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Military

U.S. Marine Corps - Small Wars Manual (1940 Edition)

Chapter II. Organization.

Section III
COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

General								2-38
Infantry							2-39
Infantry Weapons						2-40
	a. General
	b. U.S. Rifle, cal. 30, M 1903
	c. U.S. Rifle, cal. .30, M 1.
	d. BAR, cal. .30, M 1917
	e. BAR, cal. .30, M 1917 (mod.).
	f. TSMG, cal. .45, M 1928
	g. V.B. Rifle grenade, Mk I.
	h. 60-mm. Mortar.
	i. Hand Grenade, frag, Mk II.
	j. Auto. Pistol, cal. .45, M 1911.
	k. Bayonet, M 1905.
	l. BMG, cal. .30, M 1917
	m. BMG, cal. .50, M 2.
	n. 81-mm. Mortar, M 1.
	o. 37-mm. Gun, M 4 or M 1916.
Infantry individual equipment					2-41
Mounted troops							2-42
Engineers							2-43
Tanks and armored cars						2-44
Transport							2-45
Signal troops							2-46
Chemical troops							2-47
Medical troops							2-48
Artillery							2-49
Aviation							2-50

2-38. General.--a. It can be assumed that the Fleet Marine Force in the Marine Corps, and the reinforced infantry or cavalry brigade in the Army, will be the basic organizations for small wars operations. Major changes in their strength, organization, armament, and equipment are neither essential nor desirable. However, some slight modifications in armament and equipment may be advisable, and the proportion of supporting arms and services attached to the force may vary from the normal.

b. A force assigned a small wars mission should be tactically and administratively a self-sustaining unit. It must be highly mobile, and tactical units, such as the battalion, must be prepared to act independently as administrative organizations. The final composition of the force will depend upon its mission, the forces available, and the character of the operations.

c. The organization and armament of the opposing force may range from small, roving, guerrilla bands, equipped only with small arms, to a completely modern force armed with the latest types of material. The lack of preponderance of any arm or weapon by the opponent will be the material factor in determining what arms and weapons will be required by the intervening force. The force must be of sufficient strength and so proportioned that it can accomplish its mission in the minimum time and with the minimum losses.

d. The terrain, climatic conditions, transportation facilities, and the availability and source of supply will influence the types of arms and equipment and especially the classes of transportation required by the force.

2-39. Infantry.--a. Importance.--Infantry, the arm of close combat, has been the most important arm in small wars because, from the very nature of such wars, it is evident that the ultimate objective will be reached only by close combat. The policy that every man, regardless of his specialty, be basically trained as an infantryman has been vindicated time and again, and any tendency to deviate from that policy must be guarded against.

b. Tralniny.--Infantry units must be efficient, mobile, light infantry, composed of individuals of high morale and personal courage, thoroughly trained in the use of the rifle and of automatic weapons and capable of withstanding great fatigue on long and often fruitless patrols. As they must assume the offensive under the most difficult conditions of war, terrain, and climate, these troops must be well trained and well led.

c. Rifte companies. --Sooner or later, it is inevitable that small wars operations will degenerate into guerrilla warfare conducted by small hostile groups in wooded, mountainous terrain. It has generally been found that the rifle platoon of three squads is the basic unit best suited to combat such tactics. Each platoon sent on an independent combat mission should have at least one and preferably two commissioned officers attached to it. It is desirable, therefore, that the number of junior officers assigned to rifle companies be increased above the The normal complement authorized in the tables of organization. The number of cooks in a rifle company should also be increased to provide one for each platoon as the company often may be divided into three separate combat patrols or outpost detachments. The attachment of a hospital corpsm:m to each clet achment is essential.

d. Machine gun companies.--The infantry machine gun company fulfills its normal roles during the initial operations in small wars. In the later phases of guerrilla warfare and pacification, it will seldom be used as a complete organization. Squads and sections often will be attached to small combat patrols, or to detached outposts for the purpose of defense. In order to conserve personnel, some machine gun units in past small wars operations have been converted into rifle organizations, and their machine guns, minus the operating personnel, distributed among outlying stations. This is not good practice. Machine gun organizations should be maintained as such, and the smaller units detached to rifle platoons and companies as the necessity therefor arises. These remarks are also applicable to the 81 mm. mortar and antitank platoons.

2-40. Infantry weapons.--a. General--(l) The nature of small wars operations, varying from landings against organized opposition in the initial stages to patrolling the remote areas of the country against poorly armed guerrillas in the later stages, may make some changes in the armament of the infantry desirable. Whether these changes should take place before leaving the United States, or whether they should be anticipated and effected in the theater of operations, must be determined during the estimate of the situation.

