supplies forward to the combat infantry.  Their diet suffered considerably.  The surviving infantry expressed bitterness toward the perceived luxury of the Luftwaffe.  They had also become resentful towards the special food bonuses that the armored units received.  The officers maintained that it was pointless to offer the infantry propaganda, since none of the promises could be kept.  Out in the steppes of southern Russia, all supplies had to be brought from Germany.  Besides food, the infantry's major requirement was 8cm mortar shells, one of the few ways to get to the enemy's holes in cellars and gully cliffs.[20]

            Senior officers noted that they had managed to get into a battle of attrition with the Russians and although their casualties were very high, those inflicted on the Russians were much greater. As soon as the city was captured, however, the divisions would have to be rested and reorganized.  They also stated that it was critical to secure sufficient fodder and straw for the horses.[21]

            In the last week of September, Paulus launched his second attack into Stalingrad.  He exchanged divisions with his northern flank and used the new units to renew the offensive.  It pushed the Soviets back in the northern sector of Stalingrad, but casualties and ammunition expenditures were so high that Paulus called off the offensive.  The German 6th Army did not begin its third offensive until 14 October.  Paulus sent four divisions supported by armor to assist in taking the northern factory complexes.  This created a crisis for the defenders, when on the second day the Germans captured the tractor factory and reached the Volga.  In spite of the heavy rain, snow, and the consequential mud, the attack made remarkable progress, capturing the ruins of several blocks of houses, the Red October Factory, and some other burned out hulks. But at the end of the month, the attacks fizzled out from the high casualties and insufficient ammunition.  Chuikov's garrison had been reduced to two small pockets, and the block ice in the Volga had created a logistical nightmare, but the Germans were spent.  Paulus launched the fourth and final attack on 11 November, based upon the arrival of five engineer battalions.  The attack advanced very slowly against tough resistance.  It, too, expired after several days, and on the 19th, the Soviets launched their counteroffensive that would surround and destroy the German 6th Army.[22]

            As autumn wore on, Fremde Heere Ost's prediction began to become a reality as more and more Soviet units appeared in Southern Russia.  The Germans used all source intelligence, but much of their success at the operational and tactical levels resulted from their ability to intercept Soviet radio traffic.  They could pick up newly deployed units; however, the Germans did not know the scope of the deployment or where or when the Soviets would attack.  Hitler thought the attack would be against Rostov.  Fremde Heere Ost still believed the major attack would be against Army Group Center, even though more and more units appeared in the south.  Finally, they detected a new Soviet Southwest Front Headquarters and on 12 November concluded that an attack in the near future against Rumanian Third Army could cut the railroad to Stalingrad.  If that happened, it would threaten the German forces farther east, forcing their withdrawal from Stalingrad.[23]

            To summarize developments, Hitler had sent the strongest force available towards an objective that would not necessarily win the war.  That force could not be logistically supported and advanced into an ever-expanding space against an opponent that was gaining, not losing strength.  He had sent his most powerful army into Stalingrad where it basically destroyed its combat power in costly attacks that played into the enemy's hands.  And finally, even though intelligence indicated the probability of a major Soviet counter offensive, the German military leadership resorted to merely cosmetic measures.[24]

            Stalin had dispatched two of Stavka's most capable representatives, Generals A. M. Vasilevskiy and G.K. Zhukov, to oversee operations in Southern Russia.  On 4 October, they conducted a conference that began the planning process for what would be Operation Uranus, the counteroffensive against the German 6th Army.  Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin activated the Southwest Front HQ.  It fielded five armies along the Don northwest of Kletskaya.  The Don Front kept three armies in the central sector.  The Stalingrad Front deployed some five armies in the southern sector.  Some one million men and 900 tanks were to conduct a classic double envelopment of the German 6th Army by breaking through the hapless 3rd and 4th Rumanian Armies.[25]

             Luftflotte IV had been weakened considerably by the intensive months of combat.  By October, the Russian Air Force wrested air superiority from the Germans, as both more and newer equipment arrived.  In addition, as the Germans captured more and more of Stalingrad, the Red Air Force could more easily bomb the city.  Stavka also dispatched General A. A. Novikov to help coordinate air operations for Uranus (see Map 3).  He became such a valued team member that when he stated that the air forces were not yet prepared, Zhukov delayed the opening of the offensive.[26]

Timing was critical for the counteroffensive.  Zhukov and Vasilevskiy waited for the German 6th Army to expend its combat power in Stalingrad.  They also waited for the Anglo-Saxon offensives to succeed in North Africa.  By waiting until 19 November, they allowed the ground to freeze, giving their armor greater mobility.  The Soviet's artillery preparation was short but powerful, lasting only 90 minutes, after which the offensive jumped off at 0850.  The Rumanian defense broke rather easily, allowing Soviet armor to begin the exploitation about 1400.  Both Rumanian armies collapsed and there were no Axis reserves to stem the tide.  The Soviet forces continued their advance nearly unopposed and on 22 November met at Kalach, encircling Paulus's 6th Army.  Some Soviet forces wheeled in against Stalingrad, while others expanded the advance westward to limit any Axis relief efforts.[27]

            As has been oft recounted, the German military was unable to orchestrate a breakthrough and the Luftwaffe was never capable of even approaching Goering's promise to sustain the garrison.  At Hitler's headquarters General Warlimont observed, "On 18 December the Italian Eighth Army collapsed, a decisive factor in the fate of Stalingrad; less than a month later, on 15 January, the Hungarian Second Army disintegrated and on the same day the German ring around Leningrad was broken___."[28]  Paulus and his army were doomed.

            The remnants of the 6th Army deployed into positions resembling an egg 40 kilometers wide and 50 kilometers long, surrounded by the Don Front's seven armies.  Despite the Axis and Soviet propaganda, the position could hardly be viewed as a fortress, since few if any fortifications were in the open steppes west of Stalingrad.  Only a small portion of the German defense was in the remains of Stalingrad.  In spite of the profound weakness of the 6th Army units, the Soviets achieved little success when, in early December, the Don Front attacked the weakest sector of the line in the west and south.  As Earl Ziemke and Magda Bauer observed, this probably occurred because the Soviet units had also been weakened by nearly six months of unbroken combat.  German signals intelligence also contributed, continuing to intercept Soviet radio messages and alerting threatened sectors in time to stave off disasters.  The 6th Army could ill-afford such pyrrhic victories because its limited strength was wasting away.

