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Military


FM 71-3
The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade


APPENDIX A
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR


The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Army forces and soldiers are versatile. They operate around the world in an environment that may not involve combat.

CONTENTS
Section I. Overview
Section II. Planning
Section III. Peacekeeping
Section IV. Peace Enforcement
Section V. Training
Section VI. Conduct of Operations
Section VII. Armor/Light Considerations

SECTION I. OVERVIEW

Army forces have participated in OOTW in support of national interests throughout its history. They have protected citizens at the edge of the frontiers of an expanding America; built roads, bridges, and canals, and assisted nations abroad. On occasion the Army will be called upon to provide domestic support such as firefighting, support to anti-drug operations, and disaster relief.

OOTW are not new. Their pace, frequency, and variety, however, have quickened in the last three decades. Today, the Army is often required, in its role as a strategic force, to protect and further the interests of the US at home and abroad in a variety of ways other than war.

In OOTW the brigade is called upon to perform numerous activities. Essentially, the brigade accomplishes these activities through execution of tactical missions and tasks. Brigade missions and tasks are shown in Figure A-1. This appendix focuses on peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

For a detailed discussion on OOTW, see FMs 100-5, 100-19, 100-20, and 100-23.

Figure A-1. Examples of armored brigade operations other than war missions/tasks profile.

ACTIVITY

MISSION/TASK

PEACEKEEPING Patrol; Establish Checkpoints, Roadblocks, Buffer Zone; Supervise Cease-fire, EPW Exchange
PEACE ENFORCEMENT Attack, Defend, Screen, Guard, Delay, Cordon and Search
SHOW OF FORCE Perform Tactical Movement, Attack, Defend, Demonstration
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS Attack to Seize Terrain that Secures Evacuees or Departure Area; Guard; Convoy Security; Delay/Defend
SECURITY ASSISTANCE Attack, Defend, Delay, Guard, Screen
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE--
(NO THREAT)
Provide Command and Control, CSS and Disaster Relief and Manpower for Relief Effort
(CONFLICT) Screen, Patrol, Quick Reaction Force, Convoy Escort
ARMS CONTROL Assist and Monitor Inspection of Arms, Conduct Surveillance
SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITIES Provide Command and Control, CSS and Disaster Relief, Patrol, Cordon and Search
NATION ASSISTANCE Provide Security
SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS Interdict, Cordon and Search, Surveillance
COMBATING TERRORISM Conduct Antiterrorism Activities through Force Protection
SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTER INSURGENCIES Patrol, CSS, Show of Force, Medical Support
ATTACK AND RAIDS Conduct R&S, Attack, Raid, Withdraw

SECTION II. PLANNING

The difficulties of joining a multi-national force in unfamiliar territory with restrictions on ones freedom of action, may be overcome if commanders study the history and lessons of previous peacekeeping operations. This allows commanders to anticipate the kinds of problems they may have to face in a peacekeeping operation. The UN issues "force mandates" that provide the principles which govern the conduct of operations.

The principles may be supplemented by the following guidelines that apply to the conduct of a peacekeeping force in all situations:

  • All ranks must understand what the peacekeeping force is trying to do.
  • All ranks must be fully briefed on the political and military situation, the customs and religions of the people, and kept up-to-date as the situation changes.
  • They must make every effort to get to know the people, to understand their problems with the aim of achieving a reputation for sympathy and impartiality.
  • Peacekeeping soldiers must maintain a high profile; consequently, their lives are continually at risk. Commanders must balance the need to maintain a confident presence with provisions for the safety of their troops.
  • No detachment likely to face a difficult situation should be without a knowledgeable individual in charge because of the crucial decisions that may affect the reputation of the force, the success of the mission, and the safety of peacekeeping troops. These decisions have to be made without delay. However, emergencies may arise when no officer is available. Units should make sure that NCOs are well trained, briefed, and prepared for contingencies they are likely to face during peacekeeping operations.
  • The policy on ROE and the action to take with regard to infringements and violations of agreements must be enforced uniformly by all units. In operations where units have used noticeably different standards in executing the rules, there has been trouble with the belligerents and constant friction between the national contingents.
  • Peacekeepers cannot be too concerned about the risk of appearing to "lose face." On many occasions, explosive situations have been defused because the peacekeeper was willing to be accommodating, allowing a party to preserve its dignity. This is especially important when dealing with societies in which self-esteem and group honor are of great importance. It is sometimes difficult to explain the need for tact, without compromising principles, to soldiers who are trained to be forceful and aggressive. A unit naturally wishes to take credit for a successful performance, but undue concern for unit pride may prejudice the peacekeepers need to make concessions. Each situation calls for its own blend of calm, mature judgment, tact, a willingness to compromise, firmness, and moral courage.