(2) The arming of the infantry for small war purposes is influenced by--

(a) Fighting power of the enemy, with particular reference to numerical strength, armament, leadership and tactics.
(b) The short ranges of jungle warfare.
(c) The necessity for small units to defend themselves at close quarters when attacked by superior numbers.
(d) The method of transporting men, weapons, and ammunition.
(e) The strength of, and the offensive or defensive mission assigned to, a patrol or outpost.
(f) The personal opinions of the officers concerned. A company commander on an independent mission in a small war is generally given more latitude in the arming of his company than he would be permitted in a major war.

(3) Ammunition supply is a difficult problem in small wars operations. A detached post or a combat patrol operating away from its base cannot depend upon immediate, routine replacement of its ammunition expenditures. The state of training of the unit in fire discipline and fire control may be an influential factor in determining the number and type of infantry weapons assigned.

b. The U.S. rifle, caliber .30, M1903.--The bolt-action magazine fed, U.S. Rifle, caliber .30, M1903, often erroneously called the Springfield rifle, eventually will be replaced by the semiautomatic rifle as the standard arm of the infantry. Its rate of fire, accuracy, and rugged dependability in the field may influence its continued use in small wars operations. When fitted with a rifle grenade discharger, this rifle acts as the propellant for the rifle grenade.

c. The U. S. rifle, caliber .30, M1.--r Jle U. S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M1, is a gas operated, semiautomatic, shoulder rifle. It has been adopted as the standard infantry weapon by the U.S. Army to replace the M1903 rifle. It weighs approximately a half pound more than the M1903 rifle. Its effective rate of fire is from 16 to 20 rounds per minute as compared to 10 to 20 rounds per minute for the bolt-action rifle. It is especially useful against low flying aircraft and rapidly moving terrestrial targets. It requires more care and attention than the M1903 rifle, the Browning automatic rifle or the Thompson submachine gun. It cannot be used to propel rifle grenades of either the V. B. or rod type. Whether or not it entirely replaces the M1903 rifle, the characteristics of the M1 rifle make it definitely superior to the Browning automatic rifle M1917, and the Thompson submachine gun for small wars operations. A minimum of two U. S. rifles, caliber .30, M1, should be assigned to every rifle squad engaged in small wars operations and, in some situations, it may be desirable to issue them to every member of the squad.

d. The Browning automatic rifle, caliber .30, M1017.--With the advent of the M1 rifle and the adoption of the light machine gun as an accompanying weapon for rifle units, the Browning automatic rifle, caliber .30, M1917, with its cumbersome length, weight, and ammunition supply, should no longer be seriously considered as a suitable weapon for small-wars operations.

e. The Browning automatic rifle, caliber .30, M1917 (modified.)-- The Browning automatic rifle, caliber .30, M1917 (modified), is essentially the same weapon, as the BAR, fitted with a biped mount and a reduced cyclic rate of fire which convert the weapon into an effective light machine gun capable of delivering accurate, full automatic fire. It can be carried by one man, and has the mobility of a rifle on the march and in combat. Two ammunition carriers are required, the team of three men making up a light-machine-gun. Two groups, under a corporal, comprise a light-machine-gun squad, Its characteristics make the Browning automatic rifle (modified) the ideal accompanying and supporting weapon for rifle units. Pending the development and adoption of some other standard light machine gun, two of these rifles should be provided for every rifle platoon of three squads in small-wars operations.

f. The Thompson submachine gun, caliber .45, M1928.--(1) Because of its light weight and short over-all length which facilitate carrying in wooded, mountainous terrain, the Thompson submachine gun has been used extensively in small-wars operations as a partial substitute for the Browning automatic rifle. It has the following disadvantages as a standard combat arm: it uses the caliber .45 cartridge which is employed in no other weapon in the rifle company except the pistol; special magazines must be carried which are difficult to reload during combat if the supply of loaded magazines is exhausted; its effective range is only 150 to 200 yards; the continuous danger space is quite limited; it is not particularly accurate. With the development of a satisfactory semiautomatic rifle, the Thompson submachine gun should no longer be considered as an organic weapon in the rifle squad in small wars.

(2) The Thompson submachine gun may be issued to messengers in place of the automatic pistol, and to a limited number of machine gun, tank, transport, aviation, and similar personnel for close-in defense in small-wars operations. In some situations it may be desirable as a military police weapon. The 20-round magazine is quieter, easier to carry and handle, and is not subject to as many malfunctions as the 50-round drum.

g. The V. B. rifle grenade, mark I.--The V. B. rifle grenade has been replaced by the 60-mm. mortar as an organic weapon of the rifle company. However, it has certain characteristics which may warrant its use in small-wars operations as a substitute for or supplementary to the mortar. The grenade weighs only 17 ounces as compared to 3.48 pounds for the mortar projectile. An M1903 rifle, a grenade discharger, and the necessary grenades may be issued to each rifle squad, thus tripling the number of grenade weapons with a rifle platoon and eliminating the necessity for a separate mortar squad. The range of the rifle grenade, using the service cartridge is from 120 to 180 yards as compared to 75 to 1,800 yards for the 60-mm. mortar. The effective bursting radius of both projectiles is approximately 20 yards.