            The final Soviet offensive began on 10 January, after a particularly heavy artillery barrage, which cut most of the German communication wires and cables.  The ground attack opened large holes in the German line that could not be closed.  Although they had an auxiliary airbase at Gumrak, the only serviceable one was Pitomnik, through which casualties, specialists, and vital items departed the trap in exchange for a woefully inadequate flow of food, medicine, petrol, and ammunition.  Soviet units overran Pitomnik on 12 January, ending resupply in the pocket, after which the defenders' position was hopeless.  Paulus noted that artillery ammunition would run out on 13 January.  Hitler still prohibited a surrender, however, so the slaughter continued.  Final resistance ended on 2 February 1943.  The 6th Army ceased to exist.[29]

            The new Chief of the German Army Personnel Office, General Rudolf Schmundt, was not particularly affected by Stalingrad.  Before the offensive began, the German Army had already suffered losses it could not replace.  By 3 October 1942, about 30% of the army's regular (prewar) officers had left the service, been killed or received a debilitating wound.  On 26 November, however, Schmundt expressed concern over agitation within the Rumanian government in light of the Rumanian Army's recent collapse.  Most of Schmundt's time was taken up with reforming the officer corps into a younger, more National Socialist body.  Being one of the Fuehrer's most ardent supporters, he was ideally suited for this task.  Finally, several days before Paulus's surrender, Hitler directed Schmundt to assist in creating a new 6th Army and 20 divisions.  Word also arrived that one of Germany's most decorated heroes, General of Infantry Karl Eibl, had been killed while leading his XXIV Panzer Corps in Southern Russia.  A subsequent investigation revealed that someone in an Italian infantry column had thrown a hand grenade at him.  Schmundt had been correct-Germany's allies had become somewhat agitated.[30]

            Evaluating Stalingrad proved difficult both for participants and for historians.  The experience was simply too big. Many participants had not seen a large city destroyed, so the intensity and duration of violence was overwhelming.  Soviet and National Socialist propagandists assisted in making a large confusing phenomenon even more difficult to understand.  One should not be surprised, therefore, when subsequent accounts tend to focus on exaggeration and the uniqueness of the fighting.  Stalingrad has had a remarkable ability to distort perceptions for a long time.  It is perhaps too easy to become fixated on the more exotic ways to kill another human being, i.e. with knives, blunt objects, and telescopic rifles.  Outside of a few new weapons systems, the nature of the fighting and destruction remained  identical to that of Flanders and the Somme in World War I.  Veterans of those battles, however, were rare at Stalingrad.[31]

At Stalingrad, military operations absorbed more and more troop units.  This probably resulted from the infinitely greater compartmentalization that limited not only vision, but also the range of direct fire weapons.  As a result, more combatants were required to fill or watch those compartments.  For the more important compartments, heavy or specialized weapons were required.  Combat in urban areas also magnified the dimension of vertical warfare. The massive destruction of Stalingrad limited vertical combat considerably, although any remaining "high ground" remained critical for observation.  Some soldiers described the conflict as "the war of rats," because so much of it was for control of holes and cellars.  It was no accident that the German Army sent specially trained engineer battalions to Stalingrad.  Their job was to blow up buildings with explosives. Those rapidly advancing attacks limited the amount of vertical warfare.  Paulus used this method to create "channels" through the city.  But this required even more combatants to guard the long flanks of the channel and to reduce pockets of resistance that had survived the demolitions.  All those additional troops required ever more ammunition.

            The Soviets and the Germans expended an extraordinary amount of ammunition.  Between 10 January and 2 February 1943, the Don Front fired some 24 million rifle and machine gun rounds, 911,000 artillery shells (up to 152mm) and 990,000 mortar shells.[32]  The 6th Army in September 1942 expended 23,035,863 rifle and machine gun rounds, 575,828 anti tank shells, 116,932 infantry cannon shells and 752,747 mortar shells.  It deployed 14,932 mines and its soldiers expended 178,066 hand grenades.[33]  Partisans writing for one side or the other use such figures to assert that the enemy were cowardly or incompetent for such profligate expenditures.[34] Despite the strain upon these mass armies and the lack of training in many units, such high monthly ammunition expenditures for both sides would suggest that other factors were involved.

            Those larger numbers of troops fighting in urban terrain and firing greater amounts of munitions produced very high casualties. There remains a lack of clarity regarding Soviet losses, but General Chuikov observed that the divisions had already been considerably weakened before they reached Stalingrad.  He noted that by 14 September one armored brigade only had one tank left and two other brigades without any tanks had to be sent across the Volga to refit.  One division had two infantry brigades that were full, but the composite regiment of another division only fielded 100 infantrymen.  Chuikov stated that another division had a total of 1,500 men-"the motorized infantry brigade had 666 men, including no more than 200 infantrymen; the Guards Division of Colonel Dubyanski on the left flank had no more than 250 infantrymen."[35]  Later, he went on to explain the effect of the high casualties on his units:  "It means that our soldiers (even small units) crawled out from under German tanks, more often than not wounded, to another position, where they were received, incorporated into another unit, provided with equipment, usually ammunition, and then they went back into battle."[36]  Early in the battle some 10,000 men of the 13th Guards Rifle Division crossed the Volga, but without their heavy weapons. Chuikov threw them into a counterattack against the Brick Mill and the main train station. The division lost 30% of its men in the first 24 hours.  By the time the battle ended, only 320 of the original soldiers were left.[37]

Records of the 6th Army did survive and indicate that the intensity of combat was high, both before reaching Stalingrad and later in the city fighting.  It crossed the Don River on 21 August 1942.  From then until 16 October, it recorded the following losses:

                                   

Officers

NCOs & men

Killed

239

7,456

Wounded

821

30,360

Missing

  8

1,127

 

During this same period, 6th Army recorded capturing 57,800 prisoners of war (POW) and the capture or destruction of 1,950 tanks, 805 guns and 1,969 aircraft.  For the period from 13 September to 16 October 1942, during which much of the city fighting took place, it suffered the following losses:

 

Officers

NCOs & men

Killed

69

2,438

Wounded

271

10,107

Missing

3

298

Paulus's army not only fought in the city, but also held a defensive front north of the city.  On this northern front, the 6th Army captured 5,625 POWs and captured or destroyed 616 tanks and 87 guns.  In the city itself, Paulus's army captured 17,917 POWs while capturing or destroying 233 tanks and 302 guns.[38]

            As a rule, Red Army infantry divisions during the course of the war had about 10,000 men, most of whom carried rifles.  The dynamics of city fighting wore these units down even further, according to General Chuikov.  What city fighting did to a German infantry division can be seen in the soldiers of the 71st Infantry Division available on 19 September 1942.

 

I.R. 191

I.R. 194

I.R. 211

1. Comp.

25 Men

1. Comp.

12 men

1. Comp.

24men

2. Comp.

17 Men

2. Comp.

22 men

2. Comp.

 -*)

3. Comp.

20 men

3. Comp.

14 men

3. Comp.

 -*)

4. Comp.

32 men

4. Comp.

23 men

4. Comp.

28men

Staff I. Btl.

7 men

Staff I. Btl.

20 men

Staff I. Btl.

 -*)

5. Comp.

10 Men

5. Comp.

7 Men

5.Comp.

27 men

6. Comp.

13 men

6. Comp.

13 men

6. Comp.

22 men

7. Comp.

12 men

7. Comp.

10 men

7.Comp.

-*)

8. Comp.

40 men

8. Comp.

23 men

8.Comp.

43 men

Staff II. Btl.

17 men

Staff II.