Commanders must find the "center of gravity" for the operation. What is the single most important event or condition that will stabilize the situation and reverse the destruction and strife? The problem with OOTW is that the commander may not be able to identify the "center of gravity" and its connection to the end state until the operation is well underway.

Commanders and planning staffs must determine the center of gravity for all OOTW. The center of gravity for peace enforcement operations may be: controlling and maintaining MSRs, denying key terrain from the belligerents, and keeping track of key belligerent forces. If legitimacy is lost, the result may be war or failure of both the diplomatic and military mission.

The conditions required to achieve end state during OOTW are difficult to define and require continued refinement during the operation.

FM 100-5 defines end state as "A military end state includes the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state." The commanders intent defines military conditions that must be achieved to support the end state. In the last comment of the commanders intent, the commander defines victory or success for the operation.

Planning for OOTW requires a thorough understanding of the end state and the military conditions required to achieve it.

The importance of end state in defining the requisite conditions for a missions success cannot be overstated. A continuing challenge for commanders is to focus their vision on and beyond the objective to clearly articulate the conditions of success. This is difficult enough in warfighting and is even tougher for OOTW.

A large contribution to success during peace operations is for the force not to become a part of the problem.

In OOTW, the end state is commonly expressed in political terms and is beyond the competence of military forces acting alone. Military forces in OOTW facilitate the political process.


SECTION III. PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution. The US may participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of an international organization such as the UN, in cooperation with other countries, or unilaterally. Peacekeeping operations may take many forms of supervision and monitoring:

  • Withdrawals and disengagements.
  • Cease fires.
  • EPW exchanges.
  • Arms control.
  • Demilitarization and demobilization.

Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain the peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The greatest military consideration in peacekeeping is the political objective of the operation. Military forces operate within clearly and carefully prescribed limits established by agreement between the belligerents and the UN or other parties.

Peacekeeping forces assume that use of force will not be required to carry out their tasks, except in self-defense. They are structured, trained, and equipped under this assumption. Extreme restraint in both appearance and application of force is crucial to maintain a posture of impartiality and neutrality toward the former belligerents.


SECTION IV. PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Peace enforcement entails the use of armed forces to separate combatants and to create a cease-fire that does not exist. Force may also be used to create other peaceful ends such as safe havens for victims of the hostilities. The UN Secretary General also uses the term to refer to forceful actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire.

By the American definition, in a situation for which peace enforcement operations are required, armed conflict and not peace describe the situation. Also, one or more of the belligerents usually prefer it that way. This means that, unlike peacekeepers, peace enforcers are not welcomed by one of the belligerents. Rather, the peace enforcers are active fighters who must force a cease-fire that is opposed by one or both combatants; in the process, they lose their neutrality.

Because the enforcement force may resort to the use of arms against the belligerents, it must deploy with sufficient military strength to achieve those objectives established by political authorities. Unlike peacekeeping, enforcement will require a full range of military capabilities that has the potential to meet or exceed that of the belligerents.

Although the preferred objective is commitment of superior military force to dissuade belligerents from further conflict, forces deployed for these operations should assume for planning purposes that use of force will be necessary to restore peace. But unlike war, enforcement operations are more constrained by political factors designed to bring warring parties to the negotiating table. Settlement, not victory, is the goal.


SECTION V. TRAINING

Units selected for peacekeeping duty normally require 4-6 weeks of specialized training. The unit has to tailor its entire training methodology toward the tasks required to be effective peacekeepers. Training for peacekeeping includes the following considerations:

  • Peacekeeping requires specific training.
  • The entire chain of command must develop a different mind set for warfighting.
  • A peacekeeping force may quickly lose its fighting edge and may not be suited for transition to peace enforcement operations.
  • The unit training program should include:
    • Nature of peacekeeping.
    • Regional orientation/culture of belligerents.
    • Negotiating skills.
    • Mine/booby trap/unexploded ordnance training.
    • Checkpoint operations.
    • Investigation and reporting.
    • Information collection.
    • Patrolling.
    • Media interrelationships.
    • Staff training.
    • Perform relief in place (FM 7-20).
    • Establish lodgment.
    • Establish a buffer zone.
    • Supervise a truce or cease-fire.
    • Contribute to maintenance of law and order.
    • Assist in rebuilding of infrastructure.
    • Demilitarize cities or geographical areas.
    • Monitor boundaries.
    • Political mandate(s).
    • ROE.
  • Continue training on warfighting skills. The unit can be better prepared to transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations.