h. The 60-mm. mortar.--Two 60-mm. mortars are organically assigned to the headquarters platoon 47 of a rifle company. A squad of a corporal and 4 privates is required to carry one mortar and 30 rounds of ammunition therefor. A weapon of this type has proved so valuable in previous small wars that at least one mortar should be available for every rifle platoon, or the V. B. rifle grenade should be provided as a substitute weapon.

i. The hand grenode, fragmentation, mark II.--See War Department Field Manual 2330.

j. The automatic pistol, caliber .45 M1911.--See War Department Field Manual 23-35.

k. The bayonet, M1905.--See War Department Field Manual 23-35.

l. The Browning machine gun, caliber .30, M1917.--The employment of the Browning machine gun, caliber .30, M1917, will be normal during the initial phases of a small war. In the later phases of the operations, the machine gun will be used principally for the defense of outlying stations and the Browning automatic rifle (modified) will probably replace it as the supporting weapon for combat patrols.

m. The Browning machine gum, caliber .50, M2.--The employment of this weapon as an antiaircraft and antitank weapon will be normal.

n. The 81-mm. mortar, M1.--(1) The 81-mm. mortar is one of the most valuable weapons in small wars operations. During the landing phase and the early operations against organized forces, its application will be similar to that in a major war. In some situations in which hostile artillery is weak or lacking altogether, it may be advantageous to increase the usual complement of mortars and to employ them as infantry support in place of the heavier and more cumbersome field artillery. Because of its weight, mobility, and range, the 81-mm. mortar is the ideal supporting weapon for combat patrols operating against mountainous fortified strongholds of the enemy in the later phases of the campaign. Squads and sections often may be detached for the defense of small outposts scattered throughout the theater of operations.

(2) The mortar may be fired from boats in the initial landing or in river operations by seating the base plate in a pit of sandbags, straddling the barrel, and holding and pointing it by hand as in firing grenades from the rifle. The barrel should be wrapped with burlap and the hands should be protected by asbestos gloves.

o. The 37-mm. gun, M4 or M1916.--The tactics and employment of the 37-mm. gun do not vary in small wars from those of a major operation. Opportunities for its use probably will be limited after the completion of the initial phases of the intervention.

241. Infantry individual equipment.--a. Infantry units in the field in small wars operations should be lightly equipped, carrying only their weapons and essential individual equipment. Rations, packs or rolls, and extra ammunition should be carried on pack animals or other suitable transport. If the situation requires the men to carry full packs, rations, and extra ammunition, their mobility is greatly reduced and they are seriously handicapped in combat.

b. Entrenching tools are seldom required after the organized hostile forces have been dispersed. In some. situations, they have been entirely dispensed with during the period of pacification, patrolling, and guerrilla warfare which follows the initial operations.

c. The amount of ammunition carried in the belt is usually sufficient Even with a small combat patrol, the extra ammunition should be transported in the train, if possible. The cloth bandolier is not strong enough to stand up under hard service in the field. If the banclolier is carried, a considerable quantity of ammunition is lost which is generally salvaged by hostile troops or their sympathizers. A small leather box, suspended from the shoulder and large enough to carry one folded bandolier, has proved a satisfactory substitute for the regular bandolier.

d. If field operations continue for a considerable length of time, it may be necessary to reinforce the cartridge belts, magazine carriers, and other web equipment with leather. This has been done in the past by local artisans in the theater of operations.

e. Grenade carriers of leather or heavy canvas similar in design to the Browning automatic rifle bandolier, have been improvised in recent small wars operations. Another satisfactory carrier was made by cutting off one of the two rows of five pockets on the regular grenade apron and attaching the necessary straps. Empty .30 caliber bandoliers are not satisfactory for grenade carriers.

f. The agricultural machete is far superior to the issue bolo for cutting trails, clearing fields of fire, building shelters in bivouac, cutting forage and firewood, etc. in tropical countries. The minimum issue should be two per squad engaged in active patrolling in such terrain.

g. The horseshoe roll may replace the regulation infantry pack during field operations in small wars. It is lighter in weight and easier to assemble than the regular pack; it can be easily shifted from place to place on the shoulders, quickly discarded at halts or in combat, and readily secured to the riding or pack saddle.

h. Mounted men should not be permitted to carry rifles or other shoulder weapons in boots nor to secure their arms or ammunition to the saddles while passing through hostile areas in which contact is imminent.

2-42. Mounted troops.--Infantry companies, hastilY converted into mounted organizations, have played an important role in many past operations. Experience has demonstrated that local animals, accustomed to the climatic conditions and forage of the country, are more suitable for mounts than imported animals. Preparation for mounted duty will consist generally in training for this duty and the provision of necessary equipment. For further details, see Chapter VII, "Mounted Detachments."