6 men

Btl Staff II.Btl.

31 men

9. Comp.

 7 men

9. Comp.

 8 men

9.Comp

-*)

10.Comp.

13 men

10.Comp.

 9 men

10.Comp

44 men

11.Comp.

19 men

11.Comp.

13 men

11.Comp

-*)

12.Comp.

35 men

12.Comp.

27 men

12.Comp

38 men

Staff III.Btl

7 men

Staff III.Btl.

20 men

Staff III.Btl.

17 men

13.Comp.

53 men

13.Comp.

50 men

13.Comp.

61 men

14.Comp.

50 men

14.Comp.

40 men

14.Comp.

57 men

Rgt.Staff

 

Rgt.Staff

 

Rgt.Staff

 

ReconPlat

 

ReconPlat

 

ReconPlat

 

SignalPlat

 

SignalPlat

 

SignalPlat

 

Eng.Plat72

 

Eng.Plat

94 men

Eng.Plat.

80 men

 

 As can be seen, the regimental support troops suffered proportionately fewer losses than the combat infantry.[39]  The following table is an example of casualties of the 24th Panzer Division after it had been withdrawn from the fighting in Stalingrad.[40]

 

Troop Unit

Inf. Weapons

Artl.,Mines, Etc.

Burns

Aircraft attack

24.Pz.Div Staff

6.3

73.8

-

19.9

Pz.Rgt.24

 10.5

63.1

 3.0

23.4

Arm.Inf.Brig.24

-

31.1

-

65.9

Arm.Inf.Rgt. 21

 27.2

63.1

 0.3

 9.4

Arm.Inf.Rgt. 26

 30.4

57.2

 0.8

11.6

Motorcycle Btl.4

 25.5

64.1

 0.7

 9.7

Arm.Artl.Rgt 89

4.4

70.5

-

25.1

IV.Btl." "

 16.7

42.9

-

40.4

Arm.Signal Btl 86

 1.2

65.3

-

33.5

Antitank Btl 40

 10.1

77.9

-

12.0

Arm.Eng.Btl 40

 19.3

42.1

 0.4

38.2

Supply Btl 40

 14.4

21.8

-

63.8

Medic.Comp(mot)1/

 12.5

35.7

-

51.8

Medic.Comp(mot)2/

 -

58.3

-

41.7

Bakery Comp.40

-

-

-

 100.0

Butcher Comp.40

-

-

-

 100.0

Attached units

13.1

77.5

 0.9

8.5

Distribution of casualties

11.3

49.8

 0.4

38.5

 

            These statistics should be used with the greatest care because they also cover the months of July and August, before Stalingrad.  Furthermore, because this was one of the few Panzer Divisions in the city, the numbers could represent a statistical aberration.  Nevertheless, since it probably was the only division whose records survived, it requires some examination.  Since artillery fire was the most destructive agent in both world wars, the figure of roughly 50% casualties from artillery is probably typical for conventional urban operations in high intensity combat.  Eleven percent casualties from infantry weapons is probably too low to be typical.  The question remaining is what would have been typical?  Just as surprising is the 38% loss to enemy air activity.  Although this seems very high, the two regiments of armored infantry, one battalion of motorcycle troops and the antitank battalion all averaged between 9.4% and 12% casualties from air attacks.  There is also consistency in the losses of the armor regiment and mechanized artillery regiment.  It would appear, however, that these losses were incurred during the Battle of Stalingrad, rather than before.  On 28 September, General Paulus visited the 24th Panzer Division at 1315 and the operations officer briefed him on the division's considerable losses in armored infantry and tanks.  These debilitating losses had occurred in the last several days.[41]  If these losses are not a statistical aberration, this should serve as a warning for an even temporary loss of air superiority.  These losses also suggest the inadequacy of both the Luftwaffe and of German air defense.

            In spite of the presence of the 9th Luftwaffe Antiaircraft Division, Russian air strikes inflicted considerable damage in the German rear areas.  On the same day that General Paulus visited the 24th Panzer Division, the 6th Army observed that the destruction of artillery ammunition depots by day and night raids had become unacceptable.  It attributed these losses to dispersal of the antiaircraft artillery.  It consequently ordered two battalions to return from the Don River bridgeheads.[42]

            Just as the records of the 24th Panzer Division provide a unique perspective of casualties at Stalingrad, its after action report constitutes one of the few documents recounting actual combat experience in the city.  Documents are not immune from error and those who create such reports frequently have their own agendas; nevertheless, the divisional after action report provides a rare glimpse into both the strengths and weaknesses of a division fighting in Stalingrad.  Consequently, what follows is a summary of that report.  The division's after action report concluded that panzer divisions were created to use their tanks decisively, en masse in open land, not for combat in cities.  City fighting threw away armor's advantages of maneuver and mass. Furthermore, tanks were not designed for urban combat and the rubble frequently limited the effectiveness of their main guns and hull machine guns. Those tanks remained vulnerable to Soviet tank and antitank weapons, so they should not be deployed singly, but in groups of ten.[43]

            In similar fashion, the armored infantry had never fought in a large city and had to rethink many of its methods.  All German infantry loved the Sturmgeschutz because they could take cover behind the heavily armored vehicle as it advanced and fired.  It was a serious mistake, however, for the infantry to use tanks in the same manner as the Sturmgeschutz, because the Mark III and IV tanks were too vulnerable to enemy fire.  Instead, the report urged that the armored infantry advance with several tanks behind them, providing fire support.

            Although tanks and armored infantry had been working together in combat since 1939, they hardly ever had seen each other on the battlefield.  Putting tanks and armored infantry in a small compartment consequently required a different, more intimate level of cooperation.  The combined arms team in the compartment required a small number of tanks, armored infantry, and engineers.  Rubble, narrow streets and bomb craters restricted the number of tanks that could operate effectively in such a compartment.  The document urged all participating commanders to examine the terrain beforehand, noting obstacles, cover, and the enemy situation.  An attack plan had to come from this orientation, reaching an understanding of who would do what. It maintained that the only way to obtain true cooperation was through representation of all the participating units.  The tank commander had to enter the fight knowing how limited his vision would be and consequently how dependent the tanks would be upon the other branches.[44] 

Mines were the greatest danger for tanks.  The German after action report recommended that when a tank hit a mine, all tanks in the compartment halt and engineers be brought forward to clear paths. Infantry had to deploy forward to thwart Russian infantry and to protect recovery teams, for it was critical to retrieve damaged vehicles as soon as possible.  It was also necessary to withdraw the tanks before sunset for logistical support, because the support vehicles were not armored.  A panzer division possessed less infantry and artillery than an infantry division, which made it more difficult to replace infantry losses and punish the enemy with artillery fire.