Peace enforcement forces will have to be equipped and trained differently than for peacekeeping operations. They will have to be considerably larger in numbers and more capable than conventional peacekeepers. To be competent peace enforcers, units will require special skills for their soldiers (negotiating and foreign language competence), and the provision for adequate firepower and defensive capability to protect themselves from hostile actions by those they seek to help.

A force entering into a peace enforcement operation must have sufficient combat power to fight and win a war, should that become necessary. It must execute that combat power with great restraint in support of diplomatic efforts, in which the military may actively participate. The demonstration of combat power should be sufficient to preclude the necessity for its employment, except in certain circumstances.

It is the Army's warfighting ability that makes it capable of peace enforcement. The best training is based on the unit METL, with the modifications and additions that are necessary for special circumstances.

The following are some considerations for peace enforcement training:

  • Expect peace enforcement missions to be similar to actual combat missions but with tighter ROEs. Consider the political aspects of the conflict.
  • Concentrate unit training on platoon- and company-level tasks. Peace enforcement operations usually involve more small unit operations than battalion- or brigade-level operations.
  • Some recommended battalion-level missions to train for are
    • Fight a meeting engagement.
    • Conduct movement to contact/search and attack.
    • Perform air assault (ARTEP 7-20-MTP) (FM 90-4).
    • Enforce UN sanctions.
    • Protect human rights of minorities.
    • Protect humanitarian relief efforts.
    • Separate warring factions.
    • Disarm belligerents.
    • Restore territorial integrity.
    • Restore law and order.
    • Open secure routes.
    • Cordon and search.

During peacekeeping operations, the two principal ROE tenets are the use of force for self-defense only, and total impartiality when applying force. The ROE for peacekeeping operations will be more restrictive than the ROE for peace enforcement operations.

Some ROE considerations are:

  • Soldiers must know and understand the ROE.
  • The degree of force used must only be sufficient to achieve that task at hand and prevent, as far as possible, loss of human life and/or serious injury.
  • Leaders must ensure that soldiers are not limited by the ROE in their ability to defend themselves.
  • Develop and issue to all soldiers a single card that clearly outlines the ROE for reference, keeping in mind that the card in itself is not the answer. Soldiers must know the ROE.
  • The ROE must be realistic, simple, and easy to understand.
  • Do not chamber a round unless you are prepared to fire IAW the ROE or ordered to do so.
  • Do not tape over magazines to keep soldiers from chambering rounds.
  • Peacekeeping forces have no mandate to prevent violations of peace agreements by the active use of force. (Observe and report only.) To maintain the peace, units may need to be positioned between belligerents. Commanders must realize that soldiers are being placed at risk. Force protection must be emphasized.
  • Peace enforcement missions allow the active use of force. These ROE resemble the ROE for hostilities (wartime).
  • The formulation of ROE should consider the cultural differences of multinational forces.
  • Train soldiers in the ROE, using tactical vignettes or simulated events.
  • Train soldiers to avoid unnecessary collateral damage to property.
  • Training of US Army soldiers participating in these missions includes instruction to prepare and sustain the force in the performance of its mission. Pre-deployment training covers subjects that pertain to mission accomplishment. It is given at home station and includes training in both individual and collective tasks tailored to meet the needs of the units identified to support the mission. During this period of training, it is essential that all personnel who will participate in the mission are available for the training.

Suggested training requirements include the following individual, collective, and specialty tasks:

  • Individual tasks.
    • Marksmanship.
    • UN organization, mission, and background.
    • Customs and basic language phrases.
    • Survival skills (including actions if kidnapped).
    • Observation and reporting procedures.
    • Field sanitation.
    • ROE.
    • Safety (integrated training).
    • Stress management.
    • Identification of mines and handling procedures.
    • First aid and evacuation procedures.
    • Terrorism prevention skills.
    • Reaction to hostage situations.
    • Physical security (prevention of pilferage and theft).
    • Peacekeeping skills (negotiation and mediation).
    • Land navigation/range estimation.
    • Handling of detainees.
    • RTO procedures.
  • Collective tasks.
    • OP/CP operations (observe and report).
    • UN reporting formats.
    • Slingload operations.
    • Mounted and dismounted patrolling.
    • TOC operations.
    • Patrolling in urban terrain.
  • Specialty tasks.
    • Combat lifesaver.
    • Field sanitation specialist.
    • Generator operator.
    • Vehicle operator.
    • Mail handler.