2-43. Engineers.--a. Experience has demonstrated that the construction, improvement, and maintenance of routes of communication, including railroads, is one of the most important factors in a successful small-wars campaign. This is a function of the engineers.

b. The lack of accurate maps and the limited supply of those available has handicapped all operations in the past. A trained engineer unit supplemented by the aerial photographic facilities of aviation is indispensable. Although much of the basic ground work will be performed by combat organizations, the completion and reproduction of accurate maps must be left to skilled engineer troops.

c. With the increased use of explosives in all trades and occupations as well as in military operations, demolition materials are readily available to, and are extensively employed by, irregular forces. A demolition unit is required for our own tactical and construction needs, and for counter-demolition work.

d. Engineers are trained and equipped as light infantry. They should not be so used, except in an emergency, but they form a potential reserve for combat, and for guard duty at bases and depots.

e. The proportion of engineer troops with the force will depend largely upon the means of communication available in the theater of operations, and the condition and suitability of the road net for the contemplated campaign. In most small-wars situations, the necessary manual labor involved can be obtained locally.

2-44. Tanks and armored cars.--a. The morale effect of tanks and armored cars is probably greater in small wars operations than it is in a major war. The nature of the terrain in the theater of operations will determine whether or not theycan be profitably employed.

b. When strong opposition to the initial landings is expected or encountered, the employment of tanks will be a material aid and will reduce the number of casualties. Tanks are particularly valuable in assaulting towns and villages, and in controlling the inhabitants of an occupied hostile city.

c. Armored cars can be employed to patrol the streets of occupied cities, and to maintain liaison between outlying garrisons. With suitable motorized infantry escorts, they are effective in dispersing the larger hostile forces encountered in the early phases of the occupation.

d. Except for the fact that tanks and armored cars can be used more freely in small wars due to the lack of effective opposition, their tactics will be basically the same as in a major war. As the hostile forces withdraw into the more remote parts of the country, where the terrain is generally unsuited for mechanized units, their usefulness in the field will rapidly disappear.

2-45. Transport.-See Chapter III, "Logistics."

2-46. Signal troops.-a. General.-Signal troops install, maintain, and operate any or all of the following communication agencies:

(1) Message center; (2) messenger service, including foot messengers, mounted messengers, motorcycle messengers, and messengers using motor vehicles, boats, airplanes, and railroads as a means of transportation; (3) radio service; (4) wire service, including telephone and telegraph services operated both by military and civilian personnel; (5) visual service, including all types of flags, lights, and pyrotechnics; (6) air-ground liaison; (7) pigeon service. Detailed instructions governing the duties of signal troops will be found in "War Department Field Manual 24-5."

b. lmportance.-The importance of an efficient communication system cannot be overestimated. lt is only through the communication system that contact is maintained with detached garrisons and units operating independently in the field. All officers and noncommissioned officers should be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the communication system in order that full use may be made of it. In the smaller units, the commanding officer will act as his own communications officer.

c. Commercial and Government services.-When commercial radio and wire service is available, it may be convenient to execute contracts for handling certain official dispatches, particularly in the early stages of an operation before all the communication facilities of the force can be put into operation. However, military communication facilities should be substituted therefor as soon as practicable. If the local government operates its own radio and wire service, it is generally possible to arrange for transmission of official dispatches without charge. In some instances, the occupying force will find that an agreement or protocol, covering the establishment and operation of communication agencies by the occupyng force, has been established between our own country and the country involved. Such an agreement usually contains a clause stating that limited unofficial traffic may be transmitted over the communication system of the occupying force in case of interruption in the commercial system.

d. Messengers.- The employment of military messengers, either mounted or dismounted, between detached garrisons in areas of active operations is to be consider an emergency measure only, due to the hazardous nature and the uncertainty of this method of communication. In such areas, it may be advantageous sometimes to transmit messages by civilian messengers. Persons who make regular trips between the place of origin of the message and its destination should be employed. Written messages entrusted to civilian messengers should be in code or cipher.

e. Cryptography. -Codes and ciphers are used by even the smallest units in the field. It is apparent, therefore, that all officers must be thoroughly familiar with the systems utilized. In general, the use of code is simpler and more rapid than the use of cipher, due to the ease of encoding and decoding. Codes and key words and phrases for cipher messages are issued to using units to cover definite periods of time. The necessity for changing them is dependent upon the enemy's estimated ability in cryptanalysis.

f. Wire communication.- ( 1 ) In areas where the civilian population is hostile, telephone and telegraph wires are liable to be cut and long stretches carried away. The enenmy is likely to carry on such operations immediately prior to hostile activities in a definite area. Wire may be taken by a resident civilian simply because he needs it to fence a field or desires it for use in building a hut, and not because he is hostile to our forces. All wire lines are subject to being "tapped" by the enemy.