            A large number of knocked-out tanks were strewn about Stalingrad in pods, indicating paths that were once trafficable. In late September, the VIII Corps counted 62 T34 hulks in its sector, all manufactured in 1942.  The XIV Panzer Corps counted 48 hulks of various types, but could not approach most of them because of enemy fire.  The Russians had managed to retrieve several knocked out tanks, but also found it too dangerous to enter no man's land.  Russian POWs stated that most of the tanks had been manufactured at Stalingrad's tractor factory.[45]  The XIV Panzer Corps reported that on 30 September it had destroyed 24 Russian and 100 non-Russian tanks.  The latter consisted of 8 American M3 Lee tanks, 47 American M3 Stuarts and 24 British Valentines.  They were particularly interested in them, noting that they had not been assembled in Russia and contained instructional materials in English.  The Russian tanks consisted of 2 T34s, 3 T60s and 19 T70s, which apparently came from Gorki.[46]

            In the attack, commanders had to make thorough preparations, particularly in synchronizing fire support.  It was better for all the commanders to meet and, using an aerial photograph, quickly work out who would do what, rather than relying upon detailed written orders.  Before the attack, it was counterproductive to withdraw to protect oneself from the artillery barrage and air strikes.  The Germans discovered that when they did that, the Russians moved forward into the vacated ground.  In order to gain surprise, it was better to attack early in the morning without preparatory fires and then call in adjusted fire as required.  In urban operations, it was preferable to halt and regroup upon attaining limited objectives because that was the best way to coordinate the various arms and weapons systems.  Informing subordinates of what was the daily objective helped in this process. On occasion, it was necessary to task-organize an armored assault group consisting of tanks, half-tracks, and other units as required. Nevertheless, the purpose of this was still to maximize the infantry combat power and provide one unified command.  One constant was the active participation of engineers.  To exploit success, reserves had to be kept close by at the ready and yet placed under some cover.[47]            Defense in Stalingrad was made very difficult by the severely restricted fields of fire and limited observation.  It proved advisable to use a main line of resistance and attempt to keep reserves at the ready.  Heavy mortars used as batteries were very helpful and the heavy and light infantry cannons were particularly valuable in the defense.  Nightly harassment fire by the artillery and heavy infantry weapons had to be coordinated in a division fire plan.  These fires had the best results between dusk and about 2230, when the enemy carried out most logistics activities.  It was of the greatest importance to maintain the flexibility of rapidly shifting from the offense to the defense. This meant rapidly digging in, organizing a defense in depth, creating of new reserves, deploying the heavy weapons, planning the defensive fire, and if possible, laying mines quickly and contacting units on the flanks.[48]

            The 24th Panzer Division reported that it was happy with the coordination of operations with the Luftwaffe, which it viewed as vital to success.  Stuka dive-bombers were able to drop bombs 100 meters in front of their own lines.  German soldiers reported, however, that they really needed to know when the last bomb had been dropped.  The Luftwaffe liaison officer was in an armored vehicle close enough to see the strikes.  German efforts in 1942 to link Luftwaffe formations with advancing armored units continued to fail.  The situation was too fluid and too often bombs struck German positions.  To the 24th Panzer Division, it seemed much more efficient for the Luftwaffe to operate deep against the enemy's lines of communication.  And finally, the ground troops wanted to be better informed of what targets the Luftwaffe were going after, so they could deploy sufficient light and signals equipment to protect themselves.

            It would appear at first glance that fighting in Stalingrad required a revision of the infantry squad into an assault squad.  It required the standard light machine gun and riflemen, and also needed sharp shooters, automatic weapons, various kinds of grenades, and explosive charges.  Those squads required support of one or more Sturmgeschutz, several half-tracks armed with 2cm antiaircraft or 3.7cm antitank guns.  A squad of engineers also had to be available to remove mines and tank obstacles.  In addition, the after action report recommended that a flamethrower squad needed to be available.  The heavy infantry weapons required sufficient ammunition.  Rifle grenades proved very helpful.  In order to counter enemy snipers or marksmen, the trench mirror was indispensable.  And finally, the assault squads required enough radios for efficient communication.[49]

            Movement through the city was severely restricted by the massive destruction.  Avoiding streets reduced casualties.  Since all resistance "nests" had to be reduced, it was preferable to organize the advance in depth.  It was important to not become imprisoned by linear conceptions of combat, because units had to maneuver backwards, forwards, or sideways to cover a flank.  In Stalingrad, a good deal of effort was expended reducing resistance "nests" (mainly cellars).  Particularly dangerous areas were street corners and flat open spaces.  These areas without cover demanded smoke screens to facilitate crossing.[50]

            A glimpse at the 71st Infantry Division demonstrates the difficulties of such combat.  On 24 September, it advanced against heavy resistance towards the theater and CP buildings.  They had to fight through the remains of each house.  POWs said that traditional concepts such as squads and platoons had generally lost their meaning.  The Russians were led by proven officers and commissars and were still receiving active assistance from civilians.  Neither side took many prisoners.  Russian casualties were high.  The 71st divisional artillery engaged Russian craft on the Volga and managed to silence two enemy batteries, destroying a large ammunition depot on the east bank of the river.[51]

            The 24th Panzer Division was satisfied for the most part with its artillery regiment, but complained that it had limited supplies, particularly ammunition.  In the attack divisional artillery was not that helpful.  To limit friendly fire casualties, only one gun was allowed to provide fire support for an assault squad.  At the division, the major problem was the inability to observe.  At Stalingrad, the key artillery units were the observation battalions, who were army troops usually put at the disposal of a corps headquarters.  They set up their specialized equipment at the few quality observation spots. For example, on 28 September as the LI Corps advanced against the Red October and Barrikady factories, its observation battalions identified 22 enemy batteries and engaged 14 with counterbattery fire.[52]

            It was still possible to coordinate fires, however; the armored artillery regiment's armored observation vehicles proved ideal in supplementing the work of the observation battalions.  It was simply too dangerous for the infantry divisions' observation sections to attempt to do this.  Sometimes, it was necessary to call in fire of the entire regiment.  This was so effective that POWs commented upon the barrages.  In urban combat, the armored artillery reconnaissance assets only had radios.  They were, however, in Stalingrad long enough to supplement their signals with wire.  For instance, the light/flash unit had to be on the tallest surviving structure in the sector.  Hence, it was much more efficient to run wire up to its "nest."  The Red Army experience in Stalingrad proved quite similar, with artillery observers perched in the few available aerie.[53]  The panzer division itself did not have the means to be decisive in counter-battery fire.  Its 10cm cannon had insufficient range and never seemed to have enough ammunition.  On occasion, one or two divisional guns were sent to assist the armored infantry with direct fire.  This proved successful, but the guns were particularly difficult to move in the rubble.[54]

            The division cooperated with the Luftwaffe through radio, until its last week in the city, when the regimental air support radio unit moved forward to join the tracked observation vehicles. This cooperation sped up prioritization and efficiency of air and fire support.  It cut out one level of communication within the Luftwaffe and provided them many more eyes to evaluate the effectiveness of their air strikes.  In addition, when a target was taken out, this method allowed aircraft to switch rapidly to new targets.

