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Chapter III

INTELLIGENCE

1. Background

At the operational level of war, the joint intelligence system concentrates on the collection, identification, location, and analysis of strategic and operational centers of gravity that, if successfully attacked, will achieve joint force objectives. At both the operational and tactical levels, intelligence provides the basis for planning, synchronizing, and conducting joint force operations.

2. Terminology

Joint Pubs 1-02 and 2.0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, define the key terms and concepts that serve as the foundation for discussion throughout this text. Key terms and concepts include intelligence operations, intelligence system, and intelligence preparation of battlespace (IPB).

a. Intelligence Operations. Intelligence operations are the variety of intelligence tasks carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities. Predominantly, it refers to either intelligence collection or intelligence production activities of the intelligence cycle. When used in the context of intelligence collection activities, intelligence operations refer to collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting of information. When used in the context of intelligence production activities, it refers to collation, integration, interpretation, and analysis, leading to dissemination of a finished product. The concept for intelligence operations, tailored for the operational mission, results in the availability of all-source intelligence that supports JFC and subordinate commander decision-making.

b. Intelligence System. Intelligence system is any formal or informal system for managing data collection, obtaining, processing, and interpreting data to provide reasoned judgments to decision-makers.

c. IPB. IPB is an analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. IPB builds an extensive database for each potential area where a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. IPB is also referred to as "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" in Army doctrinal publications.

3. Intelligence Responsibilities

The following discussion highlights intelligence responsibilities for the respective intelligence organizations of the joint force:

a. Senior Intelligence Organization. The senior intelligence organization--

(1) Establishes plans, policies, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command.

(2) Ensures interoperability and responsiveness of intelligence structure.

(3) Articulates, reviews, and monitors intelligence priorities.

(4) Provides subordinate commands with a single, coordinated intelligence picture by fusing available intelligence into all-source estimates and assessments.

(5) Coordinates the intelligence plans and operations of subordinate commanders.

(6) Coordinates the collection plan and employment of joint force collection assets.

(7) Identifies/requests external assistance for intelligence resource shortfalls critical to accomplishing assigned missions.

(8) Establishes and supervises intelligence liaison, coordination, and communications requirements with subordinate, lateral, superior, and national intelligence organizations as appropriate.

(9) Prescribes intelligence security requirements for the entire force.

b. Subordinate Command Intelligence Organizations. Subordinate command intelligence organizations collect, process, produce, and disseminate intelligence to support respective commanders in the employment of their forces to accomplish assigned missions. Within their assigned AO, subordinate command intelligence organizations--

(1) Assess threat capabilities and provide intelligence estimates.

(2) Develop supporting intelligence plans.

(3) Support target development and weaponeering.

(4) Task organic collection assets with special focus on reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

(5) Perform battle damage assessment.

(6) Recommend force protection and counterintelligence measures.

4. DRB Intelligence Operations

DRB intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations provide the commander with the tactical intelligence needed to successfully plan and execute combat operations. The commander uses priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to focus the brigade IEW effort and leverage higher echelons to support decision making and facilitate targeting. IEW operations assist the commander to understand the battlefield, support decision-making, and effectively execute combat operations by--

a. Providing indications and warning.

b. Performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

c. Performing situation development.

d. Performing target development and supporting targeting.

e. Supporting force protection.

f. Performing battle damage assessment.

See FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, for detailed discussion of Army IEW principles, tasks, and doctrine.

5. DRB IEW Organizations

The DRB is supported by a variety of military intelligence (MI) and non-MI units capable of gathering and reporting information. Non-MI assets include battalion scouts, counterbattery radars, observation posts, and MP patrols. Brigade MI assets consist of a brigade S2 section and a DS MI company from the divisional MI battalion. Additional tactically tailored IEW assets from division, corps, and theater Army MI units can augment the brigade if required to support split-based intelligence operations, provide additional capabilities such as ground-based electronic warfare systems, or support other mission requirements.

a. Brigade Commander. The brigade commander focuses the IEW effort by identifying, clearly articulating, and prioritizing intelligence and targeting requirements. The commander must be responsive to IEW requirements of subordinate commanders and, when necessary, broker those requirements with higher echelons. The commander must integrate IEW support into the total combined arms effort to effectively accomplish the mission and exploit the full potential of the intelligence system.

b. Brigade S2. The S2 is the commander's senior intelligence officer and principle advisor on the enemy, terrain, and weather. The S2's first and most important responsibility is to provide the intelligence the commander needs for sound and timely decisions. The S2 takes full advantage of intelligence and targeting information available from direct broadcast systems, special purpose intelligence communications, and automated processing systems to meet the commander's requirements. With the staff support, the S2 plans and controls the brigade IEW operation. To synchronize IEW support with the operation and satisfy staff requirements for intelligence, the S2 works closely with other staff elements and supporting MI units.