SECTION VI. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Subordinate elements of the brigade usually conduct the following operations:

  • Patrols.
  • Checkpoints.
  • Convoy security.

PEACEKEEPING PATROLS

Units will have to conduct patrols during peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping patrols perform a dual mission of showing the UN flag and monitoring the cease-fire agreements. The patrols may move on foot, be mounted in vehicles or in light aircraft or utility helicopters. Peacekeeping patrols are normally only overt and conducted during the day.

The following are considerations of peacekeeping patrols:

  • Peacekeeping patrols are totally different from normal combat patrols.
  • The mere presence of a peacekeeping patrol, or the likelihood that one may appear at any moment, deters potential violations of peace agreements.
  • The presence of peacekeeping troops in a tense situation may have a reassuring and calming effect in troubled areas.
  • If it is necessary to operate at night, the patrol uses lights, carries an illuminated peacekeeping flag and moves in as open a manner as possible.
  • Major considerations for peacekeeping patrols are:
    • All patrols must be easily recognizable by all belligerents.
    • Its members must wear the UN forces distinctive blue headgear and its vehicles must be painted white with the UN forces insignia prominently displayed.
    • The peacekeeping flag must be carried by all dismounted patrols and displayed on all vehicles used during mounted patrols.
    • Patrols should not deviate from the planned route without contacting higher headquarters.
    • Expect to be challenged by belligerent forces while on patrol.
    • Rehearse proper responses to challenges.
    • Ensure that maps carried on patrol are unmarked.
    • Memorize positions. Each patrol should always include a member who knows the area well.
    • Log all observations and events while on patrol. Memorize details for sketch maps. Do not mark on maps if there is the smallest chance of being stopped by one of the belligerents.
    • Do not surrender weapons, maps, logs, or radios without the permission of higher headquarters.
    • Upon return from patrol, immediately report any significant observations to the debriefing officer. Mark maps and draw sketches while the memory is fresh. These maps and logs provide the basis for the investigation of incidents and the lodgment of protest.
  • The unit intelligence officer must be intimately assimilated into the peacekeeping patrol process.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT PATROLS

Peace enforcement patrols can be either overt or covert. All the normal principles of combat patrolling apply to peace enforcement patrols. They can also serve the same purpose as peacekeeping patrols, but the soldiers are not hindered by the administrative restrictions on vehicle marking and weapons restrictions.

Peace enforcement patrols should be aware of the following factors:

  • Use the normal combat patrolling techniques and procedures during peace enforcement operations.
  • Apply aggressive patrolling tactics to deter hostile acts by the belligerent forces.
  • Do not give food or supplies to belligerents as payment of tolls. This sets a precedent that the UN forces can be manipulated and will not force their way through checkpoints.
  • The convoy commander should travel with the main body. The convoy commander must be able to move up with the advance guard if required to negotiate with belligerents.
  • The commander must be firm but cautious when dealing with belligerents. Insist on the right of passage.
  • The commander must ensure he has adequate firepower available should it be necessary to force his way through a checkpoint. Remember, the lead vehicles at the checkpoint location will most likely be inside a kill zone.
  • Commanders must properly assess the situation and stop or withdraw when the checkpoint strength exceeds his capability to overcome it. Also, the commander must stop or withdraw his unit when persistence would lead to a fight that exceeds the capability of the force.

CHECKPOINT TACTICS

A high volume of pedestrian and vehicle traffic can be expected to pass through a checkpoint. Leaders must take this into consideration when preparing checkpoints. The ROE must be clear, but flexible, to accommodate rapid changes in any situation that may develop.

Considerations for checkpoint tactics include:

  • Be imaginative while operating in OOTW; develop TTP that can be applied to anticipated situations.
  • Ensure checkpoints are designed so that only the minimum number of soldiers are exposed at any given time and that they are overwatched by automatic weapons when they are exposed.
  • Make reinforcement and counter-attack plans and rehearse them.
  • Expect the unexpected at check-points.
  • Develop and rehearse drills to prepare soldiers for all possible situations at checkpoints.

Soldiers may be required to conduct vehicle searches during peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The degree of search will be determined by the ROE and the potential threat. Figure A-2 shows the vehicle search processing rate.