As has already been mentioned, the 24th Panzer Division strongly maintained that it was wasteful to use an armored division in city fighting.  Specifically, the tank regimental headquarters had little to do because the largest tank formation deployed was a battalion.  The after action report stipulated that only in rare situations should elements of an armored division be sent to assist another division.  Infantry had to be specially trained to cooperate efficiently with tanks.  Deployment of tanks without infantry was only successful when the enemy was very demoralized and lacked antitank weaponry.  Local limited tank thrusts were rewarded with success.  On the defense tanks were to be kept as local reserves and used for counterattacks.  The major threats were antitank weapons used at close range and sharpshooters.  The after action report concluded that before being returned to 4th Panzer Army, the division lost an exceptionally large number of tanks.  Many of those losses were unnecessary-the  result of having to work with infantry whose leaders had no idea of the strengths and weaknesses of tanks.[55]

            Engineers were a vital component of the combined arms team, but the division commander had some serious decisions to make.  The engineers were required to maintain the lines of communication, but when also needed for combat engineer missions, he had to choose how they would be allocated.  The 24th Panzer Division recommended deployment by company or platoon.  For urban combat they had to be fully equipped with light and heavy infantry weapons and antitank weapons.  One of the major problems for German engineers at Stalingrad was their inability to rapidly detect and remove Russian wooden mines.

            The Germans had several types of tracked antitank guns.  They were very useful in Stalingrad, where rubble and partially knocked down walls provided them with cover up to their hulls.  Deployed hull defilade behind infantry, they proved highly effective.  Deploying them in the front line, however, made these open-topped vehicles too vulnerable to enemy artillery, hand grenades, and sharpshooters.  In the defense, they had to be kept even further back because of enemy observers.  Ammunition resupply was difficult for the vehicles.  By 1942, it was clear that the version with the 5cm gun was obsolete.[56]

            Regarding individual weapons and systems, the 5cm antitank vehicle gained notice, not only for its insufficient firepower, but also for its lack of maneuverability.  In the autumn of 1942, German Army divisions still did not have telescopic rifles.  The 24th Panzer Division concluded that there were numerous instances when marksmen with telescopic sights could have suppressed resistance nests and saved casualties.  The 8cm mortar proved effective, as did the 7.5cm infantry cannon.  The 15cm infantry cannon, however, was far too difficult to maneuver in the rubble and proved difficult to resupply.

            The report concluded with several recommendations.  It urged that the armored and armored artillery regiments receive 2cm antiaircraft guns.  The armored infantry needed a company of tracked heavy infantry cannons.  Each Panzer battalion required one or two platoons of engineers (fully motorized).  It also recommended further use of Russian volunteers in armored infantry units.  And finally, armored personnel carriers were required to evacuate the wounded out of the combat area and not just to the aide station.[57]

            These immediate "fixes" indicate the lethality of Russian air operations, insufficient firepower in the armored infantry in taking out point targets, and insufficient combat infantry and engineers.  Since this was one of the most powerful, best-equipped German divisions, one wonders about both the German and Russian infantry units, which had much less maneuverability and striking power.  This helps explain the phenomenally high casualties of the 13th Guard Rifle Division, which was deployed to Stalingrad without its heavy weapons.

            Following the visit of a general staff officer to southern Russia on 28 August, the German General Staff senior medical officer warned Army Group B's doctors that in the hot summer months the soldiers should have an improved diet.  What was required was a lower fat diet.  Soldiers complained of bread that arrived with mold.  Sixth Army could do little to alleviate these problems.  The plague of flies lasted until the first freeze.  The main problem was that Stalingrad was simply too distant to be logistically supported.  After the 6th Army was encircled, its combat troops were supposed to receive a diet of 200 grams of bread per day.  Staff and rear area personnel were to receive only 100 grams.[58]

            When 6th Army soldiers began to rapidly die in December without detectable symptoms, Berlin flew a pathologist into the pocket.  He found that 6th Army soldiers had the medical problems of old men: changes in bone marrow and internal organs and loss of fatty tissue.  The actual cause of death was shrinkage of the heart.  The right ventricle, however, was enlarged.  The pathologist concluded that this resulted from exhaustion, exposure, and undernourishment. Ziemke and Bauer suggest that this phenomenon was probably related to the unique circumstances of being encircled by enemy forces.[59]  It remains possible that not all this damage resulted from the period after the encirclement-that  the cumulative stress and malnutrition of the previous months' combat contributed to this condition. 

            There is one additional factor that must be mentioned, even through it tends to be rather nebulous and remains nearly impossible to quantify.  Nevertheless, perhaps the most important revelation of Stalingrad was how city fighting impinged upon the strategic level of warfare.  Regardless of the lack of wisdom behind advancing into southern Russia in 1942, Stalingrad played only a peripheral role in that offensive.  Through the course of the campaign, however, possession of the city somehow came to dominate Hitler's thinking.  On four occasions, General Paulus reported that city fighting was eroding his army's combat power, but the city had already become a matter of prestige.  Hitler made one of his rare public appearances on 30 September at the Sportpalast in Berlin.  He displayed irritation at the fixation the world's press had regarding the Dieppe Raid, while ignoring his advance to the Caucasus and Volga.  He stated twice that Stalingrad would fall and concluded:  "You can be certain no one will get us away from there."[60]  Several days later at one of his military briefings he confessed that Stalingrad was no longer of decisive operational importance, but rather vital for public opinion around the world and to bolster the morale of Germany's allies.  Somehow, a city of relatively minor significance had become a crucial factor in national decision-making.  Whether this was an isolated miscalculation of a dictator without formal military training or a general tendency in the course of western warfare, gives pause for serious reflection.[61]

Stalingrad began being rebuilt as soon as the war ended, and in 1952, the Soviet Union completed the long dreamed of Volga-Don Canal.  By 1959, the population had climbed to 591,000 and the following year the giant dam and hydroelectric plant north of the city opened.  The city was renamed Volgograd in 1961, by which time it had largely been rebuilt, again in a long belt hugging the river. The city thrived; by 1995, it had over 1,260,000 residents.

            We shall never know with certainty the losses caused by the Stalingrad campaign.  Approximately 250,000 Axis troops were lost, along with 1,000 tanks and 1,800 guns.  Most of the Axis troops were German, but there were 50,000 Austrians killed along with smaller numbers of Rumanians, Croatians and Italians.  We also know that there were some 50,000 Russian volunteers (Hilfswillige) with the German 6th Army, none of whom probably survived the struggle.  Of the Axis losses, 150,000 were killed or wounded by January 1943. No one knows the Russian losses, which are estimated at being from four to eight times those of the Axis.  It can no longer be determined how many of those losses were civilians either.  And in addition, every spring another half dozen Russian children are added to the total.[62]

ENDNOTES

            The author would like to take this opportunity to publicly thank the following, who greatly helped with their time, knowledge and consideration: Colonel L.C. Edwards, S.B. Gray, Dr. Tim Mulligan, N.E. Sopolsky,  Dr. R.J. Spiller, and Dr. V.F. Washington.