(2) If there is a commercial wire system available, each garrison telephone communication system should be connected to the commercial system through their switchboards. Provided the commercial system is connected with other towns in a large network separated units may thus be put into communication with one another. In small-war theaters, the commercial wire system will often be found to be poorly constructed with little attention paid to insulation. Rains will cause interruption in service for hours or even days at a time, due to shorted and grounded lines. Ordinarily, the administration of the commercial telephone system is left to the civilian element normally in control of the systems, the forces of occupation cooperating to the fullest extent in the repair and maintenance of the systems. In those cases where the telephone systems are owned and operated by the governnment of the country concerned, the same cooperation in repair and maintenance is extended.

(3) Commercial telegraph systems will generally be found to be owned and operated by the government. Although the general condition of the equipment ancl facilities may not measure up to the standards of a moclern system, the telegraph service usually will be found to be very good. Most of the operators are capable men and are quite willing to cooperate with the occupying forces. By judicious cooperation on the part of the military in the repair and maintenance of the telegraph system, the conficlence and respect of the personnel operating the system are secured, with the result that telegraphic communication is constantly improved. Except in cases of extreme emergency, no attempt should be made to employ military personnel to operate the telegraph system. In an area of active operations, it may be advantageous to do so for a limited period of time, returning the system to civilian control and operation when the period of emergency is ended. In regions where towns are far apart but telegraph lines are readily accessible, civilian telegraph operators with small portable telegraph sets are a valuable assistance to patrols having no radio set, particularly when weather conditions preclude the operation of aircraft to maintain liaison. g. Radio communication.- (1) The rapid development of radio as a means of communication, in even the smaller countries of the world, indicates that the forces encountered in small-wars situations may be as well equipped for radio communication as are our own forces. It is highly probable that the hostile forces will attempt the interception of radio communications. This disadvantage necessitates the habitual employment of cryptograms in transmitting dispatches of importance. By gaining a knowledge of our radio organization, the enemy is enabled to estimate the organization and distribution of our forces in the field. In order to offset this disadvantage, it may be necessary to curtail the use of radio communicantions to some extent, particularly in an area of active operations placing temporary reliance on other means of communication.

(2) Radio furnishes the most dependable means of communication with the continental United States, with naval radio stations outside the continental limits of the United States, and with ships at sea. Commercial cable facilities and commercial radio stations may also be available for exterior communication, but are employed only in exceptional cases. Exterior communication is a function of the force headquarters.

(3) American owned commercial radio stations in the theater of operations have been utilized by agreement in the past when the radio equipment with the force was limited. This is especially true when the force has furnished military protection for the property concerned.

(4) It will often happen in small wars situations, that the best method of radio control is to establish a single net for the Force, with all outlying stations a part of the same net. This is particularly applicable when the theater of operations is limited in area. When the theater of operations necessitates the wide separation of tactical units, subordinate nets are established.

(5) There are three types of radio equipment available for forces engaged in small wars operations; semi-portable, portable, and ultraportable.

(a) Semi-portable radio equipment is of a size and weight to permit easy handling when transported by ships, railroad, motor truck, or trailers, and is intended for the use of brigades and larger units,

Power------------------------------------------------------100 watts.
Frequency:
Transmitter ------------------------------- 3043to 18,000 kilocycles.
Ileceiver --------------------------------- 300 to 23,000 kilocycles.
Type of transmission ------------- Radio telegraph:  radio telephone.
Range:
Radio telegraph ---------------------------------------- 1,500 miles.
Radio telephone------------------------------------------- 300 miles.

(b) Portable radio equipment is designed to permit easy handling when transported by hand or on hand-drawn carts when operating ashore. It is intended for the use of regiments and battalions.

Power ------------------------------------------------------- 15 watts.
Frequency:
Transmitter ---------------------------------- 2,000to 5,000kilocycles.
Rweiver ------------------------------------ 2,000 to 20,000kilocycles.
Type of transmission ----------------- Radio telegraph: radio telephone
Range:
Radio telegraph -------------------------------------------- 400 miles.
Radio telephone---------------------------------------------- 75 miles.
Weight ----------------------------------------------------- 86 pounds.

(c) Ultra-portable radio equipment consists of a carrying case, having a self-contained radio transmitter, receiver, and power supply designed for transportation by one man. It is issued to units as required and is particularly useful to mobile units, such as patrols and convoy guards.

Power ------------------------------------------------------ 1/2 watt.
Freqllency -------------------------------------- 28 to 65 megacycles.
Type of transmission---------------- Radio telegraph: radio telephone.
Range:
Radio telegraph--------------------------------------------- 10 miles.
Radio telaholle --------------------------------------------- 5 miles.

(6) The demand for trained personnel will normally exceed the number organically assigned to communication units. The wide separation of small units in the usual small wars will require the addition of numerous sets of radio equipment to those listed in current equipment tables. The use of the ultra-portable radio equipment will also require additional operators. See paragraph 2-29.

