CAPTURED WEAPONS
VIGNETTE
On 27 Dec, a cash-for-weapons program was implemented that paid Panamanian civilians for the turn-in of weapons or for reporting cache locations. Ultimately, the civilian population learned that if they piecemealed the turn-in of weapons from cache sites, they could make more money. Reporting of caches decreased until the program and rate of payment was amended. The final count was approximately 56,000 captured weapons.
KEY POINTS
The amount of weapons found at cache sites was unexpected. Analysts knew that weapons had been brought into country and cached, but not in such large quantities. The Panamanian people, in conjunction with a successful money-for-weapons program, were instrumental in rapidly locating and denying critical weapons to loyal Noriega forces.
LESSONS
LEARNED
- Issue units receipts and standard information forms to be used in a cash-for-weapons program before the program is announced. If this is not possible, standard interim procedures should be outlined using assets available.
- Plan for a cash-for-weapons program to place additional demands on limited logistics and transportation assets.
- Establish handling procedures early so the valuable data, such as serial number tracking and weapon location, will not be lost for future analysis.
- Make terms of the cash-for-weapons program clear and equitable so that civilians will not be reluctant to turn in caches instead of weapons individually.
- Allow selected personnel to keep their weapons for personal/business protection on a permit basis. Military/automatic weapons should be the primary target of the program.
- Establish SOPs or plans for collecting, tagging and transporting captured enemy equipment and weapons.
Table
of Contents, Volume III
Illicit
Narcotics and Monies
Lessons
Learned - Intelligence: Counterintelligence/Interrogator (CI/IPW) Teams
NEWSLETTER
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