[1] Transcribed Hitler military conference of 12 December 1942 reprinted in Walther Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-45, transl. By R.H. Barry, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 525-26.

[2] Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners:  Urban Operations at Century's End, (Fort Leavenworth:  Combat Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 50-55; Timothy W. Ryback, "Stalingrad:  Letters from the Dead," New Yorker, (February 1, 1993), pp. 58-71; Records of the German Foreign Ministry, file "Russland (Abwehr) Vertreter des Auswaertigen Amts beim Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Der Vertreter des Auswaertigen Amts bei einem AOK, Nr. 657g. A.H.Qu. den 10. Oktober 1942, Stalingrad, signed v. Schubert (hereafter v. Schubert, Stalingrad).

[3] Spiller, Sharp Corners, pp. 50-55;  Warlimont, Op. Cit., pp. 267-286; and Ryback, "Stalingrad:  Letters from the Dead," pp. 58-71.

[4] John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalins's War with Germany, Vol. I, (New York:  Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 298-342; H.R. Trevor-Roper, (editor) Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945, (London:  Sidgwick and Jackson, 1965), pp. 116-121; Hans Doerr, Der Feldzug nach Stalingrad, (Darmstadt:  E.S. Mittler & Sohn, GmbH, 1955), pp. 120-124; and Earl F. Ziemke and Magda E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, Decision in the East, (Washington DC:  Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 287-324.

[5] Burkhardt Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 1933-1945,  Vol. III, Der Zwei Fronten Krieg, (Frankfurt am Main:  E.S. Mittler & Sohn, GmbH, 1969), pp. 25-31 and 55-72; Andreas Hillgruber, "Der Einbau der verbuendeten Armeen in die deutsche Ostfront 1941-1944, Wehrwissenschaftliche  Rundschau, Vol. X, (1960), pp. 659-682; and Martin Broszat, "Deutschland - Ungarn - Rumaenien," in Hitler, Deutschland und die Maechte, (edited by Manfred Funke), (Duesseldorf:  Droste Verlag, 1977), pp. 524-567. S.J. Lewis, Forgotten LegionsGerman Army Infantry Policy 1918-1941, (New York:  Praeger,      1985), pp. 33-34, 112 and 130-133. The basic German Army doctrinal manual remained Truppenfuehrung.  It had been written in the early 1930s and, not having been revised, some of the younger more disrespectful officers referred to it as "TF" or Tante Frieden.  Tante Frieden meant "Aunt Peace," i.e. guidance that had little to do with the reality of combat on the Eastern Front. There had been an opportunity to reform the German Army after the Fall of France in 1940, but Hitler's decision to invade Russia condemned the German infantry to be the hand-maiden of the elite armor forces.  In spite of this and the excessive casualties in Russia, German and Russian doctrine remained rather similar, emphasizing mobility and offensive action.

[6] Erickson, op. Cit., pp. 13-49; G. Isserson, "Razvitiye teorii  sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva v 30-ye gody," Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal, (January 1965) 1, pp. 36-46; and Condolezza  Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy," in Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 648-676. The Red Army had previously produced the 1936 Field Service Regulations, but it did not survive the purges and was no longer in effect.

[7] Erickson, op. Cit., pp. 343-393; Trevor-Roper, Hitler's War Directives, Directive No. 45, 23 July 1942, pp. 129-131; Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrad  Analyse und Dokumentation einer     Schlacht, (Stuttgart:  Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974), pp. 69- 86; and  Rolf-Dieter Mueller, "Das Scheitern der wirtschaftliche 'Blitzkriegstrategie,'" in Das Deutsche Reich und der        Zweite Weltkrieg, edited by the Militaergeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, (Stuttgart:  Deutsche     Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), Vol. IV, pp. 936-971.  See also H. Dv. g. 90, Versorgung des Feldheeres, OKH/GenStdH/Gen.Qu., 1938; and H. Dv. g. 11a/2 Erfahrungen aus dem Ostfeldzug fuer          Versorgungsfuehrung 1943, OKH/GenStdH/GenQu 2 Nr. I/17591/42.

[8] Same sources as previous note; and PzAOK 4 file 28183/17 Chef-Notizen zum KTB Nr. 5 (Teil III), entry for 8 September 1942.

[9] KTB/OKH/GenStdH/ Organisations Abt., 1 August - 31 Dec. 1942, Microcopy T-78/roll 417/ frames 6386529-531; Spiller, Sharp Corners, pp. 50-55; Doerr, Der Feldzug nach        Stalingrad, pp. 30-52; and Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 17-19.

[10] AOK 6 Ia Az.Nr. 3044/42 g.K. A.H.Qu. den 19. August 1942, Armeebefehl fuer den Angriff auf Stalingrad,reprinted in Doerr, op. Cit., pp. 127-129; see also pp. 40-45; and Louis Rotundo, editor, Battle for Stalingrad  The 1943 Soviet General Staff Study, (Washington, New York, etc.,: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989), pp. 26-30 and 41-68.  The pertinent German Army manual for city or trench warfare was Geheim Merkblatt, Angriff gegen eine staendige Front (StoBtrupps).

[11] Spiller, Sharp Corners, pp. 50-55; Anthony Beevor, Stalingrad, (New York:  Viking, 1998), p. 119 and Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 37-42.

[12] Vasili I. Chuikov, The Battle of Stalingrad, translated by Harold Silver, (New York:  Ballantine Books, 1964), pp. 50-72; Rotundo, op. Cit., pp. 229-257; Klaus Maier, "Totaler Krieg und Operativer Luftkrieg," in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 2, edited by Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt, (Stuttgart:  Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1979, pp. 43-69; Kenneth R. Whiting, "Soviet Air Power in World War II," in Air Power and Warfare, Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium USAF Academy, 18-20 October 1978, edited by Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart, (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1977), pp. 98-127; Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, translated by F. Ziegler, (London:  Macdonald, 1964); and Spiller, Sharp Corners, pp. 50-55.

[13] V.Schubert, Stalingrad; v. Schubert's Nr. 667, Inf 2081 Mg. A.H.Qu., dem 26. Oktober, Inh.:  Stimmung der Bevoelkerung; Der Vertreter des Auswaertigen Amts bei einem Panzer AOK. Nr. 126, OU den 13. Oktober 1942, Geheim, Betr.:  Fahrt nach Stalingrad, signed Muehlen; AOK 6, Fuehrungsabteilung KTB  Bericht ueber eine Fahrt nach Stalingrad, Menzel, Major i.G. V.O./OKH b. AOK 6 of 25.9.42.; and Spiller, Sharp Corners, pp. 50-60.

[14] Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 37-41.

[15] The NKVD eventually relented and allowed some women and children across the Volga. Chuikov, The Battle of Stalingrad, pp. 50-168; Beevor, Stalingrad, pp. 92-144; and Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 37-43.

[16] Doerr, Der Feldzug nach Stalingrad, op. Cit., pp. 55-61; and Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 41-42.