(7) To take care of the widely separated radio equiprnent, each battalion designates one man of the communication platoon as an itinerant repairman. His duties are to make repairs in the field to radio sets operated by the communication personnel of the battalion. In areas of active operations, he joins patrols whose routes will take them to the garrisons where the equipment is located. He may be transported to outlying stations by airplane to make emergency repairs. In manycases, he will find it advisable to take an extra set with him to replace a set needing major repairs. No system for making major repairs can be definitely laid down that will apply to all situations. Due to the technical nature of the equipment, it is usually more convenient to have all major repair work accomplished by the communication personnel attached to the headquarters of the force,thus obviating the duplication of test equipment as well as the necessity for maintaining large stocks of repair parts at widely separated stations.

h. Pigeon communication.- Pigeons may be carried by patrols in active areas. Although patrols are normally equipped with portable radio sets, it may be desirable to maintain radio silence except in cases of extreme emergency. In such cases, pigeons afford a dependable means of keeping higher authority informed of the progress and actions of the patrol. Crated pigeons may be dropped to patrols in the field by aircraft, small parachutes being used to cushion the fall. This method of replenishment is used when patrols are in the field longer than 3 days.

i. Air-ground liaison.- (1) Because of the nature of the terrain usually encountered and the operation of numerous ground units employed in small-wars operations, air-ground liaison is especially important. There must be the close cooperation between aviation and ground troops. The period of each contact is limited. Panel crews must be well trained and group unit commanders must confine their panel messages to items of importance only.

(2) Panels which indicate the code designation of the organization or patrol are displayed in open spots upon the approach of friendly aircraft to identify the ground unit. They also indicate to the airplane observer where he may drop messages, and where panel messages are displayed for him. Panel strips are used in conjunction with identification panels for the purpose of sending prearranged signals. Letter and number groups of the air-ground liaison code are formed from the individual panel strips, and are laid out to the right of the designation panel as determined by the direction of march. When the signal has been understood by the airplane observer, it is acknowledged by a pyrotechnic signal, wing dips, or other prearranged method.

(3) The message-dropping ground should be an open space removed from high trees, bodies of water, and weeds. If possible, it should be so located that the panels can be seen at, wide angles from the vertical.

(4) The method of message pick-up employed in air-ground liaison is described in detail in "War Department Field Manual 24-5. " Experience has indicated that it is preferable to make a complete loop of the pick-up cord, securing the message bag at the bottom of the loop instead of the double loose-end cord described in the above mentioned Field Manual.

(5) In small wars situations, the use of pyrotechnics for communication between ground units, other than to acknowledge lamp siagnals or flag signals, may be considered exceptional. Pyrotechnics are normally employed for air-ground liaison only. Position lights and signal projectors are particularly useful to ground units when heavy vegetation makes the employment of panels impracticable. Aviation employs the Very pistol for air-ground liaison when its use will speed up the transmission of short messages by prearranged code. This method of communication with ground units is also employed when the establishment of a message-dropping ground is prevented by heavy vegetation or other reason, or when the close approach of the airplane to the ground during a message drop would expose it to hostile rifle fire from enemy groups in the vicinity.


247. Chemical troops.-a. Properly employed, chemical agents should be of considerable, value in small wars operations. The most effective weapons to quell civil disorders in the, larger towns are the chemical hand and rifle grenades and the irritant candles. Their effectiveness has been proved so many times in civil disorders in the United States that they are now accepted weapons for such situations. Consideration should therefore be given to similar employment of these munitions in a small wars theater of operations. The burning type hand grenade with a smoke filler may be use by patrols to indicate their location to friendly airplanes. Another use of this type of hand grenade is the development of smoke to conceal the flanking action of a large group in an attack over open ground against a strongly held and definitely located hostile position. Advantage should be taken of the prevailing wind clirection and the grenades so fired that the target will be covered by the smoke cloud.

b Chemical agents have not been employed by the United States in any small wars operations up to the present time, as their use in a foreign country is definitely against the best interests of our foreign policy. If they are employed, in some future small war, the armament, equipment, munitions, and tactics of the chemical troops will not vary from the normal doctrine. The strength of the chemical units to be included in the force will be clecidecl by the force commander in accordance with their prospective employment as determined by the existing situation.