Figure A-2. Vehicle search processing rate.
SEARCH PATTERN RATE (veh/hr/lane) TIME (min/vehicle)
None 600-800 ---
Check Vehicle Decal ID 400-600 10 seconds
Check Driver I D 200-400 20 seconds
Visual Observation of
Passenger and Cargo Area
150-300 25 seconds
Basic Physical and Visual
Search of Passenger and
Cargo Area
50-150 1.2 minutes
Comprehensive Vehicle Search 12-24 5 minutes

CONVOY SECURITY

Convoys may be attacked by belligerents. Convoys are vulnerable to long-range fire from manpacked ATGMs and light, mobile, direct fire artillery. The main threat for convoys is likely to be an ambush. Clearing routes, even by ground reconnaissance, is likely to be of limited value, given the use of remotely controlled mines, demolitions, and perhaps mines remotely delivered by multiple rocket launchers. In steep terrain with heavily wooded slopes, surprise ambushes are possible. The traditional answer of placing troops on the high ground will not protect the convoys. Convoys will have to be task-organized to provide their own resources for protection and immediate counterattack. Large numbers of dismounted AT weapons and automatic small arms can do considerable damage in a short-range ambush. Suppressive fire and infantry counterattack by the convoy escort and supporting helicopters are likely to be countered by the use of pre-positioned smoke pots and AP mines to enable the ambushers to slip away.

Consider the following factors when conducting convoys:

  • All convoys should be escorted by an armored mechanized advance guard force to detect ambushes, breach obstacles, detect mines, and to possibly deter attacks by belligerents.
  • Position the advance guard three to five kilometers ahead of the main body.
  • Consider using remotely piloted vehicles and helicopters to over-fly the route in advance of the convoy.
  • The main body should also be led by armored vehicles and every third or fourth vehicle should be a fighting vehicle.
  • Minimize the use of trailers in the convoy. Trailers hinder the mobility of the convoy and its ability to react to ambushes.
  • A strong reserve force or rear guard should trail the convoy to respond if the convoy is attacked.
  • The rear guard should also be armor heavy to discourage attacks.
  • Convoys should be totally self-contained. Convoys must have additional fuel, food, maintenance, recovery, medical, and their own indirect fire support assets.
  • Attack helicopters should be used to overwatch convoy routes and to assist the advance guard in forcing their way through belligerent checkpoints.
  • The convoy commander should be in the second or third vehicle in the main body.
  • Maintain convoy integrity and dispersion at all times.
  • Conduct a thorough IPB and route reconnaissance to determine the location of belligerent checkpoints.
  • Do not bring the main body of the convoy into the gauntlet of obstacles at belligerent checkpoints until the belligerents have permitted the advance guard of the convoy to move through the checkpoint. This gives the main body the flexibility to maneuver if attacked.
  • Have communications between all vehicles and have redundant communications between the advance guard and the main body.
  • Be aware that the belligerents may track the convoys along their routes and will want to verify the number of vehicles in the convoy at each checkpoint.

SECTION VII. ARMOR/LIGHT CONSIDERATIONS

While infantry forces are best suited for peace enforcement operations, armor forces can make significant contributions to the operations. Tanks are potent weapon systems when performing traditional functions, but they also make excellent infantry support weapons. Some of their capabilities are:

  • AT and antiarmor.
  • Intimidation of belligerent forces.
  • Heavy weapons support to infantry fighting vehicles (IFV).
  • Target acquisition, especially at night using thermal sights.
  • Survivable to mines and light AT weapons.
  • Provide security to convoys.
  • Provide support during search and attack operations.
  • Protect infantry against automatic weapons fire.

Some advantages of using tanks during peace enforcement operations are:

  • Armor/mechanized forces can be rapidly emplaced at decisive points throughout sector to support threatened UN forces.
  • Armor forces have extremely high visibility and can deter aggression by belligerent forces (consider firepower demonstrations as a show of force).

Some disadvantages of using armor during peace enforcement operations are

  • The enemy can focus on, isolate, and destroy armor forces in a piecemeal fashion.
  • Tanks have limited bunker and building destruction capability.
  • Tanks and other armored vehicles destroy secondary roads and MSRs.
  • The size of armored vehicles often blocks narrow country roads and can destroy private country roads and private property during movement (may offset attempts to gain support of local civilians).

Consider the following factors when using tanks in peace enforcement operations:

  • There is no pure "armor/ mechanized" or "light" scenario in peace enforcement operations. The best way to achieve success is to balance the array of tactical capabilities IAW METT-T.
  • The combined arms concept requires teamwork, mutual understanding, and the recognition by everyone involved of the critical roles performed by other arms.
  • There is no place for parochialism or ignorance; the success of the mission and the lives of soldiers depend on the ability to understand and synchronize the complexities of a diverse force.

Forward to Appendix B.
Return to Chapter 8.
Return to the Table of Contents.



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