[17] Erickson, op. Cit., pp. 343-393; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 23-36

[18] One of his senior advisors attempted to defend List, which precipitated one of Hitler's most violent outbursts against the officer corps.  The dictator announced that he would no longer eat his meals with the officers and directed that stenographers be brought in from Berlin to take down all conversations.  Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, pp. 241-260; Beevor, Stalingrad, pp. 123; Warlimont maintained that Halder's departure was precipitated by the latter's argument with Hitler of 24 August.  See also Kurt Zeitzer, "Stalingrad," in The Fatal Decisions  Six decisive battles of the Second World War of from the viewpoint of the vanquished, edited by William Richardon and Seymour Freidin, transl. by Constantine Fitz Gibbon, (London:  Michael Joseph, 1956), pp. 115-165.  The new chief of the general staff somehow forgot to mention his  opening speech, but did note that the atmosphere was clouded by mistrust and suspicion.

[19] Chuikov, The Battle of Stalingrad, pp. 86-116; Beevor, Ibid., pp. 129-145.

[20] On 18 September the 6th Army reported there were severe shortages of 10 cm cannon, 8 cm mortar, 5 cm and 7.5 cm (anti-tank) shells.  AOK 6 Abt Ia, Tagesmeldung, A.H.Qu. den 18.9.42 in folder AOK 6 Fuehrungsabteilung Anlagenband zum KTB Nr. 13, Russland.  General Chuikov claims that he ordered his troops to maintain such close physical proximity, which is probably true. Where the idea originated remains open to question, Chuikov, Stalingrad, p. 80.

[21] Records of the German Sixth Army, V.O./OKH.b. AOK 6, A.J.Wue., 25.9.42, Bericht ueber eine Fahrt nach Stalingrad, signed Menzel.

[22] Chuikov, The Battle of Stalingrad, pp. 116-194;  Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 44-46; and Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad  Decision in the East, (Washington DC:  Center of Military History United States Army, 1987), pp. 382-470.

[23] Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 48-49.  Fremde Heere Ost was the German Army intelligence organization that monitored the Soviet Union.

[24] Ziemke, Ibid.

[25] Ziemke, Ibid., pp. 50-52.

[26] Kenneth R. Whiting, "Soviet Air Power in World War II;" Maier, "Total Krieg und Operativer Luftkrieg;" and Bekker, op. Cit., pp. 278-294.

[27] Ziemke, Ibid., pp. 52-55.

[28] Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 285; Ziemke, op. Cit., pp. 55-65.

[29] Joachim Wieder, and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel (editor), Stalingrad  Memories and Reassessments, transl. by Helmut Bogler, (London:  Arms & Armour Press, 1998), p. 67.

[30] Rudolf Schmundt, Taetigkeitsbericht des Chef des Heerespersonalamts General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt 1.10.1942 - 29.10.1944, edited by Dermot Bradley and Richard Schulze-Kossens, (Osnabrueck:  Biblio Verlag, 1984), entries for 3 October 1942, 26 November 1942 and 22-25 January 1943, pp. 2-3, 23-24, and 38-41.

[31] Records of the German Foreign Office, Der Vertreter des Auswaertigen Amts beim Pz.-AOK 4 (number four crossed out), A.H.Qu., den 6. Oktober 1942, Betr.:  Stimmung der russischen Truppe unter der psychologischen Wirkung des Stalin-Befehls, in folder Russland (Abwehr).

[32] Ziemke, Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[33] KTB A.O.K. 6 Ia, 17. Oktober 1942, file 30155/33, reproduced on microcopy T312, roll 1458, frames 961-963.

[34] See for example Chuikov, The Battle of Stalingrad, pp. 39-41 and 80-93; and Beevor, Stalingrad, pp. 127-129 and 141-157. 

[35] Chuikov, The Battle of Stalingrad, pp. 92-93; and Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, (editor), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, (London:  Greenhill Books, 1997), pp. 123-125

[36] Chuikov, The Battle of Stalingrad, p. 107.

[37] Chuikov, The Battle of Stalingrad, pp. 131-136; and Zhukov, op. Cit., p. 373.

[38] KTB A.O.K. 6 Ia, 17. Oktober 1942, file 30155/33 (reproduced on microcopy T-312, roll 1458, frames 961-963

[39] V.O./OKH b. AOK 6, Bericht ueber eine Fahrt nach Stalingrad, A.H. Wu. 25.9.42 signed Menzel.  Excluded from these totals are support troops, lightly wounded, and soldiers on leave or detail.

[40] Records of the 24th Panzer Division, Anlage 5 z. 24.Pz.-Div. Ia/Op. Nr. 365/42 geh. of 10.11.42, Taetigkeitsbericht der Sanitaets-Dienst vom 28.6. bis 31.10.1942

[41] AOK 6 KTB, Frontfahrt des Oberbefehlshabers am 28.9.1942 in folder Ia/Ic Anlagenband zKTB 13, Russland

[42] AOK 6 Abt. Ia Nr. 3681/42 g. A.H.Qu. 28 September 1942, 12.55 Uhr in folder Ia/Ic Anlagenband z KTB Nr. 13, Russland

[43] Records of the 24th Panzer Division, Anlage 2 zu 24. Pz.-Div.Ia Nr. 347/42 geh. V.5.11.1942, Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren

[44] Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren

[45] AOK 6 KTB, V.O./OKH bei AOK 6, A.H.Qu. den 27.9.42 an OKH/Op.Abt. Bezug: Fernspruch vom 19.9.betr. abgeschossene, fabrikneue Feindpanzer in folder Ia/Ia Anlagenband z KTB Nr.13, Russland.

[46] AOK 6 KTB, XIV. Pz.K. 1.10.42 Oblt. Schaefer-Hansen, 22.45(Uhr) in folder Ia/Ic Anlagenband z KTB Nr. 13, Russland; and Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren.

[47] Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren.

[48] Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren.

[49] Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren.

[50] Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren.

[51] AOK 6 Ia Lagenmeldung, 24.9.42 (LI Corps) in folder Ia/Ic/AO Anlagenband z KTB Nr. 13, Russland.

[52] When Zhukov briefed Stalin on 12 September on the specific difficulties of fighting in Stalingrad, he mentioned that the Germans held several key elevations.  This allowed them to mass and shift artillery fire, Zhukov, op. Cit., pp. 380-382.  AOK 6 Ia Zwischenmeldung Datum 28.9.42, LI.A.K. meldet 16.45 Uhr in folder Ia/Ic Anlagenband z. KTB Nr. 13, Russland.

[53] See Beevor, Stalingrad, pp. 148-149.