248. Medical troops.-a. The type of operation, the size of the force, the nature of the country in which operations will take place, the health conditions to be expectecl, and the estimated casualties from combat will determine the class or classes of field hospitals and the strength of the medical personnel that will be attached to the force. In almost every small wars operation, the number of commissioned medical and dental officers and enlisted corpsmen will be considerably in excess of that required for a corresponding force in a major war, because of the numerous small detachrnents of combat units scattered throughout the entire theater of operations. Special care should be taken in selecting the hospital corpsmen to accompany the force. In many cases, an enlisted corpsman will be required to make the diagnosis and administer the medication normally prescribed by a medical officer.

b. Commanding officers of all grades are responsible for sanitation and for the enforcement of sanitary regulations within thelir organizations and the boundaries of the areas occupied by them. They must be thoroughly conversant with the principles of military hygiene, sanitation, and first aid. Particular attention should be paid to the following:


    (1) Instruction in personal hygiene of the command.
    (2) The thorough washing of hands after visiting the head (latrine) and before each meal.
    (3) The proper sterilization of mess gear.
    (4) Vaccination against small-pox and typhoid fever.
    (5) The prevention of venereal disease.
    (6) The proper ventilation of quarters, and provision of adequate space therein.
    (7) The carrying out of antimosquito measures.
    (8) The destruction of flies, lice, and other insects.
    (9) The purification of non-portable water supplies.
    (10) The proper disposal of human excreta and manure.
    (11) The proper disposal of garbage.

c. The medical officer, under the direction of the commanding officer, supervises the hygiene of the command and recommends such measures as he may deem necessary to prevent or diminish disease. He should investigate and make recommendations concerning the following:


    (1) Training in matters of personal hygiene and military sanitation.
    (2) The adequacy of the facilities for maintaining sanitary conditions.
    (3) Insofar as they have a bearing upon the physical condition of the troops:
    (a) The equipment of organizations and individuals.
    (b) The character and condition of the buildings or other shelter occupied by the troops.
    (c) The character and preparation of food.
    (d) The suitability of clothing.
    (e) The presence of rodents, vermin, and disease-bearing insects and the eradication thereof.

d. The medical personnel with the force is one of the strongest elements for gaining the confidence and friendship of the native inhabitants in the theater of operations. So long as it can be done without depleting the stock of medical supplies required for the intervening troops, they should not hesitate to care for sick and wounded civilians who have no other source of medical attention.

e. If the campaign plan contemplates the organization of armed native troops, additional medical personnel will have to be provided with the force or requested from the United States, as required.

f. See Chapters 12 and 14, Landing Force Manual, United States Navy, and Field Manuals 840 and 21-10, United States Army, for detailed instructions regarding military hygiene, sanitation, and first aid.

2-49. Artillery.-a. The amount of artillery to be included in the strength of a force assigned a small wars mission will depend upon the plan for the employment of the force, the nature of the terrain in the theater of operations, the armament and equipment of the prospective opponents, and the nature of the opposition expected. As a general rule, some artillery should accompany every expedition for possible use against towns and fortified positions, and for the defense of towns, bases, and other permanent establishments. The morale effect of artillery fire must always be considered when planning the organization and composition of the force. If the hostile forces employ modern tactics and artillery, and the terrain in the country permits, the proportion of artillery to infantry should be normal.

b. The role of artillery in small wars is fundamentally the same as in regular warfare. Its primary mission is to support the infantry. Light artillery is employed principally against personnel, accompanying weapons, tanks, and those material targets which its fire is able to destroy. Medium artillery reinforces the fire of light artillery, assists in counterbattery, and undertakes missions beyond the range of light artillery. Unless information is available that the hostile forces have heavy fortifications, or are armed with a type of artillery requiring other than light artillery for counterbattery work, the necessity for medium artillery will seldom be apparent. Anti aircraft artillery, while primarily for defense against air attack, may be used to supplement the fire of light artillery.

c. The artillery must be able to go where the infantry can go. It must be of a type that can approach the speed and mobility of foot troops. The 75-mm. gun and the 75-mm. pack howitzer fulfill these requirements. Because the pack howitzer can be employed as pack artillery where a satisfactory road net is lacking in the theater of operations, the pack howitzer usually will be preferable to the gun in small wars situations, although the latter may be effectively employed in open country.

d. Pack artillery utilizes mules as its primary means of transport and has reasonably rapid, quiet, and dependable mobility over all kinds of terrain; however, it is incapable of increased gaits. It is especially suitable for operations in mountains and jungles. Mules required for pack purposes normally will be secured locally. The loads carried by these animals require a mule of not less than 950 pounds weight for satisfactory transportation of the equipment. If mules of this size cannot be obtained, a spare mule may be used for each load and the load shifted from one animal to the other after each 3 hours of march. One hundred horses and mules are required for pack and riding purposes with each battery. The approximate road spaces for the battery, platoon, and section, in single column, are as follows:

								Yards
Battery ------------------------ 400
Platoon -------------------------150
Section ------------------------- 52

Since there is no fifth section in the pack battery, the supply of ammunition available within the battery is limited to about 40 rounds per piece.

e. The separate artillery battalion is an administrative and tactical unit. It is responsible for the supply of ammunition to batteries so long as they remain under battalion control. When a battery is detached from the battalion, a section of the combat train and the necessary personnel from the service battery should be attached to it. In the same way, a detached platoon or section carries with it a proportional share of battery personnel and ammunition vehicles. In determining what amount of artillery, if any, should be attached to the smaller infantry units in the field, the nature of the terrain, the size and mission of infantry units, and the kind of opposition to be expected are the guiding factors. The infantry unit should be large enough to insure protection for the artillery attached to it, and, the terrain and nature of the opposition should be such as to permit the attached artillery to render effective support. Also, the ammunition supply should be attached to infantry units. No artillery should be attached to infantry units smaller than a rifle company.