c. Battlefield Information Coordination Center (BICC). To supply the commander with intelligence and targeting information, the brigade BICC provides the S2 with an organic collection management, analysis, production, and reporting capability. The BICC develops and manages the execution of the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. The BICC also reviews subordinate battalion R&S plans, integrates subordinate plans into the brigade plan, and forwards the consolidated R&S plan to the next higher echelon. The BICC maintains current status of all brigade IEW assets, processes incoming intelligence reports, and disseminates information to subordinate elements.

d. Direct Support MI Company. The DS MI company maintains a habitual training and operational relationship with the brigade. The company provides organic automated intelligence processing, enemy prisoner interrogation, counterintelligence, and ground surveillance radar support. Future capabilities will include unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) imagery processing. The company does not possess organic signal intelligence/electronic warfare systems; it relies upon higher echelons for this support. The company consists of a headquarters element, an analysis and control team (ACT), and an operations platoon as depicted in Figure III-1.

The functions of the ACT and operations platoon are--

(1) ACT. The ACT provides the brigade S2 automated intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination capabilities. Using its ASAS workstation, the ACT provides access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) databases, reports, graphics, and other intelligence products from higher echelon intelligence organizations such as the division ACE. When augmented with the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT), the ACT can support split-based intelligence operations with an intelligence support base located outside the area of operations.

(2) Operations Platoon. The operations platoon provides support and conducts asset management of the company's counterintelligence team, interrogation team, and ground surveillance radar squad. The platoon will possess a UAV section and an imagery processing section when supporting systems are fielded. Table III-1 summarizes the capabilities of the operations platoon.

e. Intelligence Support Base. The division G-2 and MI battalion form the DRB's intelligence support base. The support base is the principle organization in a split-based intelligence operation from which the deployed DRB commander pulls intelligence. It is located in the division garrison or another location outside the AO. The intelligence support base allows the DRB to pull intelligence from its normal intelligence source between the predeployment and operations stages of a force projection operation. This reduces the possibility of intelligence shortfalls that could arise during the deployment phase from reliance on evolving intelligence organizations or relationships. The DRB can continue to receive support from the division ACE in addition to support from intelligence organizations within the theater. Intelligence support from the ACE includes analysis and production of tailored intelligence products; maintaining accessible intelligence databases needed by the DRB; and other intelligence operations that support the DRB. The intelligence support base may also provide the follow-on IEW assets and the deployable intelligence support element (DISE) if the operation involves follow-on Army forces. The intelligence support base complements the theater or JTF intelligence structures; it is not intended to circumvent theater or task force tasking and reporting channels established by the higher echelon Intelligence Director of a joint staff (J-2) or G-2.

6. MEF (FWD) Intelligence Operations

MAGTF intelligence operations provide intelligence support of the decision-making processes of the MAGTF commander and subordinate commanders down to the smallest unit level. MAGTF intelligence operations focus on generating tactical intelligence (i.e., intelligence that supports the planning and conduct of tactical operations). Intelligence supports the decision-making process by--

a. Describing the battlespace.

b. Identifying key factors in the battlespace that influence operations.

c. Defining and evaluating the enemy's capabilities.

d. Assessing enemy intentions.

e. Identifying the enemy's center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.

f. Reducing uncertainty.

Intelligence, operations, and decision-making are linked throughout the mission execution cycle. Intelligence shapes the plan and provides the knowledge that facilitates execution. It identifies changes in the situation that modify the plan or trigger decisions during the conduct of the operation. MAGTF intelligence operations satisfy the commander's critical information requirements about the environment and the enemy, facilitate the commander's understanding of the battlespace, identify key enemy vulnerabilities, and enable the planning and execution of successful operations.

7. MEF (FWD) Intelligence Organizations

The MEF (FWD) G-2 section serves as the focal point for MAGTF intelligence operations. The MAGTF G-2 section, supported by a task-organized detachment from the SRIG, provides all-source intelligence support to the MAGTF commander and the major subordinate elements. (Note: MEF intelligence structure is currently undergoing reorganization. In the future, MEF intelligence assets currently assigned to the SRIG may be consolidated in an intelligence battalion. In that case, intelligence and radio battalion detachments vice SRIG detachments would support the MEF [FWD].) In addition, the GCE, ACE, and CSSE all have organic intelligence sections and assets to satisfy their unique intelligence requirements as reflected in Figure III-2.