[54] See also AOK 6 Abt Ia, Tagesmeldung A.H.Qu. den 18.9.42; and AOK 6 Ia Zwischenmeldung, A.H.Qu den 20.9.42 both in folder Ia/Ic Anlagenband z KTB Nr. 13, Russland.  Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren

[55] Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren.  On 4 October the 24th Panzer Division was able to deploy 38 tanks:  2 command tanks, 9 short barreled Mark IIIs, 17 long barreled  Mark IIIs, 5 short barreled  and 5 long barreled Mark IV tanks, AOK 6 Ia Morgenmeldung Datum 4.10.42, 4.50 Uhr in folder Ia/Ic Anlagenband z KTB Nr. 13, Russland

[56] Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren

[57] Richtlinien fuer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Panzer und Grenadieren

[58] AOK 6 KTB, Der Heeresintendant im OKH GenSt.dH./GenQu. Az 809 z(I.3) Nr. I/35/800/42 H.Qu.OKH den 23.8.1942 An Armeeintendant 6 in folder Ia/Ic/AO Anlagenband z KTB Nr. 13, Russland; and Wieder, op. Cit., p. 51.

[59] Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, p. 69.

[60] Ian Kershaw, Hitler  1936-1945  Nemesis, (New York:  W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), pp. 534-557;"Der Fuehrer sprach zum deutschen Volk," Ost Front, 1 October 1942, Folge 413 (Ausgabe A) in AOK 6 KTB, folder Ia/Ic Anlagenband z KTB 13, Russland; and Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, p. 44.

[61] Wieder, op. Cit., p. 22; and Helmut Heiber,editor, Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962).

[62] The Red Army captured some 91,000 Axis troops at Stalingrad.  Of that total, fewer than 6,000 ever returned home. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses, pp. 124-124); Beevor, Stalingrad, pp. 439-440; and Ryback, "Stalingrad."

 

Bibliography

 

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

 

Documents

Records of the German General Staff

Records of the German Foreign Office

Records of the German Army

            Armies

            Divisions

 

PUBLISHED SOURCES

 

Books

 

Bekker, Cajus.  The Luftwaffe War Diaries.  Transl.by F. Ziegler.      London:  Macdonald, 1964.

 

Beevor, Anthony.  Stalingrad.  New York: Viking Press, 1998.  A popular account by a journalist.

 

Chuikov, Vasili I.  The Battle of Stalingrad.  Transl. by Harold Silver.  New York:  Ballantine Books, 1964.  The invaluable memoirs of the Red Army commander in Stalingrad.

 

Doerr, Hans.  Der Feldzug nach Stalingrad.  Darmstadt:  E.S.  Mittler & Sohn, 1955. An account of the German advance to Stalingrad by a General Staff officer in Southern Russia.        Based on interviews and document collections.

 

Erickson, John.  The Road to Stalingrad:  Stalin's War Against Germany.  Vol. I.  New York:  Harper & Row, 1975.  An indispensable source.

 

_______.  The Soviet High Command  1918-1941.  London:  Macmillan, 1962.  An invaluable book on the subject.

 

Funke, Manfred. Editor.  Hitler, Deutschland und die Maechte.  Duesseldorf:  Droste Verlag, 1977.

 

Kehrig, Manfred.  Stalingrad  Analyse und Dokumentation einer  Schlacht.  Stuttgart:  Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974.

 

Kershaw, Ian.  Hitler 1936-1945 Nemesis.  New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.  An intriguing chronicle of Hitler's daily activity.

 

Krivosheev, G.F.  editor.  Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century.  (London:  Greenhill Books, 1997.

 

Lewis, S.J.  Forgotten Legions German Army Infantry Policy 1918-1941. New York: Praeger, 1985.

 

Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Editors.  Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. 4  Vols.  Stuttgart:  Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983).

 

Mueller-Hillebrand, Burkhardt.  Das Heer, 1933-1945.  Three volumes.  Frankfurt am Main:  E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1969.  The foremost study on German Army organization, based on document collections and written by the former head of the German General Staff Organization Branch.

 

Paret, Peter. (editor).  Makers of Modern Strategy.  Princeton, New Jersey, 1986.

 

Richardson, William and Freidin, Seymour (editors).  The Fatal Decisions Six decisive battles of the Second World War from the viewpoint of the vanquished.  Transl. by Constantine Fitz       Gibbon. London:  Michael Joseph, 1956.

 

Rotundo, Louis.  Editor.  Battle for Stalingrad:  The 1943 Soviet General Staff Study.  Washington, New York, etc.: Pergamon- Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989.

 

Schmundt, Rudolf.  Taetigkeitsbericht des Chef des Heerespersonalamts General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt 1.10.1942 - 29.10.1944.  Edited by Dermot Bradley and Richard Schulze-Kossens.  Osnabrueck:  Biblio Verlag, 1994.

 

Spiller, Roger.  Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century's End.  Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:  Combat Studies Institute, 2001.

 

Trevor-Roper, H.R.  (Editor).  Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945.  London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1965.

 

N. N. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi.  Moscow:  Voevizdat, 1963.  A  troubled manuscript by yet another Stavka representative to the Stalingrad area.  Voronov was an artillery officer.

Warlimont, Walther.  Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-45. Transl. by R.H. Barry.  New York:  Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

 

Wieder, Joachim and von Einsiedel, Heinrich Graf von. (editor).  Stalingrad  Memories and Reassessments. Transl. by Helmut Bogler. London:  Arms & Armour Press, 1998.  An interesting but overwrought memoir.

 

Ziemke, Earl F. and Bauer, Magda E.  Moscow to Stalingrad, Decision in the East.  Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1987.

 

_________, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington DC:  Center of Military History United States Army, 1987.

 

Zhukov, Georgii K.  The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.  New York: A Seymour Lawrence Book  Delacorte Press, 1973.  The most authoritative memoir from the Soviet side.  It provides a unique glimpse into the senior decision making, although Zhukov was not in command at Stalingrad.

 

 

Articles

 

Brosat, Martin.  "Deutschland - Ungarn - Rumaenien." Hitler, Deutschland und die Maechte, edited by Manfred Funke.  Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1977.

 

Isserson, G.  "Razvitiye teorii sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva v 30-ye gody."  Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal.  January 1965.  1.

 

Hillgruber, Andreas.  "Der Einbau der verbuendeten Armeen in die deutsche Ostfront 1941-1944."  Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau. Vol. X. (1960).

 

Mueller, Rolf-Dieter.  "Das Scheitern des wirtschaftliche 'Blitzkriegstrategie,'" in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, edited by the Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt.  Stuttgart:  Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983.

 

Maier, Klaus.  "Totaler Krieg und Operativer Luftkrieg."  Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.  Edited by Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt.  Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1979.

 

Rice, Condolezza.  "The Making of Soviet Stategy."  Makers of  Modern Strategy, edited by Peter Paret.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.  1986.

 

Ryback, Timothy W.  "Stalingrad:  Letters from the Dead." New Yorker. (February 1, 1993).

 

Whiting, Kenneth R.  "Soviet Air Power in World War II."  Air Power and Warfare  Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium USAF Academy 18-20 October 1978.  Edited by Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart.  Washington D.C.:  Office of        Air Force History, 1977.

 

Zeitzler, Kurt.  "Stalingrad," in The Fatal Decisions:  Six decisive battles of the Second World War from the viewpoint of the vanquished, edited by William Richardson and Seymour Freidin.  Transl. by Constantine Fitz Gibbon.  London: Michael Joseph, 1956.

 

 

 



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