    A section of artillery to a rifle company.
    A battery to an infantry batallion.
    A battalion to an infantry regiment.

f. The employment of artillery in small wars will vary with developments and the opponent's tactics. When resistance is encountered upon landing and the advance inland is opposed, artillery will be employed in the normal manner to take under fire those targets impeding the movement. When the opponent's organization is broken and his forces widely dispersed, the role of artillery as a supporting arm for the infantry will normally pass to the 81-mm. mortar platoons. (see paragraph 240, n.)

g. Artillery in the march column.-(1) In marches in the presence of hostile forces tactical considerations govern the location of the artillery units in the column. Artillery should be sufficiently well forward in the column to facilitate its early entry into action, but not so far forward as to necessitate a rearward movement to take up a position for firing. It should be covered by sufficient infantry for security measures.

(2) In advance and rear guards the artillery usually marches at or near the tail of the reserve. In flank guards the artillery marches so as to best facilitate its early entry into action.

(3) The artillery with the main body, in advance, usually marches near its head. In retirement, if the enemy is aggressive, the artillery should march at or near the tail of the main body. However, when the enemy is not aggressive, it may even precede the main body, taking advantage of its mobility to relieve congestion.

(4) The difficulties to be anticipated in passing through defiles are due to the narrowness of the front and to a restricted route where the column may be subjected to concentrated infantry and artillery fire. When resistance is anticipated during the passage of a defile, the column should be organized into small groups, each composed of infantry and artillery, capable of independent action. When meeting resistance at the exit of a defile, artillery is employed to cover the debouchrnent. When meeting resistance at the entrance of a defile, the artillery is employed as in the attack against a defensive position.

(5) Due to the limitations in its employment at night, the entire artillery is usually placed near the tail of the main body on night marches.

h. Artillery with the outpost.-Normally the artillery which has been assigned to the advance or rear guard is attached to the outpost. The outpost commander designates the general position for the artillery, prescribes whether it shall be in position or posted in readiness, and assigns the artillery mission. Normally, the outpost artillery is placed in position. Defensive fires are prepared in advance insofar as practicable.

i. Employment of artillery on the defensive.- (1) The defense of towns, camps, etc., does not present the complex problem of ammunition supply that confronts artillery on the offensive. The ammunition available at each place usually will be ample and no question of transportation will be involved. The supply of ammunition need not affect the assignment of artillery for defensive urposes. The presence of a single piece in a defended town will often have a deterring effect on hostile forces.

(2) After the initial stages of the operation, if it appears that artillery will be required for special limited missions only, it can be used to advantage in the defense of stabilized bases, and permanent stations and garrisons. The troops not needed with the artillery can be used to relieve rifle units on special guard duty, such as at headquarters, fixed bases, and on lines of communication. The conversion of artillery into infantry units should be considered only as an emergency measure. However, artillery units of the force carry with them (boxed) the necessary rifles, other infantry weapons, and equipment required to convert them into infantry when the situation develops a need for this action.

j. Antiaircraft and base defense artillery.- (1) It can be assumed that, in the future, some hostile aviation will be encountered in small wars operations, and the inclusion of antiaircraft artillery in the force will have to be considered. To depend upon aviation alone for antiaircraft protection presupposes that friendly air forces can annihilate all hostile aircraft and all facilities for replacements. Even one hostile operating plane will be a potential threat to vital areas such as the beachhead, supply bases, and routes of communication.

(2) The comparative mobility of the .50 caliber AA machine gun makes it particularly suitable for employment in small wars operations. However, its limited range renders it impotent against any hostile aircraft other than low-flying planes. If it becomes apparent that antiaircraft machine guns, as such, are not needed, this weapon can be profitably employed for the defense of the more important, bases and outlying garrisons against g-round targets.

(3) Whether the 3" AA gun will be included in the force will depend largely upon the opposition expected. This weapon may be used with restricted mobility on defensive missions against land targets in the same manner as the 75 mm. gun.

(4) It is difficult to conceive of any small wars situation in which base defense weapons of 5" caliber would be required with the force. If the opponent can muster sufficient armament to make the inclusion of such artillery necessary in the force, the campaign will probably take on all the aspects of a major war, at least during the initial stages of the operation.

2-50. Aviation.-For the employment of aviation in small wars operations, see Chapter IX, "Aviation."



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