a. MEF (FWD) G-2 Section. The MEF (FWD) G-2 section plans, coordinates, and integrates intelligence operations. It provides centralized collection, production, and dissemination capabilities for the CE and subordinate elements. In addition, it provides connectivity to national, joint, and supporting force intelligence assets. Figure III-3 depicts the organization of the MEF (FWD) G-2. The intelligence operations branch serves as the focal point for MAGTF intelligence operations. It contains the collections unit, the MAGTF all-source fusion center (MAFC), and the target intelligence unit. During combat operations, the intelligence operations branch staffs the combat information center (CIC). The CIC collocates with the MEF (FWD) COC in the main CP. The CIC receives support from a surveillance and reconnaissance center (SARC) that controls the operations of organic collection assets and from a radio battalion operational control and analysis center (OCAC) that manages SIGINT and ground EW operations. For additional information on MEF G-2 organization and operations see FMFRP 3-28, Tri-MEF SOP for Field Intelligence Operations.

b. SRIG. The SRIG, depicted in Figure III-4, is organic to a MEF. The SRIG of the parent MEF provides a task-organized detachment to a MEF (FWD). The intelligence assets from the SRIG detachment consist of some or all elements depicted in Table III-2. The table does not reflect the nonintelligence assets of the SRIG detachment to include the air/naval gunfire platoon detachment and the headquarters and service company detachment. In addition, personnel from the SRIG augment the G-2's SARC, automatic frequency control (AFC), and signals intelligence electronic warfare coordination center (SEWCC).

c. GCE. GCE intelligence efforts focus on the planning and execution of ground operations, with particular emphasis on locating, identifying, targeting, and attacking targets of interest to the commander. Organic reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition assets assist this effort. These assets include--

(1) Light armored reconnaissance battalion

(2) Reconnaissance companies and platoons.

(3) Scout/sniper platoons.

(4) Counterbattery radar platoons.

(5) FAC and forward observers.

d. ACE. ACE intelligence operations facilitate friendly air operations and counter enemy air and air defense capabilities. The ACE contributes long-range reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, UAVs, and air surveillance radars.

e. CSSE. CSSE intelligence operations focus on intelligence requirements concerning the terrain, infrastructure, medical threat, and rear-area threat. CSSE subordinate elements provide valuable information on terrain, the transportation network, key facilities, and the indigenous population in the AO.

8. AMCI Intelligence Operations

IEW support to integrated operations builds upon the strengths and similarities of service IEW operations and organizations. The Army and Marine Corps share the common objective of providing the combat commander the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission and conserve fighting strength. Service IEW doctrine, organizations, and systems provide significant degrees of compatibility and interoperability. Effective integration and execution of IEW operations hinge on the clear articulation of service intelligence expectations, capabilities, and limitations. The intelligence cycle described in Joint Pub 2-0 and service intelligence doctrine provides a common framework for addressing these issues as they apply to Army and Marine Corps IEW operations.

a. Plan and Direct. Several issues influence effective planning and directing IEW operations. These include--

(1) Liaison. Intelligence liaison is critical to the success of the integrated IEW effort and requires early establishment, particularly between units that have not routinely trained together and possess differing capabilities. As a minimum, liaison teams are exchanged between the MEF or corps G-2 and the subordinate DRB S2 or MEF (FWD) G-2, respectively. If the DRB is subordinate to the MEF GCE, liaison is established between the MEF GCE G-2 and the DRB S2. Additional liaison may be necessary to facilitate joint force collection, production, or dissemination requirements. Liaison teams--

(a) Support planning and control of IEW operations.

(b) Ensure timely two-way flow of critical intelligence between commands.

(c) Broker IEW intelligence and resource requirements of the subordinate command.

(d) Advise the commander on service IEW capabilities, limitations, and employment.

(2) IPB. Commanders and staffs use IPB to understand battlespace and develop operational plans. Both Army and Marine Corps intelligence organizations follow the IPB process as described in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Some important issues to consider when developing and disseminating IPB products include--

(a) MEF or corps G-2 develops IPB products on the entire battlespace with particular focus to the main effort.

(b) DRB S2 or MEF (FWD) G-2 refines the IPB products provided by the higher echelons to satisfy the requirements of their commanders, staffs, and subordinate elements.

(c) IPB products exchanged between echelons ensure a common picture of the battle space and estimate of the situation.

(3) Intelligence Requirements. The commander's intelligence requirements, concept of operation, and intent drive the intelligence effort. The commander and staff use IPB to identify knowns and unknowns about the enemy, AO, and other factors that influence an operation. The gaps in knowledge identified by the commander and staff become intelligence requirements, The commander designates some of these PIR. Joint Pub 2-0 and FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, discuss how intelligence requirements are generated and the roles they play in directing the intelligence system. Considerations in developing and satisfying intelligence requirements for integrated operations include--

(a) MEF and corps intelligence requirements must support and be sensitive to needs of subordinate commands. For example, the MEF commander may need additional information on the enemy's antiarmor capability against Ml Abrams tanks to support the DRB mission. Similarly, the corps commander may ask for more intelligence on enemy air defense threat to Marine AV-8 Harrier aircraft supporting the MEF (FWD).

(b) Intelligence requirements should address the priority for processing, production, and dissemination as well as collection.

(c) Intelligence requirements are satisfied first by organic assets. Requirements that exceed the capability of organic assets are submitted to higher echelons.

(d) Battle damage assessment requirements must be included and prioritized against the commander's other intelligence requirements.

(4) Additional intelligence planning considerations include--

(a) Planning for intelligence communications transition to facilitate execution of branches or sequels to the plan or to accommodate shifting of the main effort from one force to another.

(b) Identifying and establishing procedures and protocols for information that exchange between processors (databases, text, secondary, imagery, voice, and video).

(c) Identifying databases each service possesses or has access to; determining which database(s) will support the operations, and if necessary, merging them into a single database and ensuring access by the entire force.

(d) Considering balancing availability of service-unique systems or capabilities between echelons or services. This may require the provision of additional resources by each service. Ultimate responsibility for allocating resources rests with the senior commander. Resources and capabilities are distributed based on the needs of the total force. For example, the bulk of Marine radio battalion assets may be committed to support the DRB when the DRB is designated the main effort. Conversely, it may be appropriate to employ the DRB's single J-STARS ground station module (GSM) at the MEF level during a particular phase of the operation.

(e) Providing the focal point for subordinate command access to national or joint intelligence. The senior commander will request and allocate resources required to support this access.

b. Collect. The integrated collection effort must--

(1) Coordinate IEW operations to optimize capabilities of collection assets and reduce duplication of effort.

(2) Integrate supporting national and theater intelligence collection assets into the collection plan.

(3) Establish procedures for tracking and handing off high payoff targets between services and echelons.

(4) Establish procedures for cross-cueing Army and Marine collection assets.

(5) Maximize available linguist capabilities. Shortages of military linguists trained in the target language may require cross-leveling Army and Marine linguists between CI, interrogation, and signal intelligence units of the other service.

Tables III-3 and III-4 portray the collection capabilities for both the DRB and the MEF (FWD) respectively.

c. Process. At the tactical level, processing, and producing intelligence are often indistinguishable. Where processing can be separated, the G-2 or S2 must prioritize by focusing on the needs of the commander. For example, when processing film or transcribing intercepted communications, personnel must understand which portion of the film or recording must be completed first and why.

d. Produce. The intelligence production effort must--

(1) Establish reporting criteria and thresholds that produce timely and relevant intelligence keyed to the commander's intelligence and targeting requirements. The intelligence synchronization matrix, attack guidance matrix list, and high payoff target list are examples of tools used to support joint targeting efforts.

(2) Establish common methodology and criteria for producing the battle damage assessment and supporting the combat assessment function.

(3) Minimize the number and frequency of periodic reports such as intelligence summaries and reports.

e. Disseminate. The ability to move information and disseminate critical intelligence between commands is essential, The intelligence communications and processing architecture require developing and resourcing before operations begin. Additional communications equipment, intelligence broadcast terminals, and personnel may be required to balance capabilities between services and fully exploit the full potential of IEW systems. Considerations include--

(1) The MEF CE or corps G-2 assumes responsibility for establishing a communications and processing architecture that ensures rapid exchange of critical, time-sensitive intelligence, and targeting information.

(2) To support reporting perishable information of immediate value, the commander establishes communications paths and procedures. For example, to facilitate timely and effective target engagement, long-range reconnaissance reporting of high payoff targets in the enemy rear area or signal intelligence reporting of enemy artillery targeting friendly forces are linked with specific attack systems.

(3) Processing requirements must address interoperability between the Army, Marine Corps, joint, and national intelligence processing systems such as the Army ASAS, Marine Corps Intelligence Analysis System (IAS), Joint World Wide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS).

(4) Connectivity and capacity must support the flow of SC I and GENSER requirements. These requirements include voice, text, data, and graphic intelligence reports and products.

(5) The JFC must resource and/or allocate limited systems between Army and Marine Corps units; that is, J-STARS GSM, UAV ground control stations (GCSs) and remote video terminals (RVT), Digital Terrain Analysis and Mapping System (DTAMS), Tactical Remote Sensor System Suite, and TROJAN SPIRIT to accomplish operational objectives.



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